Federalism and the Welfare State in a Multicultural World

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Introduction: The Progressive’s Dilemma

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Social policy is supposed to mitigate divisions of class, region, language, race, and ethnicity. Its underlying values of solidarity and risk-sharing also make it a critical mechanism for nation-building. The introduction of social insurance in Germany by Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s and the establishment of universal, tax-funded healthcare in Britain in 1948 are classic examples.

The extent to which social policy actually does generate social cohesion or shared national identity is variable and contested, however. The mere fact of pooling risk poses the question of who “we” are, with exclusionary implications as much as inclusionary ones. On some accounts, a strongly redistributive welfare state is possible only when in-group boundaries are sharply policed and those inside the boundary strongly resemble each other. And in Canada, both federalism and growing claims for the recognition of ethnic diversity challenge the nation-building capacities of social policy—the former because decentralization constrains federal powers in relation to social policy, and the latter because diversity challenges inherited assumptions about shared national identity. Despite these challenges, until the 1990s there was some evidence that Canadian social policy did play an integrative role. Indeed, Canada arguably provided a “counter-narrative” to pessimistic claims that federalism and diversity undermine the integrative poten-
Today, however, the Canadian model is under strain, reflecting changes in both the welfare state and the immigration-citizenship-multiculturalism regime. As we discuss below, there are clear trends that, if unchecked, may exacerbate rather than overcome important social cleavages. We are therefore at a crucial moment to re-evaluate the role of social policy in a federal state and multicultural society. This volume takes stock of Canada’s fraying social contract, acknowledging its growing strains but also attending to some of the novel ways in which social policy adapts to serve integrative functions. If federalism and diversity challenge traditional models of the nation-building function of social policy, they also open up new pathways for social policy to overcome social divisions. Complacency about, or naive celebration of, the Canadian model is unwarranted, but it is premature to conclude that the model is irredeemably broken, or that all the developments are centrifugal rather than centripetal.

While much of our focus is on Canada, the issues raised are of broader comparative and theoretical interest. Around the world, the political, economic, and social contexts for social policy are changing in ways that affect its integrative function, and we hope the essays in this volume will shed light on the various dynamics at work.

We begin, however, with Canada, and with the dramatic recent changes to its basic model of social policy. Canadian social expenditures have always been modest by international standards. Nevertheless, forty years ago, the Canadian system of taxes and transfers was remarkably efficient, putting Canada above the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) median in redistributive effort and in the overall equality of disposable income (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005). Complementing the power of the Canadian welfare state was a robust set of institutions for the integration of immigrants and the validation of cultural diversity, including federal multiculturalism policy. This combination of a redistributive welfare state and multicultural citizenship has been widely seen as an important and comparatively somewhat successful attempt to reconcile redistribution, social integration, and the recognition of difference.

Since the mid-1990s, however, this model has come under strain. Inequality in market income began to soar in the 1980s. Until 1995, taxes and transfers offset all of this increased inequality, but after 1995, the system ceased to offset the further widening of income gaps. Overall

1. On Canada’s role as a counter-narrative, see Banting (2008).
inequality has not widened since 2000, but the share of income accruing to the top percentiles has grown. Persons with middle incomes look on in dismay at evidence of a new Gilded Age. Governments seem to look on in bafflement. As Banting and Myles (2013, 3) put it:

[Canadian] governments have not responded energetically to the evidence of growing inequality, and they have not modernized the policy architecture in light of new social risks confronting Canadian families. Action and inaction, sins of omission and sins of commission, have weakened the redistributive state.

Contributing to the inaction is Canada’s federal system. The retreat from redistribution in 1995 consisted largely of Ottawa ceasing to fund shared-cost programs and in scaling back unemployment insurance. The federal government has given away many of the relevant policy tools and, in the absence of federal help, most provinces seem reluctant to use their constitutional powers.

Similar changes can be seen on the immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism side. For years, immigration was seen as a tool for nation-building, not just a tool for meeting labour shortages. Canada wanted new citizens, not just new workers. Citizenship was relatively easy to get and cultural policy was predicated on a balance of cultural recognition and civic integration. Indeed, new Canadians have often been Ottawa’s “fifth column” in battling parochialism (Winter 2011), and, not incidentally, are critical players in federal elections. But immigration policy has shifted. The role for provinces has grown and with this has come changes in the pattern of immigrant recruitment. Immigration may now exacerbate patterns in income inequality, rather than simply cut through them. Moreover, citizenship takes longer to attain, and the commitment to multiculturalism has weakened.

In short, the traditional nation-building functions of both the welfare state and immigration/multiculturalism policies have arguably faded. Even as Canada is experiencing new diversities (through immigration), and even as “old” diversities remain politically salient (Indigenous peoples and French-Canadians), social policy seems, at least at first glance, to be withdrawing from its integrative functions.

This book aims to bring these concerns together, and also perhaps to offer a more nuanced assessment of them. It highlights two outstanding features of the Canadian experience: (a) the role of Canada’s federal political system in shaping welfare state policies and practices; and (b) the impact of Canada’s multiculturalism policy in facilitating integra-
tion of newcomers. Each of these is an important part of accounting for Canada’s experience of nation building via social policy. As we will see, while decentralization and diversity certainly raise challenges for social policy, they also create their own pathways for social cohesion.

The Origins of the Book

The concept for this book originates in a conference to celebrate the career and intellectual contributions of Keith Banting upon his retirement from the Department of Political Studies and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston. Banting’s career can be stylized as a preoccupation with federalism and the welfare state in a multicultural world. His theoretical and empirical contributions on the institutions and social forces that drive Canada’s social contract loom large. The domestic and international reach of Banting’s work drew a distinguished crowd of senior scholars from two continents to the conference. His role in supervising and mentoring graduate students, in encouraging emerging scholars, and in shaping the careers of policy professionals ensured that the workshop would be multigenerational and not solely academic. And, as the preceding paragraphs suggest, the timing was right for a conference devoted to the core themes of his work.

Keith Banting’s career is co-extensive with the study of public policy in Canada. His first book, *Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960s* (1979), was a template for institutionalist analysis, specifically for the claim that the state itself embodies incentives that are critical for the design of social policy, independent of the balance of power and resources in society. His second book, *The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism* (1982 and 1987), makes this case even more emphatically. Of the books that have appeared since, five pursue this theme (e.g., Banting and Sim-eon 1983, 1985). The early years of his career were also the period of Canada’s seemingly endless and insoluble existential crisis triggered by nationalist and separatist mobilization in Quebec.

Although the waning of the crisis saw his interest shift to other dimensions of policy, his last major statement on federalism (Banting 2005) was agenda-setting in its own way. Where the earlier work exemplified classical institutionalism in looking at the constraints on the creation of the welfare state and on its generosity, the later work is about further modifications to programs and the channelling of energy for and against retrenchment. This work is also in the spirit of the age,
as students of the welfare state and of comparative politics in general have awakened to institutional dynamics (Pierson and Hacker 2005). The forces that shape the retrenchment of the welfare state—or almost any aspect of its further evolution—are not necessarily the same as those that shaped its earlier growth (Pierson 1994). For Banting, Canada’s federation should now be understood in three ways. It still exhibits features of classical federalism, in that powers are still divided, and for many spheres the division is absolute. The structural constraints and possibilities he identified in 1982 still hold. But mechanisms evolved to overcome those constraints. The mechanisms are summarized as shared-cost federalism. Initially, conditional transfers more than enabled provincial spending, they positively encouraged it. Somewhat parallel with the shared-cost logic, there also emerged a politics of joint decision. Pension policy is a case in point.

But in the politics of shared costs and joint decisions, retreat—either diminished sums for conditional transfers or outright shifts to block grants—has been as important as intrusion. In the twenty-first century the concern is over the devolution of taxing and spending powers and growing provincial autonomy in social and labour market policy. We seem to be decentralizing just as rising income inequality increases the pressure—or at least the need—for more, not less, redistribution by the central government (Banting and Myles 2013, 2016). The requirement for joint decision on the Canada Pension Plan may be a barrier against retrenchment but it is also a drag on using public pensions to compensate for the dramatic drop in private pension coverage.

For Banting, the stakes are about more than social insurance and redistribution; they also include the integrity of the country. In the 1990s his institutional focus extended beyond constitutional fundamentals to policies themselves as institutional contexts for behaviour and belief. The welfare state, especially Canada’s socialized system of healthcare delivery, came to be seen as psychological glue in a federation regularly threatened by centrifugal pressures.

The emergent theme in all this is solidarity, which now includes the challenge and promise of diversity. Increased diversity is an empirical fact that animates scholarly work and policy discussion in Canada in the post-war era, particularly since the 1970s, which saw a significant increase in the proportion of racial-minority immigrants, largely from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. Diverse societies are thought to be less able to deliver a robust welfare state, in large measure because the social solidarity necessary for redistribution—for “sharing,” essentially—
is thought to be undermined by diversity. This is essentially a story about willingness to share with in-group members and reluctance to share with out-group members. As a corollary, existing welfare states seem under increasing challenge from the globalization of migration. Consolidation of the European Union makes this an issue within that diverse labour market, and the current refugee crisis only exacerbates the pressure. Banting’s scholarship for the twenty-first century has been squarely focussed on the “progressive’s dilemma” (Goodhart 2004).

The trajectory of Keith Banting’s preoccupation with both these questions accounts for the eclectic makeup of this book’s editorial team: a sociologist, a philosopher, and two political scientists. The recrudescence of inequality made John Myles, the sociologist, a natural partner. Recent evidence of this is Banting and Myles (2013). The challenge of immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism did the same for Will Kymlicka, the philosopher. The most widely remarked product of this collaboration is the Banting-Kymlicka Multiculturalism Policy Index, which measures multicultural policies in more than twenty OECD countries. The convergence of inequality and diversity brought Banting into the Equality, Security, and Community research group, one of the first Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council’s (SSHRC) Major Collaborative Research Initiatives. This accounts for the ongoing collaboration with Richard Johnston, one of the political scientists. Their work on immigration and the welfare state, including discussion about how the link is moderated by multicultural policy, is widely cited (e.g., Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 2013; Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, and Soroka 2010; Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007). Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant closes the circle as a successor to Keith Banting at the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University, where she is director.

**Organization of the Book**

We have taken the liberty of organizing the themes in Keith Banting’s career in schematic form in Figure 1.1. Although it follows from the capsule biography in the preceding section, its point is neither to pigeonhole our colleague nor to propose an airtight causal scheme. Rather, it is to organize the book. All roads lead to the welfare state, Banting’s earliest preoccupation and the ultimate concern of most of our contributors. Federalism has special prominence both as an early theme in his work and as a theme that touches most of the chapters. Half of
our contributors consider direct links between federalism and the welfare state. The other half look at various facets of diversity. Here, too, most work points to the welfare state, although a few contributors look at relationships among the diversity factors in their own right.

Banting opens by reflecting on all of these themes. He notes that Canada does not fit the usual story about the rise of the welfare state in the West, with its emphasis on class mobilization and the strength of working class parties. Due to its complex diversity, politics in Canada has always been structured around other social cleavages, including region, religion, language, and other forms of “identity” and “difference.” Commentators typically assume that the displacement of class politics by diversity politics has led to a fracturing of “reformist energies” and a weakening of the welfare state. Banting argues, however, that if diversity politics creates obstacles for one pathway to the wel-
fare state, it simultaneously opens up others. For example, while the salience of region has weakened the prospects of pan-Canadian class politics, it has also stimulated forms of regional equalization that have contributed to redistribution in Canada. Similarly, while the power of Quebec nationalism has fractured the left in Canada, it has also stimulated new forms of social policy at both the federal and Quebec levels, as each engages in “competitive nation-building” to secure the loyalty of Quebec residents. More recent forms of the politics of difference—including gender, disability, and ethnic minorities—have had similar results, pushing the welfare state to expand in new ways. The groups in question have become the new champions of redistribution, alongside unions and other traditional champions of class politics. The federal system creates particular challenges for such groups, multiplying the sites of policymaking, which stretches the resources and capacity of organized interests. But if we step back and look at the evolution of social policy more generally, what clearly emerges is the multiplicity of pathways to social policy. While diversity may weaken one route to the welfare state, it opens up others, and while the resulting package of social policy has significant failings (e.g., in respect to Indigenous peoples), it also has surprising strengths.

The remainder of the volume is organized in two main sections, reflecting the two main themes of the conference and of Banting’s work: the first on federalism, the second on immigration and multiculturalism.

*Federalism and the Welfare State: Direct Effects*

Of the chapters squarely in the federalism domain, three are, so to speak, “classical” statements. Each looks at the constraints and possibilities that arise from the simple fact of divided jurisdiction. These are the chapters by Kyle Hanniman, by Alain Noël, and by Robin Boadway, Katherine Cuff, and Kourtney Koebel. In addition to dividing power, federalism creates openings for shared-cost and joint-decision processes. Two chapters pick up these newer themes. Paul Pierson looks at the shared-cost logic and Kent Weaver considers a wide range of possibilities.

As subnational sovereign states, provinces are at greater risk of default and have less borrowing capacity than the federal government. This is yet another reason why federalism might be hostile to the welfare state. But this risk of provincial default also creates an opportunity for solidarity, since the federal government could bail out provinces faced with potentially unsustainable debt loads. Kyle Hanniman looks
at bond markets for evidence of this solidarity. If, as in the United States, creditors do not believe that the central government will provide an ultimate backstop for lower-level government borrowers, provinces will inevitably pay a market premium for their debt. Since Ontario has the highest relative debt load of any sub-national government in the world, this is not a trivial question. Bond markets seem to see Canada as mainly “solidaristic,” however, not as “market-preserving.” While the costs of borrowing do vary across provinces, bond markets assume that Canadians will ultimately support each other in time of need, which is an important if under-explored form of solidarity in federal systems.

Alain Noël looks at the ebb and flow of Quebec’s distinctiveness as enabled by the federal system and as constrained by the market. As in the US, the recent decentralization of Canadian social policy to the provinces was associated with widespread cutbacks and accentuated regional variation in social programs. Unlike the Harris government in Ontario and the Klein government in Alberta, however, Quebec seized the opportunity to build a stronger model of social protection. While support for redistributive policies was weakening elsewhere, Quebec introduced universal childcare, active labour market policies, and a strategy against poverty and social exclusion. These changes helped Quebec defy the countrywide trend towards greater inequality. This is the most recent example of that other federalist possibility: the subnational state as a laboratory. But Quebec’s bottom-up, consensual politics have shifted in recent years. The decline of Quebec nationalism, the erosion of public confidence in politics, and the emergence of new, post-industrial cleavages, have weakened the forces behind Quebec’s 1990s “social democratic turn.” Although the Quebec redistribution model remains mostly intact, its future is uncertain.

Robin Boadway and his colleagues respond to the fact that an income guarantee is more effective if provinces act in concert with Ottawa. How could we design a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) that does not break the national bank and yet satisfies the demands of both Ottawa and the provinces? The authors address both issues, and come to quite radical conclusions. They show that a national BIG of $20,000 per single adult can be financed by eliminating existing tax credits and provincial welfare assistance. They propose joint federal and provincial implementation of BIG in a two-stage process that is inspired by the income tax collection agreements. The federal government first substitutes a federal BIG for existing federal tax credits. Provinces are then invited to follow suit.
Paul Pierson discusses the role that “shared-cost” federalism can play in promoting solidarity. While social policy is often a matter of state or provincial jurisdiction in federal systems, the federal government can use its spending power to encourage states to adopt national standards in their social policy, and thereby build a more truly national welfare state. In the United States, however, what we see since the early 1980s is the US federal government’s withdrawal from cost sharing. Pierson argues that the significance of this shift has been neglected by students of both federalism and the welfare state. The study of federalism has been mostly dormant in US scholarship during the past twenty-five years and Pierson concludes that this was a major mistake. As in Canada, US public policy underwent a process of centralization in the postwar years. Though little noticed, this process came to an end with the Reagan administration of the early 1980s. Since then, state politics have polarized into “red” and “blue” states with the Republican party making a “hard right turn.” As in Canada, decentralization had an important territorial dimension: the shift in territorial politics in the United States strengthened Southern conservatives and their opposition to national welfare programs. Paradoxically, the Republican states that stood to benefit most from embracing President Obama’s Affordable Care Act generally chose a path of “scorched earth opposition.” As a result, a piece of legislation designed to diminish variation among the states has instead increased those differences.

Kent Weaver looks at healthcare and pensions in the Canadian context and describes the full tapestry of path-dependent dynamics—joint-decision issues as well as shared-cost ones—as foreshadowed by Banting’s 2005 update on the politics of federalism. Weaver looks at the causal mechanisms that underlie specific policy dynamics. This leads him to examine the conditions for a particular policy dynamic to dominate in a particular policy sector, in a particular country, and in a particular period. This in turn opens up the question of how policy dynamics shift over time. This is a long way from the simple comparative statics of the federal division of power. The chapter amplifies a point in Banting’s opening chapter, a point that is also critical for Alain Noël. The interaction of several factors has produced a sharp divergence between Canada and the US. Where in the United States, diversity and geography have conspired to produce gridlock, in Canada they have catalyzed competitive state-building. Far from undermining solidarity, Canadian diversity works to promote it.
Federalism, Immigration, and Diversity

The volume then shifts its focus to questions of immigration and diversity. This is a complex area that includes three conceptual foci that are distinct yet linked. Figure 1.1 tries to sort some of this out. One component is diversity itself, which in this book has a cultural and ethnic focus. Immigration is important in its own right as a factor in the labour market but also as an engine of increased diversity. Multiculturalism, as both policy and ideology (a distinction that is critical to David Miller, below), is a response to that increasing diversity. To be sure, diversity was a fact of Canadian life long before postwar politics created pressure for multicultural policy as we now understand it. It is difficult to account for the existence, much less the dynamics, of Canadian federalism without reference to Quebec or to First Nations. But Canadian multicultural policy by that name is oriented to groups whose arrival en masse is a feature of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Canada, therefore, confronts challenges relating to both “old” diversity (Quebec and Indigenous peoples) and “new” diversity (immigration-related).

These two forms of diversity are often studied separately, but the fact that Canada is a federal country (to accommodate old diversity) has profound implications for how it addresses new diversity. Two chapters focus on federalism in relation to immigration as such. Jane Jenson and Mireille Paquet show how the logic of federalism is reasserting itself in the composition of twenty-first-century immigration. Provinces are increasingly driving the immigration and incorporation agenda. Provinces now see immigrants as resources, and they see labour markets—employers rather than public servants—as the agents of integration. This displacement prompted the emergence of a differentiated citizenship regime in which feelings of belonging become increasingly provincial while employment (rather than national citizenship) becomes the pathway to rights and access to participation and integration. Their conclusion brings to the fore one of most critical shifts in Canadian governance of the past quarter century. For years, the federal government deployed multicultural policy to build identification with Canada as such. The focus on the cultural elements in immigrant integration promised to cut through older geographically and culturally based divisions. Although Ottawa is still often held responsible for outcomes, its control over major policy levers in the areas of health, welfare, and employment have been self-consciously eroded. It is natural to wonder if the shift has implications for multicultural policy itself.
Koning asks how federalism will condition the impact of immigration on the further evolution of the welfare state. Federal arrangements are likely to increase conflict between levels of government about what immigration policies should look like and who should be responsible for them. Subnational units are more prone to local-majority triumphalism, and hence are likely to restrict access to benefits. But the boundaries of subnational units often capture and then amplify real variation in preferences. This may reflect, for example, differentiated settlement patterns. Although overall benefit levels may be lower than in unitary systems, they will also be more variable. Koning conjectures that central governments, given their weakness in delivery of benefits, will emphasize control over admission. The complexities in Koning’s account—which mirror those in Weaver—have an implication for research design: given the number of conditions that moderate the effect of federalism, multi-country statistical comparisons are likely to have a low yield (see for instance, the summary in Banting 2005); for now at least, case studies or controlled comparisons seem more promising.

Statistical tests can elucidate specific cases, however. David Green and Craig Riddell go straight to the heart of the progressive’s dilemma by testing how federalism enables current social spending to be shaped by Canada’s growing diversity. If growing immigration and diversity erode the welfare state, as many commentators worry, then it should show up in variations in provincial spending on social assistance. Provinces have different rates of immigration, and have considerable autonomy to set their own rules regarding social assistance. Indeed, the variation in immigration rates has increased in recent years, as has provinces’ autonomy in controlling social policy, due in part to the weakening of Ottawa’s role in shared-cost programs. (This parallels the situation described in Paul Pierson’s chapter). Green and Riddell test a formal model that seeks to determine whether immigration levels or other indicators of diversity at the provincial level affect spending on social assistance. The results suggest that if immigration and diversity matter, they don’t matter much. There is a hint of discrimination in transfers to families with children, but not much else. Fears of the progressive’s dilemma therefore seem to be overblown. It is true that, compared to many other countries, Canada is more selective about which immigrants are admitted via the points-based pre-selection system, and this may reduce the risk that diversity poses for the welfare state. But Green and Riddell show that this does not fully explain the results.
Diversity and Solidarity

Diversity and multiculturalism have implications for the welfare state that hold regardless of whether or not a country is also federal. The next three chapters attempt to drill down to explore the mechanisms by which diversity might constrain solidarity, and how those effects can be mitigated.

The chapter by Stuart Soroka, Matthew Wright, Irene Bloemraad, and Richard Johnston explores recent debates about how multiculturalism moderates the link between diversity and solidarity. Many countries have responded to growing ethnic diversity with a politics of recognition. Multicultural policies (MCPs) recognize distinctive rights or entitlements for ethnic and religious groups. This move is controversial, however, with much of the debate centred on its implications for social solidarity. Critics worry that MCPs encourage identity politics that in turn pushes redistributive issues off the policy agenda and/or erodes feelings of solidarity. Soroka and colleagues provide new evidence and insight on the question. They revisit findings on the country-level relationships among immigration, MCPs, and the size of the welfare state. They then take the analysis to the individual level with survey evidence on the relationships. Their findings generally support the Banting-Kymlicka claim that MCPs do not weaken the welfare state:

… the progressive’s dilemma is not an illusion, and international migration is one of its sources. But multiculturalism, one response to migration-induced increases in diversity, does not appear to exacerbate the dilemma. (Soroka et al. in this volume, chapter 11)

Randy Besco and Erin Tolley approach the matter from a different institutional angle. The institutions in question are not federalism or the multicultural policy regime but Canada’s electoral and parliamentary systems. The question they ask is not how institutions inhibit the development of anti-diversity sentiment but whether they inhibit its mobilization. Besco and Tolley show that a deep vein of negativity lies beneath the apparently placid surface of Canadian public opinion. One Canadian in three holds outright negative views on immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic diversity, while an equal number accepts the current pattern only with significant qualifications. Why, then, have Canadian parties not successfully mobilized these latent sentiments? Besco and Tolley argue that such mobilization is effectively stymied by three distinctive features of Canada’s political institutions: the electoral system,
the concentration of immigrant and minority voters in swing electoral districts, and the powers vested in party leaders. The electoral threshold implicit in Canada’s single-member district electoral system inhibits single-issue parties even as the Westminster parliamentary framework encourages broad electoral coalitions. The electoral system’s logic is amplified by the fortuitous geography of immigrant and minority settlement. Power within Canadian parties is very top-down, such that party leaders can internalize these incentives and marginalize xenophobic tendencies among their followers. Canada is not immune to the sort of anti-immigrant sentiment that we see in many countries, but it has institutional safeguards that inhibit its mobilization, and these institutional features—as much as any broader ethos of diversity or multicultural tolerance—helps to explain Canada’s “success” in avoiding the progressive’s dilemma.

Finally, David Miller asks why Canadian elites continue to support multiculturalism when it has been pronounced dead in Europe. Equally puzzling is that such routine pronouncements fly in the face of the facts: at the level of policy MCPs are not in retreat, not in Europe and not elsewhere (also a point in the Soroka et al. chapter). He argues that the key is to distinguish multiculturalism as policy from multiculturalism as ideology. As ideology, extending equal recognition to all cultures in a jurisdiction, multiculturalism has been attacked from at least five different directions: as privileging groups at the expense of their own members; for the possible misidentification of individuals; for its validation of internally discriminatory practices; for fragmenting the progressive coalition; and for devaluing the majority culture. But many policies that are labelled as multicultural can be defended on liberal-egalitarian grounds, and this may account for their empirical ubiquity. This still leaves open the puzzle of Canada’s affirmation of multiculturalism as an ideology. Miller thinks that three contextual factors inoculate the Canadian commitment. First, for Canada the logic of multiculturalism did not originate with mass immigration. Rather, it is nested in earlier recognition of “founding peoples” and of Indigenous Canadians. Full acknowledgment of the latter may lie in the future but the principle goes a long way back. Second, multiculturalism is now linked to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a potent source of legitimation. Third, the majority culture itself lacks deep historical roots, not when compared to European cases or even to French Canada and to Canada’s First Nations.
References


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