This conference was organized by Queen’s Centre for International Relations, Defence Management Studies at Queen’s University, The strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, and the Land Force Doctrine and Training Systems, Canadian Forces. Speakers came from universities, colleges, governments, organizations, armies, and militaries across North America and Latin America. The conference took place over a period of three days, from June 10, 2009 to June 12, 2009.

On the evening of June 10, 2009, there was a ‘Welcome Meet and Greet’ at the Royal Military College of Canada. On June 11, 2009, Dr. Max Manwaring, from the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, initiated the conference in Challenge to the Conference. Subsequent to his address was the first keynote address by Vice Admiral A. Bruce Donaldson, Commander for Canada Command, of the Canadian Forces. A question period followed Vice Admiral Donaldson’s address. The first panel then followed, entitled ‘The Security Environment.’ This panel consisted of three panelists: Barbara P. Billauer from the Foundation for Law and Science Centers (FASC), Assistant Commissioner Mike Cabana, Federal and International Operations, from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Colonel (Ret) John Cope, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), from the National Defense University. Carlo Dade from the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) was the Chair of this panel. After the first panel came the keynote address by Stephen Johnson, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere. The second panel followed the address, which was entitled ‘Building Security in the Americas.’ This panel consisted of Colonel Alex Crowther from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the US Army War College, Dr. Norman A. Bailey from the Institute of World Politics, Captain (N) Craig Donovan, Maritime Staff from the Canadian Forces, and Dr. Román D. Ortiz from the Fundación Ideas Para La Paz (FIP) in Columbia. Dr. Paul Kan chaired the panel.

On June 12, 2009, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Deputy Commander from NORAD, initiated the third day of the conference with his keynote address. The third panel followed the address, entitled ‘North American Security Perspectives.’ The speakers included Lieutenant General Thomas R. Turner from the United States Army North, Admiral Jorge Pastor Gómez from the Mexican Navy, and Brigadier-General Jocelyn Lacroix from Canada Command of the Canadian Forces. Dr. Joel Sokolsky, from the Royal Military College of Canada, chaired the panel. Major General Stefan Egon Gracza, Defense and Air Attaché –US and Canada, from the Embassy of Brazil gave a keynote address, which was followed by the fourth and final panel. This panel was entitled ‘Expectations and Strategies’ and included the following panelists: Dr. Thomaz Costa from the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) at the National Defense University in Brazil, Colonel (Ret) Dr. Arturo Contreras Polgatti from the Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos in Chile, Colonel (Ret) Dr Richard Kilroy from Virginia Military Institute in the USA, Dr. Stephen Randall, Director of the Institute for United States Policy Research at the University of Calgary, and Dr. Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano from the Universidad de Guadalajara in Mexico. Ambassador John Graham, from the Canadian
Foundation for the Americas, chaired the panel. A question period followed each panel and each Keynote Address. The closing remarks followed the last panel, and were given by Professor Douglas Lovelace from the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, and Dr. Douglas Bland from Defense Management Studies at Queen’s University.

June 11, 2009

Challenge to the Conference

Dr. Max Manwaring, Strategic Institute, US Army War College

Dr. Manwaring claimed that we have learned a great deal as a result of our experiences in places such as Vietnam and Central America. He stated that a great deal has changed since September 11, 2001. Manwaring spoke about the importance of democracy. He claimed that hopefully we would not go home from the conference and forget everything that was discussed. He said that we have to go beyond that. Furthermore, he argued that everything needs a strategy, and that nothing gets done without one. Manwaring spoke about the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which forced a merger between the navy and the armed forces. This Act brought the armed forces together more than they were in the past. A new Goldwater-Nichols Act is ‘in the works’ presently. A component of this new Act does not just address what the United States can do on its own, but it also addressed the importance and necessity of horizontal coordination with other countries. More than just a strategic relationship between countries is needed: permanent consultation at the highest level is necessary. He claimed that it is important for countries to work together. Documents are currently being created that are targeted at political figures. The reason for this is because these people make a difference politically in their respective countries, and it is important to start to educate them. These people need to be properly educated and many reforms need to be initiated. If the necessary reforms are not initiated, and if these political figures are not adequately educated, all the significant proposed legislation will be in vain. Therefore, he claimed, it is necessary to start at a low but practical level in hopes we might influence others and make some sort of a difference. Manwaring stated that Doug Bland, Charles Pentland, and others would be contacting some people in the audience. However, he claimed that for the people who are not contacted but have something to contribute, it is important these individuals contact them. Manwaring concluded that we might be able to help our country, and for that it would all be worth the effort- this is the challenge that we now face. Manwaring thanked the audience.
Morning Keynote Address

Vice Admiral A. Bruce Donaldson, Commander, Canada Command, Canadian Forces

Vice Admiral Donaldson stated that he understood his talk was supposed to help ‘set the stage’ for the first panel’s discussion on new and emerging features of the security environment in the hemisphere. He stated that he would focus on these issues, but also position them in terms of the role of the Canadian Forces (CF) in support of wider government of Canada objectives. He claimed that Canadians have not always thought of ‘the Americas’ when they considered their place internationally. Instead, Canada’s relationship with the United States, Europe and possibly Asia, or its history of peace support operations generally come to mind. Furthermore, when it comes to defence and security issues that matter to Canada, Canadians tend not to think of their neighbours in the hemisphere. However, our connections are as much south as they are to the east or west. He stated that as the Commander of Canada Command, the Americas are an integral part of his area of operational responsibility. The CF are engaged there and they are considering other ways they can further their involvement in the region. Interest, openness, enthusiasm and genuine warmth underpins our reputation and our relationships in the Americas. The Americas provide promise and potential for Canada. He claimed that it is no wonder the region is of increasing importance to the government of Canada. As the Prime Minister has often said, Canada’s re-engagement in the Americas is a national priority. The 2007 Throne Speech identified the Americas as one of Canada’s foreign policy priorities and highlighted that Canada would play an active role in the region. Clearly, the CF have a role to play in advancing the government’s Americas Strategy under its security pillar. Donaldson stated that from a defence perspective, the Americas is Canada’s neighbourhood and Canada wants to be a good neighbour. Canada visibly demonstrated its commitment to the region by hosting the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas last September. This major hemispheric event brought together ministers from across the Americas to discuss important defence and security matters. He claimed that while bringing ministers together might seem a natural thing to do, it has not always been easy or constructive in this diverse and complex region. The security and defence issues affecting the region are complex and must be addressed with a number of different tools and measures. He claimed that armed forces are only one of the ‘tools in the toolbox – and not always the tool most needed.’ Donaldson stated that as we in the CF and Department of National Defence (DND) consider the security and defence challenges in the Americas, we are guided by a fundamental approach to our relationships with our partners which involve respect and reciprocity. There are opportunities for cooperation and exchange with the states in the hemisphere. Canada has a wealth of experiences to offer others and there are numerous opportunities for us to learn from our neighbours. The recent travels of senior military and departmental officials in the Americas have only underscored the region’s importance to the CF. The challenges in the Americas are not always easy, and the security and defence issues are not necessarily
ones that those in the Canadian military and defence circles are used to. However, he argues that this is not to say there are not further areas in which the CF can constructively engage in the Americas. Donaldson stated that he wanted to look at the region through three related lenses: its defence and security challenges as the CF and DND see them, how Canada’s engagement in the Americas fits into the Canada First Defence Strategy, and how Canada is currently engaged, as well as where there may be scope for future activities and initiatives.

With respect to the current defence and security challenges, the risks of full-scale inter-state conflict in the Americas is currently low, but there are still close to 30 unresolved border-related disagreements in the hemisphere. While most of these are under control, several could trigger diplomatic incidents or lead to limited armed clashes. However, he stated, most of the threats to the security of the Americas are non-traditional in nature and include political, economic, social, health and environmental issues. The region faces a number of critical challenges, including continued poverty and increasing socio-economic disparities that sow dissent, social discontent and insecurity. As well, widespread corruption undermines the rule of law, and by extension, security, especially when combined with weak state institutions and limited public sector capacities. For many in the region, there are perennial threats from natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes and other calamities. Narco-trafficking, urban violence and organized crime threaten the entire region. Terrorism, whether domestic or international, also remains a risk. Donaldson claimed that extra-regional actors are also increasingly interested in the Americas. In addition to their growing economic and trade presence in the hemisphere, countries such as China, Russia and Iran are challenging the traditional role of the United States in the region in sectors such as military training and cooperation, and defence procurement. Venezuela’s rapprochement with Russia and Iran is only one example. It is clear that the security of the hemisphere can not be defined in conventional military terms alone, but must be seen as multidimensional in scope. Consequently, the military defence of the hemisphere is now only a small part of the spectrum of responses to security threats. The traditional use of national military forces is unlikely to be appropriate against many of these new threats. However, in some of the weaker countries of the Americas, the military could be the strongest national institution and the only reliable organ of government that has the ability to maintain internal order or mount a credible defence against transnational threats. This can lead to the migration of the armed forces into the civilian national security or law enforcement spheres. It also raises potential concern for civilian-military relations. With a tradition of military juntas and lack of civilian control of the military, the return of democracy throughout most of the region during the 1990s led to a needed reassessment of the roles and responsibilities of the armed forces in many countries. Troop numbers and budgets were significantly reduced, while many armed forces embraced professionalization, opened their doors to women and minorities, and adapted to functioning under civilian oversight. In a number of nations, the domestic
role of the military was curbed while new international mandates were created, leading to a significant increase in participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. This increased international engagement is most evident in Haiti, where countries of the Americas, under the leadership of Brazil, provide the great majority of troops to the UN mission. In keeping with this new international focus, many countries of the Americas have opened peacekeeping training centres and actively pursue partnerships with other nations for expertise, advice, cooperation, training and eventually partnership in operations. Canada has played a long-standing role as friend, partner and mentor in this regard. The examples are many and include our involvement in Haiti, and with others such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and with organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS). However, hemispheric multilateral cooperation on defence and security matters is gradually progressing, as is the regional confidence and security-building measures regime.

Donaldson stated that he also wanted to consider how the Americas fits within the Canada First Defence Strategy. The strategy is a commitment to keep Canadians safe and secure, and to ensure that Canada continues to be a credible and influential country on the international stage. Donaldson claimed that it draws our attention to the complex and unpredictable strategic environment marked by such things as border conflicts, fragile states, transnational criminal networks, human and drug trafficking, unequal access to resources and uneven economic distribution. All of these elements are present in the Americas. The strategy articulates three roles for the CF: defending Canada, defending North America, and contributing to international peace and security. Canada’s re-engagement in the hemisphere fulfills all three. Tackling threats to Canada at their sources is vital to protect both Canada and Canadians. For example, Canada’s participation in counter-narcotics operations in the Americas directly contributes to the safety and security of Canada by preventing drugs originating from countries in the Americas from reaching Canadian streets. Our re-engagement in the region also allows us to be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and play our part in defending the continent. Importantly, increased cooperation with the United States and Mexico in hemispheric defence and security matters also contributes to stronger bilateral relationships with our two key partners. Finally, our engagement in the Americas illustrates Canadian leadership on the international stage. Donaldson stated that countries of the hemisphere have a genuine interest in collaborating more with Canada on defence and security issues, but that Canada can play an even greater role in working with the countries of the Americas and leading the way to regional security.

Donaldson stated that with respect to the engagement of the CF in the Americas, we have much to offer the region but there are also areas where we can learn from our hemispheric partners. Our engagement and cooperation in the Americas must focus on activities and arrangements that are effective, tangible and enduring. This means building upon the practical and useful activities through which we are already engaged in the Americas. With
no history as a colonizer or ‘meddler,’ Canada is a credible and trusted partner for the countries of the region. Canada’s engagement is based upon contributions to three key areas. Firstly, Canada will contribute to regional security through peace support operations, bilateral military operational assistance, and consequence management for natural and man-made disasters. Second, Canada will continue to undertake defence and security capacity building and training, specifically through military education, professional development, and institutional and operational capacity building. Third, Canada will continue to provide assistance in defence governance issues. These include integrating military operations in a whole-of-government approach, civil-military relations, minority and gender integration, military justice, ethics and human rights, transparency, white paper development, defence budget and comptrollership, and security defence reviews. By working in these three areas, we are able to pursue and support Canada’s goals of contributing to national security, contributing to regional security and stability and supporting broader government of Canada objectives in the region. Donaldson stated that have a number of very useful approaches at our disposal to help us achieve our strategic objectives in the Americas. Essentially, these approaches fall under our broad defence diplomacy umbrella which encompasses engagement, operations and training. Defence diplomacy is an encompassing approach under which the defence team (the CF and the DND) has developed to frame Canada’s international defence engagement. Donaldson stated that in carrying out Canada’s defence diplomacy, we have a number of key instruments and tools at our disposal: the Canadian Defence Attaché programme, formal bilateral defence dialogue, multilateral regional fora such as the OAS and the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas, visits by CF and departmental representatives to the region, as well as visits to Canada by officials from the region.

There is also a whole other list of activities that fall under operations and training. They include, but are not limited to, the following: the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) which helps build the operational and institutional capabilities of member countries (25 percent of MTAP’s budget goes to the hemisphere); courses and exchanges where other nations’ military members come to Canada to the staff college or for language training; CF personnel travel to the hemisphere, engage in exercises, ship deployments, and visits; regular contributions of maritime patrol aircraft and naval assets in support of regional counter-drug detection and monitoring operations; peace support operations; and the development of contingency plans for a number of possible missions in the hemisphere, including humanitarian relief operations and the evacuation of Canadians abroad. In undertaking all of this, there is scope for increased cooperation with our traditional partners in the Americas. Canada works closely with other like-minded countries to increase the effectiveness of its engagement in the Americas and to accomplish joint objectives in the hemisphere. For example, the United States is Canada’s closest ally and has enduring interests in the Americas. Donaldson stated that Canada works with the United States in
Donaldson argued that there are specific issues where Canada has significant experience and expertise to bring to the table, specifically with respect to defence governance, the professionalization of military forces, peace support operations, terrorism, and domestic operations. While the concept of civilian control of the military is present in most of the Americas, the ministries of defence and accompanying civilian institutions of several nations remain very weak when compared to their corresponding military establishments. This may lead to an imbalance between the military and its civilian counterparts, which can undermine civilian control of the armed forces. Disturbingly, some countries (such as Venezuela) are experiencing the politicization of their armed forces. Canada’s model of defence governance and professionalism may be of use. Canada’s expertise in these important areas could go a long way to help strengthen civilian control of the military in the region, and to help ensure that armed forces in the Americas view themselves as servants of the public good. Peace support operations are another area in which Canada has much to share. Countries of the Americas are increasingly participating in UN peacekeeping missions, and particularly impressive are Brazil and Uruguay’s efforts in Haiti and elsewhere. Canada has much to offer, given its historic and on-going involvement in peace support operations, in terms of such things as preparing for missions, command and control, and rules of engagement. Further, Canada’s efforts over the years to enhance capacity building in the hemisphere has been designed to promote and stimulate regional contributions to international peace support operations. This both stimulates greater regional involvement in this global responsibility and helps to reduce the strains and demands placed on countries like Canada and the CF by a high operational tempo. Essentially, having more nations contribute to peace support operations helps to share the global burden. With respect to terrorism, a number of countries in the hemisphere have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades. In the past, some of these groups have threatened Canadian citizens or interests. During General Natyncyk’s recent visit to Colombia, he discussed terrorism with...
his hosts, particularly how their experiences domestically might be applicable to their upcoming participation to the mission in Afghanistan and to Canada’s deployment there. While the situations in Afghanistan and Colombia are quite different, Columbia may has insight and experience that Canada can apply to its endeavours in Afghanistan. Donaldson claimed that we have also seen international terrorist groups such as the Basque organization ETA, Hezbollah and Al Qaida use the region as a safe haven or as a place in which to advance their causes. It is in Canada’s interest to ensure that its neighbours in the Americas have the tools they need to fight terrorism in their territory. Finally, Canada may face similar domestic defence challenges to our southern neighbours. For example, both Brazil and Canada are large countries with vast tracts of rugged, under-populated terrain that is difficult to access, and that may be attractive to parties which are otherwise unwelcome. While the Arctic and the Amazon are on the surface vastly different, they share similar problems when it comes to maintaining a defence presence in a remote area, and conducting surveillance and sovereignty patrols over vast territories.

Donaldson claimed that opportunity exists for Canada to help modernize the hemispheric security architecture, and to ensure that multilateral efforts to address threats to the hemisphere are effective. This means being an active player in the OAS, and helping to define an appropriate role for the Inter-American Defence Board, both in its link to the OAS and in reforming its nature and ability to address the future defence and military needs of the hemisphere. From a National Defence point of view, Canada will continue to support the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas. Donaldson claimed that as a past recent nation of the Conference, we recognize that it supports Canada’s tradition of multilateralism and is a cornerstone of our defence engagement in the hemisphere. Canada will continue to use its participation in the Conference to strengthen Canadian defence engagement in the hemisphere in support of Canada’s foreign policy objectives, and to strengthen its reputation as a defence and security leader in the hemisphere. Canada also seeks a number of other aims, including enhancing bilateral, sub-regional and regional relationships, reinforcing the existing hemispheric security architecture, reaffirming the continued need for transparency and confidence-building in regional defence and security issues, and strengthening democratic civil-military relations in the Americas. In conjunction with Bolivia, Canada has led efforts to have the OAS, through the Inter-American Defence Board, house the institutional memory of the Conference. Although this is a relatively small step, it will reduce the administrative burden on host nations and creates for the first time a link between the Conference and the OAS. Finally, there are opportunities for further engagement in a number of other regional venues. These include the hemispheric service conferences, which are an important way for the CF to engage with other armed forces, as well as the Conference of Central American Armed Forces and the Regional Security System of the Eastern Caribbean.
In conclusion, Donaldson argued that Canada is a country of the Americas. He stated that this is Canada’s neighbourhood and Canada wants to be a good neighbour. The defence and security issues in the region are challenging and require multi-faceted approaches for which traditional armed forces may not always be appropriate. But they clearly have an impact on Canada’s defence and security interests. As articulated by the Canada First Defence Strategy, the CF have a role in meeting the current and potential challenges they pose. Donaldson claimed that he recognized the security environment in the Americas has changed significantly in the past two decades and will likely continue to evolve. The CF and DND are willing and prepared to continue building relationships in the region based on reciprocity, respect and trust, with the aim of developing these relationships for the long-term. There is an obvious role for Canada to play, one that is located within the government’s wider ‘Americas Strategy,’ and a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. In many ways, Canada has been gradually working with its regional partners for some time, whether through the Military Training Assistance Programme, staff talks or participation in hemispheric service conferences. More opportunities no doubt exist and Canada intends on pursuing them. Canada will ensure that its re-engagement in the region is modest and affordable, but tangible and enduring. The CF are ready and able to assist the government in its important endeavour of re-engagement. They are ready to work with partners in the Americas to build upon existing relationships and foment new ones. Donaldson concluded his talk by thanking everyone at the conference for their time and attention.

Question Period (Q= Question, A= Answer)

Q: With respect to continental security involving North America, there is a movement in the United States regarding a continental approach. There is not much support for that concept in Mexico or Canada, since both countries prefer a bilateral approach. Could you comment on the degree to which Canadian interests can best be served either in a bilateral approach, a multilateral one, or a combination of approaches?

A: I can speak to defense and security aspects of that: I see great value in a multilateral forum or trilateral one where we can put our interests on the table and understand different perspectives. I think a trilateral forum is a useful form of exchanging ideas. It is a very good way of looking at a holistic approach to many issues we are dealing with currently. Bilateral approaches will affect the third partner. A trilateral approach is positive. In many areas we are engaged in, a trilateral agreement slows down agreement in a bilateral sense. However, we do not need to choose one approach or another. We need openness and transparency instead in general. This will move us forward on many issues.

Q: A great problem in the Caribbean is the difficulty with organized transnational crime, shipment of narcotics, people, and arms, as well as inadequate resources to detect and interject these forces. The more significant security problem for that area is organized crime.
Aerial surveillance is an affordable means of making a significant contribution to solving the problem. But what else can be done?

A: We might not have enough forces to deal with this entire problem. There are limited resources. Inter-agency and international cooperation on the intelligence side is improving. The joint-task force concept is working well on both sides of the Americas. Cooperation in enforcement has come a long way over the years. We will continue to increase cooperation. Aerial surveillance is very valuable. We still dedicate the aircraft to this task because it is of importance to us. We now dedicate the ships we send to the Caribbean to support the work of the task force to both sides of the Americas to provide a platform for surveillance in the region. We will increase our involvement in region with our limited resources so that we can be more useful. We have deployed submarines to deal with this situation as well, and this has been effective. We have had successes in the region where Canadian participation and surveillance has led to arrests and interdictions. Although I would like to increase the number of resources in this respect, we have to do so in the very challenging environment that exists presently. Canada has regular participation in the region and Canada intends on increasing its participation where possible. However, no resources are available to increase contribution over next the next two to three years.

Q: I would like to hear your thoughts on the rhetoric versus the reality of the situation. Could you please speak to the genuine interaction of agencies in achieving actual results? Is cooperation and interaction a reality, or is it just rhetoric?

A: Proof of success is seen at a tactical level. Afghanistan has shown us that we can make this work in practice. Where we have applied practice to government approach, we have seen success (for example, on the ground in Kandahar, Kabul, and the Gaza Strip. In Maritime Security Operation Centers, the entire government is achieving success- a unified view is being achieved and they are making things work. We are seeing success in joint taskforce constructs across the country on a regional basis. We have had success in bringing utilizing the right resources in an inter-agency, whole of government construct to resolve domestic problems. The further back from the tactical level you get, the more challenging it becomes. We organize the whole government at the federal level based on accountabilities, and these accountabilities flow vertically through ministers. However, as we look more holistically at making sense of the whole government, we are forced into challenging ‘up and down structure’ that does not allow for resource tradeoff decisions in the context of missions for example. For a minister that is accountable for certain priorities, the resources involved have to be weighed against other priorities. At a higher level, there are challenges with the whole of government approach. Where is the rhetoric? Canadians expect us to have ‘our act together’ so there has been a degree of ‘swan-like’ adherence to illustrate we are together, giving the impression that we are paying ‘lip-service’ to this concept. However, I disagree.
Q: You talk about how Canada is good at sharing information with the United States, but we have not always been good at sharing with Mexico or other partners. What is Canada Command doing to improve the relationship with other partners, outside of the United States?

A: We have an ongoing program to try to establish the common understandings and levels of confidence to move to the next step, that involves information sharing and cooperation. We are looking to establish a Mexican liaison officer in my staff, which will provide an opportunity to work with the Mexican military in terms of information sharing and decision-making. We feel that information sharing only faces barriers because people are concerned with ownership and are generally not willing to take risks. These are barriers we must learn to work with and around. In terms of information sharing with Mexico, there may be some areas where we do not want complete unfettered access to their information. We may prefer to specify the types of information we are looking for so we may not be constrained in ways of how we utilize the information we receive. Canada continues to work with Mexico and I hope this positive relationship will continue to grow.

Q: Within reasonable constraints, can you comment on Canada’s domestic security threats?

A: With respect to domestic threats and challenges for Canada, from a security perspective, there continues to be work to be done with respect to defense. We must manage our sovereign spaces and enhance awareness in areas that are being subject to changes. We need to be ready for that type of activity. Our security agencies in Canada face challenges in terms of resources to keep Canadians secure and to keep their interest protected. When the resources are available, we have a responsibility to address natural disasters (such as hurricanes). Where we can bring capability to bear to alleviate suffering, we have to ensure capabilities can be brought to bear as well. There is the spectrum. Canada Command is well oriented to support that. We are stretched in the Canadian Forces regarding resources. We are approaching a period of heightened activity, mostly due to our participation in Afghanistan. He claimed that it is the other thing that may happen when we are extremely busy that worries him. We have to be prepared and not get distracted by things that are already working well. We have to be ready to respond to other things that Canadians will expect us to be prepared for.

Q: I am curious to hear your opinion on the institutionalization of the whole of government approach in terms of other government departments we deal with. Can you comment on that?

A: We are making good progress in understanding in a whole of government context. There is a good dialogue regarding how do we (all of government) be ready and help those deploying into situations such as Afghanistan. We are ahead of where we were two years ago. At the level of management and preparation, our inter-departmental management has improved in last few years. The level of ongoing interaction of officials has also improved. With respect to issues of security, there has been a move from an issue-based approach to a horizon-based approach. At
a strategic level, we have some work to do, but at our staff college, we are interested in improving mechanisms to get everyone to come together, study together, and form networks. There is still work to be done and this poses challenges for other government department because the public service and the CF are quite different, and we have to be open to others’ opinions, and be prepared to change our ways. I have seen a great deal of progress over the last few years to get us to the types of mechanisms that would be expected to be in place.

Panel I: The Security Environment

The first panel concerned the security environment. Carlo Dade from the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) was the Chair of this panel. The panelists included Barbara P. Billauer from the Foundation for Law and Science Centers (FASC), Assistant Commissioner Mike Cabana, Federal and International Operations, from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Colonel (Ret) John Cope, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), from the National Defense University. Barbara Billauer addressed the conference first, followed by Mike Cabana and John Cope.

Chair

Carlo Dade, Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL)

Carlo Dade stated that Canada’s involvement in the Americas has existed for some time. Many find that the Americas should be a leading priority. He claimed that the conference was a good idea and a good start to begin looking at the realm of security and how Canada can become more involved. This engagement in the Americas is one that will be long-standing and supported by the Canadian government and people. Dade then introduced the speakers.

Speakers

Barbara P. Billauer, Foundation for Law and Science Centers (FASC)

Barbara Billauer stated that although a microbe, pandemics are still enemies. She spoke on environmental security. She asked the crowd if they considered H1N1 (swine flu) to be a threat. There are three criteria when you look at the information. The first is the threat evaluation (how bad will it be?). The threat evaluation depends on who is doing the evaluation and what procedures and information they are using. One must ask whether the proponents of the information have an agenda. Even politically, in the United States, there are agency whose job it is to foster the development of the vaccines. She claimed that those agencies do not like to be questioned why the people are generating millions of dollars to
foster a vaccine for swine flu. Billauer stated that she questioned why herself. Secondly is the question of unilateral or global. Obama plans to fund H1N1 with ‘BioShield’ money (bioterrorism money). She questioned why Obama was not using the money set aside for Asian Flu. Billauer argued that in the last 125 years, we have had six pandemics (roughly one every 25 years). Can 1918 (the year Spanish flu appeared) happen today? In 1918, people did not know the germs that caused the disease, and this time period was pre-antibiotics. There was no quarantine. There is no question we will not have a 1918-like situation. However, she claimed, you need to consider the secular trends. If the next wave of this H1N1 occurs when everything is calm, there will only be one level of disease and death. But if it happens when there are economic issues or problems with terrorism, for example, the underlying condition of the population makes them that much more susceptible. Billauer argued that it does not actually have anything to do with the disease itself. Thirdly, one must assess competing security threats. She asked whether anyone was worried about Avian Flu? (No one raised their hand to indicate they were worried.) In the case of this virus, it was not as bad as was the actual spread of the virus (the number of deaths in relation to the number of cases). Billauer utilized a graph that indicated the virus and deaths heightening and then leveling off. She claimed that if anything, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is more emotional. The implications of misrepresenting a microbial enemy have political consequences. She presented the audience with an epidemic curve of SARS. The virus started in March of 2003 and ended in July of 2003. There were 8,000 cases in total throughout the world, with 774 deaths. The graph indicated a fatality rate of a little less than 10 percent. Presently, the information regarding H1N1 is a little different. Billauer presented another graph and stated that with respect to the Canadian epidemic curve, one gets a sense of what is happening in real time. She argued that one could see that for this wave, we are on the ‘down side.’ She argued that we need good data and the case fatality must be provided (the number of people that die per number of those affected). Worldwide, death as a result of swine flu is 0.2 percent. The United States considers only one factor: percentage of deaths. Billauer recalled when Al Qaeda had threatened to use Anthrax to kill mass amounts of the American populace. She stated that Janet Napolitano, the Director of Homeland Security in the United States, acted as if she believed Anthrax was a true danger when Al Qaeda threatened to spread it on the White House lawn. Billauer stated that in terms of deployment of energies, Al Qaeda should know that far more effective in terms of ‘pound per pound’ is salmonella. One can grow salmonella by taking an opened container of mayonnaise and leaving it on the kitchen counter. There have been 12 attempts at using Anthrax in the past decade. There was one attempt in 1968 at using salmonella (a domestic terrorist). Billauer concluded her talk by questioning whether the reaction by the United States government to Al Qaeda’s threat was an attempt to scare Americans because people believe Anthrax is dangerous, or whether it is an attempt to divert people from what is really significant.
Assistant Commissioner Mike Cabana, Federal & International Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Assistant Commissioner Cabana addressed collaborative approaches to safer homelands. There are 28,000 people that work across Canada in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP is unique. They police at four different levels: municipal, provincial, national and international. The RCMP fights organized crime, terrorism, and economic crime. They enforce border security, they hold federally-mandates duties, and they are trained in first response capabilities regarding nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. The RCMP is also active internationally. They stand alongside the Canadian military and the United Nations regarding peacekeeping missions. Cabana claimed that managing the extent of the RCMP’s duties is at times difficult. Close partnerships, security and intelligence agencies, and other government departments in Canada and abroad all contribute to the RCMP’s success. With respect to law enforcement in a world of change, Cabana claimed that it is tough to make predictions about the future, but there are three clear trends that are changing how we think about, and conduct law enforcement: the first is the increasing global nature of crime. Globalization has transformed crime. Globalization is altering the nature and structure of criminal activity. The vast majority of our federal investigations involve an international component, and this has implications for how the RCMP does its job and for the job it is expected to do. It affects how the RCMP deploys its resources as well. Cabana argued that new tools are required, as are new approaches. For example, international investigations are more complex and involve multiple police jurisdictions (which encompass different values, perspectives, etcetera). The RCMP needs to find innovative ways to work with other countries and governments. When the RCMP enters multi-jurisdictional investigations, they have to surrender some control, and can no longer determine the pace or direction of the investigation. He stated that the transnational nature of crime also means that what we do in Canada does not always make a difference in the overall syndicate. Without close collaboration, it might leave two thirds of an operation untouched. The second trend is the increasing sophistication of crime (for example, the use of technology). Cabana stated that the criminals are often ahead of us regarding the tools they use- they hire the best lawyers, accountants, and various people with expertise. Cabana claimed that we needed to match expertise with expertise, sophistication with sophistication, and technology with technology. We need to improve integration and work better with other groups and organizations. Criminals are doing so and so must we. The third trend is the changing nature of criminal groups themselves- changes regarding how they are organized and what they are doing. He argued that we are witnessing an increase in the involvement of organized crime groups (those who engage in drugs, prostitution, etcetera) in white collar-type crimes (like identity fraud). These groups are moving to areas with less risk and more of a ‘payoff’- areas that are easier for them and harder for law enforcement to track down. Structures have changed as well. There are no more bosses,
but instead there are more temporary alliances. Groups are allying themselves with expert providers. Organizations now form and dissolve, and shift to react to new opportunities. The police are struggling to keep up with these groups and organizations.

With respect to strategies being created to address these trends, one initiative is the Integrative Border Enforcement Team (IBETs). IBETs enhance border integrity and security along the shared Canada-United States border, between designated ports of entry, by identifying and investigating persons, organizations and goods that threaten the national security of either country, or both countries. IBET units protect both Canada and the United States from potential threats of terrorism and impede the trafficking of people and contraband. The five core IBET agencies are the RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, United States Customs and Border Protection, United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the United States Coast Guard. The bi-national partnership enables the five core law enforcement partners to work together for more efficient sharing of information and intelligence. There has been an increase in the number of liaison officers in strategic locations worldwide (for example, in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela). Cabana stated that we are seeing the benefits of integration more and more. He argued that policing today requires a new mindset, new tools, and new approaches. The role of protecting citizens no longer fits traditional ways. Cabana claimed that the vast majority of federal investigations have an international component, and we are striving to find new ways to deal with this reality. Discussions need to be initiated regarding how to improve information sharing and collaboration between agencies. We need to coordinate across borders, and develop new protocols and guidelines to work together. It is difficult to do all of this when dealing with a different nation from our own. For example, other countries have different perspectives on human rights than we do. One concern is whether we should share information with them if we are unsure how they will react with respect to human rights. Cabana claimed that we are essentially ‘sailing in unchartered waters.’ We are facing new realities with respect to globalized criminal activity. The RCMP is working hard to make changes to adjust to this new world. Cabana claimed that we are breaking down structural barriers and revitalizing operations. No one organization can fix all of these problems, so therefore, we need to work together. The RCMP works overseas and in the Americas. A multi-agency approach, both domestically and with our allies internationally, is necessary. Cabana concluded that Canada needed to combine and leverage its skills with other countries.

Colonel (Ret) John Cope, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University

Colonel Cope asked the conference attendees to see our neighbor in a different way. He stated that he agreed with comments that were made by the RCMP panelist and that he would try to re-iterate a few of those comments. Cope claimed that a change had taken
place in this hemisphere. He stated that the region south of North America, less Mexico, has really changed. Cope claimed that we have to adjust to circumstances, and this is challenging because the world is integrating as well as fragmenting. It is essential to deal with these conflicting pressures. Cope argued that we have to see our region in a different way. The theme of his talk was integration and fragmentation. He argued that many governments were likely to emphasize the integrating aspects, but would likely pay little attention to the fragmenting dimensions. Cope claimed that with respect to the security challenges, we do not truly appreciate how dangerous and deeply rooted some of the problems are. Cope questioned whether there is a true understanding of real threats. Historically, the United States has taken this hemisphere for granted. Washington has characterized its policy as ‘strategic denial.’ This approach required limited resources for the United States to protect its interests, and thereby, it avoided regional entanglements and distractions of funds from going to other regions worldwide. The advent of the Cold War forced the United States to seek a better framework for dealing with this region and one has not yet been found. During the past 20 years, most Latin American and Caribbean nations have embraced democratic governments and have adopted more liberal policies. Brazil and Mexico, now major global actors, are among several states benefiting from greater economic and trade activities of recent years. Cope claimed that many in South America have denounced the ‘savage capitalism’ championed by the United States. These Bolivarian states have promised that the government, rather than the market, will help the poor over the rich. Washington’s policy has long recognized that if its nearest neighbors are not secure and stable, then the United States will not be secure. Cope claimed that four priorities have recently underpinned the policy: strengthen democratic institutions, promote prosperity, invest in people, and bolster security. However, Cope claimed, Obama’s policy seems to rest on only two pillars: democratic governance and increased prosperity. These pillars narrowly focus on economic issues and are preoccupied with the stability of the region. Consequently, other areas are overlooked. Growing interdependence, improvements in the region’s infrastructure, and social and cultural integration are changing the nature of the United States and how it does business. As recent events in Mexico and along the border with the United States have illustrated, security challenges posed by transnational crime requires increased and effective cooperation with other states. Cope claimed that the United States could not do this alone.

The United States remains the most important trading partner for Latin America and the Caribbean, but the region’s trade in commodities, and its efforts to promote trade, capital, and investment have generated a large number of partnerships with countries outside the hemisphere. The international competition for trade and influence has started to impose limits on the United States’ ability to dominate in the region. Cope claimed that parts of the region are becoming more distant and independent, and more willing to cultivate United States’ competitors. Despite the United States’ efforts to become less threatening, Latin
America and the Caribbean have not forgotten the United States’ past, and its future potential to dominate trade. The current economic crisis has done little to lessen the view of the United States’ arrogance. The Obama administration has the potential to ‘tap’ into new trends. Regional hegemony is emerging: there are sub-regional groups that are gaining power and importance. Increasingly, countries are rallying around regional leaders. These groups are more willing to accept responsibility for their problems and they want to improve their bargaining power with the rest of the world. They want to improve investment and reduce their dependence on the United States. They also want to work with North Americans on their own terms. Cope claimed that we are beginning to recognize politically the change occurring in the hemisphere. The question is how to work in this environment that has changed so much for the United States. He stated that the ‘dark side’ of all of this is to look at organized crime and to look at some more traditional challenges, such as criminal networks. Cope questioned whether we appreciated the seriousness of this. He argued that criminal networks should be looked at as business models. They are surviving and adapting. If they need something, they will buy it (such as sophisticated expertise or equipment). Thousands of small networks across the hemisphere operate as organized groups. They are embedded in local societies, in the very fabric of these countries, at a low level. The organized crime organizations are often the principle employers of a community. Cope questioned which side had better strategy currently. He stated that they might be far more advanced than we are at the moment. This is a serious dimension of the security challenge. Another challenge is the longevity of active insurgence in Columbia. The very fact that it continues suggests it is a viable way to deal with authority in countries. Cope argued that there is the possibility we may see more of this in Peru, as Bolivarian circles may become focal points for insurgent movements to topple governments. He claimed that although new challenges are emerging, traditional challenges are still important to consider, such as challenges both on land and at sea (these are classic areas of confrontation). With respect to responses, Cope claimed that we first have to recognize the problems. How do we adjust to this new set of circumstances that we confront? Are we prepared structurally, operationally, and psychologically to address these new issues? Cope claimed there needed to be less attention on resources and more attention on partnerships. Countries need to work together. More cooperation is necessary. Cope claimed that we do not work well together in this hemisphere. Cope argued that the emphasis needed to be placed on finding ways to do things at a level that is not threatening to the other side. In terms of changing the approach, many of these countries do not need more resources, but they do need to know more about how to better use the resources. Fusing intelligence, sharing information, and operational planning are all important and necessary. Cope claimed that the United States has never tried, but it is that dimension the United States needs to get involved in. The United States needs to deal better with security. The United States will look to Canada because Canada is better accepted in this hemisphere than is the United States currently.
Cope concluded that by working with Canada, and maybe through Canada, the United States (and its partners) can achieve important things within this hemisphere.

Question Period

Q: In terms of responding to pandemics, one agreement is that cooperation is needed between countries. H1N1 was a test with respect to cooperation. How did we do?

A: From the United States, there has not been much transmission of data. However, from Mexico and Canada, data was released that should have been useful. A study done in Mexico early on considered the replication rate, which is one of the things government policy does not consider at all (replication rate is the number of people one person can infect). Canada was prepared for the replication rate (after a certain number was affected, schools were closed). However, in the United States, the response was on a case-by-case basis and on a locality-by-locality basis. There is a ‘across the country’ standard in Mexico and Canada. However, there is no ‘across the country’ standard in the United States. There was transmission of information from Canada and Mexico, but there was no receipt of Canadian and Mexican transmission in United States’ policy.

Q: Can you provide us with an example of where ‘rubber meets road’ with respect to how we respond to issues? In terms of a response to changing criminal threats in the hemisphere, how would you think of responding to that?

A: It is routine for us to be involved in joint-initiatives with Columbia, such as the sharing of information. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) is a listed terrorist entity here in Canada. It is not an issue whether there would be a joint-initiative with Columbia- this would, and does occur.

Q: When ‘push comes to shove,’ cooperation seems to break down in the hemisphere. How would you respond to that?

A: In regard to Cuba, the level of cooperation with the Cuban government regarding drug trafficking does exist, but is not terribly robust. We are talking about one United States Coast Guard officer that is in the intersection in Havana and does have contact with Cuban government officials. Cuba has always been sensitive with counter-narcotics issues. They keep good control over their air space and it demonstrates that there is cooperation between Cuba and the United States, and that there is potential for cooperation. The issue of distance between us is still very real. Regarding Nicaragua, it has a serious problem with drug trafficking on their Caribbean Coast. Many communities subsist on great white packages. The Nicaraguan government recognizes they have a problem, but they do not have many resources to deal with this problem. Having said all of this, there is still a great distance between both countries in terms of many issues.
Q: Principle threats in the hemisphere are those that do not cause the National Defense Agency to be primary. What could the military forces be prepared to support in terms of major issues?

A: What national defense should be doing is what they are already doing. They are part of the operations and have assisted us oftentimes. There are already mechanisms where information and intelligence are being shared on some fronts.

A: In many countries, it is often the police force that is the most problematic institution. Police forces often suffer from corruption. In these countries, there are various private security organizations because the police do not work very well. Mexico is working hard to improve their police forces. The institution that is probably the most reliable is the armed forces in these countries, and the question is how to reach out to them, and work with them. However, there is not one common way to do this, since each country is so distinct. The United States has difficulty working with the armed forces in Mexico. Mexico will not accept a United States military presence in their country. They are concerned that by getting too close to the United States, they may end up being subordinate to the United States, and that may be a smart move on their part. We can work together and we can develop capabilities together where it cannot be observed at home. These capabilities must be developed outside of the purview of the media- where the press and politician do not see it occurring. We have good relationships in that way. But in other countries, we have ‘gone in’ and can do so again (which confirms the point that each country is different and must be regarded as distinct from other countries within that same region).

A: Defense should not reduce the sensitivity of security issues. There is only one effective way of spreading small pox: using low flying planes. The administration is not sensitive to low-flying planes. You do not want to de-sensitize the public by permitting low-flying planes around and above Manhattan.

A: There is a disconnection between the threat matrix in the hemisphere and the financing we have for security. Police forces in the hemisphere are proving to be unprofessional and corrupt. As a result, the military is called in as the last line of defense. In terms of a radical thought, defense agencies could look to budget transfers. Maybe we should look at fixing the architecture of financing for the security of the region.

Q: It is interesting, this notion of what kind of information we have and how to get organized. Looking at the issue of organized crime, there is a high degree of violence in Latin America. With respect to organized crime in the United States and in Canada, it seems it is part of a strategy not to ‘hype’ the violence. I would like to hear from the panel regarding this relationship between the degree of violence of organized crime and the strategies in place to deal with it. Also, I would like to hear from the panel regarding the differences in terms of perspective and how we can coordinate with others to deal with the problem.
A: There has been an increase primarily in drug-related problems. Essentially, assuming your premise is correct, you do not want violence to disrupt your market, and this is where you are trying to sell the product all over the United States. You do not want to scare people away from the product by excessive violence. However, with Mexico, you have competition for a number of ways to get the product into the United States, and you want to maximize your profit, so there may be a need to use violence to eliminate competition, or at least to defend your territory to move your product into the United States. So in that sense, the violence in Mexico is understandable. Now Mexico has not always had that violence. In the 1990s, it was not there, but you could argue that it was much easier to get product and you were not competing with avenues into the United States. Some would argue that the Mexican government was not willing to pressure the various cartels, much to chagrin of the United States that was pushing Mexico to do more against cartel. Since they had a good environment, they did not need to use the violence.

A: The level of violence depends on a number of factors. From a Canadian perspective based on what we see in this situation, maybe we do not experience the same level of violence we see in other jurisdictions, but we have experienced such violence in the past. We are now seeing the contrary: these organizations are now more sophisticated, and they are in fact resorting to specialists. So we are seeing the same organizations from 20 to 30 years ago, but they are now more ‘low-key.’ For instance, if you saw them on the street, you would think they were businessmen. This does not mean they are not violent. They are now resorting to other services and are trying to carve their own place in the market. From a law enforcement perspective, the violence is there to intimidate law enforcement and people within communities. Whatever strategy is implemented, a key piece has to be community engagement. The community must play a major role in getting rid of these organizations.

As evident by the speeches and discussions thus far, there is an agreement that cooperation within countries and governments, and cooperation between governments and countries is necessary. The speakers stressed the need to learn from previous mistakes, to learn from one another and to increase and ameliorate cooperation between countries. The speakers have agreed on the pertinent threats that seem to affect each country, in both North America and Latin America, like terrorism and organized crime. Globalization affects each country, and it affects each one differently. As argued by Cope, globalization is altering the nature and structure of criminal activity. However, as Donaldson claimed, there are opportunities for cooperation and exchange with the states in the hemisphere. Some speakers stressed the need for Canada to become more engaged in Latin America. A sharing of information and skills, and increased cooperation seemed to be the themes of the conference thus far. Cope claimed there needed to be less attention on resources and more attention on partnerships. Countries need to work together. More cooperation is necessary. As noted by Cope, the countries in this hemisphere do not work well together, and this needs to change.
Afternoon Keynote Address

Stephen Johnson, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the Western Hemisphere

Stephen Johnson opened his keynote address by offering his appreciation to the Four Points Sheraton for hosting the conference, and particularly to the previous speakers for setting the stage, and providing such a strong foundation upon which subsequent analysis and discussions can be based. In terms of the earlier discussion on pandemics as introduced by Barbara Billauer, this certainly merits further discussion and analysis that brings together civilian and military expertise. He was struck by Assistant Commissioner Mike Cabana’s remarks with regards to the role of social elements within police work and mounting an effective defence against threats. Johnson further thanks Colonel (ret’d) John Cope for his advice and leadership while Johnson was at National Defence.

Johnson noted that it is clear from the earlier discussion that the Western hemisphere is not the same place it was ten or twenty years ago; the bipolar east and west axis is gone, American unipolarity is on the decline, and the international system is entering a multi-polar age marked by the existence of a number of power centers. We are increasingly subject to the influence of extra-hemispheric powers in our neighbourhood; interconnectivity affects us all.

Moreover, the recent shift seen in many Latin American countries from a tradition of authoritarianism to electoral democracy is a remarkable thing to see, made even more remarkable by the fact that it happened in a time span of about twenty to thirty years. When we look at some of the challenges that we are facing in the Western hemisphere today, it is important to understand that this shift to democracy is recent.

Most of our countries are enjoying increase prosperity, with growing trade relationships; though some of us are facing an economic slowdown, this is in part due to our interconnectedness.

The threat picture has changed as well. We see a shift from a Soviet-centric threat picture to issues of transnational crime and national disasters, though state-on-state subversion is still a possibility in episodes of backlash against markets and governments that exist in various places around the world. The way that we deal with threats is also evolving, and must continue to do so. Until recently, America’s Cold War experience has continued to inform today’s defence decisions. Johnson summed up this experience with the following Will Rogers quote: “If you stay on the right track too long, you’ll eventually get hit by a train.” Occasionally, it’s important to occasionally adjust our thinking, even as we think we’re headed in the right direction.
Transnational crime, fuelled by drug smuggling, the arms trade, and human trafficking, is valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. No nation can face this threat on its own. Arms proliferation is another issue of concern; even as the world’s powers seek to reduce their nuclear arsenals, developing nations wish to acquire them. Even natural disasters have the potential to overwhelm states. The key to facing this broad array of threats is developing a paradigm that better employs law enforcement, regulatory agencies and the military, and developing cooperative measures to facilitate burden-sharing. This may require a redefinition of roles and missions to some extent.

Johnson noted that the United States was particularly appreciative of the fact that Canadian foreign policy was redefined in the past to take Latin America and the Caribbean into greater consideration. Canada’s closer relationships with Brazil, Mexico, Chile and others is very much appreciated south of the border because, of course, the US cannot deal with issues in Central and Latin America alone.

As partners in security and defence, Johnson states that we need to be aware of our strengths and weaknesses; moreover, we must seize opportunities when they appear as these moments typically do not last very long.

So why cooperate? By sharing and cooperating where possible, we push our borders out further and increase our security. This is not an infringement on state sovereignty; rather, it is a way to ensure that our defence and law enforcement institutions can defend our population better by sharing information with other agencies with similar responsibilities. For example, few American decision makers were able to connect the dots prior to 11 September 2001 due to limited cooperation and interdepartmental connectivity; Washington has since been reorganizing to ensure greater cooperation.

This has also been happening at a regional level. The Central American Integration System, which started in 1997, promotes information-sharing between militaries and law enforcement agencies in Central America; the Conference on Central American Armed Forces seeks to integrated defence institutions more effectively into civilian government; the newly-formed South American Defence Council enhances coordination and builds confidence amongst its members (primarily Brazil and its immediate neighbours).

More countries are assuming regional and global leadership roles in the security arena as well; this is a new trend. Chile has hosted exercises and opened its military schools to foreign students; Brazil is involved in a leadership role in United Nations peacekeeping missions and building sub-regional narcotics interdiction capabilities; El Salvador contributed troops to Iraq, and Columbia agreed to provide stabilization forces to Afghanistan. In these ways, we are all making our defences stronger and gaining global experience through a mix of both defence and law enforcement.
Modest economic performance coupled with weak tax collection keeps many developing states from effectively deliver government services, including territorial defence and public security. Armed forces are underequipped, and due to shortages in funding, forces to spend the majority of their budgets on salaries. Police in many places are underpaid, undertrained, corrupt, and deployed only in large cities that have political clout. These weaknesses foster insecurity and suppress investment, which further limits tax revenues – it is a vicious cycle.

Central America, where the problems are most acute, is resource constrained. For example, Guatemala’s GDP of about $33B compares to that of Dayton, Ohio; Costa Rica’s GDP is relative to that of Syracuse, NY; Honduras’ economy is similar in size to Fort Collins, Colorado. Belize is a case in point. It’s the size of Massachusetts with a population of 300,000. Belize simply cannot deal with narco trafficking; the state can barely afford an air force or a coast guard, yet it is situated on a major drug trafficking fly-way route. Though Belize receives air traffic alerts from joint task forces, they lack the means to respond. In terms of drugs, human trafficking, arms trade, and weapons of mass destruction, how can we reduce smuggling in a systematic and intelligent way?

Most countries in the region have the will, but cannot afford to address these problems. Their ability to secure air, sea and territorial border domains is inadequate; in this context, cooperation is absolutely necessary.

No one has a lot of resources right now; Johnson argued that the key to a good strategy is knowing how to leverage what you’ve got, including intellectual resources. There are moments of opportunity in which problems can be managed before they get out of hand. Canada and the United States seized one such moment of opportunity with the formation of NORAD. Chile and Argentina built mutual confidence through the formation of a binational standby peacekeeping force. Guatemala’s commitment to the United Nations to fight impunity and accept United Nations help in building trust in public institutions; this was integral to their attempt to gain a handle on crime in their territory.

Down the road, there are more opportunities. Brazil is working with Columbia and Peru to build border security; similarly, Canada, the US and Mexico might look to add a defence element to the existing Security and Prosperity Partnership. There will shortly come at a time when we will need mechanisms to discuss continental security in a more comprehensive, trilateral manner.

Disaster response, Johnson argued, is another area in which cooperation is absolutely necessary. Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, health pandemics, man-made disasters; all are able to kill as many people as small wars. Our means of communicating, and supplying the right kind of assistance, will require coordinating mechanisms at the highest levels.
Johnson then offered a quick word about the Organization of American States. The OAS, he said, is suffering a brush with irrelevance. The Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago had an agenda of over 100 items, way too much to discuss in two days. Already, the summit process is rife with hundreds of agreements never concluded by member countries; indeed, OAS agreements suffer from a markedly low level of implementation. Moreover, it seems as though the only item on the agenda at the last Summit that seemed to carry any weight was that of welcoming Cuba into the fold.

This is a different organization than that which approved the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. The OAS stood for democracy and free markets before they were common in our hemisphere. Part of the problem now is how to deal with rising authoritarian leadership represented by Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua; now it’s important to seize the opportunity to urge these leaders and others to press Cuba to enact democratic reforms.

In terms of the OAS’ long “to-do” list, Johnson suggests a “top-ten list” approach akin to late night television top-ten lists.

*The Top Ten Things the Hemisphere Doesn’t Need*

10. Arms races, aided by extra-hemispheric powers
9. Interference in other people’s elections
8. Inventive reasons to suspend civil liberties
7. Attention from the United States; no one remembers what it was like the last time they got it, or else they wouldn’t ask

It remains with the audience to fill in the remainder of the blanks, though the top thing that the hemisphere doesn’t need is an unwillingness to listen to the concerns of others.

Our neighbourhood has achieved remarkable progress, and we must keep that in mind, and keep working at it to continue achieving progress. In order to do this, we need approach security with a cooperative spirit.

In closing, Johnson offered a word about the value of conferences. There are many talented minds that come together at conferences such as this, and we have an opportunity to dive into some serious challenges. To see these challenges for what they really are, we may have to abandon old paradigms to ensure that we approach these issues with our eyes open. We need to expand our scope and see the larger dimensions of the challenges that we face.
In the coming years, the hemisphere’s population will surpass 1B people, our resources will become scarcer, and jobs will likely be in short supply. How will we deal with this? What will be the role of our militaries and law enforcement and regulatory agencies in this new world? Hopefully we’ll be thinking about the answers to these questions throughout the conference, and Johnson looks forward to the conclusions that arise from this discussion.

**Question Period**

Q: I understand that, in JIATF, there is joint civilian and military high command. Could you talk to the merits of command or leadership of organizations and/or task forces that are multidisciplinary (military/civilian) at the command level? Please speak to any limitations that this may bring, and how to best mitigate these limitations.

A: There are other commands that have done the same thing and the idea is to bring civilian experience into the commands so that there is greater coordination across agency boundaries. The Coast Guard has always been good at this (now homeland security), with good representation in a number of agencies (State, DOD all host Coast Guard liaison officers). Having a civilian deputy is one way of doing that at a very high level.

This is an attempt by the US to imitate Canada, which is much more joint in their armed forces. The US takes lessons from watching others, and seeing how other operate. Civilian experience in a military organization can help make decisions, and answer questions such as how will host countries react to certain things? How can we best deal with embassies? This is more convenient than having to schedule an interagency meeting.

Q: Some of these problems that are being discussed at this conference have a history that extends beyond 9/11. One of the big strategic efforts of the US in the late 80s/90s was Plan Columbia. What has the US learned from Plan Columbia that can be applied here? Was that project misdirected or forgotten?

A: No, it wasn’t forgotten; it remains very much in our minds. One of the lessons was not to call anything else Plan Columbia because no one wants to be lumped into a similar basket as the situation of another country. So the initiatives that are undertaken bilaterally are tailored to the specific needs of the country.

The other lesson is that there is much to admire in Plan Columbia. It was something that had to come along at the end of a period of disengagement on the part of the US; what resulted from Columbian planners working with US planners was something that was much more comprehensive. Plan Columbia had ten points that dealt with poverty, human rights, IDPs; only a few points had to do with security and defence. That is the greater lesson. The extent to
which Plan Columbia was successful was based on the fact that it was comprehensive. There was no silver bullet solution.

The other thing that was key was Columbian leadership. And not just in terms of inspiration, but inspired leadership on the part of those who came into government during various administrations. Look at Columbia; it’s a country that has a great deal of intelligent youth that have come out of the universities and into government, filling important positions and laying the groundwork for greater institutionalisation of public institutions. The experience base is building upon the energy and enthusiasm of young people in their jobs. People remember those things and go back into civil society and inform other decisions; take on other important jobs like running for public offices. From a citizen’s standpoint, Plan Columbia was a success. And of course Columbia must be applauded for its work. It would have been nice to have found a way to cut down on narco-trafficking; but Columbia is a large country and this is a difficult issue to get a handle on. But about 90% of it was successful.

The keynote speaker thanked the conference, and received a token of appreciation on behalf of the conference and its sponsors.

Panel II: Building Security in the Americas

Chair: Dr. Paul Kan, Department of National Security Studies, US Army War College

The second panel of the conference commenced with a few brief introductory comments by the panel chair, Dr. Paul Kan of the Department of National Security Studies at the US Army War College. Dr. Kan defined the task of this panel as that of building a process by which solutions can be identified to security issues in the Americas.

Colonel Alex Crowther, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College

Colonel Alex Crowther of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, was the first panelist to speak; he directed his comments towards the security situation in Mexico and Central America, as well as how to build capacity in this region.

After first thanking Dr. Kan for his introduction, Colonel Crowther noted that it is a pleasure for him to have the opportunity to speak at this conference as Kingston is much better than Baghdad; Colonel Crowther is returning to duty in Iraq at the end of the week.

The security forces in Central America were particularly forceful during the latter part of the Cold War, and the peace processes towards the end of the Cold War led to a downsizing of the military, and the disbanding the police forces due to their particularly harsh role in repressing Central American populations.
At the same time, the US was increasing pressure for the drug war, while limiting military assistance for Latin America, allocating only 300 million USD last year for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The drug war was able to shut down transport corridors through the Dominican Republic and Haiti through the aggressive use of the interagency task force; the Caribbean was all but closed to drug trafficking. As a result, the only remaining trafficking route was through Mexico and Central America. This redirection of trafficking occurred at the same time as a downsizing of external military support to the region.

The transport routes and land pipelines utilized for drug smuggling are also used for human trafficking. And, at the same time, the United States was deporting gang members back to Central America.

All of these things were mixed together in a witch’s brew and overwhelmed the security sector in Central America.

There are currently around 60 000 military forces in Central America; this force is smaller than the military contingent in El Salvador along during the war. The aforementioned issues, when combined with such things as corruption, lack of infrastructure and poverty, serve to overwhelm the military and security capacity of the region.

Panama disbanded their military in the late 1980s; Costa Rica has not had a military since 1948; Nicaragua and Honduras both possess “alternately governed” territories, within which a lack of government authority permits the free movement of drug runners. Aircraft smuggling, marine smuggling, land transport, truck transport... all of this is occurring at a time when there is no system in place to address these issues.

So what have these countries done? There have been some bilateral programs instituted to increase security capacity, including an international criminal investigation and training assistance program, SICA, SIECA and SIFAC. The US Department of State has instituted a number of programs. Southern Command has bumped up security assistance to the countries in question. SIFAC is of particular importance, as it is the one place where countries can discuss security issues; however, as it is an armed forces centric organization, countries such as Panama and Costa Rica have a hard time being heard.

Central America is currently working on integration. The United States has run counter-drug flights in El Salvador, and supports a 500-person detachment with a helicopter support battalion to assist in counter-drug programs. However, the capacity of programs such as these is overwhelmed.
Drug traffickers tend to be much better equipped than local forces such that, in most cases, their aircraft or boats can outrun local law enforcement; moreover, many of the air and sea assets in the region are laid up with maintenance issues anyway.

Crowther noted that the system that has been overwhelmed, but that, as a result of the region’s history and a lack of financial resources, states don’t want to pursue a security-centric solution to these issues; therefore they have no solution.

From the perspective of northern Central American states, boats or aircraft will arrive in Ecuador, Guatemala, Belize, etc., and once they get into Mexico, they are able to tap into a well-developed transport system. Once you get into the Mexican heartland and start moving north, Crowther notes, it just gets worse from there. Mexico, therefore, is an issue in itself.

One can think about Mexico in a number of ways. They really don’t want to attract that much attention from the United States; when Mexico has security issues, the United States gets “hinky” pretty fast.

Crowther notes that it is not uncommon to see American newscasters referring to Mexico as a failed state; Mexico won’t be a failed state any time soon. Though it does face a significant challenges posed by pervasive criminality in the north, this population will not overthrow the Mexican state. The Mexican army is viable and attempting to deal with the situation.

In terms of security, the local police are not up to the challenge of effectively addressing the issue of narco-trafficking. Local police, and their families, live in the area and the local drug lords know who they are and where they reside. As a result of this, and of issues of corruption, local police are simply not in a position to engage in counter-drug operations. The Government of Mexico has engaged in what can be referred to as an “internal surge”. The state is divided into 45 military zones and 12 military regions, of which southern regions are taxed for units to serve in the north. For example, one military zone may be required to provide an infantry battalion. Conventional units then spend 90 days serving in the north of the country; because they aren’t local, the drug lords cannot threaten their families; moreover, the army doesn’t have the same institutional problem with corruption. However, due to gun smuggling into the north of Mexico from the United States, there is a proliferation of high-end weaponry in the region; Mexican special operations forces operating in the north thus find themselves in fire fights with a highly-skilled and well-armed adversary.

In addition to the aforementioned security programs, the Mexican government is working on a number of political solutions. The Mexican and American Presidents met in January, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Mexico in March. Individual programs are
having some success, though institutional suspicion between the Mexican and American governments remains an obstacle.

Crowther then spoke of the feasibility of a comprehensive plan for Mexico along the same lines as Plan Columbia. Though there cannot be a Plan Mexico, some of the same tools are being used to address a number of issues in Mexico. However, the Mexican Government is refusing to allow the United States to impose any caveats on them; Mexican institutions are very resistant to any perceived sovereignty infringement.

The United States has allocated 400 million USD for Mexico and 65 million USD for Dominica, Haiti and Central America. Mexico is, at best, a tertiary priority for the United States after such places as Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa, and current domestic economic concerns.

In spite of this, Colonel Crowther posited that not all is lost. The United States retains a forward-looking disposition.

Crowther concluded that the reality behind these security concerns is that they are, by and large, caused by the American drug user. Until issues of demand reduction are addressed, drugs will continue to run through Central America.

Immigration policies remain an issue. Gun trafficking remains an issue. The United States is looking to strengthen bilateral cooperation throughout Mexico and Central America. Crowther notes that it might be beneficial to include Canada in a trilateral organizations, though neither Mexico nor Canada are particularly interested in this idea. Still, as a supplement to bilateral relations, a trilateral meeting may have merit; Crowther further proposes taking this trilateral body and bringing in SIFOC to produce a four-way talk shop that can take a holistic approach to dealing with issues from Alaska to Panama.

Colonel Crowther further argued for the need for greater intelligence sharing; Canada-US cooperation is decent right up until moment when another party enters the room.

Crowther concluded his remarks by noting that the underlying causes feeding the security situation in Central America must be addressed. Until such things as corruption, tax reform and poverty are addressed, no state will be strong enough to counter the effect of criminality in the region.

Dr. Norman Bailey, The Institute of World Politics

Dr. Norman Bailey of The Institute for World Politics was the second panelist to speak in the afternoon, directing his comments to the nature of Iran’s influence and activities in Venezuela and the Americas.
Bailey began his speech with a brief story. There was a reception held in the capital city following a presidential election in Peru in which the ruling party received only 5% of the vote. One of the state administrators attended the party; because of his party’s poor showing, he was rather depressed and, accordingly, rather drunk. As he was staggering out of the party, he noticed a tall lady standing by the wall, dressed in a long red gown. He stumbled over to her and asked if she would dance with him. She looked down at him, and said “Not in your life! First, you’re drunk. Second of all, this song is the national anthem. Third, I’m the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima.”

The moral of the story is that things are not always as they seem.

Bailey then offered a quote from an editorial.

“Venezuela poses no strategic threat. The US has paid far too high a price in international influence for George Bush’s bullying.”

Both of these statements are incorrect. The situation in Venezuela is not the result of American bullying; rather there is no American interest in Venezuela. Recent major speeches have included no mention of Cuba or Venezuela; this is akin to a speech on physics that doesn’t mention gravity.

Yet the more important part of the statement is that which posits that Venezuela is not a strategic threat. It is. One of the most important aspects of this threat is associated with the influence of Iran in Venezuela and, through Venezuela, in Latin America.

Bailey noted that the first thing to be said about the Iranian penetration into the Western hemisphere is that it is very broad and very deep, and touches areas that most don’t know about or have never heard about. The press in the United States has almost totally ignored its responsibility to inform, and the Governments involved are not doing much better.

Iran has invested in Venezuela and elsewhere in the region, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 20 billion dollars as of 2009.

This was done with the collaboration of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The Government of Venezuela regularly issues identification documents to Iranians; Bailey commented that if you meet someone whose name is José Rodriguez, who possesses valid Venezuelan identification documents but who speaks poor Spanish with a heavy Farsi accent, you can be fairly sure he is Iranian.

The sectors in which Iran has an active presence in Venezuela include: financial and trade services; industry; food industry; transportation; energy; chemicals; construction; technical industries; diplomacy; and, the military.
In terms of Iranian influence in Venezuela’s financial sector, Bailey noted that Iran uses the Venezuelan financial system to evade American, United Nations and EU sanctions. There are two Iranian banks in Venezuela: one, a joint back with the Venezuelan government; the other, owned entirely by Iran. All are used to evade financial sanctions, while four Venezuelan banks are used extensively by Iranian nationals for their operations in Venezuela and Latin America.

In terms of industry, Iran owns a tractor factory, a cement plant, a car assembly plant, a bike factory and a gold mine in Venezuela. However, the first four of the aforementioned examples have been purchased by Iranians for other reasons, such as to act as warehouses for contraband or to be used to house the headquarters for various activities in Venezuela. So, Bailey asked the audience, why the gold mine? The mine also produces uranium.

In terms of Iranian influence in Venezuela’s food industry, Iran owns a tuna processing plant, a corn processing plant and a dairy plant. Dr. Bailey noted that the tuna processing plant, for example, was used as a cut out for the Venezuelan government. The tuna plant permitted the controlling interests to purchase a fleet of ocean-going tuna boats in Ecuador. Iran subsequently bought a ship yard in Panama, moved the tuna boats to the shipyard and then converted them into tuna/cocaine boats. The tuna, Bailey noted, hides the smell of the drugs. This fleet of “tuna boats” is now used to carry cocaine to West Africa to be shipped into Europe.

Bailey noted that there are weekly flights from Caracas to Damascus to Tehran; the commercial flights are alternately run by Iranian and Venezuelan airlines, but you cannot buy tickets for these flights as they are reserved for Government officials. Yet, Bailey notes, the cargo hold is always full, and isn’t subject to customs in either country. Moreover, there is a direct container route from Iran to Venezuela.

There is extensive cooperation between state oil in Venezuela and state oil in Iran, due in part to various joint ventures in production, refining and shipment.

Iran further supplies assistance in military, intelligence, energy, government, food and agricultural sectors, including extensive interchange between civilian and military intelligence in both countries. Moreover, the Venezuelan Presidential Guard is now predominantly Iranian.

Due to long-standing ties between the Persian Empire and the Western hemisphere, Iran now has a huge diplomatic presence in the region. The Iranian Embassy in Managua now has 120 people, many of whom are “cultural agents”. From Managua, they move into Central America, where they maintain a large presence in Panama in spite of the fact that Iran doesn’t have diplomatic relations with Panama.
In terms of military affairs, Iran collaborates with the Venezuelan military and assists in the training of the Venezuelan Armed Forces in asymmetric war and techniques to sabotage energy infrastructure. The energy infrastructure in Venezuela has been mined with Iranian support; in the event of an American attack against Venezuela or Iran, the energy infrastructure in Venezuela would be blown up.

Moreover, Bailey posits, Iran and Venezuela intend to sabotage the Panama Canal. Six months ago, a headless body of a scuba diver was found in the Canal. Scuba divers, Bailey explained, are able to attach cocaine to the hull of a ship as it passes through the Canal, and it can be picked up when the ship arrives at its destination. However, the diver stole 15000 dollars of cocaine from the shipment, and thus the diver was killed in retribution. This story is important, argues Bailey, because the same could be done with explosives. If a ship was exploded in this manner while it was passing through the canal, the canal would be closed.

Iran also maintains a presence in regional drug trafficking routes. Iran supports the FARC in western Venezuela and Columbia and, through a number of activities, Iran also supports Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. Iran is also involved in money laundering, drug trafficking, diamond smuggling, terrorist financing, circumventing sanctions and producing the precursor chemicals required for cocaine production.

Dr. Bailey concluded that Iran has achieved its goal of establishing a strategic presence in the West. With the information he collected to date, it is clear that Iranian activities in the Western hemisphere are different from what is publicly announced. The US and other governments should, Bailey argues, implement immediate actions to confront the threat that those activities represent to our national security.

Bailey concluded his comments by highlighting a number of recent events that spark even further concern about Iranian influence in the Western hemisphere. Missile parts were recently intercepted en route to Syria from Iran to Venezuela. Israeli intelligence services said that Venezuela and Bolivia intended to provide uranium to Iran; Bolivia responded, arguing there was no uranium in Bolivia, however the ministry of mines announced days later that uranium exploration was to be restarted.

**Captain (N) Donovan, Maritime Staff, Canadian Forces**

The third panelist of the afternoon was Captain (N) Donovan of the Canadian Forces’ Maritime Staff. He prefaced his speech with the caveat that he is not an expert on Latin American affairs, but rather an operator and a ship driver. Donovan introduced his remarks as a discussion of building security in the Americas by building relationships in the Americas. As is the case with many relationships, Donovan noted, relationships in the Americas require a significant commitment of time and effort.
The Canadian Navy has been engaged in building relationships in this region through the use of sea power throughout the Caribbean; however, in the future, effective security measures in the Caribbean will require the formation of new relationships, as well as the expansion of existing relationships through a more effective use of sea power. Sea power, with its inherent flexibility, remains ideally suited to contribute to Caribbean security, providing the Canadian Government with options in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

Canada has a long-held interest in the Caribbean. According to federal statistics, eleven percent of Canadian immigrants are from the Caribbean, with the two largest immigrant communities coming from Jamaica and Haiti. Given that these populations often choose to settle in key regions and neighborhoods, they have a unified voice in lobbying political leadership.

Moreover, the Caribbean is a priority market for Canada. Our trade with the Caribbean is growing, and government reports indicate that exports to the region (not including exports to Mexico) increased by thirty percent between 2007 and 2008. Moreover, Canadian direct investment is substantial in the region, estimated at over ninety-four billion dollars in 2008 (not including Mexico or Bermuda); this is almost three times the level of investment in Asia.

Canada’s holistic approach to security issues, as represented by the Canada First Defence Strategy, is tailored to support hemispheric objectives. The Canadian Forces is a strong partner to work in collaboration with American forces in all manner of hemispheric activities. Furthermore, the Canadian Forces is a key component of the whole-of-government approach.

The recent visit of the Chief of the Defence Staff to the Caribbean and Latin America have set the tone in building the right relationships in the region; this was the first time the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff has visited the region in over a decade, which is reflective of Canada’s commitment to continued strategic military engagement in this region.

Canada has identified four main threats in the region, including drug trafficking, organized crime, health pandemics and natural disasters. These threats have transnational reach and cross-border implications, and the intensity required and risk assumed in countering these threats ranges from low to high. In any case, these threats have implications for Canadian security.

The social effects of narcotics in Canada have implications for crime levels, conflict between competing drug organizations, and resulting high policing costs. Also, drug issues exert an influence on issues of weapons smuggling, money laundering, and family effects. Organized crime in the Caribbean has a clear nexus with narcotics trade. These groups have the means, both in terms of violence and financial resources, to coerce, threaten, and bribe
governments and police authorities, and thus corrode government authority. The impact of crime in the Caribbean can be felt within Canada’s tourism industry.

In terms of natural disasters, hurricanes can result in disease and possible social instability if governments are unable to respond effectively. For Canada, such disasters can harm investment, Canadian nationals vacationing in the region, and ongoing work by Canadian aid organizations operating in the region.

Canada has a number of reasons to be interested in building security in the Caribbean, but there are also a number of challenges in this endeavour. First, the Caribbean is very far away from Canada. The region is large, and diverse, and the challenges to security in the Caribbean come from a number of sources, and require a range of responses. These are challenges for which the navy is particularly well-suited, and the navy has been involved in building security in the Caribbean for some time. Through joint operations with the United States and hemispheric partners, the Canadian navy has built the relationships and the body of regional knowledge required to be effective in this region. Donovan argued that, through capitalizing on the timelessness of sea power, we have been able to overcome geography and distance through the use of a rapidly deployable, mobile and self-sustaining navy. Given that relationships take time to build, the fact that Canadian sea power can come and go with little or no footprint over time allows it to have an enduring effect in the region, representing strategic flexibility for Canada.

One of the early naval operations in the region was Operation Forward Action, conducted between 1993 and 1994. During this operation, Canadian ships deployed to enforce United Nations resolutions against Haiti. Over the course of the operation, Canadian ships conducted 9000 hailings, 1300 boardings, and diverted 120 ships from delivering banned material to Haiti.

The navy’s flexibility to switch missions mid-course was demonstrated last year. During the 2008 hurricane, HMCS St John’s deployed to the Caribbean to participate in an international operation, after which it was to participate in US Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South counter-narcotics operations (Operation Caribbe). While conducting another operation, the ship was tasked to support OP Horatio in hurricane support operations. The ship left the coast off Honduras to sail to Jamaica, where it participated in relief operations through the World Food Programme. HMCS St John’s delivered supplied from Port-au-Prince to isolated areas; within 13 days, its ship and helicopter delivered 450 metric tonnes of food during this operation, demonstrating the ship’s ability to shift from a counternarcotics operation to a humanitarian operation within 24 hours. Operation Horatio also demonstrated the value of having a naval vessel in the region during hurricane season, able to redeploying to meet Canadian objectives in the region.
The Canadian Navy has a long history of participating in counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean. Prior to the commencement of OP Caribbe two years ago, the Canadian Navy deployed to the Caribbean on a regular basis, to paint the ship, to test missiles in American ranges in Puerto Rico, and to conduct counter-narcotics surveillance in the process. Today, the role of Canadian ships is defined before they deploy to participate in OP Caribbe; ship painting comes second. In 2008, HMCS Cornerbrook deployed for three months, followed by HMCS Montreal, which was then involved in the seizure of a drug-running vessel.

Success in OP Caribbe continued this year as Montreal deployed again, assisting in a drug bust and participating in the development of tactics and procedures to aid in the detection of semi-submersible vessels. In this capacity, Montreal became the first naval ship to conduct these trials in cooperation with the US Coast Guard and JIATF-S.

Donovan argues that our participation in JIATF-S operations highlight three key points. First, sea power is playing a leading role in Canada’s contribution to Caribbean security. Second, Canada is developing new ways to advance tactics so that we can stay ahead of smugglers. Most importantly, JIATF-S operations show the Navy’s ability to operate effectively with international maritime forces over a long period of time. Canada has been able to plug into JIATF-S in its operations in the Caribbean each time we deploy to the region, and the Canadian Navy has built and sustained relationships with this organization.

The task of building security is never complete. Where security does not exist, it must be established; where security does exist, it must be developed and expanded. There are and will continue to be opportunities for engagement in this region. New issues may arise relating to stewardship of the marine environment, exploitation of offshore resources, protecting fish stocks, or combating the long-term effects of climate change. This is a future where sea power can continue to play a valuable role. The navy can contribute to building security capacity in the Caribbean, including such things as the provision of boarding team training, training in diving operations, and contributing expertise in maritime domain awareness. By assisting Caribbean nations in developing these skills, Canada will contribute to building security in the region. Moreover, the procurement of new technology will mean that the Canadian Navy will be in an even stronger position to offer strategic capacity to the Canadian government.

The challenge for the future is to make our efforts more holistic, and interdisciplinary. This will require greater understanding of sea power in the halls of government; how do we get someone to say, “Where’s the nearest ship?” in moments of crisis. Looking to the future, Donovan suggests that the Navy could have interagency teams to talk about the experience of the Canadian Navy as a means to share and collaborate. This would represent a unique level of governmental cooperation, and a similar model of cooperation could be beneficial to Caribbean states. At the end of the day, it is the government’s responsibility to decide.
Donovan concluded that the Caribbean is a region of strategic important to Canada, and one in which the Navy has much to offer. The Canadian Navy can deploy without lengthy notice, and operate without leaving a footprint, giving the Government an opportunity to redefine the mission of Canadian ships in the region. Despite the Navy’s non-permanent state, it can deliver an enduring presence in the region and can contribute to the development of lasting relationships. This, Donovan summarized, is good for security, good for Canada and good for the Western Hemisphere.

Dr. Romàn Ortiz, Fundacion Ideas Para La Paz (FIP), Columbia

The final speaker of Panel II was Dr. Romàn Ortiz from the Fundacion Ideas Para La Paz in Columbia, and he posed the question, “What could be the new rules to deal with this new security situation?” Ortiz argued it becomes a matter of dealing with the perfect storm. His presentation was organized into two parts: the first, addressing changes in the security scenario in the hemisphere; the second, exploring what we could do with this situation.

Ortiz opened his presentation by presenting the four main reasons behind the emergence of a new strategic scenario in this region. The first, American strategic withdrawal, is marked by the closing of the Manta Air Base and the expulsion of American ambassadors from Venezuela and Bolivia. This withdrawal is caused by a confluence of factors, including the economic crisis, strategic exhaustion in the Middle East, and the priority given by the new US administration to internal affairs over external policy issues. The second factor is the arrival of new extra-hemispheric powers in the region. The third reason behind the emergence of a new strategic situation in the region is the ideological division of the region, which Ortiz argues is more so now than even with Cuba during the Cold War. At this point in time, he argues that we are talking about complete ideological division between intermediate countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, the Bolivarian axis, and more moderate states, such as Columbia, Mexico, Peru and Chile. The final reason is competition amongst leadership and coalitions. Venezuela has emerged as the head of a group of Bolivarian-inspired governments; Brazil has assumed the role of an unwilling power; and, such countries as Mexico, Columbia and Chile, which have the capability to exert influence in the region, but are looking inwards for various reasons.

Moreover, Ortiz posits, there is a simultaneous rise in non-state threats. Factors such as globalization, the reduction of political autonomy and the economic crisis are leading to the weakening of states. The extension of coca crops in Bolivia and Peru, the emergence of new narco-trafficking routes in West Africa, new criminal activities and the increased technological sophistication of organized crime is leading to the expansion of illegal economies in the region. Furthermore, the region is experiencing a modernization of terrorism, marked by increasing technological capacity, international networking and urbanization amongst Latin American terrorist groups. Non-Latin terrorist groups are
increase their presence in the region as well, particularly through groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda. Latin America is also experiencing a rise in mixed political-criminal actors. The politicization of organized crime, and the criminalization of terrorist groups are closely linked to drug trafficking as Latin America sees more traditional terrorist groups moving into the drug trade to sustain its terrorist activities and networks.

As a result of the confluence of these two sets of factors, there will be a radical change in the patterns of conflict in Latin America in the future. Ortiz spoke of the fusion between internal and external security, including the use of international safe havens for terrorists and criminals, and the connections of some governments with terrorist groups. He spoke of new motivating factors, including the aforementioned strategic competition and ideological rivalry, as well as the rise of ideology as a motivation for violence and the connection between revolutionary ideologies and strategic rivalries. Latin America, Ortiz argued, will also experience a decline in limited war as a pattern of conflict and greater tendency towards total confrontations as a result of the weight of ideology as a motivating factor for conflict, and the introduction of more powerful and sophisticated weapons systems; whereas clashes in Latin America have tended to be limited both in terms of the military power used and the time periods of the conflict, we will see a tendency towards the use of military power in a broader fashion, with a parallel tendency towards the acquisition of military hardware able to reach targets throughout Latin America. Ortiz also spoke of the proliferation of conventional weapons, including unmanned aerial vehicles, fourth generation subs, rearmament in Venezuela and the according strategic implications of these shifting military balances. Finally, Ortiz spoke about the increasing strategic relevance of urban terrorism and the decline of rural guerrillas, a factor closely related to the vulnerability of the democratic system to terrorism.

In order to address this new strategic scenario, Ortiz recommended the adoption of “Ten Rules of the New Game”.

1. The rationale behind the behaviour of governments is changing, and the economic and commercial incentives of the past have been replaced by strategic and ideological motivations as the key motivators for countries in the region. Thus, ideology is more important, as are strategic considerations. Ortiz presented two examples to support his point: Chavez’ manipulation of commerce with Columbia to exert pressure on the Uribe administration in spite of the negative effects his actions had on the Venezuelan economy as an example of this; and, Morales’ opposition to exporting gas through Chile due to nationalistic considerations, even though this deal may be the key to the development of Bolivia.
2. Hemispheric homogeneity is over, and it is time to build like-minded government coalitions. The Bolivarian axis is coordinated through ALBA, and moderate governments should pursue such a mechanism for political coordination.

3. Hemispheric security is closely interlinked, and the United States and Latin America need each other in this context. Moderate governments will require American support to deal with regional instability, while American security is linked to the ability of Latin American governments to contain external and internal threats.

4. Internal and external security concerns are no longer separate, and we have to develop comprehensive strategies to guarantee internal peace and international stability. The activities of terrorist groups and organized crime networks will increase the tensions and conflict among governments in the region, and the ideological division within Latin America will increase the difficulties in developing regional strategies to deal with international threats.

5. The hemisphere is a part of the global strategic scenario; let’s deal with regional projections of global strategic challenges, such as the penetration of Russia, China and Iran in the region and the emergence of Islamic networks in the hemisphere.

6. Inter-state conflict is back, and we have to develop CBM and Arms Control Agreements as well as be ready for deterrence and defence.

7. Not everyone is playing by the same rules, so we should develop coalition strategies to deal with this new breed of rogue and revolutionary regions; for example, Venezuela is supporting terrorist organizations in the region and developing ties with other rogue states such as Iran.

8. An increase in ethnic tensions may lead to civil war in Bolivia, and the influence of drug cartels in some countries could lead to the emergence of narco-states. The dissolution of some Latin American states will pose further challenges, so we have to be ready to deal with failed states.

9. The stabilization of a divided region will put a premium on the development of a mechanism to facilitate political dialogue between the different blocs; accordingly, we should promote basic consensus-building mechanisms shared by all, or at least most, of the actors in the region.

10. Confronting the rise of non-state threats will demand a minimum consensus above the ideological divisions of the continent. We have to develop inclusive agreements to deal with transnational threats, and then sanction those governments that do not accomplish the
targets outlined in these agreements. Broad consensus should be sought in terms of such issues as narco-trafficking.

These ten rules are the only way to approach a security scenario that is undergoing rapid and radical change; the most important obstacle to the implementation of these rules is our own paradigms about Latin American security. Ortiz concludes that we have to begin again, and think about how things are changing in the region, what is occurring in the region, and how we can adapt to this new security scenario.

**Question Period**

Q: Dr. Bailey, your abstract states that “countermeasures should and must be taken.” What sort of countermeasures are you proposing?

A: The first thing is to realize that there is a problem – “If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.” Iranian penetration of the Western Hemisphere is a serious security threat to the entire hemisphere.

Secondly, there should be much greater attention paid to information and intelligence sharing between intelligence services. For example, there should be increased cooperation between American, Canadian and Spanish intelligence services in Latin America.

Thirdly, there should be much greater policing at the mouth of the Oronocle river. Currently, almost all of the policing assets are devoted to the Caribbean; more attention should be paid to the Atlantic, where the ‘tuna boats’ can be intercepted! From this place, we can cut off the route to West Africa and then on to Europe via air and naval power; this is a potential role for the Canadian Navy.

Fourthly, Panama. There is some good news about Panama, finally. The new government will be much more pro-Canada/US than pro-Venezuela. We should increase cooperation in attempts to control the security in the canal, particularly in reference to the scuba activities. Furthermore, the frontier between Panama and Columbia is important for two reasons. It is almost completely un-policed on the Panamanian side. There are no armed forces situated here, and electronic surveillance cannot fill in the gap because of such things as mule trafficking. Increased presence will limit the area where FARC can move to regroup, which will be beneficial for the Colombians as well.

Finally, banks should be sanctioned. The United States, Canada and Europe should sanction Iranian holdings, and demand Venezuela to clean up their financial sector on threat of cutting them off from our banking system. These sanctions should also include branches outside of Venezuela.
Q: Dr. Ortiz, you mentioned the retreat of limited war and the threat of total war. Could you wrap that into an analysis of the ability of the parties to carry this out?

A: Rather than speaking about the certainty of a regional war, the point is that we have strategic competition involving ideological factors; in this sense, Venezuela is competing with Columbia in terms of political models, not borders. At the same time, we have the proliferation of conventional weapons in the sense that armies are getting new equipment with more powerful real-time capacity for destruction. Finally, there are governments that are simply not following conventional rational behaviour models, such as Venezuela. The possibility of escalation, whereby a small clash becomes something much more important in terms of the targeting of strategic or economic infrastructure or populations, is greater than before. In the Peruvian/Ecuadorian crisis, there was a strong border clash but neither party was willing to target the economic infrastructure within the other country. In the future, crises may evolve in this direction very quickly. This represents a change in conflict patterns in Latin America.

Q: Captain Donovan, Arctic sovereignty is currently being sold as a security issue. In light of what we have been speaking about today, including such issues as narco-states and criminal organizations, and given the remoteness of the Arctic, is this a Canadian issue only, or is it even an issue at all?

A: Certainly the Arctic is a growing business at NDHQ. To answer your question, it is all of those things. One doesn’t necessarily see a lot of crime in the Arctic, but this is not to say that this won’t be an issue in the future. And there is an issue of security in this region. If we leave the Arctic wide open, criminal entrepreneurs will find a way to make use of it. This is a North American issues, and it may even be a global issue. When we are looking at the Arctic, we see it as a metaphor for what is going on in the world today. There are economic issues; climate change isn’t the only thing behind increased traffic in the Arctic. It’s related to resources and resource extraction, which will cause more shipping and activity in the Arctic. And so the global community must look at the Arctic, North America must look at the Arctic, and Canada must look at the Arctic. We just don’t know how to deal with security in Arctic quite yet. We can look at how Russia is posturing, how other Arctic Council nations are reacting to that, and how Japan and the EU are getting involved in Arctic matters. There remains much to happen before an answer can truly be given in relation to Arctic security.

Q: Dr. Bailey, given the new American administration and interests in Latin America, is the relationship between Iran and Venezuela as nefarious as you’ve made it out to be?

A: Yes. If you weren’t convinced by the presentation, more documentation is available. In short, however, the answer is yes. The new American administration hasn’t shown any more willingness to deal with Venezuela than we saw in the previous administration, though perhaps the successor in hemispheric issues within the American government may be willing to do
more. If the Iranian President is re-elected, there will be no change; if his opponent is elected, maybe there will be a change. Activity in Venezuela is expensive, and Iran isn’t in the best financial shape. If the opposition is elected in Iran, perhaps the Iranians will pull back from their positions in Latin America.

Some have said that Iranian penetration is similar to Nazi penetration in the 1930s, when they couldn’t do anything. While the situation is not all that different than the situation in the 1930s in terms of the arrival of new, antidemocratic powers in a given region, we still must question why the Nazis couldn’t do anything in the 1930s. First, the Nazis could support a coup in Argentina in 1943. Second, they couldn’t be more successful because of the eventual American and Latin American opposition to Nazi penetration. If we don’t develop the right strategies to deal with Iranian penetration today, the story may be written a different way.

Q: Given the adage that “we’re fighting them over there so we don’t have to fight them here” in combination with the exportation of terrorism to Latin America, what are your thoughts about the use of Iranian bases in Latin America for launching a conventional attack?

A: The threat to the United States is threefold: first, the threat of retaliation if the United States of Israel attacks Iran; second, the penetration of the United States by Iranian agents across the Mexican border; third, the degree to which the United States looks like a helpless giant in terms of its ability to confront these threats, and the extent to which this makes it more likely that there will be more threats of this kind in the future.

We have to look at the Iranian presence in the region in the context of the conflict over Iranian nuclear capacity. The Iranian deployment has two goals. First, they are in the process of gaining local assets. They are trying to place assets in other countries that may help the regime in the future; for example, refineries that exist outside of the reach of any bombing campaigns in Iran. Second, in a way, they are trying to develop a kind of retaliatory capability. For Iran, their diplomats act as the strike force of the regime in that they deploy diplomats instead of aircraft carriers. They use terrorists as a strategic weapon, and support this through their diplomatic presence. When they increase their presence in a general sense, in terms of Iranian networks, they are building the capacity to launch retaliatory terrorist attacks. This is not a certainty, however, though they are building the capacity necessary to be able to decide whether or not to retaliate to an attack against nuclear installations in Iran.

At this point, the panel chair concluded the discussion and offered a memento of appreciation to the panelists on behalf of the conference and conference supporters.

June 12, 2009

Morning Keynote Address
Lieutenant-General Bouchard, Deputy Commander of NORAD

Lieutenant-General Bouchard prefaced his remarks by welcoming conference participants in a number of languages, Dr. Bland, general officers and all those who serve their flag. He noted that many may wonder why he is offering such a formal welcome in so many languages; it is a combination of offering respect to allies, friendship to warriors, acknowledgements to army warriors and appreciation to civilian partners. In the pursuit of the objectives of homeland defence, there is no single organization that can handle the scope of activities and issues that we face. In this context, it is not one command, but rather a grouping of commands. It takes more than one village to continue pursuing the objectives of homeland defence, and we require increasing levels of interoperability to this end. In order to facilitate this interoperability, we must learn each others’ customs, traditions and languages; French, English and Spanish as well as army, air force and navy. We must speak diplomatic, joint, combined, interagency, operation, strategic, tactical, and other government languages. Rather than speaking of a whole-of-government approach, we need to think in terms of whole-of-society. In order to do this, we have to learn to work within this diverse environment. It is not about one leader, and the adaptation of others to this one leader; rather, it is about working together seamlessly.

Lieutenant-General Bouchard offered regards and appreciation on behalf of the commander of NORAD, and noted that it is a pleasure to be here. In order to put his role in perspective, he noted that he is essentially an army pilot, but in Canada, everything that flies is in the Air Force. For Canadians, we believe that if God had wanted the army to fly, the sky would be brown.

Lieutenant-General Bouchard has held the position of deputy commander of NORAD for two years. Bouchard noted that the conference participants likely want to hear about NorthCom as well, which is integrated in command with NORAD. His comments will be comprised of his personal thoughts, as opposed to a chronological survey of the history of NORAD.

As a preface to his comments, Bouchard offered an anecdote that builds on Dr. Bailey’s anecdote, and the moral that reality is not always what it seems.

A gentleman leaves his hotel in Brussels en route to NATO Headquarters, and notices that his watch is broken. He goes into a store with a window dull of clocks, and asks for a new battery for his watch. The storekeeper replies that he doesn’t sell clocks, which the customer questions in light of the clocks in the windows. The storekeeper says, “Here, we castrate cats. What would you have me put in the window?”

The moral of this story is that things aren’t always as they seem, and that, sometimes, the truth is not so pretty.
NORAD has come a long way in the past fifty years in terms of cooperation and interoperability. Intelligence and information passage has improved remarkably, even within the last two years. How do we make organizations like this work? It requires that you trust your partner, respect their customs and the way they do business, and be confident that they will be there when you need them. The Canada-US relationship is well known; we share goals, objectives, and ideas of prosperity and success, and in this way, we are liked to one another.

Freedom is not free, Bouchard notes, and there is not a day that he doesn't remember that he is a member of the home team, while those on deployed operations comprise the away team. We know that we need a stronger home team because the ocean is no longer an acceptable option to rely upon in terms of keeping the enemy away from us.

NORAD is a bi-national command tasked with aerospace warning (the provision of timely warnings of attack from various threats around the globe), aerospace control (taking action against unknown and unwanted unauthorized aircraft or missiles), and the provision of maritime warning. Within this framework, how do we use information from all available sources, fuse it, and present it appropriately to permit timely and educated decision making?

Last year, NORAD initiated 1295 tracks of interest, and responded 282 times, including scrambling on late flight plans, responding to unwanted passengers, and addressing aircraft within the aerospace identification zone. Within Canada, NORAD responses averaged at approximately one time per week. Moreover, NORAD tracked Santa, which Bouchard notes is the best way to get their message out. As he spoke, there were approximately 7000 aircraft flying in North America, and NORAD is notified when one or more stops operating within the guidelines set for it. In Canada, it is a similar situation. In Montebello in 2007 alone, NORAD had 29 tracks of interest. This provides an idea about what the Olympics may look like in 2010.

The Olympics will be a force to get people talking to each other, and working together. We must be able to operate seamlessly across borders, and employ each country’s assets effectively. We have been able to learn a number of lessons from such events as the Salt Lake City Olympics and the G8 Summit in Kananaskis. At the tactical level, Bouchard argues, we are already there. At the operational level, however, we are still working out some of the issues linked to national regulations and policies. At the national strategic level, Bouchard notes that his glass remains half-full, and he retains a spirit of optimism.

So what are the key points? How do we identify points of friction? We must build an understanding of culture so that we can identify cases where the RCMP will operate differently than NORAD. Once we understand each other’s cultures, it takes a minister to
offer top-down direction. We are probably lagging behind our American partners, but we didn’t have a 9/11; our relationship with homeland security in Canada started later.

As we work on building a team that is sensitive of cultural differences, understanding each other becomes key to understanding how we will work with each other. As military operators, during Olympic exercises, the intent is to push as hard as is necessary to identify breaking points; once one is found, it is fixed, and the exercise is pushed harder. Other organizations see failing as a failure in itself, rather than as a marker of an existing breaking point. In this case, military and civilian operators have different perspectives.

NORAD is not the only organization that operates in this framework. Others include US Northern Command, and Canada Command. On the Northern Command side of the house, the main mission is homeland defence and support of civil authority, as well as security cooperation. This requires information sharing, enhanced interoperability, and combined operations. All of this is to say that there are three commands that operate in pursuit of homeland security objectives, and the challenge is to operate seamlessly. This takes daily work.

The difference between bi-national and bilateral relationships must also be understood. The Minister of National defence visited NORAD recently, and highlighted the difference between bi-national and bilateral commands. At NORAD, 23% of the command is comprised of Canadians who work inside the operations center. Bilateral organizations place Canadians down the road or down a few floors, whereas bi-national commands bring national partners within the wire. The key in bi-national commands is the ability share information, and capitalize on the privileged relationship between partners in terms of information-sharing. Additionally, Canada-US bilateral relationships do work well, for example: the 24-hr mobilization of Canadian aircraft in support of American fighters in November 2007; assistance to Hurricane Katrina operations, whereby Canada deployed a C-17 in support of medical evacuation operations in New Orleans. The Canadian C-17 was among the last aircraft to depart New Orleans prior to the closure of airports in the region. The point is that both bilateral and bi-national arrangements work, though they work in different ways.

Bouchard then spoke of how the strategic environment is changing in light of new threats, weapons of mass destruction, and the existence of asymmetric threats. How, Bouchard asked, do we balance freedom of movement of people and trade with security? Border security, customs, the Coast Guard – all of these activities come to bear in light of the increased ease of moving such things as cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and biochemical capabilities in and around North America. Even the smallest UAV, when armed with sufficient chemical agents, can be a concern. As for weapons of mass destruction, Bouchard argues that cocaine is one of the most potent weapons of mass destruction.
available right now. NORAD is tasked with countering these issues, especially on the US side, and we need to continue limiting the air movement of drugs and contraband.

Air security exists on a continuum from the bans on liquids in carry-on baggage, to what you put up with during aircraft security, and so on and so forth. For example, an abandoned suitcase in Tel Aviv is noticed within ten minutes. A study in Canada showed that an abandoned suitcase was noticed in around two hours. This demonstrates the continuum of security.

The H1N1 virus is another threat; from the air perspective, this is not that big of a threat, but the point is that we are all aware of this particular concern and we are getting better at connecting across borders to address it.

Bouchard noted that Mother Nature has been a bit rough lately. Hurricanes, floods and forest fires all keep Northern Command and Canada Command busy.

The cyber environment is a real environment with real threats as well. Cyber attacks are unconventional, asymmetric and cyber in nature.

And so how will we deal with command and control, and the structural aspect of this? How do we communicate with our partners to deal with homeland security and civil defence? Not only is the threat changing, we are changing as well in terms of how we put our national systems together, the nature of the relationship between border authorities and border issues, and the work being done on the northern and southern borders of the United States. What side of the border you exist on defines the context of your understanding of border security. Complaints about the porousness of the border between Canada and the United States must be balanced with trade considerations. For example, complaints about border security in Denver must be weighed against the fact that three meat plants were forced to close because of problems getting shipments of Alberta beef. This exemplifies the fact that where you stand on an issue depends a lot on where you sit to look at it, and we need to understand the shades of grey that impact decision making in terms of perspective and points of view. When you approach the Canadian border, questions center on drug use, whereas US border guards question alcohol consumption. Both can cause you to be turned around, but the point is that we put emphasis in different areas and we need to understand how this affects security infrastructure.

In terms of our geography, the Arctic will play an increasing role. Any aircraft overflying Canada or the United States poses a potential threat to the continent, so we have to stay vigilant. Bouchard offered the following question for consideration: when we look at security in the Arctic, it has to start with an understanding of the region. How do we connect all of the networks, and how do we conduct surveillance on this region? Can NORAD offer an
architecture that includes wide area surveillance in the air? How can Canada and the United States work together, possibly through NORAD, without infringing on sovereignty issues? What can Canada do to increase wide area surveillance, and what can the United States do to assist in the development of this capacity? It isn’t about one party taking over for another, but rather a streamlining of efforts whereby we minimize overlaps, and have a clear understanding of what lines exist, and what lines cannot be crossed in this context to ensure security and preserve sovereignty.

In terms of Russian infringements on the air defence identification zone, questions emerge about whether we are perpetuating the Cold War or not. However, these aircraft are not operating within the international rules of the North Pole, and thus there is a safety issue. More importantly, when NORAD chases an aircraft, we chase unknown aircraft, not Russian Bears. Anything within the zone of air defence identification that breaches authorization is termed as an unknown, and must be identified. This zone extends northward and southward to the Gulf of Mexico.

At this point in the presentation, Bouchard offered his interpretation of the center of graving of Northern Command and NORAD. At the strategic level, the center of gravity is to ensure that our shareholders, including both Canadian and American citizens, retain a level of confidence in NORAD’s ability to stay ahead of, and deal with emerging threats. The events of 9/11 almost shattered this confidence. At the operational level, the center of gravity is to keep Canada and the United States working together; this includes relationships with CSIS, the RCMP, NavCan, and so on.

The center of gravity of Northern Command is similar. When dealing with fifty states and four territories, the United States are not all that united. They have individual state interests that may or may not match federal interests. When added to the sixty agencies that Northern Command works with on a daily basis, Northern Command must work with all interests, and avoid stovepipes. This situation cannot be viewed vertically, but rather horizontally; we must identify common areas of interest.

During yesterday morning’s keynote address, Vice Admiral Donaldson spoke about Canada First, excellence at home, being a strong and reliable partner in defence and leadership overseas. NORAD plays an important role in our partnership in defence, and we should work to improve synchronization of our operations.

What is our role to play? We must anticipate the impact of all of the activities and events that impact security, and work to reduce and minimize the effect of interagency and intergovernmental seams on the border, and on air/land/sea/cyber domains. We must continue to share information; early and complete sharing of information will increase the time available for national decision making. We must feed our operating picture with
whatever is available. Let’s find out what systems we’re not using to their capacity before we can identify what systems we should be developing.

In any case, we have to find a way to share information effectively, and we need to continue to expand our military capability, and develop our ability to adapt to change. The Civilian Assistance Plan, signed by Northern Command and Canada Command in 2008, is a perfect example of this; it is not a plan for one party to take over, but rather a plan to pass information to each other in a streamlined manner and open a line of dialogue about it. What capabilities can we bring to the table, and what capabilities can our partners bring to the table?

Bouchard noted that NORAD is 51 years old, and has lasted longer than most marriages. In this case, however, divorce is not an option. The agreement is about more than airplanes and radars; it’s about information and knowledge sharing.

At some point, the lines between security and defence have been blurred. When an aircraft is approaching the hemisphere, what is defence? What is security? What is law enforcement? The Olympics will force us to define how to best operate together. And yet cooperation, close work and synchronization do not trump sovereignty. There have been great developments with the work at Canada Command, Northern Command and NORAD, and we have come a long way in the past two years. Things are getting increasingly better, and we are certainly headed in the right direction.

In the case of Canada Command, Northern Command and NORAD, we have three commands working with one another and, at the beginning, there were three stovepipes. These commands are coming closer together, and we must identify the areas that overlap. What does the Venn diagram look like in this situation? Where can we work together? The point here is that the dialogue must be ongoing and regular.

The Basic Defence Doctrine tasks us to work together and with supporting agencies. We must continue to stay involved with each other as we look to the future. How do we identify, deter, and disrupt all threats to North America, and how do we approach consequence management for events that do occur? Who is in charge, and who plays a supporting role, both within and across national borders? How do we balance unity of effort? Bouchard suggests that in times of crisis, we need to turn to national suppliers such as Wal-Mart and Kmart to synchronize efforts so that we aren’t sending one truck of water to places where three are needed. Unity of effort, unity of command, and considerations of economy of force in relation to redundancy are required to meet the needs that emerge in times of crisis.
Finally, Bouchard notes, we must develop an understanding of the political environment and prevailing political will. NORAD must remain in line with the wishes of both nations. Working with the RCMP is a perfect example of this: how do we bring the RCMP into an environment that already involves considerations of law enforcement? For example, when an aircraft was stolen in Thunder Bay, information of the theft was transmitted to NavCan, to the RCMP and to NORAD. Communication in this situation was of absolute importance. Once it was determined that the pilot was suicidal, it became a different story than if it had been a case of an unidentified stolen aircraft travelling to Chicago. How do we handle sensitive law enforcement information? What constitutes too much sharing, and what will prejudice a case? What information is necessary for NORAD to do its job? This particular relationship is developing, and we are learning as it does.

The point, Bouchard argues, is that we have gone from need to know, to need to share, to accountability for sharing. How should information be treated in such a way as to respect sources, avoid prejudicing the information, and ensure that Canadian and American regulations are respected? How can these considerations be brought together? What is law enforcement sensitive? When does the source need to be revealed? We have not yet reached a point where we really understand these considerations, nor do we have a complete and full understanding of national laws.

Bouchard reiterated that we have to move beyond a whole-of-government approach to a whole of society approach that draws on academics, the military, government and industry. We need to listen to partners in industry, the Red Cross, and faith-based organizations, ensuring that everyone has a seat at the table.

This is a challenge for us, as the middle of the crisis is not the best time to be exchanging business cards. Rather we need to build these networks prior to the crisis through constant communication and liaising. This is a difficult task that will require a commitment of effort, but it is necessary.

In terms of communication, Bouchard noted that he currently works with five computers in order to manage classified, open source, military and civilian communication. How can we put this all together?

Classified information presents a particular set of challenges. Bouchard noted, however, that we now have access to more information as well as more programs to help in the future; we also have a better understanding of the programs available to make us more interoperable. At the end of the day, we need to speak each other’s language, and we need to learn it at a younger age. We should promote cross-cultural exchanges, and incorporate officers that speak ‘industry’.
We are great partners, but sometimes our skill-set may be overwhelming to others without a similar set of skills, so we must bring everyone up to speed.

The leadership that we have at NORAD and Northern Command is strong, but we should develop leaders much earlier, and this leadership needs to come from outside the organization. We need ‘meta-leadership’, or ‘jointness’ in leadership that focuses on developing leadership across the board in a manner that educates all actors on each of the key players. Every actor will approach the situation from a different perspective, and we will only be able to put together a complete perspective once we bring everyone together. Leadership also needs to be based on the crisis or the event of the day; does it require science-centric leadership, or military-centric leadership? Each actor should exert their own influence to help us to succeed as a whole.

NORAD and Northern Command are separate entities but they work together with partners on both sides of the border, Bouchard concluded. It is important that we increase bi-national and bilateral relationships. However, we have to be mindful of the fact that Canada and the United States have a very special relationship, and development of new relationships cannot come at a cost to this particular relationship.

Bouchard concluded his remarks with three key words: trust, respect, and confidence. We guard, he says, that which we value most.

**Question Period**

Q: Lieutenant-General Bouchard, from a Mexican perspective, we can learn a lot from this discussion. Based on your experience and background, what will limit this cooperation, and what are the critical points for stronger cooperation?

A: Trust, respect and confidence. The limits are found if you lack a long-term vision. This is a journey, rather than a destination, and as we develop this relationship, the limits to it will expand and shift. There is, essentially, no limit, and no line in the sand. We must keep looking beyond, continue evolving, and see where it leads us. The limits of NORAD today will not be the limits that we see in ten years. Let’s avoid being short-sighted; rather, let’s take it as far as we can.

Q: We speak of enhancing military relations in a way that respects sovereignty. I remember twenty years ago, we spoke only of military-to-military relations; we would not talk about respect. How to we bring that to bear? How to we foster this mind set within an organization, ensuring that all your people adhere to it? It is one thing to achieve this at the general staff level, and quite another at the tactical level.
A: The answer to this is to be more aware as you introduce these arrangements. Understand that there are sensitivities in terms of title 32 versus title 10 in the United States, as well as issues of state/country/municipal sovereignty. These all come to bear. The questions that arise are: Who is in support?; Who is supporting who?; Who are the dogs in this fight?; Who is the leader, both legally and in terms of the individual that has the ability to bring it together?; and, in putting this into effect, how can you be mindful of sensitivities, and mindful not to step on anyone’s toes?

We were good at military relations, but we never brought NavCan or the FAA into the fold. We need to understand each other’s areas of responsibility, and the areas that are near and dear to each actor. Failure to do so will lead to seams, gaps, and failure.

Moreover, it’s not that difficult. If the officers involved don’t realize that there are issues of sensitivity, they will find it difficult to do whatever it is they are trying to do. Someone will always stop you from doing what you want to do. If you have a valid military idea, but are not aware of contextual sensitivities, political concerns will stand in your way. Military officers are now better educated about this, and are supported by policy advisors. The military is plugged in with civilian objectives, so both can act as middlemen for each other. It’s not complicated to identify the sensitivities, but rather to identify solutions that are militarily applicable and that respect these sensitivities.

Lieutenant-General Bouchard was thanked for his remarks and participation in this conference, and offered a memento of appreciation on behalf of the conference and conference sponsors.

Panel III: North American Security Perspectives

Chair: Dr. Sokolsky, Royal Military College of Canada

Dr. Sokolsky, of the Royal Military College of Canada, opened the first panel on the second day by thanking the organizers. He noted that we have already broached a number of the issues that will be raised on this panel, but that he cannot think of three more qualified senior officers to address these issues in depth.

Admiral Jorge Pastor Gómez, Mexican Navy

Admiral Gómez of the Mexican Navy was the first panelist to speak. He thanked conference organizers for the invitation to attend this conference and, on behalf of himself and the Secretary of the Mexican Navy offered his hopes that this conference will achieve its objectives.

Gómez spoke about Mexican Navy’s role in continental security and defence. The current conditions in the world require international joint effort to consolidate a secure
environment. Given this scenario, Gómez introduced the point of view of the Mexican Navy on continental security and defence.

The Mexican Defence Concept is based on the tenet that the Armed Forces can be properly structured and sized to ensure reasonable dissuasive effects. The diplomatic service works in support of the pursuit of peaceful solutions to points of conflict, and the probability of Mexico becoming involved in an armed conflict is very low.

Mexico’s denunciation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Treaty) in September 2001 was in response to the fact that it had been surpassed both by the global system, and the threats within it. However, since then, Mexico has participated in two regional conferences on trust and security measures, and offered support to the Plan of Hemispheric Action against Transnational Organized Crime.

Mexico defines the worst threats to Latin America as those posed by limited economic development and extreme poverty. These cannot be faced with military strength alone, and any response must include political, economic, social and environmental considerations.

For Mexico, the term ‘hemispheric security’ is defined in a manner consistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Mexico defines hemispheric security as the security of the American continent, including the Caribbean, though other states may define hemispheric security as the securing of Canada, the United States and Mexico. It is important to understand that the hemisphere and the continent are understood in different ways depending on where you are. For Mexico, hemispheric security is also understood in a manner that incorporates both economic and social development.

Mexico’s Armed Forces are organized as follows: the President is the Supreme Commander of National Defence, under which there is a Defence Secretariat comprising the Air Force and the Army, and a Navy Secretariat. The Navy is responsible for maritime defence and coast guard activities. Mexico’s Armed Forces support federal and state law enforcement agencies in any tasks related to public security, including: the fight against organized crime, which Calderon’s administration has identified as key to establishing the rule of law in Mexico; and, joint high-impact operations in support of this commitment, including Naval operations in high crime areas to reduce drug cartel capabilities.

The Mexican Navy is also directly involved in law enforcement activities against drug trafficking. International statistics evaluating Mexican organized crime place money laundering operations as valued at up to $70B annually. Mexican organized crime produces 80% of the methamphetamines in the United States. The Mexican Navy works to deny the use of the ocean for drug trafficking through a constant exchange of intelligence with national and international agencies. Through unified centers of maritime and port incidents,
increasing Mexico’s capacity to control and oversee all maritime operations in Mexican ports, including compliance with international ship and port facility security codes. Their operations have played a role in restricting the transport of illicit cargo.

Weapons trafficking efforts have resulted in increased seizures, and a reduction in the permanent flow of illegal weapons. Tracking operations allow Mexican authorities to identify the points of origin for weapons from across the southern United States, where a direct-sale mechanism exists for Mexican organized crime. The American government has recognized that the situation poses a threat to border security, and that steps must be taken to reduce cross-border weapons trafficking. Moreover, the southeast border of Mexico has become a crossing site for illegal weapons trafficking.

Illegal immigration is also an issue. The Mexican Government, in coordination with the American Border States, is utilizing border forces to reduce illegal immigration into the US. In the south, the Yucatan Canal is used for the transport of Cuban migrants bound for the United States. In 2008, Cuba and Mexico signed a memorandum of understanding to guarantee the legal flow of migrants. The Mexican Navy has accordingly increased operations in the Yucatan Canal; these efforts are supported by operations along Mexico’s borders with Belize and Guatemala. All operations are conducted with full respect for human rights.

Mexico and the United States have started to coordinate actions for maritime security through North American maritime security initiatives, the development of standardized operational procedures for coincidental operations, and the formation of a direct line of communication during such operations. For Mexico, these operations are termed ‘coincidental’ to reflect the fact that they are comprised of two forces that happen to be operating in the same theatre.

The Mexican Navy is also involved in providing security for strategic facilities, defined as the pillars of Mexico’s economic development. The Navy takes steps to guarantee the security and protection of all offshore facilities through the deployment of ships, aircraft and marine detachments.

In terms of subversive groups and sabotage, Gómez notes that, though these groups don’t pose a threat to the stability of the country, they do pose a threat to security. The political and operational organization of these groups means that, though they lack dynamism and are isolated politically, they retain a capacity to generate some level of violence.

Terrorism as a subject really entered the national scene after 9/11. Mexico, as a close commercial neighbor and hydrocarbons supplier to the United States, could be a target of
terrorist attacks. Still, there is no evidence that terrorist groups are using Mexican soil to prepare for actions against any other state.

Mexico must also be concerned with natural phenomena, including such hydro-meteorological phenomena as floods, rains and hurricanes. In order to combat damage to coastal areas, the Navy has implemented ‘Plan Marina’ to support civilian populations in case of emergency. The purpose of this plan is to diminish or reduce the destructive effects of natural calamities on the population and the environment. Lately, however, the country has not had any human casualties caused by natural phenomena.

In terms of telluric and volcanic threats, Mexico does exist on the Pacific ring of fire, marked by lots of seismic activity. Approximately 25% of Mexico’s population lives along the volcanic axis. Moreover, recent memory will recall the 1985 earthquake; in 1991, the Seismic Alert System of Mexico City was formed.

Due to globalization, epidemics can develop quickly. The recent swine flu pandemic originated in Mexico; the World Health Organization recognized Mexico for responding to this emergency with the seriousness, responsibility and transparency required. During the outbreak, naval medical units were integrated with national efforts and the Navy’s High Specialty General Hospital was opened to the public.

Gómez then spoke about Mexico’s foreign policy, which is based on the following seven normative principles:

1. self determination
2. non-intervention
3. peaceful settlement of international disputes
4. refrain from the use of threat or use of force in international relations
5. legal equality
6. international cooperation for development
7. international peace and security as a primary goal

These normative principles are the result of Mexico’s national history, and align closely with the Charter of the United Nations, to which Mexico is the tenth largest contributor worldwide.
Gómez spoke of Mexico’s naval exercises. Mexican naval forces undergo constant training, and are outfitted with the equipment necessary to fulfill their mission. The Mexican Navy is an instrument of the state, used to demonstrate Mexico’s international policy. The knowledge and capabilities acquired during various exercises are used to counter the threats against national security in Mexico.

Mexico does not perceive the materialization of warlike threats against the state in either the short or medium term. Still, continental security faces a profile of asymmetric threats that is expanding daily. Drug trafficking is one of the most harmful manifestations of organized crime. Poverty and natural disasters are concealed threats to stability and security, both required for development.

Gómez outlined the Mexican perspective on security. Mexico, within the framework of the OAS Special Conference on Security, ratified that each state can define their national security priorities and responses thereto independently.

Transnational organized crime continues to be an omnipresent continental challenge; fortunately, the OAS has agreed on the need for a hemispheric plan of action. The first Meeting of Ministers for Public Security was held to this end in October 2008.

In conclusion, Gómez noted that Mexico has adopted strategies to counter new threats and emerging challenges, and the Mexican Navy has been a major part of this. Decisive actions have been taken to cooperate in the pursuit of the security of the continent, including standardizing operational procedures between the Mexican Navy, the American Navy and the American Coast Guard.

Mexico also recognizes the unique capability of the OAS to advocate dialogue and agreement. There is a need for all countries in the hemisphere to join together to fight organized transnational crime, which harms institutions, endangers democracy, degrades society and attacks our most fundamental right, that is, the right to life itself.

**Lieutenant General Thomas R. Turner, United States Army North**

Lieutenant General Turner of United States Army North was the second speaker on this panel. Early in his presentation, Turner noted that we are facing a changing security environment in North America. The enemies of the past were relatively predictable and state-supported, whereas today we face a range of threats extending across domains. Contemporary threats are both diverse and decentralized, but they are also networked.

The availability of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat, as does drug trafficking, pandemics and natural disasters. Emerging threats such as attacks on information and space systems must also be addressed. Globalization and interconnectivity, though good for
economic growth, also assists in the spread of weapons and radical ideologies. There is a seam of uncertainty, when meeting these challenges, between ‘war-fighting’ and ‘law enforcement’. Homeland security exists on this seam.

As with most nations, the United States has split responsibilities within the government for tasks of homeland security. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for security within American borders, while the Department of Defence contributes to this objective through homeland defence operations and by supporting civil authorities in case of domestic emergencies.

Northern Command also supports homeland security objectives, including providing support for border patrols and counter drug operations. Whatever the mission, Northern Command’s involvement supports the efforts of civilian law enforcement agencies. Northern Command deals with the forward regions, the approaches and the homeland, integrating American capabilities while relying on a shared situational awareness across areas of responsibility with partner nations. This consistently includes cooperation and coordination with other governments and governmental organizations. NORAD is involved in the defence against aerospace and maritime threats, while the Department of Defence maintains the ability to support civil authorities in national emergencies through effective consequence management capabilities. The whole-of-government approach is only possible when everyone understands the competencies of their partners, and when all partners work together to achieve common goals.

Accordingly, integration, cooperation and collaboration are increasingly important. Joint doctrine has been developed, and mechanisms put in place to define how the Department of Defence can support other agencies. Moreover, Turner argues, strong relations between all levels of government are vital to security the homeland and ensuring citizen safety.

There is a unity of effort as Northern Command and Army North coordinate with partners to execute homeland security responsibilities. Homeland security operations partner law enforcement, intelligence, the Department of Justice (including the DEA, the FBI, the US Attorneys and the ATF), the National Guard and National Task Forces (including JFLCC and JTF-N). US NORTHCOM conducts theatre security operations, working with the Department of Defence, and Mexican and Canadian militaries to enhance American interoperability with hemispheric partners. Northern Command also provides military support for American federal law enforcement agencies to counter drugs, narco-terrorism, and transnational threats.

American relations with Mexico grow daily through joint operations and exchanges. The United States is involved in various ongoing train-and-equip programs in terms of anti-drug support, pilot training, specialized skills training, as well as disaster and hazardous materials
response. The United States is working to facilitate the exchange of drug and arms trafficking information between Mexican and American law enforcement agencies. US Army North and the Mexican Army also host commanders’ conferences, facilitating communication and cooperation on both sides of the border; the US has also hosted regional joint task force command conferences that include Canada. The US Armed Forces share lessons-learned from urban operations in Iraq with Mexican forces operating in the border regions. In this complex and changing security environment, borders, waters and security concerns are common ground.

At home, Turner concludes, we need to build a civil-military framework for homeland defence that employs an integrated, interagency, whole-of-government approach. We also require an international approach to face the complexities of deterrence while ensuring the sovereignty of our neighbors. Northern Command will continue to build these effective relationships with North American partners in homeland security.

Brigadier-General Lacroix, of Canada Command.

Brigadier-General Lacroix thanked the conference organizers for inviting him to participate. Lacroix joked that one of the benefits of speaking late in the conference is that others have touched on some of the things he wanted to talk about.

Lacroix introduced his comments as a Canadian perspective on North American security, with a focus on the type of operations Canada Command conducts, and how they fit within a whole-of-government approach.

Canada Command operations exist on a spectrum from safety to security to defence; all are conducted in an integrated fashion both at home and with other defence partners across North America. Security, Lacroix notes, cannot be achieved by working in isolation. This holds true for how the Canadian Forces has evolved, particularly with the formation of a joint command. This enables Canada Command and the Canadian Forces to better serve Canadians, and contribute to North American security. The need for collegiality holds true with how we seek to work with all mission partners. By working closer with our partners, we are more effective and prepared to respond to threats to Canadian security.

So what is Canada Command and why is it unique? Canada Command was established in 2006 to place greater emphasis on the defence and security of Canada and North America. There are six regional joint task forces in Canada that report to Ottawa. For the first time in Canadian history, both domestic and continental operations are under one command; North America is one theatre of operations. Within Canada Command’s area of responsibility fall all routine and contingency Canadian operations. Canada Command is working with partners to build a security infrastructure capable of meeting the threats of the 21st century. The
Canadian Forces’ most important mission is the defence of Canada and Canadians, and Canada Command has enabled this.

In looking at Canada Command’s operations along the spectrum of safety, security and defence, Lacroix spoke first about operations related to safety. In these operations, Canada Command partners with federal departments when involved in emergency response plans. Canada Command is a convenient military point of contact for public health and public safety; if a request for military assistance is made in the aftermath of a natural disaster, Canada Command provides that support. For example, during the flowing in James Bay in April 2008, Ontario requested assistance from the Canadian Forces for the transport of evacuees from the at-risk populations in Kashechewan and Fort Albany. At the same time, when the St John’s River in New Brunswick flooded, Canada Command was also able to respond to the request for CF assistance. Contingency and natural disaster support operations are one way that Canada Command assists Canadians. Canada Command is also involved in maritime search-and-rescue operations, responding to thousands of incidents requiring maritime and aeronautical search-and-rescue capabilities annually.

In terms of security, Canada Command works with mission partners to ensure effective whole-of-government responses to situation that threaten Canadians. To this end, Canada Command works to build and strengthen a comprehensive security architecture, which has been maturing as a result of such major events as the 2007 North American Leaders Summit in Montebello and the 2010 Olympics. Canadian Forces’ operations with the Olympic Games will include surveillance of the sea, land and air approaches, and assistance with venue protection where required, acting in support of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

The 2010 Winter Olympics will be the Canadian Forces’ top domestic priority in 2010. The work that has gone into preparing for the Games from all partners has been integral to establishing a more effective security architecture that is better prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century; this is a legacy that will extend beyond the length of the Games.

The Canadian Forces supports law enforcement when requested for assistance in counter-drug operations, including, for example, participating in maritime surveillance during a 2008 RCMP-led counter-drug operation off the coast of Nova Scotia which resulted in the seizure of 750 kg of hash oil.

In continental security operations, Canada Command works closely with JIATF-S. Lacroix offers his opinion that we can do more in this area, not necessarily in terms of the number of ships or flying hours, but rather by bringing greater effect to the type of things that we do. He suggested, for example, stationing law enforcement detachments on ships deployed with JIATF-S missions. We can also coordinate better so that when the Canadian Forces deploy,
we can participate in additional activities at the same time. This requires an engagement strategy to direct how we can engage with JIATF-S and, at the same time, do something else. Lacroix suggested deploying during hurricane season so that Canadian assets are available to help if necessary. Operation Caribbe is one example of how we cooperate to ensure security of the Americas.

The Arctic is a rapidly changing region that will present challenges to Canadian security, and is one in which the Canadian Forces is enhancing their presence as a result of their unique ability to operate in such a remote environment. This should not be seen as an effort to militarize the north; rather, the Canadian Forces will be involved in operations in this region because of the unique demands of the Arctic, and the Canadian Forces’ ability to meet these demands. Indeed the Government’s capacity to operate in the North is maturing through greater institutional cooperation, including such organizations as the Arctic Security Working Group, which brings together federal and territorial experts to focus on northern security issues. We must respond to Arctic security issues in an expeditious manner with the correct capabilities; this is not possible without a whole-of-government effort.

The largest annual Canadian Forces operation in the North is Operation Nanook, a joint, integrated sovereignty operation that highlights interoperability, command and control, and interdepartmental cooperation. In 2008, Operation Nanook was held in the Baffin Islands area, and included a number of simulated maritime emergency scenarios, including hostage-taking, an oil spill, and a maritime emergency. The operation helped to develop and refine relationships between territorial, regional and federal agencies through the participation of a number of departments and agencies under leadership from Canada Command. Operation Nanook will be more extensive this year, as its simulations demonstrate the need for cooperation in the North.

Canada Command is integrated into whole-of-government efforts, and this applies to all operations in Canada. While Public Safety coordinates emergency response, the Canadian Forces and its mission partners also play an important role in emergency management. Through ADM-EMC, Canada Command can inform and contribute as necessary to emergency response in Canada. For example, during the H1N1 concern, via meetings between government agencies and interagency reports, information was communicated to those who needed it in a timely manner, thus ensuring a whole-of-government response to the pandemic.

In terms of defence operations, Canada Command is responsible for the defence of Canada and North America, in cooperation with defence partners with the United States and Mexico. NORAD is one such example of this cooperation. Canadian collaboration with the United States extends beyond defence matters. With Mexico, our defence relationship is developing into a partnership based on the security of North America, particularly with
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regards to the threat posed by narco-trafficking and drug cartels. Canada is encouraging Mexico to become involved in international peacekeeping operations by sharing lessons-learned. Canada also maintains a security dialogue with Mexico in a number of forums, including the Canada/Mexico security consultations. These consultations offer an opportunity to share information and explore areas of future cooperation. Lacroix stated that his hope is that, by August of this year, there will be a Mexican liaison officer stationed in Canada Command headquarters.

In conclusion, Lacroix noted that we are currently facing non-traditional challenges, but that we are better prepared to meet these challenges through cooperation with those partners that play a critical role in Canada Command’s safety, security and defence mission.

Question Period

Q: I have noticed that there are commonalities in the approach to national security concerns in Canada and the United States in that both states have created a command apparatus that is employs a whole-of-government approach to security concerns. Mexico’s organization, however, is divided. For example, there is a Secretariat for the Air Force and the Army, as well as one for the Navy and the Coast Guard. It seems as though this approach is much more stove-piped in nature, and there doesn’t appear to be a whole-of-government approach at play. Can Admiral Gómez comment on this?

A: This is linked to our national history, in that we put our eggs in different baskets. We used to have a small army, and we don’t have an integrated defence force because we don’t need it. The Navy is more of a constabulary navy, rather than a blue water navy.

Follow-up Q: To clarify, Canada and the United States have concluded that a whole-of-government approach is necessary, but this seems to be missing in Mexico. Though you speak about the Navy meeting security threats, I don’t get the impression that a whole-of-government approach is used. Please comment further.

Follow-up A: We have a Security Council in which all partners are involved, including the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Navy, the Federal Prosecutor, the Attorney General and Public Security. We are all working together, but we are not joined.

Follow-up Q: Is there any intention to adopt a whole-of-government approach?

Follow-up A: Yes, sooner or later. There is nothing on paper right now though, but sooner or later, there will be a defence ministry.
Q: Admiral Gómez, most of the cocaine that is entering the United States enters by sea and land through Mexico. Does the Mexican Navy patrol the waters off Central America (staying outside of territorial waters, of course), or are its operations restricted to Mexican waters?

A: Our operations are restricted to Mexican waters; however, we exchange information with Columbia and the United States about the maritime domain. The last four major seizures of cocaine were coordinated with JIATF-S. We may also assist police from other countries, though we require a request in writing from these countries so that we can patrol their economic zone. The US Coast Guard also maintains a presence in Central America, though neither the Mexican Navy nor the United States has enough boats. We are doing our best.

We have been fairly successful in maritime interdiction operations as well. Recent reports indicate traffickers are using shorter jumps along the coastline in small boats, and using semi-submersibles as well. Cooperation with other countries allows us to detect where these boats are being built in Columbia, which leads to successful interdiction by Columbian authorities.

Q: Admiral Gómez, what do you feel is the best approach for Mexico with respect to continental operations? Should Mexico work bilaterally with the United States or trilaterally with the United States and Canada? What are the advantages or disadvantages to each approach?

A: Our approach has been much more bilateral than trilateral; we just don’t have the assets to participate in trilateral operations. If we want to participate in North American defence, it doesn’t make any sense to adopt a trilateral approach. So we solve our problems with the United States as Canada is just too far away. We work with the United States to approach common problems. In terms of policy, we’ll sort out our policies, you sort out policy on your side, and we’ll exchange information.

Q: Lieutenant General Turner, Northern Command is bilaterally structured with a ‘cookie cutter’ approach to bilateral relations. There does not appear to be recognition within Northern Command of the unique aspects of the Canada/US relationship. What is your opinion about the advantages of the Northern Command structure in terms of American interests, and how do you see the development of the Canada Command/Northern Command relationship progressing, and what do you feel is the future of NORAD?

A: After 9/11, we knew we would need to be prepared for the 21st century. Army North is the component command for this sector. This command was largely a result of Katrina, with folks thinking that there needed to be an army command in this theatre. There was a philosophy about the role of military forces in our homeland, which was on par with Canadian views at the time. We focused on deployable command and control organizations for Title 10 forces in support of a federal agency. Canada Command was born at about the same time.
When Canada Command was stood up, we all looked at the nature of the cross-border relationship in the north, and that’s what we’ve been working on ever since. Both Canada Command and Army North are sensitive to the smaller size of our organizations. Our relationship has evolved, with regional task for commanders in Canada.

Frankly, our efforts are directed towards in-theater security cooperation with Mexico.

Q: Lieutenant General Turner and Brigadier-General Lacroix, you represent two organizations that manage Canadian interests in the Canada/US military relationships. What, in your opinion, is the present command relationship? What is the nature of the national command structure? And, what do you feel are the key separate responsibilities addressed by each? How do you see this evolving in the future?

A: In terms of theatre security cooperation, today it is not an issue; it was an issue two years ago. Today, however, we have government officials that are concerned that we’ll lose our special relationship with the States. The commander of Northern Command is a combatant commander with the associated specific responsibilities. His engagement with countries in an area of operations is different than what Canada Command could do, as the commander of Canada Command is not a combatant commander. At first, two years ago, when Northern Command wanted Canada Command to participate in theatre security cooperation, we thought we would have a closer relationship as a result of our existing special relationship with the United States. However, as we have worked with each other, this has not been an issue.

Command and control between Canada Command and Northern Command is hard, and we work towards more efficient command and control. Canada Command, NORAD, and the Strategic Joint Staff were miles apart in terms of what we should do and how we should do it. Our people in uniform and our security partners in the RCMP weren’t sure who should do what. In terms of command and control for the Olympics, the structure is an improved version of how we operated in August 2007. There are two supporting commanders; NORAD, which offers support in terms of ALEA (Assistant to Law Enforcement Action), and Canada Command both report to the Chief of the Defence Staff in this structure.

From an army perspective, this is a bit disconcerting because there are two commanders in one space. From an air force perspective, this isn’t an issue. So we will do the Olympics, learn from it, and see if this is the right approach or if we should go for something else in terms of command relationships.

Where does the RCMP fit in? When the RCMP saw NORAD playing a role, the RCMP wasn’t comfortable because of their responsibility for law enforcement. They want to do the job themselves, but they don’t have the capacity. It was almost a case of ‘do our job, but we’ll tell you when’. When the RCMP realized the complexity involved, they became more amenable to
NORAD’s involvement. NORAD has worked with the RCMP in training, and this relationship is growing, but we’re not quite there yet.

A: In terms of theatre security cooperation, issues arise when you lack understanding about who you are dealing with, and the fact that there are two distinct cultures at play. You can’t build a security cooperation plan using experiences from European experiences when you’re dealing with your own backyard. You have to think differently. How do we do this without using a cookie cutter approach? We need to tailor our cooperation to the partners involved. There are a lot of discussions between the commanders of the Air Force and the Army and the Navy with each other. These relationships already exist outside of the so-called ‘cookie cutter’. The danger exists in having someone who will use the cookie cutter approach rather than adapting. These changes are part of the maturing process for this relationship. Remember, Northern Command is only seven years old, and Canada Command is five years old.

The command and control element of this depends on where you sit, and how you look at the issues at hand. Life would be easier with only one boss, but we have to be pragmatic about the realities of the situation. There may be a tactical or operational imperative to do something one way, but strategic imperatives to do it another way. How do we do this without jeopardizing a strategic relationship in service of an operational imperative?

There are similar issues at play when we look at our relationship with the RCMP, or the Secret Service in the United States. How can we draw on the experience of the military to achieve unified goals under the leadership of the RCMP? The Olympic Games force us to think about these relationships. At the end of the day, we need to see what players bring what to the table in terms of decision making and situational awareness. It’s okay if there is some confusion, because we are moving in the right direction. Financial pragmatism will also play a role in motivating us to streamline our efforts. At the end of the day, we are all working in service of the mission. Everyone that has a dog in the fight can say their piece, but then we have to get on with it.

The biggest effort has been to inform each other effectively. What’s your lane? What are our lanes? Can you do it? Can we? How? Who should do it? If I can do it, and you can’t, then I am the best person for the job.

We need to understand how each other works, and create a joint and combined interagency organization with both the RCMP and the military at the table; by bringing people together, speaking each other’s language, and looking at things horizontally, we avoid stove pipes.

A: When we speak about the operational level, we must remember that there are two other levels: the senior political level, and that which incorporates the general public. With that in mind, there are those in Canada who may react poorly to closer cooperation with the United
States, and those who saw the offer of joining Northern Command as a threat to sovereignty. In the United States, we see legislative concern about the border, which has resulted in steps designed to reinforce the border. This is occurring at the same time as the military attempts to increase cooperation, so we seem to be moving in two different directions. We speak about the need to exchange cards before an incident occurs; however, during a crisis, cooperation will indeed become more difficult because there will be recriminations related to perceptions about who has done less to prevent the incident.

Q: Admiral Gómez, in the United States, we have to explain to people that there are two secretariats within the Mexican national security structure. What we forget is that, from a Mexican perspective, there are two combatant commands in the United States: Northern Command and Southern Command. Could I give you an opportunity to comment on the advantages or disadvantages of dealing with two American combatant commands as you try to do your job?

A: We only deal with Northern Command, via a liaison officer there. With Southern Command, we are only related through the interagency task force in the Caribbean. We have a liaison in JIATF-S because of the need to share information in the maritime area. But mostly, we work with Northern Command because we are in North America.

Q: When we renewed NORAD, we carefully expanded the mandate to include a maritime dimension. As we look to the future, is there a need to expand this mandate further to incorporate a land dimension? Is there the need to capture the ground relationship between our countries?

A: The maritime dimension was added with a similar vision as the air dimension, though this was more difficult because of the size of the maritime dimension, so we look about 1000 miles out. The land domain is more up-close and personal. What happens on the ground in one’s country can be a defence issue, or an issue of law and order. In the United States, Army North cooperates with law enforcement.

The land dimension is more complex because it’s on your own territory. It is likely worthy of consideration, but how far do you go? Should there be a line? As soon as you draw a line, however, that causes division. So it is important to remain as flexible as possible.

Still, the land issue is largely an issue of law and order.

A: If the ships of two countries work together offshore, no one can see it. If an aircraft does something at 30 000 feet, no one can see it. But if an American plane flies over a city in Canada, Canada Command will get a call from the general public questioning why the US is flying in Canadian airspace. I don’t believe that either the American or Canadian sides will be
comfortable with armed soldiers in uniform on each others’ territory. I doubt there will be a unified North American command in my lifetime. This would be very difficult.

That being said, we need to work closer with different scenarios with regards to how we would coordinate so that we can come up with something like a shipwriter program for land. How do we cooperate and respect each others’ sovereignty, and do so in a militarily effective way? I don’t think we will resolve this soon.

Q: We talk about the need for cooperation, but for those outside of North America, what do we tell them? It seems that conferences such as these are focused on how to get organized, and we are still confused about it. My comment is that, having worked with the Mexicans, I would recommend that the entrance of Mexico into this environment provides us with a refreshing way to look at the problems. We have talked about organizations, and there were a number of questions posed about Mexican internal organization. This should not overshadow the comment that Admiral Gómez made about the use of forensics as an effective counter-terrorism strategy. There are ten ways of dealing with the arrival of Mexico at the table, and we shouldn’t let Mexico’s challenges overshadow the contributions that intellectual and strategic thinking in Mexico may render for North American security.

Concluding Remarks from the Chair and the Panelists:

Let’s talk about how to bring others into the fray. We have worked to define our relationship at the operational, strategic and national political levels. We have the North American Leaders’ Summit, which look at economic and military issues. We also have mechanisms to improve this. In terms of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, should we challenge them to look beyond what we are doing today? How to we bring others into the architecture, for example through observer status?

We also need a level below the leadership level to hold similar meetings. Should we look to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to be more involved terms of agenda-setting, identifying areas to define this relationship and how to advance it, and constructing the architecture to talk about these issues? This discussion needs to be elevated. We are doing lots at our level, but it must go higher.

In terms of the comment about sensitivities, it is my view that they will always be there, and the only way to ameliorate them is to educate ourselves. While I know that a lot of people are uncomfortable with the word ‘educate’, but that is what we use. We educate each other about our differences, and it is the only way to find common ground, military logic, and get things done while respecting each other’s sensitivities.
Mexican forces have joint forces, common doctrine, but different command structures. Still, the education is shared. In the military academies, there are a number of joined courses but the services are not joined.

Relations between American and Mexican militaries may be at the best state they have ever been in. The armed forces are now in the fight with drug cartels, so we do what we can to help them.

In terms of recriminations, some of the recent moves by the new administration have been particularly strong. Mexico is concerned about our ability to dampen drug demand and firearms trafficking. There are lots of illegal gun dealers on the border, but we can increase the number of ATF officers on the border to interdict arms trades. We are indeed moving in the right direction, and federal civilian agencies are coming together more effectively each day.

At this point, the Chair thanked each of the panelists, and offered them mementos of appreciation on behalf of the conference organizers and sponsors.

Afternoon Keynote Address

Major General Stefan Egon Gracza, Defense and Air Attaché- US and Canada, Embassy of Brazil

Gracza started his discussion on Brazil by addressing the *Estratégia Nacional de Defense* document. He claimed that the Ministry of Defense in Brazil is only ten years old, and the aforementioned document is only six months old (as of June 18th, 2009). He claimed that this is the Brazilian ‘homework’ that needed to be done, under civilian leadership. The three sister agencies (the navy, army, and air force) are very proud because under the civilian leadership, they had the opportunity to participate as well. This document is a type of ‘think tank’: it is a product of all of these important actors. Gracza stated that it was about discussing with the public, through Congress, regarding defense. Gracza stated that Brazilian society has a peaceful legacy. With respect to the document, transforming the Armed Services to better prepare them for future challenges is a current requirement. The document contains three important pillars. The first pillar involves reorganizing the Armed Services and the Defense Sector entirely. The second pillar involves rebuilding the Brazilian defense industrial park and creating partnerships with respect to new technologies. The third and final pillar involves the military service, and the fact that it should not be a voluntary service, but it should be a mandatory one when someone becomes 18 years old. So all of this was discussed with the people, with civilians. The hypothesis, or the core of the document, addresses the defense of Brazilian sovereignty (sea, land and airspace) and the safeguard of Brazilians and/or Brazilian patrimony abroad. Gracza claimed that as soon as
you have something written, it could make a significant difference between types of possible solutions. More respect is generated and guaranteed when there is something written (as opposed to simply being a verbal commitment or statement). In Brazil, Gracza stated, we engage in diplomacy before resorting to other measures. Another part of the hypothesis or core of the document is participation in peacekeeping operations, and United Nations peacekeeping forces or other multilateral organizations in the region.

Regarding directives, the document emphasized the ‘purple ideal’ among the military services: essentially, it is about confronting all of the problems facing the nation together. Furthermore, it strengthened the following capabilities: surveillance, strategic mobility and force projection (it is necessary to show force or be prepared to do so within our own country). Gracza claimed that it made three strategic sectors a priority: nuclear, space and cyber. The document emphasized the importance of protecting and developing the Brazilian Amazon, of redepolying military assets, and of creating strategic partnerships with other countries. With respect to the impact on the Armed Services and the Brazilian navy, a main task is engaging the navy elsewhere. The navy has a great responsibility and it cannot stay in Rio de Janeiro any longer. The operational capacity must be strengthened in ‘brown waters.’ The ‘brown waters’ are the Amazonian and Paraguay Basins. Gracza argued that these basins need the presence of the Brazilian navy. Gracza argued that it is necessary for Brazil to now ‘go out there’ and take care of these areas. Regarding the impact on the Armed Services, the rapid projection force capability must be strengthened. Technological exchange and partnerships must be created between Brazil and other nations. Gracza claimed that with respect to the strategic transport aircraft, we have to look at heavier aircrafts to replace the C130. Although Gracza did not think the C130 would be replaced, he did think something new needed to emerge. Furthermore, he stated that intelligence, security, and reconnaissance were essential. In conclusion, Grazca stated that the main goal was to deter any aggression. He claimed that this was a long-term project. Some of the things he discussed, and that are discussed in the document, will take a long time to come to fruition because Congress needs to become involved to work on the current laws in place, and possibly adjust them, or create new ones. For this reason, some things in the document cannot be implemented immediately. For example, the army cannot be used in domestic areas in Rio de Janeiro. Since it cannot be done, the law needs to be changed, but Congress needs to be involved in this process. Gracza provided the attendees with certain dates as an approximation of when major changes of this sort (like the changing of laws for instance) could occur: 2014, 2022, and 2030. He claimed that Brazil is seeking a relevant role in global issues. Brazil has the political will to develop the military instrument of national power. Although Brazil does not believe it has any enemies, Brazil still needs to be prepared with the appropriate capabilities in the event certain countries do become threatening. Gracza concluded that Brazil is open for strategic partnerships with other countries.
Question Period

Q: Can you give us some insight as to how the document was actually developed?

A: At least 12 experts, plus the ones that helped them, participated in the creation of the document. Once the document began to take form, it was then taken to the government. The document took two years to complete. It was a long birth, but there are many plans that are in the works, and it is not an easy job. However, this was the homework Brazil needed to do.

Q: The transformation of civil-military relations is a challenge. How did the established military officers accept this type of system?

A: It is a blend of civilians and the military. We came out the ‘Brazilian way’- diplomacy is one of the weapons we have, and the one we first employ. The main goal is to prepare the civilian workforce, since they are not the military, and since they will be connected to these necessities. We do not have the expertise among the civilians, so we need to teach them at the universities.

Q: Thank you for an excellent summary of an excellent document, which I have read. Can you tell us if there is a review or an organization that is preparing a national security document that would include elements such as law enforcement (the police)? We all know the police have problems of various kinds in Brazil. Is such a review underway in Brazil?

A: The police forces are an issue. Every time you have low wages, you will have corruption and drug trafficking, for instance. In a document, you will not have this written. The National War College would be the place for this discussion to begin. This idea will take some time, but that is the way it goes.

Q: I want to talk about Brazil’s ambitions regarding peacekeeping. Brazil has distinguished itself recently in its ‘take charge’ approach regarding the military approach in Haiti. Peacekeeping institutions and training are beginning to develop in Brazil, but will Brazil’s peacekeeping extend beyond the Western Hemisphere? Will there be missions in other parts of the world?

A: Yes and no. We are concentrating in the hemisphere. So I would say it does not mean we would not go into a Portuguese-speaking nation elsewhere in the world, but the document concentrates on hemispheric issues. At a first glance, I can say we will concentrate in the Americas, but there is always a possibility we will act elsewhere. If we do act in other areas, it will always be under the umbrella of the United Nations.

Q: I want to ask a question regarding Haiti. Brazil has played an important role in this country. How is this role perceived in Brazil? How is it developing in Haiti? How long can you sustain this leadership role?
A: It is a difficult question for someone like myself to answer, who is not directly connected to the operations. I have been hearing from the army people that in the near future, we will shift leadership in that area before it is too late, but I think that is as much as I can say. For us, it has been a good experience. We are applying things we learn at home abroad. But this is a role that the Brazilian government wants to pursue. However, Brazil does not want to impose anything. Diplomatically speaking, it needs to have a ‘green light’ from every sector. Besides, it is an expensive ‘game.’ However, Brazil is willing to pay for that game. Because whatever we get from that experience, (knowledge, expertise, etcetera), it is far better now than it was in the beginning.

Q: You give an interesting description of national defense strategy. You talked about internal concerns (for example, the Amazon). What are the security threats to Brazil right now? What are the external security threats?

A: We have some noisy neighbors, but we do not actually have a problem with anyone. Leadership in Brazil and the armed services are preparing in order to react if there is a necessity, but we hope no one takes such actions (like breaching Brazil’s sovereignty). The Brazilians are good at diplomacy and we are very proud of that. We need a good navy, air force, etcetera, and we need partnerships and interactions. However, we are not willing, or expecting to attack anyone. Sometimes predators are within- our own citizens, for instance. We need to take care of the Amazon for example, but we are not looking at aggressors, except for traffickers.

Speech by Major-General Andrew Leslie

Major-General Leslie found the previous presentation to be an excellent one. He found parallels between the problems Brazil has encountered in defending and protecting the Amazon and Canada’s struggles to protect the North. He claimed there are lessons we can learn from Brazil in this respect. Canada’s closest friend and trading partner is still the United States. Leslie stated that he had recently visited Brazil, as have many political and military figures in the country. He claimed there could be a mutual exchange of ideas on how to protect pristine areas in both countries. There are very close parallels between both countries. He claimed that he is delighted to see so many conference attendees. He wondered whether, as Army Commander, anyone had questions that he could answer. Leslie stated that our first job is to enhance the security of Canada. We must protect physical security, and focus on this at a strategic level. After that, you can consider the markets and the exchanges of goods, as well as the effects all of this has on the country. Currently, with respect to most Western economies, what we want to stay away from is ‘blanket protectionism.’ As we know, one in four jobs in Canada is directly related to that which is happening down South. Leslie stated that Canada is an exporting nation. Leslie claimed that the technology we need to better protect our people is a driving factor with
respect to costs. If we were purely a domestic force, we would not need a variety of equipment types to do the ‘harder edge’ of our business. Regarding services, the army currently needs more soldiers, as well as ‘stuff that rumbles around on wheels.’ It would make sense for the army to do as much of the assembling, manufacturing, and building as possible. He stated that the days of finding the best piece of equipment, no matter where it is from, is gone. Leslie argued that jobs would enhance Canada’s national security in the long-term. He claimed that the armed forces have received a great deal of ‘heat’ from the people of Canada and the government, just like other armed forces have. He concluded by stating that these are interesting times. Leslie thanked the conference attendees and organizers for the ability to participate in the conference.

Panel IV: Expectations and Strategies

The fourth panel concerned expectations and strategies. Ambassador John Graham, from the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), chaired this panel. The panelists included Dr. Thomas Costa from the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) at the National Defense University in Brazil, Colonel (Ret) Dr. Arturo Contreras Polgatti from the Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE) in Chile, Dr. Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano from the Universidad de Guadalajara in Mexico, Dr. Stephen Randall, Director of Institute for United States Policy Research at the University of Calgary, and Colonel (Ret) Dr. Richard Kilroy from the Virginia Military Institute in the USA. Dr. Costa addressed the conference first, followed by Dr. Polgatti, Dr. Sumano, Dr. Randall, and Dr. Kilroy.

Chair

Ambassador John Graham, Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL)

Ambassador Graham stated that three years ago he was asked by the government to do a study on some countries in Latin America. He went to the Department of National Defense, and they said there was not a great deal they could tell him. Graham stated that the scale of this conference and level of participation says that there has been a major change in the past few years. Graham then introduced the panelists.

Speakers

Dr. Thomas Costa, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), National Defense University- Brazil

Dr. Costa is currently working on a project entitled ‘The Teaching of Strategy.’ He claimed that there are many concerns and questions regarding the environment, and whether the
changes in the environment mean our professional military education must change. There is a great deal of reflection on this matter. He proposed three tracts: firstly, non-subordination. Not hegemony, but leadership will guide Brazil and allow decision makers to increase freedom of action. Brazil has strived not to be autonomous, but to be independent. For instance, Brazil is one of the five global net food producers, Brazil has multiple partners in terms of trade and foreign direct investment, and Brazil is striving to modernize in terms of basic science, applied science and business, telecom, naval engineering, and aerospace. Costa argued that Brazil is the missing link in Iraq. The second tract is one that allows Brazil to be an ‘honest broker,’ exercise engagement, and validate situations to be a rule-making actor. Costa claimed that Brazil has an interest in all international committees, and is one of the only countries to have such an interest. Brazil tries to break deadlocks (for example, regarding Kyoto). There are a series of initiatives where Brazil has tried to be this type of actor (an honest broker). Costa claimed that when it is time to implement something, you move from multilateral to bilateral. He stated that Brazil is isolated. It is outside of the global axis. It is therefore part of Brazil’s strategy to hedge against international issues. Brazil does not have border issues, but Brazil must pay attention to issues in its neighborhood, where other countries have issues. Brazil is a regional hegemon with respect to foreign policy. Brazil is a hegemon in the sense of setting the rules, pace, and timing in certain situations. Costa stated that Brazil is a strategist. The population of Brazil is small, and one must consider issues Brazil deals with, such as the issue of civil-military relations and the issue of border disputes. Costa claimed that the main point to understand is a different concept of the notion of ‘strategy.’ Costa concluded that thinking of the future when creating strategy is important. This notion of projecting yourself for the future is evident in Brazil’s training, education, and socialization of individuals, which is apparent in key sectors of Brazil, such as the military, science and technology, and business.

Colonel (Ret) Dr. Arturo Contreras Polgatti, Academia Nacional de Estudios Politicos y Estratégicos (ANEPE)- Chile

Dr. Polgatti claimed that this conference was one of the few venues where one can say what one is actually thinking. At the beginning of his talk, he quoted from Lenin: ‘The peace is the continuation of the war by other means.’ Polgatti stated that this passage makes one question whether absolute warfare is possibly part of peace and not part of war. He claimed that we thought the Cold War ended twenty years ago, but maybe that is not true. He proposed a classic definition of strategy. Strategy is the art of the time and the distance, and the capacity to make decisions with a vision of the long-term. The current distribution of the world product is the following: the United States has 28 percent, Europe has 32 percent, Latin America has 5 percent, Japan has 10 percent, and the rest of the world has 25 percent. With respect to the cross-world internal product projections, Europe, China, Japan, and the United States are the major actors. The United States will maintain its power for the next 50 years. Polgatti stated that there are strategic effects related to Eastern growth. In Asia,
there is a constant demand for increased resources. Both South America and Africa are regions containing abundant natural resources. There is an expansion of the oriental influence and the creation of new economic dependencies. The role of soft power is important in this context. Polgatti claimed that the numbers provided the following conclusion: South America is becoming more irrelevant from an economic point of view, but regarding natural resources, it will be more important for the emergent powers. Our hemisphere will not be the same in the future, and this will create problems related to security and development. South America is connected to the world in this way. Currently, there is not a good relationship between the North and the South. In this context, we have to consider the small alternative for the Americas. This alternative is an initiative of the Bolivarian movement: it is anti-North American, anti-free market, and non-democratic. However, there is a group of countries in South America that want to develop and integrate with the rest of the world. These countries have a special relationship with the South Pacific. Brazil, the most powerful country in South America, is looking to the world and is looking for a global role in terms of security and development. The South American integration progress consists of threats for development and security. All our relations in the past have been relationships between partners, but there are now more relationships between countries in the periphery. The friendship that exists between Caracas and Havana exemplifies the increasing culture of anti-Americanism in that region, and we need to be honest and recognize this reality. The influence of Iran, China and Russia is increasing.

The current situation consists of two opposite visions for political, social and economic development in South America. Many countries show symptoms of democratic regression. The expansion of the Bolivarian ideology is creating political conflicts and a social anti-American culture. The situation is critical for stability, governance, and peace in the region. The Bolivarian ideology exists in countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Columbia and Chile will be the only countries that are looking out at the rest of the world, wanting to cultivate partnerships with other countries throughout the world. However, if the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) wins, Chile will be alone. Polgatti stated that MERCOSUR, the South American economic organization, is completely paralyzed and maybe Paraguay will leave it in the future. The immediate challenge consists of having to choose between an open integration to the world, or a closed integration centered in the region, complete with anti-globalization. The region is gradually furthering itself from the West. Polgatti claimed the most important effects that took place in 2008 and 2009 included the following: the Andean crisis of March 2008, the creation of the UNASUR (another Brazilian initiative to overcome the fragmentation in South America), the creation of the South American Defense Council (this has something to do with the conflict level that the region has), and the vote supporting the restoration of Cuba in the Organization of American States (OAS). Cuba was re-integrated, and then subsequently rejected the OAS, by refusing its offer of being reinstated in the organization. A United States’ diplomat
questioned whether we should change our notion of democracy, to accommodate countries like Cuba in the OAS. However, Polgatti questioned whether we were in the business of doing such a thing (he was essentially questioning whether democratic countries were in the business of changing their notion of democracy, and essentially disregarding their morals and values to accommodate undemocratic countries).

Colonel (Ret) Dr. Richard Kilroy, Virginia Military Institute- USA

Dr. Kilroy’s talk centered on the possibility of a new trilateral security relationship between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Kilroy discussed the Security Complex Theory (SCT) and perimeter defense. He stated perimeter defense is a collaborative research effort, involving himself and a few of his colleagues. The depth of history regarding Mexico-United States relations is important to take into consideration. It is also important to understand the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848. Kilroy questioned whether it is possible to have a trilateral relationship among the three countries comprising North America. There have been some significant changes post-Cold War, such as improved hemispheric relations, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and increased terrorist attacks. All of these changes influence the trilateral relationship. Kilroy claimed that the global war on terror brought something new to the relationship between the three, as did Hurricane Katrina. Threats to the region today consist of drug-related violence, pandemics, illegal arms, human trafficking, natural and man-made disasters, terrorism, and the current global economic crisis. Kilroy stated that the purpose of his research is to examine different levels of security cooperation. Kilroy focused on the sub-regional level, and stated that there is disagreement on how important the sub-regional level is to the three North American countries. Canada, the United States and Mexico all have different opinions on this point. After September 11, 2001, the United States focused primarily on terrorism, and this has shaped the United States’ security policies. With respect to the SCT, it is a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved separately. Kilroy emphasized the importance of security culture. Kilroy then addressed Mexico. He stated that in response to Mexico’s growing criminal and drug trafficking threats, and the concern over the ‘militarization’ of the drug war, the United States had allocated $500 million in 2009. With respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and peacekeeping, there is an opportunity for Canada to do business with Mexico where the United States has difficulty. Kilroy stated there were important questions that needed to be answered, such as ‘can Canada play a significant role in encouraging Mexico with things like their military?’ and ‘are we trying to create a North American union?’ Kilroy stated that there is not a desire in the United States or in Canada for such a union. The United States needs to be careful not to push a particular security model on Canada and Mexico. A perimeter defense model is important, and such a model would focus on specific threats to security, like terrorism, pandemics, natural disasters, and drug trafficking. Furthermore, such a model would increase security cooperation between
the state and local agencies for example, and would increase military-to-military cooperation. There would not be formal alliances or treaties. Also, perimeters would be expanded rather than contracted (behind border fences for example). Kilroy concluded by stating that the window of opportunity may be closing. We need to build a trilateral relationship so that countries do not act unilaterally.

Dr. Stephen Randall, Director, Institute for United States Policy Research, University of Calgary- Canada

Dr. Randall addressed Canada and hemispheric security. The questions that he focused on included the following: ‘How does Canada foresee the hemispheric security agenda evolving?’, ‘How does Canada intend to respond to those challenges?’, and ‘How well is Canada equipped to respond to those security challenges?’ Randall claimed that it is difficult to separate issues of human security (like soft power) and issues that involve ‘boots on the ground.’ Traditional and non-traditional threats have been discussed a great deal over the past 20 years, in post-Cold War period. Randall argued that non-security threats have melded strongly. The current challenges include Canada-United States border security, counter-terrorism efforts, combating international narcotics and small arms trafficking, increasing arctic patrol capacities, combating international organized crime, increasing peace-building efforts (like in Haiti and Colombia), and ameliorating natural disaster response, energy security, and poverty alleviation. Although Canada is becoming increasingly interested in Latin America, the United States is still Canada’s most important ally and partner. However, Randall claimed that this bilateral relationship would translate to multilateral relationships as well. With respect to Canadian policy perspectives, Canada has long believed that military capability is only one part of a broader approach to security at home and abroad. Regarding the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), this organization supports international efforts to reduce threats to Canadian security. Randall stated that we have had challenges and failures. In 2003, the OAS in Mexico produced a Declaration on Security in the Americas, which identified human trafficking, cyber attacks, transnational organized crime, and extreme poverty, among other issues. Randall stated that it is clear that the current Canadian government did move toward rectifying the ‘demise of the Canadian military.’ The goal is to modernize the Canadian military. There is also a focus on the Arctic. He claimed there is clearly a need for more icebreakers, submarines, and helicopters suitable for coastal patrol and other activities. There has been a commitment to increase Canadian ground forces. Randall stated that we have taken some initiatives to improve our presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Randall addressed the diverse bilateral and multilateral approaches possible, such as the Security Prosperity Partnership, DFAIT (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada- the global peace and security fund), the Smart Border Declaration, and MINUSTAH (the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti- the commitment to train Haitian police and justice authorities). The unilateral initiatives that have been created since September 11, 2001 include the
Integrated Threat Assessment Center, the Government Operations Center, and the Cyber Incident Response Center. However, there are some associated problems and challenges, especially with respect to budgets. Canada spent only 0.32 percent of its economic output on aid. Of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Canada was sixteenth. The United Nations Office of Development Assistance has established a target of 0.7 percent of countries’ Gross National Income. In Canada, however, there have been major budget cuts to DFAIT and CIDA. These cuts reduce capacity in areas of diplomacy and aid. The Harper government has shifted the focus of foreign aid from Africa to Latin America, and there has been an overall reduction in the number of priority countries from 25 to 20. Furthermore, the government has attached an ideological edge to its assistance and foreign aid. For instance, the exclusion of Nicaragua is purely political, and these types of actions are shortsighted.

Randall concluded his talk with some recommendations. He stated that Canada needed to continue to enhance cross-border collaboration with the United States. Randall argued that multilateral collaboration with the United Nations and the OAS was necessary. Furthermore, Canada needs to be more aggressive in flexing its diplomatic muscle in Latin America to defuse regional tensions. Continued enhancement of military capacity (especially naval capacity in the Caribbean, the Arctic, and in Coastal waters) is necessary. Furthermore, Canada needs more resources, and needs to build on its Brazilian relationship. Canada should also approve the Columbian Free Trade Agreement because it is the right thing to do, and this will send a clear message to Columbia and the United States of where Canada stands with respect to Columbia. It would also send a clear signal to Venezuela, and it would reinforce Columbia’s current President, Alvaro Uribe, and his successors.

Dr. Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano, Universidad de Guadalajara- Mexico

Dr. Sumano discussed Mexico’s challenges regarding national security in a geopolitical context. He stated that Mexico’s history needed to be taken into account. He discussed Mexico prior to the arrival of Felipe Calderón. Sumano claimed that there were 72 years of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)- one single party ruled for that long a time. In 2000, the National Action Party (PAN) finally came to power. There was a transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy. The Fox administration seemed ambivalent about Mexico’s relationship with Washington after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Right after 9/11, the global war on terror was not a major concern in Mexico- poverty was more of a concern. Sumano claimed that there is a fragmentation of power in Mexico. There are three major forces with three different views of security and foreign policy: the PAN, the PRI, and the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD). This fragmentation has made it difficult to agree on issues involving security, foreign policy, and necessary reforms. Mexico’s strategy on security consists of the following: the recovery of territories, strengthening the role of local governments, the creation of new organizations and security agencies, a land deployment of
Joint Operations mainly conducted by the Armed Forces, and increased international cooperation. Sumano claimed that it is important to foster social unity in order to combat organized crime. There is an overlap between the public security system and the national security system. With respect to the parties’ divergent perspectives on national security, PAN does not even have a conception, the PRI’s conception of security focuses on the rule of law, and the conception of the PRD party centers on development and poverty. There are often overlaps in certain cases between cabinets on national and public security systems. The main threats and vulnerabilities facing Mexico involve corruption. Sumano addressed one main threat to Mexico’s national security: the drug trade. For instance, regarding army desertions from 1994 to 2007, 253,196 members of the army deserted. There is also a problem with the confiscation of funds involving organized crime. Six percent of funds from organized crime are accounted for, but Sumano questioned where the other 94 percent was located. He made similar comments with respect to the confiscation of illegal guns. Sumano claimed his point is that due to the hemispheric dynamics and the interdependence on the drug trade, the major vulnerability is along the United States-Mexican border. Sumano argued that this needed to be taken into consideration and answers needed to be found. He stated that it is important to think in a more integrated way regarding national security, public security, defense of territory, and simply defense. In order to have a master plan regarding Mexican national security, a major problem is the drug trade that is related to American consumption. Sumano concluded that this aspect of the drug trade needed to be taken into consideration when developing and reshaping policies.

Ambassador Graham, the Chair, thanked the panelists and commented on Canadian diplomacy. He stated that he agreed with comments made by Dr. Randall regarding the lack of Canadian peacekeeping, but only up until eight days ago. Graham had just returned from Honduras where the OAS had been held, which was a major event in his opinion, and where Cuba had been readmitted into the organization. He stated that it was about time this happened, and that this should be done with no strings attached. This occurred as a result of diplomacy and a great deal of pressure. He concluded by arguing that this was a very significant success.

Question Period

Q: The drug maps you used are seriously out of date. Much of the traffic has been pushed into Venezuela and Ecuador, and then goes to Central America and up through Mexico into the United States.

Q: I have a comment about Cuba. I am not satisfied with the OAS’s resolution regarding Cuba because I think it was general. There were not clear commitments regarding the reintegration of Cuba into the OAS, and in this sense, we are following the same path of weakening our principles of democracy that were defended by the OAS for so long. I have a question regarding
peacekeeping. You put Haiti and Columbia in the same basket, but the situation in both countries is very different. Haiti is a failed state, and Columbia is a country in conflict. Please provide some clarification.

A: I agree with you, but I put them together to indicate there are peace-building challenges in both countries. I do not think the countries are even remotely similar, but I think Canada should do more, especially in the Columbian case.

Q: This is a rhetorical question, but if Cuba does not want to join the OAS, why is the OAS making such an effort? My actual question is the following: Canada seems to lose track of Latin America once in a while and every 10 years there is a new diplomatic initiative of some sort. On the security side, Canada has been a dismal failure, because in some respects, we are not sure what we can offer Latin America or what Latin America wants from us. Also, Canada is unsure what Latin America can do for us. When trying to put substance into a relationship in the security field, Canada typically ends up ‘scratching its head’ so to speak, as to what it can productively do in certain situations. I am hoping that given the greater openness of key Latin American countries to global trends that affect us all, progress can be made. You might have an idea for where Canada’s place ought to be in your world, because CAN is good at figuring out where it belongs, but Canada’s problem is what to do once it is there. What should Canada do to enhance its relationship with Latin America?

A: There is not just one ‘American’ but many ‘Americans.’ When the North talks about Latin America, it is talking about a world that does not exist. The region cannot be approached as a whole- one must approach each country in Latin America differently. The North and the South have to overcome their own problems and differences. The majority of my pupils think South America is divided because America does not permit us to be only one nation. This is a Cold War argument. Something is wrong with our communication and we have to overcome this problem or misunderstanding. In Latin America at the moment, some countries feel as though their relationship with the United States benefits them, while other countries think the opposite. A great deal needs to be done to improve communication between countries. In Latin America, each country seems to have a different conception of certain terms or concepts, like democracy.

Q: We cannot seem to establish an agenda that will enable us to work together on things that will make a difference to us all. There are always bilateral relationships instead of trilateral ones.

A: The promotion of a research agenda is needed. It is necessary to identify where the issues are in terms of trade, security, and order, and how these issues impact Mexico. Also, the evolution of threats is necessary to understand and to take into consideration. The promotion of a stronger research agenda is needed to foster better cooperation and a better
understanding between the countries. NORAD is a good example. What lessons can be learned in Mexico from NORAD? It is important to learn from one another.

A: I understand the frustration regarding the lack of cooperation. Why is there not more cooperation than exists presently? I do not mean to offend anyone, but you have been involved in a political alliance (NATO), and you have all been born intellectually inside of this alliance. There is no question regarding political limits inside of this alliance. More needs to be done at an operational level. You have to build political commitments. However, when you try to translate this into Latin America, this does not exist. We talk in Washington of allies. But, who are the United States’ allies south of the border? The United States’ allies are Columbia and El Salvador. When we say we need to have a greater exchange of information and intelligence, this is still at a technical level. This is a major barrier for the type of cooperation we want to have- the political instruments are not there.

A: Why the fuss about Cuba? Castro said he is not interested. Venezuela, for instance, wanted to use this as a ‘stick to beat the OAS with,’ and this did not work. The OAS has emerged from this strengthened.

Q: Regarding the comments on DFAIT and CIDA, thank you for bringing that approach to the table. What do you think about the government’s creation of a Minister of the Americas? How is this different from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs? What do you think of this post, and what it will accomplish?

A: It is probably too early to say anything about this at all. It is a symbolic gesture of significance, but there is no reason it cannot be handled within Department of Foreign Affairs or within CIDA. We must not lose sight of the fact that our most important trading partner, and military alliance, is the US.

The Chair thanked the panelists and organizers of the conference.

As evident by the talks, speeches and addresses made in this section of the conference, and the discussions generated as a result, certain issues and themes were made apparent. There seemed to be an agreement on the fact that Brazil is becoming not only a regional hegemon, but also a major world power. Brazil is arguably the most powerful country in South America and is looking for a global role in terms of security and development. There was also an agreement on the anti-Americanism that was spreading, especially in South America. The Bolivarian states are becoming more hostile, and are increasing their influence in the region. The conference attendees acknowledged the importance of democracy. Many questioned whether it was possible to have a trilateral relationship between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. There are many significant reasons for, and benefits that would be generated from, the creation of such a relationship. As stated by Kilroy, a trilateral relationship needs to be
created to prevent countries from acting unilaterally. Furthermore, considering the countries in the region suffer from the same problems such as illegal immigration, terrorism, and organized crime, increased cooperation would improve the region’s response to these issues. Many people at the conference claimed that multilateral collaboration is necessary. Countries need to work together.

Closing Remarks

Professor Douglas Lovelace, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Professor Lovelace argued that both the United States and Canada needed to fashion security policies within the broader context of the Americas/the Western hemisphere. The security in the Western Hemisphere is a key part of the global security architecture. This came through clearly in many of the presentations. As far as threats are concerned, non-traditional and non-military ones are the most concerning. One of the major challenges is transnational crime and the associated corruption. Also, several of the presenters mentioned the significance of Iran, Russia and China in this security dimension. Lovelace claimed that the significance of these countries present a challenge for hemispheric security. The strategies that are fashioned need to account for the non-traditional and non-military challenges to security, as well as the numerous types of actors involved. Continuous engagement in the hemisphere needs to continue. Many argue the United States is not paying as much attention to the hemisphere as it should (possibly because of its role in Afghanistan and Iraq). This suggests there is a need for another look at the discussion forums and architectures that are currently in place. They may need to be adjusted for the type of issues that presently challenge hemispheric security. The Cold War legacy type of architecture is not currently suitable. Internal and external security cannot be separate. Lovelace claimed that there is currently no unilateral concept to hemispheric security. No one nation can provide security for the hemisphere. This requires trust, respect and confidence, not only within governmental agencies, but among various governments. Increased cooperation is needed among governments, and within governments. Lovelace argued that we have to ensure the functionality of borders. It was correctly noted that increased border cooperation is necessary and is going to be important. Cooperation involving the United States and Canada regarding hemispheric security has advanced a great deal over the decades. The relationships between the United States and Mexico, and between Canada and Mexico are improving as well. Lovelace questioned whether this should be a three-way arrangement rather than separate bilateral arrangements. He concluded that although unity of command may not be achievable regarding hemispheric security, unity of effort is achievable. He claimed that there was rich discussion at this conference. Lovelace stated he was grateful to the hosts, co-sponsors, and organizers of the conference.
Dr. Douglas Bland, Defense Management Studies, Queen’s University

Dr. Bland stated that even before attending the conference, he knew it would be enjoyable and worthwhile in many respects. There are some concepts that kept reoccurring throughout the conference, and that are important in a broad way. There was a discussion concerning pandemics and the response to notices of disease, and stories being told in media. What all of this entailed was a story or a narrative about a problem. Narratives were apparent throughout the conference. Bland stated that perhaps some people would consider our discussions of Latin America to be riddled with misunderstandings, but he said that he saw them as being composed of different stories. A combat of stories and narratives was apparent to him. Bland stated that when dealing with an issue or problem, the first thing one needed to do was capture the definition of the problem. If you define the problem, you define the range of solutions regarding the problem. Bland claimed that when he was listening to the presentations at the conference, he was listening from that point of view, whereby he was always attempting to capture the definition of the problems and issues being discussed. Bland claimed that he heard many interesting narratives regarding the relationship between Canada and the United States, military commands, and different issues concerning Latin America. Bland argued that it is sometimes helpful to think of narratives, and to try to understand where they are coming from. He stated that there is often a notion that things will be fixed if we first get the organization right, and if we have joint intergovernmental relations or agencies for example. People tend to think that if we fix the organizational part of our policies, then the problem will respond to the way we have organized everything. Bland argued that this was not the case. Responses tend to be traditional, ordinary and non-functional, and these types of responses do not appropriately correspond to the current world and the present reality. With respect to dangerous groups or organizations, it is necessary to think about counteracting them by matching and combating their organization and how it functions. Bland claimed that that is what gangs do when they battle each other. Bland stated that the problem may be that we are caught in a dilemma regarding the traditional way that public administrations have emerged in Canada, the United States, and Europe as functional organizations, each operating under its own national laws and customs. These administrations and organizations have strict and defined responsibilities and accountabilities, and consequently, they cannot move across ‘lines’ (their responsibilities) very well. Bland argued that many of the functional departments are not equipped for the types of problems we are facing. The nature of threats is changing, but not the nature of departments that are in place to deal with these threats. A new concept of governance is needed to overcome the functional departments that are currently in existence. Bland suggested the creation of permanent committees from these operative entities and that these committees be given temporary laws and legislations that would enable them to act quickly in their own stead. Bland concluded by stating that the conference discussions were stimulating and extremely interesting. He claimed that he was
pleased so many different people from different parts of the world attended the conference, and that agencies and departments of government participated in this conference as well. Bland thanked everyone for attending and participating in the conference.

Concluding Remarks

Consistent throughout all panels was the view that countries in this hemisphere do not work as well together as they should. Cooperation should be increased and improved. Countries need to work together to address issues that affect all of the countries. The issues that affect them all were addressed, and these include, but are not limited to terrorism, organized crime, environmental disasters, and the effects generated as a result of globalization. The need to learn from previous mistakes and to learn from one another was stressed. It was determined that there are opportunities for cooperation and exchange with the states in the hemisphere, and that these opportunities need to be acted upon. There was consensus on the need for Canada to become more engaged in Latin America, and for North America to work on building a trilateral relationship instead of simply bilateral relationships. Most of the scholars agreed that Brazil is becoming a regional hegemon and also a major world power. There was also an agreement on the anti-Americanism that was spreading, especially in South America. The Bolivarian states are becoming more hostile, and are increasing their influence in the region. The conference attendees recognized the importance of democracy and the importance of upholding their values. Many people at the conference claimed that multilateral collaboration is necessary. Countries need to work together. A sharing of information and skills, and increased cooperation were essentially the themes of the conference.