SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE: FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

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KEY INSIGHTS:

• Stability operations in fragile states are likely to remain an important focus of the foreign policy of Western countries for the foreseeable future. The central question to consider when launching these operations is whether a particular type of intervention is more effective than others, and to determine what insights can be drawn from previous deployments in failed and fragile states.

• Capacity building is a lengthy process that requires a considerable amount of resources to produce lasting results. The progress achieved through military partnerships between countries should therefore be measured over decades rather than in months or years, as a lengthy engagement is more likely to produce lasting results in a weak or fragile state.

• Efforts at institution building in fragile states have been largely unsuccessful. Attempts to construct viable regimes in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan have proven far more challenging than was originally assumed, and resistance from sub-national groups has been far more protracted than policymakers expected.

• Capacity building is especially difficult when it requires cooperation among multiple host nation agencies and collaboration among multiple assisting countries that consist of a mix of military, civilian, and NGO entities.
INTRODUCTION

The fifth annual Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS), entitled “Security & Governance: Foundations for International Security,” was held June 21-23, 2010, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The conference was organized by the Queen’s Centre for International Relations (QCIR), Queen’s University Defence Management Studies, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, and the Land Force Doctrine and Training System of the Canadian Forces. It was designed to outline strategies for coping with the threat posed to international stability by fragile, failing, or failed states. The keynote speakers were: Dr. Richard Downie of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (National Defense University); Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Chief of Land Staff (Designate) of the Canadian Forces (CF); and Joseph Quesnel of the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. This conference was attended by over 150 government officials, academic experts, think tank members, and U.S. and Canadian military personnel, and included a wide range of presentations that outlined various strategies for identifying and ameliorating the security challenges that result from state failure in contemporary international environments.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the risk of large-scale conventional warfare between major states has declined dramatically. At the same time, the increasingly interconnected nature of the international system resulted in new sources of global instability, one of the most important of which is instances of state failure and fragmentation in the developing world. Failed and fragile states can serve as havens for terrorist organizations; function as centers of weapons proliferation; foster intrastate and regional conflict; and generate refugee crises that spill over into neighboring states. As a consequence, Western countries have intervened in these states with increasing frequency over the past 2 decades. However, while the problems associated with state failure are widely recognized, the solutions to these challenges remain elusive. Should Western nations foster the development of liberal-democratic institutions in failed states, or should more traditional forms of governance be promoted in order to restore order as quickly as possible? Should the creation of a democratically-elected regime be emphasized at the outset of an intervention, or should elections be postponed until functional institutions have been established? On a more fundamental level, there is debate over whether it is justifiable to intervene in a fragile state at all and, if deemed necessary, what determines the optimal time to intervene. What criteria should be used to determine when a state has “failed,” and what is the appropriate response to state failure in a world of finite military and financial resources? If Western countries cannot intervene in every fragile state, how should policymakers determine if an intervention is warranted? What form should that intervention take, and which institutions have priority for strengthening to ensure that a newly reconstituted state does not collapse as soon as foreign military forces depart? Although the answers to these questions will continue to be debated, KCIS 2010 offered a valuable opportunity to discuss the challenges posed by state failure in the developing world, where stability operations in fragile states are likely to remain an important foreign policy component of Western countries for decades to come.

The colloquium focused on major issues stemming from the nature of the violent conflicts to which Western armed forces have responded; most have had their origins in the incapacity of states to perform their most basic function—to provide for the safety and security of their citizens. Governments of fragile, failing, or failed states are marked notably, though not exclusively, by weak public administration in the provision of public services related to security and the rule of law. Such conditions often generate civil conflict within states and may contribute to broader interstate and regional instability. The international community has found itself increasingly engaged in attempts to foster effective governance strategies, most often during or immediately after civil or transnational wars. Western armed forces and police have gained considerable experience in reforming security institutions and training personnel at the national and local levels, while at the same time coping with difficult issues of civil-military relations. The central questions of the
colloquium are: How to provide the human, technical and tactical capabilities for effective national and local security in these countries, how best to deploy international military and civilian forces for such purposes, and how to recognize when the job is done well enough to permit gradual or complete disengagement. The conference deliberated on these questions through the keynote address and four panels as summarized below.

Keynote Address: Capacity Building on Civil-Military Governance.

In presenting this address, Dr. Richard Downie explored the importance of the whole of government model for combating threats emanating from failed and fragile states. He began with a case study of Colombian government forces attempting to retake land from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies uses a whole-of-learning model for capacity building in South America, with a specific focus on civil-military interaction. The Center facilitates a 3-week course to break down barriers to trust and cooperating between civilian agencies and the military. An important element of the Center’s work is the sustained contact that they maintain with their program graduates. As such, the Center provides resources and serves as points-of-contact for the graduates when they return to their government responsibilities. Graduates tend to rise very quickly to positions of greater authority and as such, sustained dialogue and relationships are important to support each other both domestically and internationally.

Keynote Address: The Army’s Contribution to International Security and Governance.

Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin used examples from Operation HESTIA in Haiti following the Earthquake of 2010 and Operation ATHENA in Afghanistan to illustrate the diverse role of the military in both permissive and non-permissive environments.

Despite its relatively small size, CF have significantly contributed to missions around the world. The CF quickly deployed 2,140 personnel (49 percent of them Army) to Haiti with a whole-of-government reconnaissance team. The Army coordinated relief efforts and established priorities with a number of other Canadian agencies, including Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), Public Safety, Health Canada, and Canadian Border Security Agency. The successes of interagency cooperation brought fresh water, security, infrastructure maintenance, and capacity building to Haiti.

Operation ATHENA was conducted by the same CF, but in a much different environment. Focused on Kandahar Province in Southern Afghanistan, there are 2,500 Army personnel with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs); operational mentor liaison teams (OMLTs); a national support element; an air wing; and with theater support elements. The objective is to create a more secure and safe Afghanistan. Operation ATHENA uses a whole-of-government approach and emphasizes the relationship between security, development, and governance.

An immediate goal was to regain the initiative over Taliban forces in order to begin governance building from the provincial level up to national level. Security planning included President Karzai, since success required the national government of Afghanistan to reaffirm its strategic position.

Panel I: The Roots of Insecurity: National, Regional, and Global

The first panel addressed institution building in fragile states, with each of the panelists seeking to outline a model for identifying and strengthening nations that have been weakened by internal conflict or governmental collapse. Panel members included: Nathan Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), whose presentation was entitled “Strategic State Collapse: Risk, Hazard, and Warning”; Dr. Stephen Saideman, Canada Research Chair for International Security and Ethnic Conflict, McGill University, whose presentation was entitled “Too Little or Too Much Government: The Central Trade-off of State-Building”; and Mark Sedra of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), whose presentation was “Clear, Hold, Build &
Mr. Freier did not propose an explanatory model for understanding the dynamics which drive conflict in failed and fragile states. Instead, he sought to explain how the United States conceptualizes state failure, while at the same time outlining the factors that dictate whether or not efforts are undertaken to stabilize a fragile state. The main theme of his presentation was that while functional states are essential to American security, some states are more important than others.

While Freier focused on those factors which America takes into account when determining whether or not to intervene in a fragile state, Dr. Saideman discussed the policies that should be pursued after the state-building process has begun. Saideman’s main argument was that if a state’s military apparatus is strengthened without simultaneously constructing a governing regime that is regarded as legitimate by the population as a whole, the most likely result is more, rather than less, conflict within the state.

Much like Saideman, Mr. Sedra sought to outline a new approach for dealing with instances of state failure. However, while the former advocated a framework that fairly closely resembled the liberal democratic model of governance, the latter preferred an approach that relied more heavily on non-Western norms and practices, characterized as a “post-liberal” or hybrid model. Implementing this framework would involve the creation of a more limited version of the liberal state, with a focus on the construction of stable institutions before economic and political liberalization is attempted. Traditional institutions would be integrated into the new state apparatus, and a longer time frame is envisioned for the implementation of political and economic reforms.

The common theme present in each of the presentations was the belief that past efforts at institution building in fragile states have been largely unsuccessful. Attempts to construct viable regimes in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan have proven far more challenging than was originally assumed, and resistance from sub-national groups has been far more protracted than policymakers expected at the outset of these deployments. For Freier and Sedra, this lack of success can be attributed to overly ambitious goals adopted by Western countries, which sought to transform profoundly dysfunctional states into Western-style liberal democracies without first establishing a viable institutional framework. However, while conceding that strong institutions are necessary to ensure a stable transition to democratic rule, Saideman insisted that lasting security cannot be achieved in the absence of liberal democratic norms of governance. Policymakers must therefore strike a balance. While future interventions may involve working with groups that do not possess a firm commitment to democracy and human rights, these ideals cannot be abandoned entirely. Instead, a more incremental approach must be pursued wherein economic and political reforms are adopted over a longer timeline. By doing so, there is a greater likelihood that a newly created regime will be both stable and legitimate in the eyes of its own people.

Panel II: Governance Strategies: What Works?


Mr. Tamas addressed the difficulties of capacity building in operations that include multiple agencies. Issues with defining and achieving success were explored, using examples from Anti-Corruption and Strategic Advisory Teams in Afghanistan and work with the National Development Planning Committee and COMSEC in Iraq. Issues in Iraq include the problem of ministry collaboration—political appointees operate individual ministries as “chieftoms,” without any communication or coordinated planning with others. Intervening states continue to struggle
with divisions of labor between military, civilian, and NGO entities working in the field with varying objectives and ideal end states.

Mr. Kilppen proposed developing sound electoral institutions in Afghanistan and discussed the role that outside powers can play to facilitate this capacity. The 2009 Afghan elections were not necessarily an indication of democracy, due to reasons related to the media, President Karzai, and the international community. Kilppen argued that the time between elections (2005-09) was essential for building capacity for credible elections, but ISAF and other agencies failed to empower the public service and government officials through mentoring and teaching skills needed to facilitate, investigate, and adjudicate credible elections. The institutions and processes required for democracy must be established at provincial, district, and village level, where most of the fraud took place.

Mr. Milne argued that the military needed to be aware of basic development theory and models when working in fragile states to build capacity. He feels that military personnel do not need to be experts in development; simple awareness should suffice. Canada’s contribution to the Haiti PK mission 2003-05 was used to support this assertion. Changing Canadian domestic political situations and security and political situations in Haiti affected Canada’s mandate, objectives, and strategic planning for its Haiti operations. Described as “mission creep,” Canada’s commitment was initially 90 days, and progressed to several years. CF were required to continually adapt to the situation on the ground including shifts of missions among relief, security, and peacekeeping efforts.


The third panel explored the use of the military for capacity building toward stability and good governance. The panel members were: Colonel Alex Crowther, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, who assumed the role of chair and discussant; Brigadier General Denis Thompson, CF, presenting “Lessons in Capacity Building: 13 June-19 June 2008”; Lieutenant Colonel Simon Banton, British Armed Forces; and Dr. Hilton McDavid, University of West Indies, who provided a Caribbean perspective on the topic.

Colonel Crowther focused on the role of the military to train and develop indigenous national forces. The case studies illustrated lessons learned from an operation in Afghanistan during the summer of 2008. CF assisted the Afghan National Army (ANA) in planning an operation against dug-in Taliban units along the Arghandab River. Afghan political, military, and police units were involved at the planning level, but Afghan forces were linked with its Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) only 1 1/2 hours before the operation began. Several failures resulted from the first attack, largely due to lack of leadership in the field and no preparation to care for casualties. After withdrawing, greater coordination followed with more time for planning between OMLTs and ANA; the second attack was successful. The case study demonstrated that: capacity building requires long-time investment; training and mentoring is best done in the field; and enduring support is essential despite initial indigenous force failures.

Brigadier General Thompson sought to illustrate the relationship between security and development and security and governance. Using three examples from operations in Afghanistan, he highlighted issues in the current counterinsurgency strategic design of SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, and BUILD. One of the greatest impediments to security and governance is the instability that follows the CLEAR phase of operations. Local villages and districts will invite the Taliban back into an area to provide stability where NATO forces have been unable to stay and reinforce their initial success. Campaign consistency was the key to successful security and governance building following the removal of the Taliban from an area. Shaping operations was an important campaign element for informing and preparing local inhabitant development following the removal of the Taliban. ISAF and the Afghan government had to convince the local population that they could provide better services than the Taliban or other competing interests in the area, such as narcotics, gangs, and militias.

Dr. Hilton McDavid provided a Caribbean perspective on the military in security and gover-
The panelists agreed that different levels of integration and coordination exist in the theater and that greater effort is needed to incentivize civilian deployment and the elimination of cultural barriers between military and civilian personnel.

Panel IV: International Military Engagement and Disengagement in Unstable States and Regions.

The fourth panel focused on the methods used by Western countries to enhance the capacities of partner states in the developing world. Panel members included: Colonel Dominic McAlea, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Forces, whose presentation was “Making Security Sectors Operationally Effective and Accountable”; Colonel Stephen Mariano of the U.S. Army (Africa), whose presentation was “Foundations for International Security: Engagement and Disengagement in Africa”; and Rear Admiral Michael Parks of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) (9th District), who discussed the role played by the USCG in strengthening the maritime capabilities of developing states.

Colonel McAlea focused on the challenges facing Western states seeking to reform dysfunctional institutions in the developing world. Drawing on the Canadian experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), he highlighted the difficulties associated with altering entrenched patterns of behavior in a country with a legacy of instability and conflict. In countries such as the DRC, the security apparatus is often deeply distrusted by the civilian population. To alter this dynamic, the partner countries must implement reform programs specifically tailored to the situation on the ground, with the overarching aim of promoting the rule of law and increasing accountability among the security services. In the context of the DRC, Canadian military personnel spearheaded efforts to: reform the payroll system for the Congolese military; provide skills training for officers involved in the military justice system; and sought to integrate former rebel forces into the national army. However, while arguing that initiatives of this nature are a vital first step in resolving the more entrenched problems present in a fragile state, McAlea also pointed out that capacity building is a lengthy process that requires a considerable amount of time to produce lasting results.

While McAlea highlighted the measures that can be taken to reform the security sector of a partner state once a relationship has been established, Colonel Mariano outlined the criteria that Western states use when deciding whether to establish such a relationship in the first place. Examining the issue from an American perspective, he outlined U.S. foreign policy aims on the African continent, which include maintaining regional stability, neutralizing the threat posed by terrorism and ensuring continued access to natural resources. In seeking to further these aims, America engages a wide range of African partners, with the ultimate goal of strengthening democratic institutions, fostering economic growth and preventing regional conflict. The degree of American military engagement is determined by a set of criteria that ranges from the willingness of a partner state to participate in counterterrorism operations to the extent to which a given country is actively involved in regional or global peacekeeping initiatives. Overall, the principal theme of the presentation was that American military engagement is often driven by concrete considerations that stem from the relative importance of a potential partner to U.S. foreign policy objectives on the African continent. As a result, the American military does not simply seek to establish partnerships with countries that possess more developed capacities; increased engagement with less stable states is often dictated by the
relevance of those actors to broader U.S. policy initiatives.

Much like McAlea, Rear Admiral Parks sought to underscore the benefits that can be generated by engaging in military partnerships with states in the developing world. Approaching the issue from a maritime perspective, Parks discussed the role played by the USCG in enhancing port security and developing the naval capacities of a range of partners in the Global South. Acting through frameworks such as the International Port Security Program and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, the USCG seeks to share resources and expertise with partner states, while at the same time promoting common standards in the area of maritime security. Capacity building by the USCG is undertaken to help partner states develop the ability to police territorial waters, interdict smuggling activities, and regulate offshore industries such as the fishing, oil, and gas sectors. While the tasks undertaken by the USCG are primarily constabulary in nature, the panelist argued that providing partner states with the ability to effectively police their maritime boundaries can ultimately promote stability by providing the means to curb criminal activity in territorial waters. As the maritime challenges facing developing states are seldom military in nature, the USCG is actually a more relevant model for partner states to emulate than the U.S. Navy. At the same time, the panelist was forced to concede that the training efforts of the USCG are limited by its relatively small size, while partner states often lack the resources to develop even a constabulary force in their territorial waters.

While each of the panelists emphasized a different facet of military engagement with partners in the developing world, the common theme in each of the presentations was the belief that capacity building is a lengthy process that requires decades of efforts to achieve lasting results. Altering entrenched patterns of behavior requires a sustained commitment of resources on the part of the donor state, especially in those instances in which its partner is emerging from a prolonged period of instability and conflict. Weak states often lack the capability to impose order within their territorial boundaries, and Western norms of discipline, professionalism, and accountability may not exist in the armed services of a country recently wracked by civil war. However, once significant resources have been invested in mentoring the armed services of a partner state, the benefits to national and regional stability become clear. For McAlea and Parks, a reformed security sector is an essential prerequisite to increasing accountability and establishing the rule of law in a failed or fragile state. As host countries often lack the resources to undertake significant reforms on their own, it is necessary that Western states provide the resources, personnel, and expertise that these states require to create a functional security apparatus. Failure to provide these resources has the potential to result in greater instability in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, as unreformed armed services are often unable to defend national borders, police maritime boundaries, and prevent conflict between sub-state groups. Overall, the potential benefits that can be derived from partnership initiatives should not be underestimated, although policymakers must be prepared to provide long-term assistance that is specifically tailored to the requirements of the host country, rather than focusing on brief deployments and unrealistic goals.

Conclusion: Responding to State Failure in the 21st Century.

The aim of KCIS 2010 was to bring together military and civilian experts from a wide range of fields to discuss the challenges posed by state failure in the developing world. By doing so, participants in this conference were able to provide those in attendance with a more nuanced understanding of the state building process, and share expertise and knowledge among a range of policymakers in both Canada and the U.S. However, while many of the panelists were able to highlight instances in which state building initiatives achieved a degree of success, this conference also underscored the difficulties associated with constructing viable institutions in a fragile state. A consistent theme among the panelists was that state building is a lengthy process that requires a considerable commitment of time and resources. Establishing a functional regime in an unstable state may take decades, and both military and civilian expertise is required to train personnel in
the host country. While providing a partner state with the means to impose order on its territory is a vital step in stabilizing a volatile region, many participants argued that lasting peace can only be built upon accountability, democracy, and the rule of law. Providing military capabilities to a host state without creating the institutional safeguards that will legitimate the armed forces in the eyes of the citizenry at large is likely to generate more conflict, as sub-national groups contest the authority of the central government. A balance must therefore be struck between the desire to construct a functional regime and the need to ensure that the liberal democratic norms are respected, as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated. As the legacy of a host nation’s institutional history cannot be erased in a few short years, capacity building in fragile states must be regarded as an incremental process that will take place over a considerable amount of time.

However, while KCIS 2010 identified a number of flaws in past state-building initiatives, the participants also highlighted a number of areas where successes have been achieved. Military and civilian partnerships with countries in the developing world have resulted in more stable institutional frameworks in regions as diverse as sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and transparency and accountability have been promoted in formerly unstable states. While few initiatives can be regarded as unqualified successes, each contains important insights into the state building process. The forum provided by this conference enabled experts from a wide range of backgrounds to learn from these initiatives, which will in turn allow these lessons to be integrated into future deployments. As the challenges posed by state failure will endure well into the 21st century, opportunities for dialogue that forums such as KCIS 2010 provide are likely to remain relevant for years to come.

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