North Korea, Syria and Washington’s Credibility Gap (policy implications for Canada)

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KCIS 2014 - Key Policy Questions

How has the international community responded to the evolution of CBRNe over the course of post-Cold War era – North Korea and Syria?

With respect to threats to Canada and its allies, how concerned should the international community do about the continued existence of CBRNe materiel, weapons and capability?

What threats do the nuclear ambitions of states like North Korea and Iran pose? What lessons do the cases of chemical weapons in Syria hold for current threat assessment?

How has the international community responded to the these threats, and are there any actions the international community can take to deter proliferation and/or assist in control of movement above and beyond the existing treaties/sanctions?

Policy implications for Canada - what diplomatic measures should the governments be taking to support anti-proliferation efforts of like-minded countries and allies?
North Korea crises reinforcing strategic logic of DbyD and U.S./NATO BMD
- consider the evolving threat from NK:
  . Unha-3 – three stage ICBM launched December 2012
### Comparison of Naro-1 and Unha-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naro-1</th>
<th>Unha-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satellite loaded</strong></td>
<td><strong>Satellite loaded</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naro scientific satellite</td>
<td>Gwangmyeongseong-3 (North's claim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 76×102×116cm</td>
<td>Weight 100kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight 100kg</td>
<td><strong>Length</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33m</td>
<td>30-32m (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-stage rocket</strong></td>
<td><strong>Three-stage rocket</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(first stage liquid, second stage solid-fuel)</td>
<td>(first - second stage liquid, third stage solid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9m</td>
<td><strong>Diameter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 ton</td>
<td>2.4m (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,100km (approx.)</td>
<td><strong>Weight</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flight range</strong></td>
<td>At least 70 ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satellite</strong></td>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170 ton (first stage), 8 ton (second stage)</td>
<td><strong>Satellite</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thrust</strong></td>
<td><strong>Launch timing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled for 2013</td>
<td>Dec. 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Launch timing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- KN-08
- Mobile ICBM
- 6,000 km Range
- Test firing stage one (May 2-4, 2014)
North Korea crises reinforcing strategic logic of DbyD and U.S./NATO BMD

- consider the evolving threat from NK:
  - Unha-3 – three stage ICBM launched December 2012
  - combined w/ latest nuclear test in January 2013
  - preparations (April/May 2014) for another nuclear test
- a nuclear tipped ICBM provides NK w/ potent deterrent threat
  ... no small/deployable nuclear device yet
  ... & no rational motivation to attack w/ nucs

- but inevitable deployment affects US/Can strategic calculations
  - *leaked DIA report claims NK has deployable capability*
  - *Mark Schneider (DIA analyst – J Contemporary Strategy)*
  - diminishes US/Western coercive leverage in NK-SK crises

- March 2013 crisis - Kim Jong-un raised threat level following UNSCR sanctions.
  - deployed Musudan missiles on its east coast;
  - declared the Korean War armistice null and void;
  - closed Kaesong complex (120 companies / employs 50,000);
  - restarted the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and processing facility;
  - issued additional threats of a “pre-emptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors.” (DPRK, March 7, 2013).
- China's diminishing capacity to coercive NK leadership:
  . failed to stop nuclear test in December;
  . failed to prevent launch of Unha-3;
  . failed to halt deployment of Musudan missiles;
  . NK actions provided U.S. w/ justification to deploy BMD assets to region;
  . Musudan launch would provide U.S. with operational BMD test;
  . provoked rebuke from Chinese President Xi Jinping:
    . "No country should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain."
  . recent released reports of Beijing's *contingency planning* for NK collapse
    . No indication that saving NK regime is a priority

Standard approaches failing:

- constructive engagement is repeatedly exploited by NK w/ no results
- Obama's "Strategic Patience" approach has failed
  . State Department official "No way they will give them up." (NYT)
- indifference provokes escalation
- harsher UN sanctions are making NK increasingly desperate (Obama wants more)
  . NK becoming more dependent on fabricated irrationality/unpredictability
  . goal: manipulate fears in US, South Korea, Japan, Europe and China
  . assumes US/China will cave at some point to avoid escalation
    . increases prospects for miscalculations b/c...
    ... authoritarian leaders rarely get balanced intel/advice
U.S. – Syria Crises ➔ Deterrence-by-Punishment (DbyP)

Paul Davis (2013: 5)

"Deterrence by Denial does not stand alone. The larger deterrent strategy should include elements of deterrence by threat of punishment or other mechanisms for imposing costs (even opportunity costs).

Credibility of U.S. DbyP is strong with respect to:

(-) nuclear retaliation against a nuclear strike;
(-) conventional retaliation against direct attacks;
  e.g., Afghanistan 2001 required 9/11 attack;

Credibility of U.S. DbyP declining with respect to secondary threats:

(-) Iraq 2003 required 9/11 and...
  ... a decade of UNSCRs;
  ... consensus among key allies and most of NATO re. Iraq's WMD;
  ... dozens of US, UK and UN reports concluding material breach;
  ... a unanimously endorsed and "final" UN resolution (material breach);
  ... strong public support (following Bush's multilateral turn);
  ... strong congressional endorsement/authorization to use force;

(-) despite all of this, Hussein underestimated the 'real' threat to his regime
  - he expected airstrikes but did not expect invasion of Baghdad
  - US 'credibility damaging' reputation for casualty aversion
Credibility of U.S. DbyP declining with respect to other secondary interests:

*. extended deterrence
*. protecting allies (nuclear umbrella)
*. protecting allies (conventional attacks)
*. protecting other states/populations from serious harm (Syria)

(-) lessons learned (by adversaries) from non- and weak threats/interventions:
- Somalia (1993-1994) and Rwanda (1994);
- Bosnia (1992-1995);
- Iraq 1998 (Operation Desert Fox);
- Kosovo (1999);

(-) coercive diplomacy (deterrence/compellence) fails and succeeds through stages:
- weak threats (red lines) provoke challenges, probes and tipping points
- followed by clearer, stronger more credible threats
- Bosnia (Srebrenica), Kosovo (Racak), Syria (Ghouta)

- paradox of intervention:
  . need a humanitarian crisis to justify/sell humanitarian intervention
  . need a chemical attack to deter chemical attacks
Lessons from Syria crisis:

(-) Washington lost key allies (UK) and a coalition-of-the-willing;
(-) faced strong public opposition to intervention;
(-) faced strong congressional rejection of authorization to use force;
(-) DESPITE:

- 100,000 lives lost;
- several previous chemical attacks (deterrence failures);
- August chemical attack killing 1400 civilians (400 children)

U.S. deterrence/compellence in Syria *failed*, hit a tipping point, and then *succeeded*:

(-) threat of an "unbelievably small" (Kerry) air campaign sufficiently probable;
(-) US promise to avoid mission creep was *not* credible (escalation probable);
(-) risk/costs convinced Syria/Russia to capitulate;
(-) lessons learned from miscalculations by Milosevic, Hussein and Kaddafi.
But Syria case raises concerns about credibility of U.S. DbyP in context of North Korea/ Iran:

(-) If Obama failed to obtain support for airstrikes on Syria *despite* chemical use...

... why would the public support strikes against Iran for merely deploying?

... would US public support striking a nuclearized NK for attacking SK

**Conclusions and Policy Implications for U.S., NATO and Canada**

Declining credibility of U.S. Deterrence-by-Punishment *increases* the imperative to embrace and invest in mechanisms to enhance Deterrence-by-Denial through U.S. BMD and global BMD cooperation.

Jonathan Trexel (2013) – BMD affects adversary's strategic calculations:

- enhances credibility of commitments to re-assure allies and coalition partners;
  
  i.e., protect defender's freedom of action
- adversaries are more likely to view U.S. as willing to escalate, take risks, or intervene;
- increases adversary uncertainties - complicates probability of achieving goals;
- BMD cooperation creates a more formidable and resolute coalition;
- prevents SK and Japan from contemplating deployment of their own nuclear deterrent

  . 2013 - 66% of South Koreans support nuclear weapons program - 48% in 2012
  . 2012 - 48% trust U.S. nuclear deterrent commitment - 55% in 2011
Strategic logic of BMD becoming more compelling:

(-) *Everyone* appears to be embracing the case for BMD

### Europe

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Working with NATO committees on planning and execution for territorial BMD. Working with ALTBMD to refine interoperability between U.S., C2BMC and NATO ALTBMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>BMD Framework Partner; RDT&amp;E Cooperative Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>BMD Framework Partner; Thule Upgraded Early Warning Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>PAC-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>BMD Framework Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>PAC-3, Maritime BMD studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Agreed to host Aegis Ashore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Agreed to host Aegis Ashore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Hosting BMD-capable ships to support NATO BMD and other missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>AN/TPY-2 radar host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BMD Framework Partner; Fylingdales Upgraded Early Warning Radar, Joint Project Arrangements for Cooperative Projects</td>
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### Middle East

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Arrow Deployed, Arrow System Improvement Program; development of short-range BMD, Upper Tier program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions, PAC-3 purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Foreign Military Salescases for THAAD and PAC-3</td>
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### Asia / Pacific

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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>BMD Framework Partner; Joint Project Arrangement for Cooperative Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>BMD Framework Partner; AN/TPY-2 radar host, 21° Missile Development; 4 Aegis BMD capable ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Missile defense discussions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why the consensus?
(-) BMD critics losing ammunition:
- fears of automatic proliferation by Russia and China mistaken;
- BMD costs still represent a small fraction of defence budget;
  (*) $12 billion - 2.5% of $496 billion defence budget
(*) BMD costs assessed in terms of return in security:
  - implications of failure to defend against ballistic missile attack
  - implications of self-deterrence (e.g., North-South Korea crisis)

- BMD combined w/ multilateral arms control (NACD regime) is a rational policy:
  (*) these are NOT mutually exclusive policy options (never were);
  (*) exclusive reliance on multilateral 'diplomacy' provides no guarantee of sec.;
  (*) consider thousands of failed NACD 'intercepts' leading to proliferation
    - Israel, India, Pakistan (non-NPT) and Iran and North Korea (NPT)

- Technology continues to improve (how good does it have to be to be useful?)
  (*) US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) Periodic Reports to Congress.
  (*) Sea-based (Aegis) platform (boost and ascent phases) 28/34 successes since 2002.
  (*) Ground-Based (midcourse) 8/16 successes since 1999.
  (*) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (final stage) 11/11 intercepts since 2006.
    - 64 of 80 (80%) hit-to-kill intercept across all programs since 2001.
    - 43 of 55 (78%) hit-to-kill intercept for THAAD, Aegis BMD, and GMD since 2001.
Canada's Puzzling BMD Policy

In November 2010, 28 NATO members signed NATO’s updated Strategic Concept

“This develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance....Develop missile defense capability that is strong enough to cover all NATO European territory and populations, as well as the United States.”

At NATO’s 2012 Summit in Chicago, alliance members reinforced their collective commitment to BMD:

“We continue to be concerned by the increasing threats to our Alliance posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles…. The aim of this capability (is) to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.”

NATO’s 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review added additional weight to the alliance’s (and Canada’s) missile defence commitments:

“The proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern for the Alliance and constitutes an increasing threat to Alliance security. NATO’s ballistic missile defence capacity will be an important addition to the Alliance’s capabilities for deterrence and defence.”
Canada's Puzzling BMD Policy

Ottawa embraces strategic logic of BMD for NATO, Europe and the US, but not for Canada or Canadians. Why?

ANSWER 1 - b/c North Korea is not really a threat? Wrong...according to the GoC.

The Canadian government’s official assessment of the nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation risks and threats from North Korea is very clear:

“North and South (Korea) technically remain at war, as hostilities were concluded with an armistice, not a peace treaty. Canada remains gravely concerned about North Korea’s provocative and destabilizing actions, such as nuclear and missile tests and related proliferation, as well as egregious human rights abuses.” - http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca.

ANSWER 2 - Canadian officials are perfectly secure in the belief (hope) that US officials will fulfill their obligation to protect Canada... so why rock the boat – avoid messy public debate

But there are 'no' clearly articulated US guarantees to protect Canadian territory and populations – none!

Security guarantees exist only in the minds of some Canadian officials;
Conspicuous absence of BMD discussions with Washington constitutes a serious error in judgement;
- a failure to fulfil government’s core obligation to proactively defend Canadians.
Opportunity cost to waiting until the last moment to engage in discussion – architecture already defined.
Onus is not on proponents to defend BMD; onus is on holdouts to explain why SQ makes sense;
Domestic politics is an excuse, not a rational guide to Canadian security and defence policy.
THANK YOU
North Korean missile ranges
Maximum estimated/calculated

1. Nodong: 1,000km
2. Taepodong-1: 2,200km
3. Musudan: 4,000km
4. Taepodong-2: 6,000km

Source: Council for Foreign Relations