

Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series

Knowing by Doing



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Imagine I tell you that the spatula is in the left drawer of my kitchen cabinet. You ask me how I know, and I respond: "I put it there." Here I know my way around because I arranged things so. Despite its popularity in ordinary discourse, such explanation of how one knows appears not to be recognized in contemporary philosophical reflection. When one looks up "ways of knowing" in a standard textbook on epistemology, one usually finds inference and perception, sometimes also memory and testimony. Action tends not to come up – not even where it is argued that there is such a thing as practical cognition. The recent discussion of that ancient notion revolves around knowing how to do something and knowing what one is doing. In effect, our bit of ordinary parlance is bound to appear as a mere *façon de parler* to be explained away. In the paper, I argue that it can express a genuine explanation that presents an irreducible distinct form of cognition essential to human agency.

Thursday,
February 16th
4p.m.

Law Building
Room 3



Everyone Welcome!

For accessibility requirements, please contact philosophy@queensu.ca

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<https://www.queensu.ca/secretariat/policies/administration-and-operations/covid-19-vaccination-requirements>