

The ‘Bismarckian Paradox’ Explained

Republican Ideology and Anglophobia, from Rebellion to Rapprochement

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Introduction: Buying Royalty for ‘Cash and a Daughter’

Former German chancellor Otto von Bismarck remarked shortly before his death in 1898 that the future of global politics was to be determined by the fact that two great powers, situated on facing shores of the Atlantic Ocean, had English as their native tongue.¹ As a German, he did not take comfort from this cultural commonality, which he sensed would lead to the emergence of an international system in which a British-American condominium dominated global politics. In light of what did transpire by the middle of the twentieth century, Bismarck’s remark proved remarkably prescient. Even though the mooted Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ took longer to be born than either he or some of his contemporaries imagined, born it nevertheless was, with enormous implications for the global balance of power during the era of the Second World War. Nor were those implications limited to the sphere of security and defence relations – as important as that sphere obviously was and is. Instead, the implications extended to a variety of other policy domains, such that it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that the construction of the entire post–Second World War multilateral order subsumed under the rubric of the ‘West’ was in great measure an Anglo-American undertaking.²

If, however, as Bismarck adumbrated, having a common language was to give rise to that core institution of global politics that we have come to know of as the Anglo-American special relationship, it still

took some time before linguistic and other cultural commonalities could work their anticipated geopolitical magic. The main cause for this lag, or so this chapter argues, is to be found in something that appears to have slipped the attention of the Iron Chancellor: the divisive impact of American republican ideas and ideologies upon relations between the two countries. Americans' understanding of what it meant to be an American required their cultivation of an ontological counterpart, call it a 'significant oppositional Other,' which could complete their understanding of who they were, as well as to valorise their claims to national virtue. This, in turn, led to their fostering of a powerful strain of *political* Anglophobia such that even after the objective empirical reality of a British threat to American security interests had passed from the scene, it was still necessary to maintain – and in some cases even to elevate – the subjective presence of a British 'threat' to American identity.

In this striving for self-identification and self-valorisation – the twin motivational features of social identity theory³ – republicanism proved itself to be a handy conceptual vessel for the country's political Anglophobes. Importantly, those who hefted the labouring oar on this vessel hailed mainly from America's demographic (i.e., Anglo) majority during the nineteenth century; they did not, as is so often imagined, come predominantly from the country's ethnic minorities, even though so many of these (especially but not only the Irish) admittedly brought with them to the New World an abiding grudge against – and in the case of the Irish, often a hatred of – England.⁴ That demographic majority, of course, comprised the English-descended Americans – the folk whom Horace Kallen, during the era of the First World War, would stylise as the Brito-Americans.⁵

To understand this apparent contradiction of how Americans who were culturally so English could at the same time be so politically Anglophobic, we are better served not by heeding Bismarck's comment but by turning to another famous figure of the German-speaking world a century or so ago, Sigmund Freud. In many respects, the explanation for American political Anglophobia, with its focus upon the assumed harm that royal practices could have upon republican values, owed a great deal more to what the Viennese psychoanalyst famously termed the 'narcissism of small differences'⁶ than to anything else.

Simply put, for a very long time, and to the great dismay of Cecil Rhodes and numerous other policy elites in the United Kingdom (UK) who were championing an Anglo-American alliance during the

latter years of the nineteenth century,⁷ to be American meant to be politically (though not culturally, and certainly not linguistically) anti-English, with English often being held, during this era, to be synonymous with British – and not only in the United States (US) but in the UK too.⁸ Anglophobia was such an important supporting girder in the architecture of American national identity that we could paraphrase Voltaire's famous quip about God and say that if Anglophobia did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent it.

Importantly for our purposes in this book, the touchstone for political Anglophobia became, and for a good long while remained, royalty and the Crown, so nicely reflected in a comment of Mark Twain's Yankee protagonist in his 1889 novel, *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court*: 'Any kind of royalty, however modified, any kind of aristocracy, however pruned, is rightly an insult.'⁹ But if royalty in general could be counted upon to raise American hackles, what really got the national goat was *British* royalty. The reasons for this were complex and rooted in individual and group psychological aspirations, to be touched on next. For the moment, all that needs to be said is that many observers, Twain among them, detected an unacknowledged sense of national inferiority among his countrymen and countrywomen (but chiefly the former), which lay at the base of what in recent years many scholars of international relations have taken to associating with the politically fraught concept of status anxiety.¹⁰ In his typically delightful way, Twain isolated envy as the source of Americans' anxiety, with their professed attitudes towards *royalty* constituting the proof of this particular ontological pudding: 'We have to be despised by somebody whom we regard as above us or we are not happy; we have to have somebody to worship and envy or we cannot be content. In America we manifest this in all the ancient and customary ways. In public we scoff at titles and hereditary privilege but privately we hanker after them, and when we get a chance we buy them for cash and a daughter.'¹¹

Thus if sharing the same mother tongue might, as Bismarck feared, bring the two sides of the Atlantic closer together, the anti-royalism that was part and parcel – indeed it was the very core – of republican ideology¹² had a powerful constraining impact upon the pull of linguistic nationalism.¹³ I will show why it did this, beginning in the following section by situating this chapter's problematique in the international relations' empirical and theoretical debate over the origins of the very important quality called stable peace.

Potholes on the Road to the Anglo-American Stable Peace

It is at least a minor mystery in international relations why a relationship that has so often, and in my view correctly, constituted the platinum standard for bilateral cooperation in world politics – to wit, the Anglo-American special relationship – should have taken such a long time to come into existence. Certainly, there are those scholars who deny that it ever *had* come into existence; thus for them there really is no mystery whatsoever. Why bother trying to explain lags in the progression of bilateral relations, from enmity to amity, if there was no such progression worth boasting about in the first place?¹⁴ However, for the majority of those who study the ties between the two countries, which is to say for those who do find meaning even if not necessarily comfort in the appellation *special relationship*, there exists puzzlement as to what brought it about and sustained it. Interests? Values? Something else?¹⁵ No less puzzling is another feature of the special relationship, the chronological lag, separating that period when, objectively, relations between the two countries had evolved from their earlier pattern of hostility (which at times had featured overt warfare) to their subsequent irenic coexistence. The time lag can be usefully approached through Charles A. Kupchan's theory of stable peace, as developed in his 2010 book bearing the revelatory title *How Enemies Become Friends*.¹⁶ In it, we see sketched out a timeline running from the moment in the latter half of the 1890s when the two countries achieved rapprochement to some later time (the exact year remaining unspecified) when they were able to take things up a couple of notches and to cement their stable peace.

In the view of this international relations scholar, the qualitative transformation of relations between the US and the UK, that is, their 'safe passage'¹⁷ from enmity to amity, constitutes a singularly bright feature on an otherwise gloomy geopolitical horizon. It is uncommon, to say the least, for states to transform themselves into friends if they had once fought each other, *and*, even after ceasing to engage in mutual bloodletting, they had continued to be rivals for the position of leading state (so-called hegemon) in the international pecking order. Yet this is what the US and the UK managed to do, at a moment in the late nineteenth century when it appeared that a global power transition was underway. In IR theoretical lore, power transitions are considered to

be particularly worrisome periods, susceptible more often than not to triggering a hegemonic war to settle the question of who would be number one.¹⁸ Power transitions are not supposed to end peacefully.¹⁹ This one did; hence some have argued that there might be lessons worth learning from the Anglo-American transition, with applicability to future such transitions (for instance, the mooted one between the US and China).²⁰

Kupchan bent his efforts to trying to understand and explain how Britain and America managed to pull off such a happy transformation in their bilateral relationship, which had got off to such a rotten start a century or so earlier. He found the answer to be subsumed in some combination of three preconditions: institutionalised restraint, compatible socio-political orders, and cultural commonality. Of the three, it is the latter two that held the most causal significance; the first, restraint, Kupchan took to be merely a 'favoring' condition,²¹ and in this respect, he has gone somewhat against the grain of other theorists of international relations, who put great stock in the ability of restraint (sometimes known as *accommodation*, occasionally even as *appeasement*) to facilitate peace between great-power competitors.²²

On top of this set of three preconditions, Kupchan introduced another three-part distinction, appertaining to chronological stages through which the bilateral relationship progressed on its way to stable peace. The first stage was rapprochement, which in the Anglo-American case was reached by the second half of the 1890s, subsequent to the 'therapeutic' crisis in the bilateral relationship that was touched off by the Venezuela–British Guiana border controversy.²³ The second stage was security community, meaning that sentient elites in both countries grew to understand that a forceful resolution of conflicts between them was effectively off the table, such that neither war with, nor the threat to go to war against, the other could be said any more to be conceivable.²⁴ The third, and most important stage of all, was union, held by Kupchan to mean that the interacting states forged a new collective identity through the process of 'narrative generation', by which he understands that elites in one state could no longer quite see those in the other as being fundamentally different from themselves. He nicely encapsulated the staged progression of Anglo-American stable peace by situating it within yet another cluster of threes (leading IR theoretical paradigms), explaining to his reader that what began in realism (rapprochement

engendered by restraint, in this case Britain's) progressed through liberalism (the liberal-democratic security community) and was completed in constructivism (the new narrative of collective identity).²⁵

I introduce Kupchan's theory in this section as it sets the stage for the later discussion of republicanism and Anglophobia. Charles Kupchan is hardly alone in isolating as the highest stage of stable peace the notion of union, conceived as a cognitive community in which elites share a collective identity that is both transnational and transatlantic. Although expressed in a different vocabulary, this was also the message imparted in Christopher Hitchens's values-based study of the Anglo-American special relationship, in which the claim was made that a cognitive union had come into existence between the English and the Americans.²⁶ Though it might be incorrect to argue that Hitchens was necessarily exuberant about the phenomenon that he was so brilliantly chronicling,²⁷ his own assessment of the relationship clearly rested upon his acceptance of qualities that some scholars refer to as 'intermestic'; were he to have been a political scientist specialising in international relations, rather than a literary critic, we could easily have slotted him into the constructivist paradigm. For the intermestic notion signals the fundamental bivalence that characterises the concept of Anglo-American, a term that can refer to both an international relationship and a domestic demographic feature of the US alone. Usually it is the international aspect that dominates the employ of this compound adjective, most obviously in discussions revolving around the special relationship. But there is also a significant domestic sense of the word, one that is going to tell us something of importance about the connection between republicanism and Anglophobia in the US.²⁸

The English and the Americans, Hitchens writes, should not be considered to be separate peoples. "There is a culture, even a literature, possibly a language, and certainly a diplomatic and military relationship, that can accurately be termed "Anglo-American",' he argues, adding that there is 'something in the very landscape and mapping of America, with seven eastern seaboard states named for English monarchs or aristocrats and countless hamlets and cities replicated from counties and shires across the Atlantic, that makes hyphenation redundant. Hyphenation – if one may be blunt – is for latecomers.'²⁹ By this last comment he was intending to connote a crucial distinction: Only immigrants to America, or so Hitchens maintained, should properly be

described with the use of a hyphen (as in 'Irish-Americans', 'German-Americans', and so on); the English-descended Americans, not being 'latecomers', required no punctuation mark.

Not only, Hitchens argued, must the English in America never be considered tantamount to later arriving immigrants, but England itself had to be regarded as an intrinsic part of the American identity, from which it could not be extractable even if it were thought desirable to do so.³⁰ Borrowing imagery popularised in a 1958 book by Harold Isaacs about American perceptions of China and India,³¹ Hitchens discerns 'scratches' on the collective mind of Anglo-America, consisting of 'certain literary, historical, cultural, and emotional images' that steered the preferences of decision makers in either country along parallel channels and 'formed part of the common stock of allusion and reference – one might call it the unacknowledged legislation – which underlay the ways in which people thought and responded, and the ways in which they made up their minds'. In the case of the Anglo-American special relationship, those 'scratches are more numerous and wider and deeper than in any comparable case'.³²

Aside from the obvious grammatical difficulties involved in trying to take the hyphen out of a compound adjective, there are two problems with Hitchens's attempt to so clearly demarcate the English presence in America from the so-called immigrants. In the next section I show what they were and how they mattered.

America's 'Hawthornian Majority' and the Persistence of Anglophobia

Scholars of Anglo-American relations have often pointed, with apparent reason, to the impact that America's demography has had upon the ability of the government to fashion a consistent and coherent grand strategy.³³ According to this way of looking at the matter, that strategy is always up for grabs as a result of competition among the country's numerous interest groups. Nor does it help that America's constitutional structure and practices lend themselves perfectly to the business of lobbying the central government,³⁴ to such an extent that some scholars have configured those interests – in particular, big business and ethnic minorities – as the tail that effectively wags the dog of American foreign policy.³⁵ For those who see the making of

America's foreign policy in this manner, it is easy to understand the stickiness of Anglophobia in the country's body politic, even after the passions aroused by the violent break from Britain had, with the passage of time, dimmed to insignificance. Anglophobia endured, or so it was maintained in this conventional rendition, because of America's changing demography, especially in the decades between the ending of the civil war and the sealing of rapprochement at century's end. For, in this telling, far too many of these new Americans were hailing from parts of the world where love for England was in very scant supply – Ireland mainly but, as time went on, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire also.

The conventional story goes something like this. In the first several decades following the rebellion against British rule, it was natural enough for Americans to be feeling their Anglophobic oats, on the solid grounds that no foreign power during those early decades of their independent existence had constituted more of an objective, certifiable, threat to their country's physical security than had Great Britain, often as a result of the latter's attempts (or at least, desires) to 'contain' America's territorial expansionism.³⁶ Delmore Schwartz, among others, has been associated with authorship of the quip that 'even paranoids have enemies'.³⁷ Regardless of the saying's authorship, there can be no disputing that for almost all Americans as they surveyed the threat environment during the decades preceding the civil war, it was not difficult to determine the country that stood between them and geopolitical bliss. That country was none other than Great Britain, the ancestral homeland for most of them. But, again according to this story, once America had sufficiently risen in the global pecking order, say after the civil war, it should have been able to outgrow its earlier palpitating, if not altogether unreasonable, Anglophobia and joined with those growing numbers in Britain who, for whatever reason, were beginning to imagine that Anglo-American rapprochement could be the only smart bet for both British and American foreign policy. Alas, rapprochement between the two powers would have to wait – even for as long as another quarter-century following the 1871 Treaty of Washington, which one Canadian scholar nicely adjudged to have brought to a definitive termination the Anglo-American 'Hundred Years War'.³⁸ The 'war' might have ended, but the Anglophobia had endured. Why?

In the conventional telling, it was the growing non-English demographic component of America's population that was making the country resistant to burying the hatchet with the former mother country; in the symbolism of Dickens's *David Copperfield*, Britain may have been the 'willin' Barkis, but America decidedly was the reluctant Peggotty. Demographic realities, it is widely said, accounted for America's refusal of an offer of union (in the form of an alliance). Significantly, it was all attributable to the doing of the minorities, those folk whom Hitchens, in the preceding section of this chapter, dismissed as the 'hyphenates'. In that section I mentioned that there were two problems with Hitchens's exemption of the English-descended Americans from hyphenate status. Here I identify those problems (apart, that is, from the aforementioned grammatical complexities raised by compound adjectives).

The first of these problems is semantic but nevertheless revealing of something important about American demography during the long period when Anglophobia constituted a core aspect of the national identity. It is often claimed that while people who came to America from elsewhere in Europe than the British Isles were properly called *immigrants*, those who arrived directly from the UK needed to be regarded as *settlers* – although from the perspective of those who already were established territorially in North America, namely the Indigenous populations, a more accurate descriptor for both groups would likely be *invader*.³⁹ But even if one shrinks from adopting the latter descriptor, there are a couple of objections to employing the settler-immigrant distinction.

For starters, not all of the so-called European settlers in America originated from England and other parts of Great Britain. From the earliest days of European colonisation a not-inconsiderable minority of America's European population consisted of Germans, supplemented by a goodly number of Dutch and Irish.⁴⁰ Moreover, if not all so-called settlers were English-descended Americans, not all of the latter were settlers, either. Many English, Scottish, and Welsh entered America during the nineteenth century, along with vast streams of other immigrants.⁴¹ It is sometimes forgotten that migrants from Great Britain and Ulster, these latter being mainly non-Catholic Irish, constituted the third-largest cohort of European arrivals in America (after the Germans and Irish Catholics) in the dozen or so years prior to the civil war, when some 500,000 of them entered the US from England, Wales, Scotland,

and Ulster. After the civil war, though, things changed dramatically, with the British (including Ulster) share of new arrivals becoming halved, shrinking to about 12 per cent by the 1880s.⁴²

More important by far is the second reason for avoiding succumbing to the all-too-common temptation of ascribing causality for the stickiness of America's Anglophobia to the ethnic minorities. It is not that America's ever-more diverse demography, as the nineteenth century progressed, boded well for British interests, or that those numerous British commentators who detected problems for Britain associated with America's Irish and, later, German diasporic communities were wrong to be so worried.⁴³ The problem lay elsewhere. All of the attention ladled especially upon the Irish Americans as *the* source of American Anglophobia during the second half of the nineteenth century obscures the fundamental reality of political Anglophobia among the majoritarian ethnic community in America during those decades. Tagging the minorities with the blame for Anglophobia misses the elephant in the American demographic room – the country's English-descended folk, who as late as the end of the nineteenth century were still comprising two-thirds of the nation's population (as opposed to today's figure of less than a fifth).

These were the people whom I have elsewhere labelled the 'Hawthornian majority' of the United States.⁴⁴ That eponym owes its existence to a passing observation made in 1853 by the recently arrived American consul in Liverpool. This was the novelist (and a New Englander, no less) Nathaniel Hawthorne, who had been nominated to the consular posting following the November 1852 election, as fourteenth president of the US, of his close friend from undergraduate days at Bowdoin College in Maine, Franklin Pierce. It might seem to be more than a bit odd to associate the Hawthorne name with a nationwide ideational predisposition, for he was widely considered to be someone who marched to his own drum and cultivated a sense of self as distant from the cultural mainstream in America as was possible to imagine; in the words of one leading literary critic of the early twentieth century, Hawthorne and fellow writer Edgar Allan Poe distinguished themselves in mid-nineteenth century America by being as 'out of touch with society as few other artists in the world have been before; to their contemporaries they seemed spectral and aloof, scarcely human'.⁴⁵

That may have been so, but in an ethnic sense Hawthorne was more than at one with the demographic majority in nineteenth-century America. If ever there was an American who could be said to be ethnically and culturally more English than the English, it was he. He was born in Salem, Massachusetts, on 4 July 1804, a proud if perennially troubled descendant of East Anglian Puritans who had flocked in great numbers to Massachusetts Bay colony in the decade after 1630. One of those Puritan forebears, great-great-great grandfather William Hathorne, had made a name for himself persecuting witches in the Salem trials at the end of the seventeenth century, the memory of which no doubt had a dampening effect upon whatever filiopietism Hawthorne might have been inclined to muster.⁴⁶ Hawthorne's literary and cultural inspirations were almost exclusively English (not surprisingly, given the relative infancy of the arts in post-revolutionary America), and he himself felt such a close emotional connection with the ancestral homeland that he could rhapsodise upon 'England, the land of my ancestors! Once I had fancied that my sleep would not be quiet in the grave until I should return, as it were to my home of past ages.'⁴⁷

Hawthorne was to get that shot at a quiet everlasting sleep, for he did manage to return 'home' in early 1853, when he took up his diplomatic appointment. In correspondence with the State Department he offered some candid and snippy views of the ancestral homeland, and it is these views that have prompted me to label as the 'Hawthornian majority' the English-descended Americans. What, exactly, were these pithy words of Hawthorne's, conveyed in a letter to the State Department? 'I hate England, though I love some Englishmen, and like them generally.'⁴⁸ Here was expressed perfectly the Anglo-Americans' feelings towards the former mother country: disgust for its political practices – above all those emblematic of royal rule with all its attendant fripperies so offensive to signalled republican virtues – mixed with general admiration and even a bit of love for its people, as well as for English civilisation writ large (which was also, be it recalled, American civilisation). To better understand this strange but politically powerful sentiment, we need to contextualise American Anglophobia, the task of the following, concluding, section.

Conclusion: Anglophobia and the American Ontological Security Dilemma

Hawthorne's comment may not have contained many words, but it certainly offered a heap of insight into the American mind. Though a literal reading of it might strike us today as a prime example of what psychologists would refer to as cognitive dissonance, it was anything but that. Rather than exemplifying the psychological distress engendered in someone struggling to reconcile intellectually two palpably self-cancelling presuppositions, as the psychologists might have it, the words actually revealed something else: They represented the kind of cognitive consonance associated with the expression of true Americanism as it had been imagined by Americans ever since the revolution, and *by none more so than the English-descended Americans themselves*. Despite the cultural and even civilisational affinities between those Americans and their kin in the ancestral homeland, there was a huge political difference whose convenient objective correlatives in the American mind would, for many decades, be the Crown and royalty. For reasons that were difficult for many in the England of the late nineteenth century to grasp, their American cousins needed *political* England, the England that Hawthorne professed to 'hate,' as the ontological foil for their self-understanding as Americans.

Scholars of international relations have long been familiar with the 'security dilemma', a notion popularised by John Herz and, later, Robert Jervis, to speak to the difficulties introduced when a state (let's call it State A) attempts to ensure its own physical security through measures that it understands to be 'defensive' and thus a threat to no one. But State A's potential adversary (let's call it State B) sees those measures to be menacing and directed at *it*, requiring the adoption of countermeasures. The result is an upward spiral of arming, in which States A and B attempt to keep ahead of an increasingly dangerous curve. To the extent that this variant of the security dilemma did at one time have a profound negative impact upon Anglo-American relations, it ceased to do so following the 1871 Treaty of Washington, which I argued earlier can be taken as the effective terminal point for the lengthy period in which Americans had a reasonable basis for worrying about a British threat to their physical security.

Yet still the rapprochement was delayed – for another quarter century following that treaty. As we saw, the standard view for that delay throws the blame (or *causality*, to invoke a more value-neutral term) on America's ethnic minorities. What that standard view overlooks, however, is the impact of a different kind of security dilemma upon the bilateral relationship: the ontological security dilemma. This is a fairly recent addition to the scholarly analysis of international relations, and is associated particularly with Jennifer Mitzen. Her point of theoretical departure is international relations' traditional security dilemma, as expressed previously. This can be, and is, worrisome enough, but Mitzen tells us that it is only half the story when it comes to understanding the dangers inherent in international anarchy, as well as the obstacles confronting international cooperation.

She posits an even more troubling ontological security dilemma, held to be a function of a state's need to protect its identity as much as, perhaps even more than, its physical security. This is so troubling because for states whose own sense of their self depends powerfully upon the presence of a significant oppositional Other, there can be a rational (sort of) basis for the continuation of conflict, or at least for the perpetuation of strategic aloofness, and this is because of the collective need for self-knowledge in an otherwise perplexing cognitive setting. In this view, state identity emerges from an international pattern of behaviour, and while it is possible to imagine such a routinised pattern being cooperative, it is more likely to be a competitive one. Thus, the routine can generate a kind of collective identity, albeit a dysfunctional one, such that while states do seek physical safety, they also seek to make secure their identity – an identity that, perversely, can often be 'embodied in the competitive routines and therefore become attached to the competition as an end in itself'.⁴⁹

If we combine Mitzen's insights into a state's cravings for ontological security with the aforementioned assertions of those who take guidance from social identity theory, then an answer begins to emerge for Peggotty's surprising (to the British, at least) reluctance to grasp the hand of Barkis. British analysts, starting in the latter half of the Victorian era (i.e., after civil-war tensions had abated but prior to the rapprochement),⁵⁰ consistently failed to take the full measure of the necessary but involuntary role that their country was playing in the self-identification

of Americans. Thus they would often express incredulity that the long-running pattern of suboptimal bilateral relations proved so resistant to eradication, even and especially in light of the rise and the growing popularity, after mid-century, of a set of racialised ideas swirling around the recently invented concept of Anglo-Saxonism, which might have been thought likely to effect Anglo-American rapprochement but did not – at least not until another half a century had passed.⁵¹

An important reason for the delay can be found in the need of America's dominant demographic cohort for something they understood to be *political England*, so that this same Anglo-American (in the domestic sense of the concept) cohort could know and validate itself. It sounds strange, possibly weird, to phrase it this way, but it does make more sense to interpret the Bismarckian paradox as a function of the groups who actually *did* control American foreign policy, rather than as something stemming from those who did *not* – namely, the ethnic minorities. In short, the Hawthornians' othering of political England served a vital purpose for them, in both of the senses suggested by social identity theory – and did so for a very long time, outlasting the nineteenth century.⁵² This othering helped them to know who they were. And it comforted them by demonstrating their republican political system's – and therefore their personal – superiority to that of their 'royalist' kith and kin across the Atlantic.

America's majority, English-descended, population were so politically anti-British that the rote proclamation of an abiding 'hatred' for England could be considered the litmus test for their own red-blooded Americanness, even into the twentieth century.⁵³ And if it really was not possible to hate one's own kinfolk and their civilisation, it was definitely possible to target for opprobrium English political practices, especially those associated with royalty.

It was precisely this rejection of such practices that gave meaning to their identity as Americans. Given that they spoke the same language, professed mainly the same Protestant religion in its various denominations, and organised their economies along similar liberal lines as time went on in the nineteenth century, were it not for the major cleavage over politics, there would have been little point in having separated from the mother country in the first place. Stephen Tuffnell explains why Anglophobia could play such a central and long-lasting role in shaping American identity:

As a concept, Anglophobia held too prominent and potent a place in the demonology of American politics to be simply dispensed with ... Anglophobia's deep roots in American society and political culture ensured its endurance as the primary negative reference point of American nationalism until the close of the nineteenth century. Anglophobia was a capacious, politically contingent language that acted as a crucible in which American nationalisms were forged. Its lexicon and iconography not only catalyzed debate, but also served as critical markers of social and political membership at the height of the United States nation building project ... It allowed Americans to define themselves against Britain and British policy, in the process articulating a more positive vision of American nationality and branding those unsympathetic with their vision as unpatriotic ... [A] chimerical John Bull acted as a critical reference point for Americans' own national identity.⁵⁴

To be sure, the ontological chip poised on the national Hawthornian shoulder would eventually become dislodged as a result of subsequent developments. But those developments would occur in the twentieth century, for reasons to be discussed in subsequent chapters of this volume.

Notes

- 1 Quoted in W. Clark, *Less than Kin*, 2.
- 2 See, especially, Mead, *God and Gold*; Cronin, *Global Rules*; and Rosenboim, *Emergence of Globalism*.
- 3 On this social-psychological theory see Tajfel, 'Social Identity', 65–93; and R. Brown, 'Social Identity Theory', 745–78.
- 4 T.N. Brown, *Irish-American Nationalism*; Moody, 'Irish-American Nationalism', 438–45.
- 5 Kallen, *Culture and Democracy*.
- 6 Quoted in C. Hitchens, *Blood, Class, and Empire*, 157–8.
- 7 Rhodes was certain that the restitching together of the first British empire, possibly even by folding the latter into the American republic, would establish the 'foundation of so great a power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity'. Aydelotte, *Vision of Cecil Rhodes*, 5.

- Similarly longing for the universal peace that only an Anglo-American alliance could provide humankind was Bryce, in 'The Essential Unity,' 22–9. On the budding enthusiasm for the universal peace during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, see D. Bell, 'Before the Democratic Peace', 647–70.
- 8 Hence the subtitle of Bradford Perkins's locus classicus on the rapprochement between the US and the UK at century's end, *The Great Rapprochement*. As one prominent British historian reminds us, even in the UK itself during those decades 'it was at least as usual to say England and English as Great Britain and British.' Joll, *Origins of the First World War*, xi.
 - 9 Quoted in Ayres, *Wit & Wisdom of Mark Twain*, 15.
 - 10 See, especially, Renshon, *Fighting for Status*; Murray, *Struggle for Recognition*; and Onea, 'Between Dominance and Decline', 125–52.
 - 11 Quoted in De Voto, ed., *Mark Twain in Eruption*, 64. Also see, for this same tendency, Sir Ambrose Abercrombie's reminder to Dennis Barlow, in Evelyn Waugh's *The Loved One: An Anglo-American Tragedy*, on the need to keep up appearances when an Englishman gets to America: 'They may laugh at us a bit ... but, by God they respect us ... You never find an Englishman among the under-dogs – except in England of course.' Quoted in C. Hitchens, *Blood, Class, and Empire*, 46–7.
 - 12 That these ambiguous and sometimes contradictory denotative qualities of the concept had only one common denominator, the yearning for a 'kingless government', is argued persuasively in Rodgers, 'Republicanism', 37–8. Also see on this essentially contested concept Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism*; Pocock, 'Between Gog and Magog', 325–46.
 - 13 On language as a shaper of identity, a phenomenon sometimes called linguistic nationalism, see J.R. Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity*.
 - 14 The deniers of the Anglo-American special relationship, who insist there is nothing special about it, remain in the scholarly minority, for reasons not difficult to comprehend. Their ranks include Ingram, 'Wonderland of the Political Scientist', 53–63; Arnold, *America and Britain*; Lagadec, *Transatlantic Relations*. For somewhat more constrained versions of denialism, see Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars*; Barr, *Lords of the Desert*; Leebaert, *Grand Improvisation*.
 - 15 For different assessments of the source(s) of the Anglo-American special relationship, see Baylis, 'Anglo-American Relationship', 368–79; Aldrich, 'British Intelligence', 331–51; Cronin, 'Convergence by Conviction', 781–804; C. Bell, *Debatable Alliance*; Allen, *Great Britain and the United States*; and Marsh, 'Beyond Essential', 382–404.
 - 16 Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.
 - 17 To use the imagery of another IR scholar, Schake, *Safe Passage*.
 - 18 The scholarly corpus of power transition theory and hegemonic war is ample and includes Organski, *World Politics*; Organski and Kugler, *War Ledger*; Gilpin, *War and Change*; Allison, *Destined for War*.

- 19 See, for this systemic rarity, Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out*.
- 20 For instance, see Yongping, 'Peaceful Transition of Power', 83–108.
- 21 Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, 6–8.
- 22 For accounts that emphasize the transformative significance of restraint, see Paul, *Accommodating Rising Powers*; Paul, 'Study of Peaceful Change', 3–26.
- 23 Bertram, *Birth of Anglo-American Friendship*. On therapeutic crises see Eznack, 'Crises as Signals of Strength', 238–65.
- 24 See Adler and Barnett, 'Governing Anarchy', 63–98; Deutsch et al., *Political Community*.
- 25 Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, 52.
- 26 C. Hitchens, *Blood, Class, and Empire*.
- 27 For instance, see Andrew Mumford's claim that Hitchens was sceptical about the normative (indeed, ethical) meaning of the Anglo-American special relationship: 'Never backward at coming forward, the late polemicist Christopher Hitchens (himself an Englishman at home in America) labeled the special relationship a "transmission belt by which British conservative ideas have infected America, the better to be retransmitted to England".' Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars*, 3.
- 28 For this domestic application of the concept see Kaufmann, *Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*. Also see, for one particularly intermestic account that highlights an 'unmistakable thread of ethnocultural continuity' in the evolution of transatlantic Anglo-America, Phillips, *Cousins' Wars*, xv–xvi.
- 29 C. Hitchens, *Hitch-22*, 227–8.
- 30 An argument also made, *mutatis mutandis*, in Fischer's wonderfully stimulating *Albion's Seed*.
- 31 Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*.
- 32 C. Hitchens, *Blood, Class, and Empire*, 44–5. Writing several decades before Hitchens, one prominent historian of Anglo-American relations gave expression to a similar thesis, detecting the existence of a strong transatlantic collective identity created on a foundation of 'increasing similarities of predilection, interest and outlook between the two peoples ... The similarities of principle are plain and the sympathies of personality are almost equally so.' Allen, *Great Britain and the United States*, 568–9.
- 33 On the concept itself see Silove, 'Beyond the Buzzword', 27–57; on the impossibility of America to fashion a grand strategy see Drezner, Krebs, and Schweller, 'End of Grand Strategy', 107–17.
- 34 Baumgartner et al., *Lobbying and Policy Change*. Also see Schrifftgiesser, *Lobbyists*; Deakin, *The Lobbyists*; Berry, *Lobbying for the People*; Howe and Trott, *Power Peddlers*.
- 35 A claim made by, *inter alios*, Samuel P. Huntington, 'Erosion of American National Interests', 28–49; Schlesinger, *Disuniting of America*; Fuchs, 'Minority Groups and Foreign Policy', 161–75; T. Smith, *Foreign Attachments*. For a

review of the scholarly corpus on ethnic lobbying in US foreign policy, see Haglund and Stein, 'Ethnic Diasporas'.

- 36 The literature on British containment proclivities is voluminous. See Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power*; Lewis, *American Union*; Rippy, *Rivalry*; W.D. Jones, *American Problem*. For various expansion-engendered diplomatic incidents of the decades prior to the civil war, see B. Perkins, *Castlereagh and Adams*; H. Jones, 'Anglophobia and the Aroostook War', 519–39; Howard Jones, *To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty*; Merk, 'British Government Propaganda', 38–62; Merk, *Oregon Question*; Haynes, 'Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas', 115–46; E.D. Adams, 'English Interest in the Annexation of California,' 744–63; Naylor, 'British Role in Central America', 361–82; Van Alstyne, 'Anglo-American Relations', 491–500; M. Crawford, *Anglo-American Crisis*; Bourne, 'The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty', 287–91.
- 37 Others to whom the words have been attributed are Henry Kissinger and even Freud; see 'Quote Investigator', available at <https://quoteinvestigator.com/2016/07/09/paranoid/>.
- 38 Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism*, 256–7.
- 39 Among scholars trafficking in the immigrant-settler distinction are Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, and Huntington, 'Hispanic Challenge', 30–45. For the possibly more accurate appellation see Jennings, *Invasion of America*.
- 40 Sometimes the second-mentioned of these, the Dutch, can be overlooked altogether due to their relatively small impress upon American demography, compared with that of the larger German and Irish diasporas; for an intriguing corrective, cf. Shorto, *The Island at the Center*.
- 41 See MacRaild, 'Ethnic Conflict', 37–63; Berthoff, *British Immigrants in Industrial America*.
- 42 Phillips, *Cousins' Wars*, 498.
- 43 The Irish diaspora in the US was a particular concern for British policymakers, understandably so, given the support provided by America's Irish to the independence struggle in the Emerald Isle. See McCaffrey, *The Irish Diaspora in America*; Sewell, 'Rebels or Revolutionaries?', 723–33; Bagenal, *The American Irish*; Ó Broin, *Fenian Fever*; Gantt, *Irish Terrorism*; Short, *Dynamite War*; Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*; Golway, *Irish Rebel*; Ward, *Ireland and Anglo-American Relations*, 64–90; Tansill, *America and the Fight for Irish Freedom*.
- 44 Haglund, *US 'Culture Wars'*.
- 45 Brooks, *America's Coming of Age*, 45–6.
- 46 Hawthorne changed the spelling of his last name (from Hathorne) after graduating from Bowdoin College. Van Doren, *Nathaniel Hawthorne*, 4–6. On the Salem witchcraft hysteria see Starkey, *Devil in Massachusetts*; Hansen, *Witchcraft at Salem*.

- 47 Quoted in Wineapple, *Hawthorne*, 269. The words are from his short story 'Fragments from the Journal of a Solitary Man'.
- 48 A British diplomatic counterpart in the US, Richard Bickerton Pemell (otherwise known as Lord Lyons), corroborated Hawthorne's basic point later in the same decade when he astutely observed that the 'taking and giving of offense had become a reflexive habit in Anglo-American relations since the separation of 1775–83'. Quoted in Foreman, *World on Fire*, 13.
- 49 Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics', 360.
- 50 Campbell, *Unlikely Allies*.
- 51 For the origins of this policy idea see Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*. On the inability of this idea to foment Anglo-American geostrategic union, see Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons', 1315–53.
- 52 On the phenomenon of othering in international relations, see Neumann, 'Self and Other', 139–74.
- 53 See G.H. Adams, *Why Americans Dislike England*; and G. Smith, 'Hatred of England', 547–62. Also see E. Wallace, 'Goldwin Smith', 884–94; Reuter, 'Anatomy of Political Anglophobia', 117–32.
- 54 Tuffnell, "'Uncle Sam Is to Be Sacrificed'", 79; G. Smith, 'American Anglophobia', 190–2.