Introduction

Among the various policy ideas to have circulated in the transatlantic political arena in recent years, few have been as charged with controversy as the notion of the ‘Anglosphere’ – a notion that began to attract a good deal of attention early in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This ideational construct has been interpreted as representing either something wonderful or something terrible. At one extreme, it has been viewed as representing the fullest flowering of the venerated Anglo-American tradition of liberty, the ideational underpinning of the West’s liberal-democratic ‘zone of peace’. Conversely, it has been said to signify nothing so much as the continuation of a pattern of ethnic (some say even racial) self-promotion that makes a mockery of those very same liberal-democratic norms and values. It has even been mustered, by one of its detractors, into the service of justifying Scotland’s leaving the United Kingdom and joining – wait for it – Canada, as the latter’s eleventh province. For Ken McGoogan, who was evidently serious in advancing this policy idea, among its merits would be the clearly normative one of situating both Scotland and its new ‘country’ on the right side of justice, because ‘while the Tories in Britain and the Republicans in the United States set about creating a neo-liberal Anglosphere – anti-egalitarian, avowedly Christian, pro-Big Business, pro-military – Scotland becomes part of Canada and helps lead the way to a more progressive world’.

Nor is the debate simply limited to the normative meaning and consequences of the Anglosphere, as important as these may be. Scholars, policymakers and political activists have also disputed the postulated sources of this policy idea. Some argue that its origins can be found in the realm of linguistics; in so doing, they merely use different formulations to echo Otto von Bismarck’s
famous remark about how English being the predominant tongue in two very powerful transatlantic countries would be the determinative geopolitical feature of the twentieth century, a consequence of the ‘logic of history’. Or, as the same thought was expressed in more cultural than geopolitical terms shortly after the First World War, ‘a language, of course, is more than words. It is a body of literature, it is a method of thinking, it is a definition of emotions, it is the exponent and the symbol of a civilization. You cannot adopt English without adapting yourself in some measure to the English, or the Anglo-American tradition.’ Others, however, put the emphasis not so much upon the tongue as upon the ‘blood’, taken by them to represent not only the speaking of a common language, but also the sharing of a ‘biological’ common past.

This chapter examines the rise and apparent demise of enthusiasm for the Anglosphere. To reiterate, the rubric itself may be of recent vintage, but the concept has its roots in a more distant period, one in which talk of Anglo-American amity and (who could say?) possibly even ‘reunion’ was being heard in certain quarters on both sides of the Atlantic. Eventually, there would develop a stitching together, of sorts, of the first British Empire, made manifest through an alliance between the United States and its former mother country, and enshrined in a bilateral relationship whose qualities were deemed to be unprecedentedly ‘special’ in world affairs. And while the Anglosphere and the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR) may not be identical constructs, they possess obvious common features. Accordingly, this chapter’s next section embeds the current debate over the Anglosphere in an anterior discussion on that geopolitical dispensation we know as the AASR. Following this, the focus shifts to the business of trying to define the Anglosphere and identifying its two principal significations. The chapter’s fourth section zeroes in on the most controversial matter of all, namely whether the Anglosphere countries have a propensity towards military intervention and, if so, why. The concluding section explores the current state and future prospects of the Anglosphere.

Is the Anglosphere Just Another Way of Saying, ‘Anglo-American Special Relationship’?

The volume in which this chapter is found constitutes a broad historical, cultural and philosophical overview of Anglo-American political traditions, some of which date from a moment in the eighteenth century preceding America’s departure from the first British Empire and some of which are much more recent. Among the conceptual parvenus in international relations (IR) lore, few, it would seem, have attained the celebrity (if not infamy) so recently associated with the Anglosphere, an apparent, and novel, derivative
of that older geostrategic institution known as the Anglo-American special relationship, with which it shares a certain lustre or, as the case may be, notoriety. Although the two geopolitical conceptualizations are obviously related, they are not identical. Thus, it is important to draw attention to a couple of differences between the Anglosphere and the AASR at the outset. To start with the obvious, the membership of the latter is more restricted than that of the former: by definition, the AASR involves two states, the United States and the United Kingdom, while the Anglosphere constitutes an assumed identity-based community embracing, depending on how it is construed (see below), anywhere from a minimum of three members to upwards of a dozen or more. Then there is the second distinction, functional in scope, that sets the AASR apart from the Anglosphere. The former must logically connote as its *raison d’être* the cultivation and sustaining of a highly co-operative political relationship between two state actors, each of which seeks to derive benefit from their co-operative interaction; it is, in a word, a *purposive* enterprise, intended to effect, at its most ambitious, nothing short of the construction and maintenance of ‘world order’. The Anglosphere, by contrast, is a looser grouping and – again depending upon its definition – it can embrace states or societies, or a combination of the two, and can exist for some purpose, or for no particular purpose at all.

These differences being noted, there are nevertheless some commonalities between the two conceptual entities. Most importantly, each has spawned queries as to whether it even *exists* or is simply a geopolitical conceit, with the more familiar AASR presenting itself as a useful proxy for the Anglosphere in this matter of existential contestation. This is to suggest that there is a natural comparability between what has been said of the AASR’s existence and that of the Anglosphere, save that not enough time has passed to enable a full-throated airing of the contestation of the latter. Nevertheless, existential questions that have been posed regarding the AASR can, *mutatis mutandis*, find applicability in respect of the Anglosphere. So let us see what has been said of the AASR, as a surrogate for what might be said of the Anglosphere.

Like Caesar’s Gaul, the interpretive school of the AASR can be divided into three parts. The first part consists of the sceptics, scholars who are blunt in their insistence that to the extent there might be anything deemed particularly ‘special’ about the AASR, it inheres in how lousy an arrangement it has been for one, if not both, of the transatlantic partners. For the sceptics, the so-called merits of the AASR have been an overhyped and oversold potion, a kind of geostrategic snake oil that has been poured down the gullets of a credulous transatlantic public for far too long. These scholars include those whom the editors of this volume have labelled AASR ‘terminalists’. Among the sceptics (indeed, cynics), we find Erwan Lagadec and Edward Ingram. For Lagadec,
the only thing ‘special’ about the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is its dysfunctionality – a relationship ‘only “special” insofar as it has been more contentious than any other in the recent past. As a result, the political “special relationship” is but a futile exercise in deluded nostalgia. It leans on the altar of a past that never was, though it yields but the flimsiest results in the present, and is a useless tool to shape the future.’

Ingram goes one step further than Lagadec and considers the AASR to be nothing other than a sinister means by which the United States ensnared a hapless Britain into its orbit of satellites, blinding gullible British decision-makers to reality, such that ‘[a]lthough the United States did not formally declare war against Britain during World War II, it did destroy Britain and may have done so deliberately’.

Against the sceptics are two other categories of analyst, each of which professes to discern utility in the AASR for both members, albeit for different reasons. One group, let us call them the ‘Palmerstonians’, understands the AASR to be held together purely on the basis of rational calculations of interest in both the United Kingdom and the United States. They agree that there is logical and empirical substance to this geostrategic institution and they also think it has served each country reasonably well ever since it came into existence. But they insist, in the manner of most (though not all) ‘realist’ analysts of IR, that self-interest constitutes the AASR’s bonding agent, especially as that interest gets manifested through the pursuit of power. In the words of one such analyst, the AASR is nothing more or less than ‘an element in the central power-balance, … [therefore] the failure to see it in this context leads to its either being sentimentalized or (and this comes to much the same thing) being written down as of no account’.

The third group, whom we are going to meet again later in this chapter, represents both a new and an old tradition in IR and foreign-policy theorizing. In its newest guise, it reflects an interest in ‘collective identity’ and emotion as factors in policymaking. In its older guise, it associates both of those phenomena with a policy construct once known as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ idea. Importantly, it is possible to describe both the AASR and, a fortiori, the Anglosphere as having been built upon cultural foundations predicated upon a transatlantic, ‘racialized’, collective identity. But even if one dismisses the emotional appeal of this postulated racial identity, there still remains a theoretically interesting, also ‘counter-Palmerstonian’, claim with which to contend – namely the claim, advanced by certain constructivist theoreticians, that states can indeed be ‘friends’ for reasons derived as much from affect as from interest, and possibly even more from affect than from interest.

Prior to getting to this counter-Palmerstonian inquiry, let’s return to the question, adumbrated earlier, of how we might actually go about defining the
Anglosphere, as well as illuminating its principal denotative qualities. That is the task of the next section of this chapter.

Conceptual Foray: The Two Faces of the Anglosphere

A convenient, likely even necessary, point of embarkation for this definitional foray is the 2003 Iraq War, concerning which a few commentators both at the time and since have professed to detect a definite, if dimly understood, connection between one ‘cultural’ attribute and one particular foreign-policy output. The attribute was language and the output a willingness, if not a keenness, to undertake military interventions. Because the big three of the interventionist coalition mustered to topple Saddam Hussein – the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia – were all populated mainly by native English speakers, some imagined they detected evidence of a linguistic connection, even if no one could actually be sure how a common language was supposed to stimulate a proclivity towards interventionism. It was at this time that, suddenly, media pundits and celebrity-happy scholars began to talk up the prowess of the Anglosphere. But what was the Anglosphere supposed to mean and who was in it?

To begin to answer this, we need to back up a few years, to the middle of the previous decade, for it was in the 1990s that our concept got its name, in a science-fiction novel penned by Neal Stephenson, entitled *The Diamond Age*. Stephenson’s Anglosphere was one of three large cultural groupings in a future world order organized more on civilizational than on traditional Westphalian (i.e. state-centric) lines. There was no apparent connection between the word and the policy orientation until the Iraq War and certainly there was none with martial connotations. But even the Iraq conflict, which saw some analysts attempting to discern an Anglospheric element of great significance, cannot be said to have settled the question of how to define the word.

That is because, in addition to, and in many ways more persuasive than, the protagonists of the Anglosphere-as-intervention thesis was a second group of thinkers, for whom the Anglosphere was more likely to conjure up Kantian visions of perpetual peace than Hobbesian ones of recurrent bellicosity. If the militaristic version could be termed ‘Anglosphere heavy’, then its more irenic conceptual cousin can be labelled ‘Anglosphere lite’. The chief intellectual luminary of this second variant of the Anglosphere is James C. Bennett, president of the Anglosphere Institute in Virginia, although it need hardly be said that Bennett himself would not, and did not, use the adjective ‘lite’, with its potentially pejorative connotations. Bennett’s Anglosphere has two ‘nodes’: the United States and the United Kingdom. But that is not all it has, for its
membership includes some ‘powerful and populous outliers’: Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the Anglophone portions of Canada and South Africa. He calls this group a ‘network commonwealth’. Importantly, it is a non-interventionist kind of community, a gathering of like-minded countries and societies that ‘concentrates on tending and perfecting our own garden first, on creating deep and strong ties between highly similar nations and cultures, and seeking to help other nations by serving as an example (and sometimes, as a caution). It does not impose solutions on nations and cannot benefit thereby’.

There are two ironies associated with this clustering of Anglosphere adherents. One concerns the label. It could be remarked that there must be something derogatory in likening what is, after all, the most highly refined of the two Anglosphere variants to an insipid brew, lite beer, which many Americans and Canadians seem to enjoy quaffing. My purpose here is not to demean, but to describe, and I use the modifier in somewhat the same way that, for instance, Michael Ignatieff employed the notion of ‘empire lite’, as a means of drawing attention to policy implications that are thought to be rather admirable.

The other irony concerns not the label applied to the deed, but the deed itself. In this connection, those who imagine culture and intervention somehow to be positively correlated must be disappointed, for this Anglosphere, sometimes also known as the ‘English-using’ community, turns out to be very much a stay-at-home phenomenon. It is also the most ‘inclusionary’, and therefore the most territorially expansive, variant of the Anglosphere – indeed, some have come close to making it virtually synonymous with the entire West.

It represents a security dispensation associated with a liberal-democratic set of transnational values of unmistakable Anglo-American rootage – a dispensation known as a ‘security community’, which is to say an international order informed and sustained by ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, meaning that members of the community neither make war on each other nor threaten so to do. If this were all that we could say about the Anglosphere, namely that it was the throbbing heart of the Western ‘zone of peace’, then our concept would lose much of the normative sting associated with it – except, of course, for those excluded from membership in the zone, or conversely, those critics (‘populists’ and otherwise) who see little worth cheering about in the liberal international order of the post-Second World War decades.

It is no small matter to contemplate a world – or at least a portion of a world – from which the use or threat of force has been banished as a means of international dispute settlement. This is indeed an accomplishment worth celebrating. But this Anglosphere, founded as it is upon collective identity derived above all else from shared political values of a British provenance, seems to be a particularly inert beast when it comes to the issue of actually using,
instead of refraining from using, military force. In other words, Anglosphere lite may be a marvellous device for getting its members to abstain from physically bashing each other, but it is not such a good mechanism if the challenge at hand is to impel them to intervene outside their zone of peace. If culture is somehow correlated with interventionist preferences on the part of members of the Anglosphere, we will have to turn to the alternative variant, because, in this respect, lite can at best whet, but cannot slake, a thirst for military expeditions. For quenching that thirst, we have to turn to ‘Anglosphere heavy’.

This higher-octane concoction has been responsible for generating the most criticism of the Anglosphere concept, as evinced by the widespread opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is also the variant that puzzles us the most. For at the core of Anglosphere heavy, there must be assumptions about the Anglo-American ‘character’ that can somehow be credibly linked to interventionism. Though it might discomfit proponents of Anglosphere lite, who want to insist upon the non-racial content of their concept, in a very real sense the current discussion of Anglosphere heavy is but a continuation of a debate harking back more than a century, concerning the meaning of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ identity for international peace and security. On this issue, Owen Harries is correct: the term itself might have been new, emerging as it did in discussions of a latter-day ‘English-speaking union’, which began to surface in the late 1990s, but there was nothing new in the aspiration contained within the Anglosphere rubric. ‘[W]hat some are now referring to as a political “Anglosphere”... [is a] line of argument almost exactly replicat[ing] one advanced by a group of highly intelligent, well-educated and well-connected young men at the beginning of the last century.’

Those who articulated and advanced that vision were identified by a series of appellations during the first third of the twentieth century, ranging from ‘Milner’s Kindergarten’ through the ‘Round Table’ and eventually even the ‘Cliveden Set’ (though this latter is typically associated with pro-appeasement enthusiasts of the mid- to late 1930s, so much so that it is easy to forget the group’s principal focus at its founding, namely the fostering of closer Anglo-American strategic ties). Regardless of the name they bore, they preached the same message about the singular promise of English-speaking unity as a necessary and quite possibly sufficient condition of international peace and stability. Panegyrists of this earlier collective identity appealed to cultural solidarity, specifically to the once and future co-operative vision of a great Volk, the Anglo-Saxons, destined to prevail over the international political system.

To be sure, what was sought by the Anglo-Saxon unity enthusiasts in that earlier era is precisely what the more recent Anglosphere heavy enthusiasts have wanted: peace through strength, that is, through Anglospheric strength. As there is a separate chapter in this volume that is specifically focused on
‘Anglo-Saxonism’, it suffices here simply to highlight one essential unity of aspiration between the earlier and later champions of peace through English speakers. In that earlier period, commencing towards the end of the nineteenth century and picking up steam in the first decade of the twentieth century, the quest for ‘universal peace’ was predicated upon the fomenting of the ‘Anglo-Saxon alliance’ – that is, progression of Anglo-American comity from the Great Rapprochement of 1898 to the cementing of a bilateral alliance. For some time, there had been discussion, within the transatlantic world, of the wonderful benefits that could be enjoyed, for it as well as for the entirety of humankind, should the formerly antagonistic English-speaking powers not only bury the hatchet, but also take the next step in fashioning a co-operative relationship. That step was the forging of a military alliance.

Such a mighty alliance between the international system’s two leading economic powers had already begun to be bruited by policy intellectuals even prior to 1898. Much of this advocacy stemmed from enthusiasts based in the United Kingdom, but some Americans also happily drank the Kool-Aid of ‘universal peace’ through Anglo-American strategic union. No one quite captured the uplifting vision with as much verve as British mining potentate, Cecil Rhodes, who knew what the reassembly of the first British Empire could achieve; it would lay the ‘foundation of so great a power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity’. Imagine, Rhodes enthused, what could be accomplished through the combined might of these two great powers: ‘What an awful thought it is that if we had not lost America, or if even now we could arrange with the present members of the United States Assembly and our House of Commons, the peace of the world is secured for all eternity!’

It is easy enough for us to grasp, at the remove of a century, the geostrategic logic of this policy aspiration. IR theorists have long been convinced, after all, that the source of state power must ultimately be found in economic strength, and the United States and the United Kingdom happened to be the first- and second-ranking economies during the era of enthusiasm for the Anglo-Saxon alliance. By 1880, America’s GDP already exceeded that of any of the European powers; by 1910, it was 10 per cent larger than the combined GDPs of Britain and Germany. Today, so many are convinced that the big story of the twenty-first century must be the implications for global security of China’s ‘rise’ – and this big story betrays logic identical to power-transition assumptions from that earlier period. With economic strength, it was maintained, came military power; with military power came military threat, all things being equal. But, of course, ceteris was not paribus for champions of Anglo-Saxon universal peace. They knew that, in this specific case, cultural affinity could corrode the logic of inexorable great-power war, at least between members of the cultural
in-group (the United States and the United Kingdom). This was not all that cultural affinity could accomplish, however; it was also said to be capable of serving as a mighty spur to collective militarized statecraft vis-à-vis members of out-groups. Thus, these debates prefigured those that, a century later, would transpire regarding the Anglosphere, especially in its ‘heavy’ aspect.

Anglosphere and Affect: The Impact of Character, Identity and Folkways

One should always approach the concept of ‘culture’ with trepidation, as it is one of the most slippery categories upon which political analysts find themselves forced to tread. Although Raymond Williams was neither a specialist in, nor particularly fond of, the scholarly discipline of international relations, his assessment of the concept of culture was spot on, insofar as concerns IR theorists: to him, the word ranked as one of the two or three most difficult to define in the entire English language (and, he could have added, in any other language). Yet, it is also an apparently indispensable concept in IR, as evidenced by the attention allocated, over the past generation, to the notion of ‘strategic culture’, which, to quite a few analysts, holds the key to unlocking the secrets of state behaviour. If culture is valuable to that end, it is even more valuable as a tool for contemplating the Anglosphere, which, in both its lite and heavy variants, pays homage to the impact that ‘cultural’ variables have had upon the ability of countries sharing a common language to adopt qualitatively different – and, it is said, healthier – patterns of interaction than is the case for states that do not share cultural attributes. Cultural commonality, the argument runs, counteracts the otherwise iron grip of international anarchy on the behaviour of states, forcing them to constantly be on the qui vive for security challenges, no matter from which direction they originate.

Illustratively, and to advert to the concluding paragraph in the above section of this chapter, it is sometimes remarked that the perils of the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’ in IR can be obviated through cultural commonality and the ‘affect’ associated therewith. Adherents of a school of thought known as power-transition theory insist that whenever there is so great a reduction in the margin separating the leading power in the international system from the second-ranking power as to bring about near-parity, the risk of war between them vastly increases. If there is a glimmer of light on an otherwise dismal theoretical horizon, some descry it in the manner in which Britain managed not only to ‘accommodate’ the rise of the United States, but even incorporate it into its security network, thereby making it a buttress of the AASR, to the benefit of both countries. However, a serious reading of the
Anglo-American transition would suggest more caution than celebration, at least when analogical utility is being sought to help us contemplate the future course of Sino-American relations; there is just too little cultural commonality between the United States and China to ensure a smooth transition of power from the former to the latter.\textsuperscript{38}

And this thought brings us back to how culture might be said to relate to the Anglosphere, particularly in its heavy variant. Analysts who seek guidance from the strategic-culture paradigm tend to be divided into two clusters. One group puts a premium on the myths, symbols and associated metaphors through which the purposes of statecraft are known and expressed; they are cognitivists before they are anything else and set great store by the investigation of symbolism. The other group holds culture to be tantamount to ‘context’ and, for them, the challenge is to discover what it is about the identity or character of a state (or a group of states) that might be said to propel it (or them) along certain policy paths. This kind of strategic-cultural inquiry into Anglosphere heavy could feature, for instance, an examination of ‘national character’ – or would do so had that particular rubric not fallen out of favour as a result of one serious distortion of it during the Second World War, when some (wrongly) held it to represent an apologia for Nazism.\textsuperscript{39} These days, scholars seem to prefer what they consider to be a very different rubric, ‘national identity’, over which they fawn in their bid to provide insight into foreign-policy making.

Some analysts have detected an unmistakable ‘ethnic’ quality in the national identity of Americans and they have traced this back to the former mother country. Despite the ‘multicultural’ appearance of today’s America, they say, the country remains very much what it has been all along, a chip off the ancestral (British) block. Moreover, the ‘ethnocultural continuity’\textsuperscript{40} on display on both sides of the Atlantic tells us a lot, not just about Anglo-American relations, but also about the Anglosphere when this latter is said somehow to be predisposing certain countries towards interventionism. For those who subscribe to the thesis that there is a transatlantic ‘Anglo’ identity and that it corresponds with a propensity to undertake military interventions (which is, of course, the gravamen of the Iraq War/Anglosphere linkage), the task before them is to demonstrate how culture and intervention go hand in hand.

One would think this a daunting task, and it is. But some have risen to the challenge of trying to make the connection between transatlantic ‘Anglo’ identity (character, really) and the use of military force. They do so, in the first instance, by invoking, implicitly more often than explicitly, the notion of an \textit{ethnic}, that is a collective identity predicated in some way upon ethnicity. To be sure, ethnicity is, in its own right, a large and controversial topic, but for my purposes here I rely upon Anthony Smith’s understanding of this version of
collective identity that presupposes an affixation to a ‘named human population with a myth of common ancestry’. And while many things can sustain the myth of common ancestry, three constituent elements of identity stand out. One is religion. Another is language. A third is a shared political history. The second of these must, by definition, be of more than passing interest to students of the Anglosphere; indeed, we have already seen in the preceding section how important language can be for adherents of the Anglosphere lite category, not only when this latter is conceived as a network commonwealth, but also when it is seen to be the embodiment of a political-cultural legacy handed down through generations of English-speaking political leaders and theoreticians.

For Anglosphere heavy adherents, enthusiasm for practices of English origins transcends the linguistic dimension of ethnicity, incorporating other cultural phenomena as well. What is sought is the establishment of a connection between political values and a cultural identity that, at the extreme, can be and sometimes has been invested with some of the ‘racial’ (or biological) qualities mentioned above, in the discussion of Anglo-Saxonism. But culture hardly derives its meaning from race alone and while it is true that the earlier Anglo-Saxonist vogue was suffused with a great deal of bunkum associated with the ‘blood’, there were always other policy advocates who placed the spotlight on culture as a sociological rather than biological phenomenon. To put it in contemporary terminology, not even in the heyday of Anglo-Saxonism did ‘essentialism’ (or, ‘primordialism’) rule the roost completely; there were plenty of ‘circumstantialists’ lurking in the conceptual bushes, folk who, in a later age, would wear the label of social-constructivists. This is especially so true today, among scholars or enthusiasts of the Anglosphere, who direct their gaze towards non-racial, yet still eminently cultural, sources of foreign-policy behaviour.

So, how might a case for culturally conditioned interventionism be made, in the context of this section’s emphasis upon Anglosphere heavy? To start to answer this question, we need to ask a different one: is there something uniquely warlike about native speakers of English? Do they, to borrow a phrase employed recently by a recent Chinese ambassador to Canada, possess a ‘gene of aggression’? Needless to say, proponents of the Kantian Anglosphere that I have been calling ‘Anglosphere lite’ would scoff contemptuously at the very posing of such a query, for what is being suggested is that there could be something singular about a social grouping that expresses itself in English as a mother tongue, no matter what its ostensible racial origins may be – namely, that it has a propensity towards military interventionism! Putting things in this way seems, on the surface, absurd, or if not absurd, then so fraught with stereotyping as to arouse our immediate suspicions.
Well might we laugh today at stories such as one told by an English traveler in Holland a little more than a century ago about the cleanliness of Dutch cities and towns: ‘Spring cleaning goes on here ... all the year round ... Every bulwark has a washing tray that can be fixed or detached in a moment. “It’s a fine day, let us kill something”, says the Englishman; “Here’s an odd moment, let us wash something”, says the Dutch.’ Amusing as this remark might seem to us now, we would do well to recall that it was not so very long ago that many English-speaking policy analysts put a great deal of stock in the notion that one could ascribe martial (hence, interventionistic) qualities to a people who spoke a certain language. We called those people Germans and thought them to be a particularly bellicose crowd, so much so that to the extent that the international system had a security problem, one could do much worse than to refer to it as the ‘German problem’. It is true that even when such a problem was taken to be the principal source of upset in European and global politics, there had always been some who were prepared to concede that it may have been Germany’s geopolitical setting and not the Germans’ national character that lay at the root of things, but there never was any shortage of English-speaking biographers, historians, political scientists and even prime ministers who could assure you that most of what was wrong with the planet had to be traced to the individual and social demerits of Germans qua Germans.

Similarly, there are some writers who will tell you that Anglosphere states do have a propensity towards military interventionism such as that glimpsed in the Iraq War, in the sense that there exist societally conditioned traits possessed by denizens of the English-speaking world that put a cultural impress upon interventionist practices. How so? In a word, it is a function of the kind of ethnocultural ‘continuity’ we glimpsed above, in which social practices developed in one part of the world get reproduced in another part, pari passu with the processes of demographic transfer associated with long-term migratory trends. This is certainly a claim that has been advanced in respect of Anglo-American relations and since those relations form the central pillar of the Anglosphere, at least in its heavy variant, it is well worth taking a closer look at those processes of demographic transfer.

A superficial observer might remark, of the United States, that it has never been less ‘Anglo’ than it is today, or – more to the point – than it was more than fifteen years ago, at the time of the Iraq War. It would follow, from this observation, that British-inherited cultural attributes must have little or nothing to do with America’s foreign policy, not least when it comes to the business of projecting military force abroad. Indeed, decennial census results would appear to validate this assumption regarding US demography, given the slight share (less than 10 per cent) of the country’s population that today self-identifies as ‘English’ (by which they really mean ‘British’). But the numbers mask
a deeper reality, according to some scholars. One such scholar is David Hackett Fischer, who advances a modified form of ‘germ theory’ expressive of a very old idea that America’s political and social virtues derived from its ‘Teutonic’ ancestry; instead, in Fischer’s view, it is specifically to British sources that one must look in order to understand contemporary America, census figures to the contrary notwithstanding.

America, according to Fischer, remains very much what it has been for centuries. It is ‘Albion’s seed’. Transatlantic ‘folkways’ of British provenance have endowed American political culture with inexpungible sociological qualities, down to the present time. Importantly, these characteristics are not, themselves, homogeneous inheritances from the former mother country, but are rather variegated legacies dependent upon where in the British Isles the emigrants to America originated. That is why, Fischer explains, there are four relatively distinct British folkways, each associated with one of the great waves of immigration to colonial America. Singly and collectively, these have been much more responsible for giving American political (and we could also say strategic) culture its peculiar stamp than any competing sources of American identity, whether those competing sources are anchored in environmental factors (viz. the Turner, or ‘frontier’, thesis) or are ‘pluralistic’ in nature (e.g. the [s]melting pot metaphor).

For Fischer, America’s having been born ‘British’ does not in the slightest translate into its being a socio-demographic monolith. Because those who arrived in America from the British Isles were so unlike each other politically, their possession of a common language could not be expected to generate social conformity in their new country, any more than it had in their old one. Those four waves of immigration to colonial America brought 1) Puritans from East Anglia to Massachusetts between 1629 and 1640; 2) a royalist elite from the south of England, along with their indentured servants, to Virginia between 1642 and 1675; 3) emigrants from the North Midlands and Wales to the Delaware Valley between 1675 and 1725; and 4) a very interesting, if excitable, group of borderers from the northern counties of England and the southern ones of Scotland, who came, some after a sojourn in the north of Ireland, to settle down in the Appalachian back country between 1718 and 1775. Fischer’s thesis is that, thanks to these four groups, British folkways have remained the single most important determinant of America’s voluntary society down to the present day.

For this section’s inquiry into Anglosphere heavy, it is only the last group that stands out as a potential link between affect and intervention, and even then only in a qualified way. These are the folk who became known as the ‘Scotch-Irish’ (sometimes ‘Scots-Irish’) and what makes them so interesting is both their peculiar value set and their recent, and surprising, rebound as
one of contemporary America’s dominant subcultures – if not its *dominant* subculture. The borderers had known little but conflict for some seven hundred years prior to their arrival in America and the constant warfare left an indelible mark on their group identity. They fought in the old country and they continued to fight in the new one. *Lex talionus* was their quotidian rule and their golden rule was ‘do unto others as they threaten to do unto you’ – only do it first, if you can.50 In the words of their principal contemporary chronicler, Walter Russell Mead, the value set of the borderers constitutes America’s ‘folk ideology’ and, to the surprise of many, not only did they *not* get subsumed by the great waves of continental European migration to hit America throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, but they actually managed to expand their cultural reach from its original heartland in the ‘Southern Highlands’ to vast swathes of America, more or less coterminous with the ‘red-state’ America of recent electoral maps (so called for the colour assigned on televised depictions of states carried by Republican candidates, in con- distinction to the blue states taken by Democrats). These borderers are, today, the solid core of support for Donald Trump.51

They are also the people Mead calls the ‘Jacksonians’.52 This Weberian ideal type is one of four great schools, or ‘paradigms’, of American foreign policy (the other three being the Hamiltonians, Jeffersonians and Wilsonians). The Jacksonians are America’s martial caste, its warriors par excellence, and they abide by a code of values that accords pride of place to virtues imported from the ancestral borderlands, among which is a willingness to kill, and die, for country and kinfolk, possibly including those still resident in the ancestral homeland.53 There is no reason to challenge Mead’s assessment of this *ethnie’s* impact upon American foreign policy, but we do well to ask to what extent Jacksonianism in one country can be constitutive of a transnational collective identity worthy of the descriptive ‘Anglosphere heavy’.

The concluding section of this chapter begins with an explanation of why Jacksonianism really cannot be taken seriously as a vector for the kind of transnational collective identity subsumed under that descriptive. It ends with some observations regarding the impact of Trump upon the Anglosphere, in either of its two main variants.

**Conclusion: Jacksonianism, Trump and the Demise of the Anglosphere**

If there is any ethno-cultural correlation to be made between English-speaking countries and a fondness for military interventionism, then the Jacksonian category is the place to begin the search. What one would need
to establish, in order to sustain the Anglosphere-heavy thesis, is an evidentiary link between ethnicity (in this case, Scots-Irish) and foreign-policy behaviour. Even if we accept the validity of the Fischer–Mead hypothesis for America's Scots-Irish, and by extension *its* foreign policy, it does not follow that the other assumed core members of the interventionist Anglosphere, so hotly debated a decade or so ago, can and do boast their own ethno-cultural ‘martial caste’. In the case of the two other active interventionists of 2003, the United Kingdom and Australia, it really would be a wild stretch of the imagination to make a claim about Scots-Irish ethnicity somehow having contributed to interventionist zeal.

For the United Kingdom itself, the Scots-Irish ethnic factor obviously matters, given the sempiternal Ulster problem, but it matters primarily for reasons relating to domestic politics, not foreign policy. As far as Australia is concerned, while there is a considerable (albeit declining) proportion of the population that can trace its ancestry to Ireland, it is not with Ulster but with the other three provinces of the Emerald Isle (Leinster, Munster and Connaught) that the ancestral sentimentalities are mainly associated. If one were permitted to add to the small group of Anglosphere-heavy countries some of Bennett’s ‘outliers’ – for instance, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa – the search for anything remotely approaching a Jacksonian strain in foreign and defence policies would be even more fruitless. Therefore, while the Jacksonian ‘contribution’ to American national character may indeed be formidable, it is not exportable; it cannot and does not serve as the basis of any transnational collective identity within the English-speaking world that corresponds with what I have been terming ‘Anglosphere heavy’.

But what about Anglosphere lite? Is it the default option for those who wish to believe in the continuing relevance of the Anglosphere? This variant, it will be recalled, is the one Bennett had in mind when he spoke of the Anglosphere as a network commonwealth. It is also one that many others might regard as being virtually indistinguishable from the liberal international order created by the United States and the United Kingdom following the destruction of the Second World War. But why label this the Anglosphere, when we have far superior, and more familiar, descriptive terms at our disposal? Why not just say the liberal international order (LIO), or, even better, the West?

Admittedly, the state of health of both the LIO and the West is in no small way a function of the quality of co-operation between the United States and United Kingdom. This, then, obliges us to think about the recent Trump administration and its impact upon transatlantic relations in general, and Anglo-American relations in particular, upon which topic this chapter concludes. It is hardly original or provocative to assert that of the forty-four individuals to have served as US president since the inception of the republic, Donald
Trump has been a case apart.\textsuperscript{54} Never has there been anyone quite like him. For both his admirers and critics, he was a president cut from a decidedly different bolt of cloth to that of any predecessor.\textsuperscript{55} What admirers like to stress, namely Trump’s willingness to shatter taboos and venture where no others have dared to go, his detractors chalk up to his simply being out of control.\textsuperscript{56}

Shocking, for many observers, was the manner in which he seemed to delight in irritating key allies, countries that, these observers would argue, can and do contribute to America’s overall image and its power ranking.\textsuperscript{57} In early 2019, two former US ambassadors to NATO, Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, issued a sombre report on the alliance’s state of health during what was its seventieth anniversary year. NATO, they said, confronted a range of daunting and complex challenges, with the biggest one of all coming from the Trump White House, which appeared to revel in flaunting an ‘absence of strong American presidential leadership’.\textsuperscript{58}

Without any doubt, there has been a sharp degradation in America’s image in many allied countries ever since Donald Trump’s assumption of power. Once again, during his tenure in office, talk of ‘friendly-fire’ anti-Americanism was on everyone’s lips, just as it had been during the Iraq War.\textsuperscript{59} Public opinion polls in most NATO countries revealed a worrisome degree of distrust in the quality of American leadership, even and especially among such close allies as Canada and the countries of Western Europe (though farther to the east in Europe, the populations of allied countries seemed to like the president well enough).\textsuperscript{60} The AASR did not escape this affective downturn. This is somewhat ironic, given that following the November 2016 election of Trump there was a flurry of excitement in some quarters about a rekindling of American enthusiasm for both the AASR and the Anglosphere, with some analysts being quick to note that a bust of Winston Churchill had been restored to prominence in the White House. The new president’s gesture was supposed to signify, particularly for Brexiteers such as Boris Johnson, the UK prime minister, and Nigel Farage, the head of the country’s Brexit Party, an American recommitment to its ‘Anglo’ heritage, following the administration of Barack Obama, considered by them to have been insufficiently attentive to that same heritage, in large part because the president’s Kenyan ancestry was said to have instilled in him an abiding distrust of Britain, stemming from its colonial record in Africa. Indeed, Farage went so far as to proclaim Obama the most anti-British president ever\textsuperscript{61}

Yet this rebirth in enthusiasm for the AASR, and by extension the Anglosphere, proved to very short-lived. Instead, we saw in Washington more than a bit of schadenfreude at the heartburn Brexit visited upon Theresa May, rather than any committed initiatives to buttress the beleaguered British ally. Even worse, when I wrote the first draft of this chapter I originally wrote this draft,
Jeremy Corbyn was pawing the ground for an election that some pundits thought might return Labour to power. Understandably, AASR watchers were nervous about the short-term future of bilateral relations. Withal, the AASR has been pronounced dead on so many previous occasions that its obituary notices have a way of inducing reader fatigue; that is why two scholars have sagely described it as the ‘Lazarus’ of the international system. Yet it remains far from obvious that the Anglosphere possesses a similar ability to arise from the dead. There are many reasons for this, the most important of which is that it remains extremely difficult to imagine how the conditions that temporarily gave rise to this Anglo-American policy idea we call the Anglosphere can be replicated. That policy idea, it bears recalling, was a feature of the uniquely ‘unipolar’ structural context of the post-Cold War period.

Consider, illustratively, the impact that China’s current challenge to America has had upon both that structural context and the so-called core Anglosphere members. Some analysts would tell us to forget about sophisticated notions such as Anglosphere lite or Anglosphere heavy, and concentrate instead upon the ‘one true’ Anglosphere, considered by them to be that group of five English-speaking countries who share the most top-secret intelligence only among themselves. They are called, strangely, the ‘five eyes’ (which conjures up images of cyclopes or pirates, rather than two-eyed officials in close consultation with their counterparts). To the extent that this is the Anglosphere, then its immediate future is foreshadowed by the manner in which the group responds to Huawei’s bid to be the dominant company in 5G networks worldwide. The Huawei controversy elevates the notion of a ‘network commonwealth’ to a new, and more complicated, level than even James Bennett could have imagined. As of this writing, the group suffers a severe case of Huawei-induced geostrategic amblyopia, with the eyes of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand focused upon blocking the Chinese tech giant on the grounds of national security, while Canada stares off at different horizons.

But as this chapter has argued, the Anglosphere was more than a set of eyes, no matter how they are counted or where they are looking. Yet, at the same time, it was much less than the AASR. The latter will almost certainly rebound from its current moribund condition, just as it has done on similar occasions over the past several decades. But it is doubtful that the structure of the international system in the post-unipolar era could ever result in the re-emergence of the Anglosphere, in either of the variants described in this chapter. Both lite and heavy were products of the unique structural configuration that arose in the wake of the Cold War’s ending and the USSR’s demise. Therefore, it seems only fitting to close this chapter’s assessment of the Anglosphere with one of Alice Roosevelt Longworth’s most memorable quips, apropos of New York
governor Thomas Dewey’s second try for the presidency in 1948: ‘you cannot make a soufflé rise twice.’

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Notes

2. Though not employing the ‘Anglosphere’ label, the following works clearly reflect the assumption of close affinity between Anglo-American political traditions and the Western zone of peace: Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002) and James E. Cronin, Global Rules: America, Britain and a Disordered World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).


12. So termed because of Lord Palmerston’s oft-cited 1848 comment in the House of Commons about Britain’s having neither eternal friends nor perpetual adversaries, but only eternal and perpetual interests.


18. I have introduced these rubrics in my article, ‘Relating to the Anglosphere: Canada, “Culture,” and the Question of Military Intervention’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3(2) (2005), 179–98. Portions of this section have been drawn from that article.


21. Save that, as Ignatieff used it, lite is code for a politically acceptable species of interventionism, which he calls ‘temporary imperialism’; my usage of the descriptor tends in the other direction, away from the willingness to project military force. See Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), vii.


23. See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities’, *Ethics & International Affairs* 10 (1996), 73; idem, Se-


29. For one particularly euphoric recitation of the manifold benefits such a combination could bestow, not just upon the two participating states, but upon the entire planet, see Andrew Carnegie, ‘A Look Ahead’, North American Review 156(439) (1893), 685–710. Expressive of the same sentiment, and longing for the day when the two countries could be reunited in alliance, was James Bryce, ‘The Essential Unity of Britain and America’, Atlantic Monthly 82 (1898), 22–29. Also see Duncan Bell, ‘Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Unionism, Empire, and the Abolition of War’, European Journal of International Relations 20(3) (2014), 647–70.


34. Williams, cited by William H. Sewell Jr, ‘The Concept(s) of Culture’, in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds), Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 35–61. For an extensive catalogue of culture’s many, and at times contradictory, meanings, see Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde


43. Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to Canada, explaining to a Toronto audience that his own country’s geostrategic DNA, naturally, lacks such a ‘gene’. Robert Fife, Steven Chase and Nathan VanderKlippe, ‘Chinese Envoy Says It’s Up to Canada to Thaw Diplomatic Relations’, *Globe and Mail*, 24 May 2019, A1, 7.


46. See note 40 above.

47. The numbers are necessarily imprecise, given that many, if not most, of those who self-identify on the census as ‘Americans’ are themselves of British extraction, so adding these self-identifiers to the English category results in around 13 per cent of Americans claiming in 2010 that they are of British descent (excluding all parts of Ireland). The leading ‘ethnic’ self-identification choice remains what it has been ever since 1980, when Americans were first given the chance to declare what they thought their ethnicity was: German (14.7 per cent), followed closely by African-American (12.3 per cent) and Mexican (10.9 per cent). See ‘Largest Ethnic Groups and Nationalities in the United States’, available at https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-and-nationalities-in-the-united-states.html.


49. The ‘frontier’ thesis held that geography, not demography, was most responsible for the development of American political culture; see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in
American History (New York: H. Holt, 1921). By contrast, ‘pluralist’ theory put the emphasis upon demography, and in particular upon the processes of ‘Americanizing’ a multicultural demographic flow. Ralph Waldo Emerson was the first to popularize the ‘melting pot’ metaphor, but over time it ceded its place to the related, though somewhat different, image of the ‘melting pot’. Technically, the former is used to separate a metal from its mineral, while the latter is used to blend metals into alloys. For the metaphor and its evolution, see Denis Lacorne, La Crise de l’identité américaine: du melting-pot au multiculturalisme (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 198–203.


54. See Arthur Paulson, Donald Trump and the Prospect for American Democracy: An Unprecedented President in an Age of Polarization (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). Although there have been forty-five administrations, an enumerative oddity results in there having been only forty-four actual human beings presiding over these administrations, due to the manner in which Grover Cleveland’s time in power is assessed. Because he served two discontinuous terms – elected in 1884, failing to be re-elected in 1888, and regaining the White House in 1892 – his reign is counted as two separate administrations, thus he is both America’s twenty-second president and its twenty-fourth. In contrast, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was elected four consecutive times from 1932 to 1944, is counted as only one president, the country’s thirty-second.


57. In the understated words of one editorialist, President Trump ‘tends to ignore how soft power cements alliances’ (Economist, 18 May 2019, 9).


59. See Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance (Pittsburgh, PA: European Union Studies Association; and Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) and Julia E. Sweig, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2006). Also see, for that era’s wave of

60. An April 2019 poll in Canada found that only China, among a group of selected countries, had a more negative approval rating than America. Western European survey data reveal similar attitudes. See Michelle Zilio, ‘Canadians More Positive about Ties with Europe than with the U.S., China: Poll’, Globe and Mail, 3 May 2019, A6, and Richard Wike et al., ‘Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies’, Pew Research Center, October 2018.


64. Available at https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/alice_roosevelt_longworth_398015.

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