
20 April 2020 | [https://hdiplo.org/to/RT21-37](https://hdiplo.org/to/RT21-37)
Roundtable Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii

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Introduction by Michael S. Neiberg, U.S. Army War College

Historians like myself have spent a great deal of time over the last decade or so trying to convince people not to confine the First World War to what I once described in a question and answer session as ‘the idiot box.’ The conventional wisdom, reinforced by movies, documentaries, and even some scholarly books, still looks back at what George Kennan called the seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century and assumes that the people of a century ago were somehow dumber than those of other time periods. We see the futility, the death, and the awful consequences of that terrible war and try to convince ourselves that we now know too much to ever let it happen again, as if we can somehow inoculate our own era from the grand processes of human history. Or we tell ourselves that the period 1914-1918 was just so different from our own that there is nothing useful we can learn from it.

Historians of the war’s outbreak have done their best in the past few years to run against this trend. As a group, we tend to argue that the world of 1914 looks too much like our own to take comfort in the distance we have put between ourselves and the black-and-white age of the European monarchies. Then, as now, politicians and generals (many of them deeply flawed or totally unprepared to manage a major crisis) have a difficult time reading a rapidly changing world; multipolarity vastly complicates rapid decision making as allies and adversaries alike press their interests; technology rarely provides the easy solutions that its proponents promise; and events like acts of state-sponsored terrorism threaten to upset seemingly stable balances of power.

Three years into this terrible conflict of mutual mass slaughter, American leaders had few illusions about the cost of joining the war, yet they did it anyway. In retrospect, and especially after the failures of the peace process, to many Americans the decision appeared to have been a terrible mistake, so they blamed flaws in President Woodrow Wilson’s leadership, or they dreamed up vast conspiracy theories that depicted financiers like J. P. Morgan pulling the strings of government. Later generations would similarly cite the massive profits of the military-industrial complex as a reason for starting failed wars in Vietnam and Iraq.

Traditionally, scholars in David Haglund’s field of international relations have used the intellectual heuristic of Kenneth Waltz’s “three images.” The first, the personal, places at the center Woodrow Wilson, the man who ultimately bore the awesome responsibility to stand before Congress in April 1917 and ask its members to take America into that bloody war. The second image, the national, usually focuses on America’s quest for global power or its desire to reshape the world in its own image. The third image, the international system, tends to see an America seeking to either restore the balance of power in Europe or take advantage of the tectonic shifts the war created.

The great value of David Haglund’s new book is that it shows us another way to think about this problem and another commonality through time, namely the persistent role that culture and identity politics play in shaping government policy. Today we see how identity politics have vaulted Donald Trump to the White House, pushed Great Britain out of the European Union, and brought some of the states of Eastern and Central Europe to the verge of illiberalism. As the reviewers discuss below, Haglund shows us how similar dynamics played out in the United States between 1914 and 1917. The ‘culture wars’ of those years, he convincingly argues, need to form a part of how we think about America’s road to war.

Identity and language matter as ways to express a community’s sense of its own security. In this case, the transition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved the United States coming out isolation to contemplate what previous

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generations would have found unthinkable: deploying an American army to Europe in support of the British. Haglund explores why this transition happened, who made it happen, and what impacts it had on American identity and foreign policy going forward.

Without stealing the thunder of the insightful scholars who participated in this roundtable, the core of Haglund’s argument is that a “Hawthornian majority” existed in the United States. This label describes Americans who had British ancestry and claimed to like individual Britons but who shared the traditional American disdain for the old world and its seemingly endless strife. They also shared a belief that the United States had indeed managed to form a more perfect union than other nations in Europe. This majoritarian group, like the German and Irish minorities in the United States that have received far more scholarly attention, also forms a diaspora group. We should not ignore their views, Haglund reminds us, simply because they were in the majority. They too had a shared identity, culture, and set of interests.

Part of the privilege of this Hawthorne majority expressed itself in the ability to establish definitions. Being first on the scene (at least among the Europeans), they had the chance to set the terms of American identity. Their particular brand of nationalism and patriotism became the model for later groups to emulate or risk ostracism: they were settlers, not immigrants. As Haglund writes, “hyphenation is for latecomers” (38). This majoritarian identity, expressed under the slogan ‘100% Americanism,’ proved central to America’s ontological security, a term loosely defined as understanding one’s identity and being willing to fight alongside those who share it. Identity, of course, is a fluid category and it is precisely this fluidity that interests Haglund as it pertains to the First World War.

In the years 1914-1917, the criticisms of that majoritarian identity from minority groups like the Germans and the Irish led the Hawthornians to see their security as increasingly tied to their ethnic kin, the British. Haglund argues that identity politics and divergent visions of American identity played a critical role in making these Americans rediscover their cultural and political inheritances from Great Britain. This shift was genuine and deeply felt. I have argued elsewhere that Americans were not as fooled by British propaganda as the conventional wisdom suggests; rather, they sympathized with the British and French both because they saw the democracies as fighting a just war against authoritarian aggression and because the economics of the war tied the United States to the Entente.3 In short, culture, economics, and politics all inclined Americans, especially majoritarian Americans, to support the British and the French.

I have also argued that many German, Irish, and Jewish Americans came to share in the majoritarian viewpoint as their own opinions shifted from 1914-1917. Imperial Germany came to look more and more like a threat to these groups both for their ‘American’ identity and their ‘hyphenated’ ones. Most, if not all, German-Americans came to dislike being associated with the militarism of Prussian Junkerism, the sinking of the Lusitania, and the threats to American security as revealed in the Zimmermann Telegram (in which the Germans promised support for Mexico reacquiring Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico in exchange for Mexico invading the American southwest in order to occupy American forces). Most German-Americans drew careful delineations between an autocratic and retrograde ‘Prussia’ and the rest of Germany. The latter, not the former, they argued, bequeathed to a shared ‘Anglo-Saxon’ civilization the German education, science, and music so widely admired by Americans. Like the German-American journalist Oswald Villard (himself a non-Prussian from Wiesbaden), they came reluctantly to accept the need for war, but only if it replaced the Prussian autocracy represented by Kaiser Wilhelm II with a genuine democracy that served the needs of all Germans.4

In other words, more than a shift in attitudes toward the British was underway. The ethnic divides of the early twentieth century culture wars could be overcome and reshaped, both by acculturation and the changing opinions of many in the minority. In effect, many Germans and Irish came to join the majority, and the war played a major role in effecting this


4 Neiberg, Path to War, chapter seven.
shift. After the war, a new group of immigrants, mostly from southern and eastern Europe became the ‘other.’ To make this argument takes nothing away from Haglund’s. Rather it is a call for more research into the role of culture and clashes of culture in the shaping of policy in this (or any other) era.

Writing as an historian, I would be remiss not to praise Haglund for his deep and careful engagement with the historians and historiography of this period. His is not a casual check-the-box nod to history or a careful cherry picking of anecdotes to support an argument. Instead it is an admirable example of the kind of interdisciplinarity that both political scientists and historians should be doing more often, for there is more we can learn from each other than we often acknowledge.

The reviewers do not always agree with all of Haglund’s arguments nor do they always agree with one another. Kori Schake’s review is probably the most critical, bringing her own expertise in power transition theory to challenge some of Haglund’s main points. Kathleen Burk gives us a British perspective and takes Haglund gently to task for his argument that this transition from 1914 to 1917 eased the formation of the special relationship of the Second World War. David Clinton eloquently explains this problem by arguing that because of the shift in the First World War that Haglund describes, “it was not necessary to cross the same ontological Rubicon” in the run-up to the Second. Daniel Gorman questions whether Haglund underplays race in his quest to discuss and analyze the differences between groups of white Americans. Finally, Srdjan Vucetic’s review is likely the most positive, pushing Haglund to press his own arguments even further.

But rather than sum up their complex critiques in just a few words, it would be better for me to turn the rest of this roundtable over to them as well as to Haglund himself. It only remains for me to compliment David Haglund for writing a book about the First World War that not only helps us better understand that time period but our own as well.

Participants:

David Haglund is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario). His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on American and Canadian international security policy.

Michael S. Neiberg is Professor of History and Chair of War Studies at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His published work specializes on the First and Second World Wars in global context. The Wall Street Journal named his Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I (Harvard University Press, 2011) one of the five best books ever written about that war. In October 2016 Oxford University Press published his Path to War, a history of American responses to the Great War in Europe, 1914-1917 and in July 2017 Oxford published his Concise History of the Treaty of Versailles. In 2017 he was awarded the Médaille d’Or du Rayonnement Culturel from La Renaissance Française, an organization founded by French President Raymond Poincaré in 1915 to keep French culture alive during the First World War.

Kathleen Burk is the Professor Emerita of Modern and Contemporary History at University College London (UCL). She graduated with a BA with a Double Major in History and Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley; she then went to Oxford University, where she took an MA and a D. Phil in Modern History, working under the supervision of A.J.P. Taylor. She remained at Oxford for a further three years as the Rhodes Research Fellow for North America and the Caribbean, and then took up an academic post in London. Her many books include Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914-1918 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985); Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning (London: Little, Brown, 2007 and New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008); and The Lion and the Eagle: The Interaction of the British and American Empires 1783-1972 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018). She is currently working on a book on the use of state finance as a weapon in foreign policy from the Renaissance to today.

David Clinton (Ph.D. Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia) is chair of the Department of Political Science at Baylor University. His books include Realism and the Liberal Tradition (co-edited with Stephen Sims, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016), The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations (ed., Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2019).

**Daniel Gorman** is a Professor of History at the University of Waterloo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. He is the author of *International Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century* (Bloomsbury, 2017), *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester University Press, 2007). He is presently completing a book on decolonization and international governance after the Second World War.

**Kori Schake** is the Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the author of *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony* (Harvard University Press, 2017).

**Srdjan Vucetic** is Associate Professor and MA Program Coordinator at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, a research co-coordinator at the Center for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, as well as a co-director (Security) in the Canadian Security and Defence Network. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Ohio State University, and he holds an MA in Political Science from York University and Hon. BA in International Relations from the University of Toronto.
David G. Haglund is a Canadian professor of political studies who is primarily a political scientist, but who calls on history to support his arguments. This approach can sometimes lead IR theorists to look for evidence to support a favoured theory. Therefore, I approached this book with some concern as to what I would find, although I knew of Haglund’s excellent scholarly reputation. In this book he does straddle the line between history and IR theory. Fortunately, once I had read beyond some jargon-ridden prose, I found, as I had expected, a deeply researched and lucidly-written analysis, one that modifies previous approaches to the American ethnic diasporas and their relative importance in the decision to go to war in 1917. It is, on the whole, convincing.

Diasporas have been an interest for Haglund for some time, his previous book, *Ethnic Diasporas and the Canadian-US Security Community*, having been devoted to the topic.¹ There are, however, differences between the two. First, Canada is included in the earlier book, whilst the U.S. is the centre of the second. Second, the first book covers over a century, whilst the recent book concentrates on three years, with spill-over fore and aft. And third, he has changed the diasporas on which he concentrates, from German-American, Irish-American and Muslim-American to German-American, Irish-American and English-American (i.e., Brito-American). His argument is that just because a diaspora constitutes the majority population of a country does not mean that it is not a diaspora. In particular, although by 1910, 60 per cent of the population had what he terms a kin-country relationship with the United Kingdom, it was, and is, the German-American and the Irish-American diasporas that have been accorded the title of influential diasporas, but not normally the English-American.

He argues that this is wrong, and that it ignores an extremely important element in the question as to why the United States joined the war in 1917. He sets out the crux of his approach:

> “I propose to show how the combined and robust assaults made during the neutrality period against England and *English civilization* [italics in the original] by the anti-Allied lobbyists from the German-American and Irish-American communities had the assuredly unintended consequence of making English-descended Americans (the majority of the population a century ago) more disposed toward a security ‘union’ with Great Britain than they had been at any time since the rupture of 1776” (ix).

It is this domestic conflict that he terms the ‘culture wars.’

He then devotes the first half of the book to analysing the extent to which various international relations theories might help to demonstrate how this came about. His methodology is literally concrete: he builds a structure, block by analytical block, to see which, if any, of a range of IR theories illumine the problem as to why the U.S. abandoned neutrality. He is attracted by the approach of Kenneth Waltz, which broke down the levels of analysis into three: the individual, the domestic, and the systemic (i.e., international), which were given the labels of first, second, and third images respectively. Haglund writes that his own approach “is one that will situate me squarely in the ranks of second-image analysts, given my emphasis upon demography and the culture wars of the neutrality period as constituting a necessary condition for both the transformation in Anglo-American relations and the entry of America into the war” (103). Within this, when trying to answer the question as to what caused people to change their minds, he incorporates “fairly recent and theoretically rich work” (vii) by some scholars in IR with an interest in emotion and what is called ‘ontological security,’ i.e., knowing what one’s identity is.

It is in the second half of the book that Haglund brings his research experience, based on wide reading in contemporary memoirs, newspapers and periodicals, and analyses – although not on archival research – as well as later historical works to

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support his argument. He is dismissive of those theorists who appear to believe that abstract speculation need not require research to find out if there is any actual evidence for the theory, a charge of which he himself is certainly innocent.

During the 1914-1917 period, the central questions about identity were, what are Americans and who are they? The result of this ontological clash between diasporas was the decline of automatic political Anglophobia and the acceptance of close links between the two countries – quite a change from 1775 and the intervening period. The driver was what he terms the 'Hawthornian majority,' those 60% of the American population who were of British descent: the title arises from the comment of the American writer Nathaniel Hawthorne in 1853 that "I hate England, though I love some Englishmen, and like them generally" (125). They were true Americans because they were not English; indeed, Brito-Americans defined themselves against Great Britain. What made them change their minds?

Increasingly, it was the attacks on England and English civilisation, along with the strident claims by German-Americans and Irish-Americans during 1914-1917 that they were the true Americans, those who wanted to keep the U.S. from supporting Great Britain in the war. Great Britain had for over a century been the 'oppositional other' against which Brito-Americans had defined themselves; what these Brito-Americans now gained was the ontological security of knowing that they were Brito-Americans, and that Britain was a much better country than Germany. The impact of organised Irish-Americans also drained away. The importance of this relationship was that it permitted the president to take the country into war’" [sic] (242). Based on his analyses, Haglund eventually dismisses proposed second-level images, such as the interests of American capital (economic revisionists) or the clamouring for war of a deceived or, at the least, misguided American public (what he terms the propaganda school), or a third level image, the exigencies of the balance of power (which he ascribes to some structural realists). Rather, Haglund’s conclusion is that it was a first-image rationale, i.e., that President Woodrow Wilson himself decided that it was the right thing to do, that was conclusive. This remains something of an open question, but Haglund’s analysis is alluring.

What is less convincing is his argument that this change was the origin of, or at least paved the way for, an Anglo-American ‘special relationship.’ It certainly allowed the possibility of a friendly relationship that jiggled along, but it is more doubtful that it in itself encouraged a ‘special relationship’ over twenty years later. Much happened in between. During the 1920s there was a ferocious Anglo-American naval rivalry, accompanied by bitter arguments over the War Debts, the latter culminating in the resentful British acquiescence to the harsh American terms. During the 1930s the U.S. and Great Britain were unable to agree on the strength of the threat posed by Japan to the interests of both countries in the Far East. Counterfactuals can be very dicey, but without Pearl Harbor, what would be the chances of a ‘special relationship’ growing up? And in any case, what constitutes this ‘special relationship,’ given that during the war, the U.S. government made a continuing effort to weaken a post-war British Empire?

What a ‘special relationship’ required was the acknowledgement by both sides that one was necessary. A claim can be made for 1940, when the two countries inaugurated a closer military alliance than had heretofore appeared in history. Prime Minister Winston Churchill certainly called for one, but the U.S. always believed itself superior to the UK, which may be a basis for a relationship but arguably not for a special one. If the premise is that both sides must acknowledge their requirement for a closer relationship, a more compelling candidate is the post-war fear of the rise of the USSR. As stated in a State Department policy paper in April 1950,

“No other country has the same qualifications for being our principal ally and partner as the UK. It has internal political strength and important capabilities in the political, economic and military fields throughout the world. Most important the British share our fundamental objectives and standards of conduct ... To achieve our foreign policy objectives we must have the cooperation of our allies and friends. The British and with them the rest of the Commonwealth, particularly the older dominions, are our most reliable and useful allies, with whom a special relationship should exist.
This relationship is not an end in itself but must be used as an instrument of achieving common objectives. We cannot afford to permit a deterioration in our relationship with the British." 2]

In short, Haglund’s argument that the English diaspora was the victor in the 1914-1917 neutrality wars is convincingly made; as convincing is his argument as to its importance in permitting and enabling President Wilson to take the United States into the German War (as many British then termed it). What is less convincing is his conclusion that it directly enabled the future ‘special relationship.’ All in all, it is a thought-provoking book which amply rewards the effort expended in reading it.

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It is rare that a scholarly study simultaneously manages to treat an important event in a frequently examined era of history and to do so in a way that is strikingly original, but that is the feat that David Haglund accomplishes in this well-wrought and thoughtful monograph. One might have thought that everything had been said which could be said about the prolonged and bitter debate over U.S. entrance into the First World War, but Haglund has mined the record of the domestic political struggle from 1914 to 1917, and has managed to add something truly new to our general understanding of Washington’s reasons for joining the war.

In short, Haglund finds this new piece of the historical puzzle in the concept of ‘ontological security’—that is, the idea that states (or nationalities, or ethnic diasporas, or other social groups) feel themselves to be ‘secure’ not only in terms of the amount of power, whether hard or soft, they possess relative to the power possessed by others, but also in terms of their collective ‘identity.’ If they know who they are as a group, their sense of security is heightened, and this sense of ‘groupness’ derives from the characteristics, including beliefs, that are shared by fellow members within the group, and also from the distinctiveness of those characteristics from their counterparts in other groups. A group identity depends on differentiation from those outside the group.

In the specific case of the United States at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the dominant group in the American population was, in Haglund’s formulation, the ‘Hawthornian majority’—those Americans who were, as the novelist Nathaniel Hawthorne was, of English descent and were not only the single most numerous group of American citizens, but also the group of the highest socio-economic standing (122). To the bafflement of British statesmen who at this time were contemplating an Anglo-American understanding or even alliance supported by the shared language and culture of the English and their cousins the Hawthornians, the American partners in this projected union refused to play their part. In large part the Hawthornians did so because their definition of their group identity, of what it meant to be a ‘good American’ included social and linguistic similarities with the English across the water, but also stark political differences. Their ancestors had fought for independence against government by Britain in the American Revolution, a generation later they had reaffirmed that independence in the War of 1812, and in 1914 ‘English’ Americans still looked upon British government and foreign policy with suspicion and distaste.

The story that Haglund tells is of increasing efforts that began in the summer of 1914 of two other groups who shared in the American identity, Irish Americans and German Americans, each of which had a grievance against Britain, to maintain American neutrality in the war, to interpret that neutrality in a way more favorable to Germany and its allies, if possible, and, in the best of all possible worlds, to bring the United States into the war on the side of the Central Powers. As their rhetoric became more heated, it could go as far as charging the Hawthornians with being unpatriotic Americans when they declined to follow this political lead and defer to these two newer groups of Americans in defining their shared national identity. Faced with this challenge, the Hawthornians underwent a surprisingly swift and complete (though ultimately short-lived) mental revolution: they put aside the idea that one’s identity as an American required hostility toward British political practices and policies and became receptive to the idea that being a good American might be perfectly compatible with political cooperation with London. This change in the domestic American political landscape allowed President Woodrow Wilson to gain congressional approval for his request for a declaration of war against Germany in April of 1917. In the longer term, it also created the basis for a wartime Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR, in the helpful acronym employed in this study) that, after a hiatus in the interwar years, experienced a revival during the Second World War that in a more lasting way formed one of the important elements of the international order to this day.

Any such innovation that sets out the markers for an alliance that was central to international conceptions of power and legitimacy and that has existed (again, with lapses) for over a century would naturally attract the attention of scholars seeking to discover the reasons for a change of this magnitude and duration. Haglund gives full attention to the interpretations of such scholars, discussing in a balanced way the various candidates for this role, including the effectiveness of British wartime propaganda that emphasized German atrocities in Belgium and elsewhere, the fear of American banks and corporations that an Allied defeat would render valueless the loans and credit arrangements into which they had entered.
with Allied countries, and strategic concerns that a German victory would so unbalance the distribution of power in Europe that it would ultimately imperil American security.¹

With an impressive range of information, Haglund reveals the inadequacies of each of these proposed solutions to the mystery in American foreign policy that he is unraveling—how the Hawthornians’ resistance to incorporating political teamwork with Britain, a resistance that had been central to their definition of Americanism for well over a century, could collapse between August 1914 and March 1917, an brief period, historically speaking. It is not that he dismisses any of the alternative explanations; indeed, his balanced examination of the cultural, domestic political, strategic, and economic factors leads him to grant some legitimacy to most of them. He does, however, suggest that neither singly nor in combination can they tell the whole story. His aim is to fill the remaining gap, one that he contends is both large and immensely important.

To this task Haglund brings an erudition that is astonishing in its comprehensiveness. Literature from the disciplines of political science, political psychology, diplomatic history, and international relations passes before the reader, each considered with the depth that comes only from a familiarity that passes into mastery. Indeed, if there could be any improvement to this path-breaking volume, it would be made because the review of the existing literature in all these fields is so extensive and solid that the depiction of the decisive events of 1914-1917 occupies a comparatively short part of the contents of the book. It is undoubtedly true that, with the benefit of a painstaking clearing of the field and cultivation of the crop, the plucking of the fruit can be accomplished in relatively short order. This allows the climactic part of the story to be told with economy. Still, one can also hope that Haglund will follow this admirable multidisciplinary account with a more extensive investigation of the pivotal phase of the struggle between the Hawthornians and their domestic adversaries in a subsequent volume.

In such a follow-on work, the central scene would be the presidential election campaign of 1916, which was the culmination of an increasingly acerbic dispute between the Hawthornians on one side and Irish-American and German-American organizations on the other. In this contest, the leaders of the latter overplayed their hand, both by over-estimating their own numbers and influence and by questioning the ‘loyal American’ bona fides of the Hawthornians so bitterly as to provoke English-Americans to drop opposition to British government policy as an element of their own definition of Americanism. The way was thus opened for cultural kinship between the Hawthornians and their ‘mother country’ to become decisive as that kinship was no longer neutralized by political differences. The aim of British proponents of Anglo-American cooperation cum alliance could at last be realized. And although the celebration of that “special relationship” was relatively brief and began to dissipate with the armistice at the end of 1918, the decisive psychological step had occurred. Political differences between London and Washington might and did reoccur, but never again were criticisms of British policy arising from those differences considered by most Americans, including most Americans of English and Scottish descent, as constitutive of American identity. When the events of 1939-1941 led step by step to a revival of the special relationship, one which was more durable and has lasted to the present day, it was not necessary to cross the same ontological Rubicon. That step had been taken in 1916, making the presidential election of that year one of the most consequential in American history.

Haglund’s telling of this story combines the theoretical erudition of the best political scientists with an eye for the colorful illustrative detail and a knack for compelling presentation worthy of the finest historians. In a rich but compact account of fewer than 250 pages, he has added immeasurably to our understanding of one of the most important international relationships of modern history.

David Haglund’s *The US “Culture Wars” and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* is a study of an important component of the American melting pot that has been hiding in plain sight: Anglo-Americans. The study of ethnic politics in international relations (IR) and international history alike has focused primarily on minority groups and diasporas. This approach makes much sense, as it is minority groups which have pressed for independence or greater domestic autonomy, challenged political and cultural status quo’s, and created extranational communities. The categories of “ethnic group” and “minority” have become synonymous in international affairs, a historical legacy of both the League of Nations’ consecration of these categories and of critical theorists’ emancipatory raison d’etre.¹

Haglund concentrates on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century cultural and political identity of Anglo-Americans (what he terms the “Hawthornian majority” (117-59), upon which more below) in order to answer the question of why the United States entered the First World War in 1917.

The book's first half synthesizes the scholarship of international historians and IR scholars on how and why the United States entered the war. In its second part, Haglund argues that the American entry into the war can be explained by an emergent majoritarian Anglo-Saxon identity that reversed American longstanding political Anglophobia. This political Anglophobia, he suggests, dated from the Revolutionary War and was exacerbated by more recent British challenges to the Monroe Doctrine such as the Venezuelan Boundary dispute from 1895 to 1899. An explicit American Anglo-Saxon identity emerged when it did to satisfy the United States' ontological security needs, in opposition to the ascendant ethnic identities and interests of German and Irish Americans. The outbreak of war in 1914 brought this ontological conflict to a head, causing Anglo-Americans to put aside their political opposition to Britain and instead embrace a transatlantic alliance. German and Irish American identities faded into the background, with Germany the wartime enemy (and one which presented a manifest threat to American interests through its unrestricted submarine warfare campaigns and its willful transgression of international law) and the Irish Revolution threatening British rule in Ireland. The Anglo-American Special Relationship (upon which also more below) that emerged during the war was thus a consequence, not a cause, of the “culture wars” of the 1910s (163).

Haglund’s argument is complicated and nuanced, and it requires much unpacking. The book has many strengths. Primary among them I would point to its thoughtful combination of historical and theoretical analysis, the rich source base of primary material (especially early twentieth century political pamphlets and commentary) and secondary scholarship, Haglund’s use of Ontological Security Theory (OST), and the attention he gives to the significance of emotions and friendship as variables in IR analysis. Alongside these strengths, the book’s reach sometimes exceeds its grasp (to indulge a cliché, the excessive use of which unfortunately weighs down the book’s prose). This overreach leads to some limitations, including an opaqueness in Haglund’s use of the concepts of “ethnicity” and the “national interest,” a resultant vagueness as to who exactly belonged to the “Hawthornian majority” at any given historical moment, the surprising absence of any sustained analysis of Anglo-Americans’ willful erasure of African-Americans and other minority groups as central components of Anglo-American identity, and the lack of attention given to British interests in the formation of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. I will engage with these strengths and limitations over the balance of the review.

Haglund’s book speaks to one of our most pressing political problems, namely the rise of aggrieved ethnic nationalism of majority ethnic groups who are unsettled by demographic and political challenges to their hegemony. His analysis connects twenty-first century debates about American identity with the early twentieth century “culture wars” about what it meant to be an American (159 and passim). It is thus possible to draw links between the politics of fear and exclusion at work in the years before and during the First World War with those dominating American politics in the twenty-first century. As Erica Lee has recently shown, xenophobia and its genteel cousin, majoritarian patriotism, is as much a defining feature of

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American political history as is the politics of liberty and exceptionalism, as highlighted by Haglund and historians such as Jill Lepore.\(^2\)

Haglund comes to this study of the early twentieth century roots of the Special Relationship from his work on diaspora and ethnicity politics.\(^3\) He is not quite correct that “majority ethnicities” have not been studied in any great depth. Many international and imperial historians have assessed how majority identity groups have shaped global imperial networks and the international system itself. Historians of settler colonialism, such as James Belich (whom Haglund cites) and Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, among many others, have demonstrated that settler colonial empires in the nineteenth and twentieth century, including the United States, were built upon a foundation of white supremacy.\(^4\) It is true, however, that excepting the scholarship of Samuel Huntington (upon which Haglund builds his argument) the significance of ethnic majorities has been comparatively understudied in IR (though there are important exceptions, such as the work of Haglund’s colleague Will Kymlicka).\(^5\) Here IR has absorbed the idea of the nation-state that was advanced by nineteenth century scholars like Ernest Renan, who argued that nations are based upon a spiritual principle of unity that flows from a shared understanding of their history and a common set of goals, rather than that of critical and postcolonial scholars who have taken seriously the arguments of Edward Said, Benedict Anderson, and their many successors that nations and the states they form are historical constructions that reflect prevailing currents of political and cultural power.\(^6\)

In IR terms, historians give priority to explanation, and see all or most variables as independent. In historical terms, IR scholars think systemically rather than granularly in search of grand narratives and predictive theories. One of the book’s many virtues is how it combines these two epistemological and methodological approaches without doing violence to either. As such, the book is an example of the sort of instructive historically informed IR scholarship for which many scholars have long called.\(^7\) Haglund present a novel theoretical and, to a lesser extent, empirical understanding of the role of the Special Relationship in explaining how and why the United States entered the First World War on the Entente powers’ side in 1917. Haglund weaves primary sources into an immersive analysis of IR scholarship on ethnic politics, national identity,

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and the causes of the First World War. The book demonstrates the insights to be derived through mid-range theoretical analysis of identity formation and its influences on foreign policy.

Haglund employs Kenneth Waltz’s conventional three images as his interpretive frame, dismissing the first image (individual politics, thus minimizing President Woodrow Wilson as a factor) and the third image (the system of states) to focus on the second image of the state. So far, so orthodox. Where he provides insightful middle range theory is in drawing on the OST of scholars such as Jennifer Mitzen, which is buttressed more eclectically by loosely related social identity theory dating to the mid-twentieth century psychologist Erik Erikson and psychiatrist R.D. Laing, to explain how debates about American political identity and security created circumstances that led to the decision to go to war (137-138). Mitzen argues that political conflict arises from states’ need for self-identification through conflict with an essentialized Other. Just as identity gives meaning to individuals’ lives, so it does so for states. Haglund thus argues that English, Irish, and German Americans each had ontological security needs for a stable sense of continuity and order that preserved their identity, and that the United States entered the war when English Americans’ ontological security needs trumped their historical political Anglophobia.

Haglund’s use of OST presents a potential way out of the Thucydides’ Trap by explaining why the United States joined a war that arguably did not present a challenge to its own position in the international order. He thus suggests an escape from the structural realist cul-de-sac by explaining in this historical case why and how the national interest was ultimately expressed as it was, rather than asserting that the United States entered the war because it was ‘compelled’ to by systemic pressures. As David Welch has argued, “international politics is primarily about choices, not constraints; that self-interest is but one motivations among many, and not always the strongest…and that ‘national interests’ are constructed in historically contingent, seemingly arbitrary ways, not ‘given’ by the ‘structure’ of the system.” Closely related to Haglund’s focus on ontological security is his attention to the role of emotions and friendship in IR. While he reminds us that an analysis of fear is a staple of realist thought, Haglund’s study of emotion widens to include the politics of friendship (128-34). This idea provides instructive possibilities for the study of many IR subjects.

Haglund’s concentration on the importance of majoritarian ethnicity thus enriches our understanding of why the United States entered the war in 1917, as well as how majority ethnic groups’ interests shape foreign policy decision-making more broadly. Haglund’s conceptualization of identity formation and the politics of “civilization” and ethnicity, however, are reductive. This limitation results directly from his reliance on Huntington’s work on identity as a fulcrum of the book’s argument. Haglund approves of Huntington’s dictum that “identity prefigured interests” (240). This may or may not be true, but it begs the realist question of how identity itself is formed, what its explicit and implicit assumptions are, and how and why it changes over time.

Haglund argues that the war led to the end of political Anglophobia and an increase in anti-German (and less clearly, anti-Irish) sentiment that altered American social identity and enabled Wilson to bring America into the war (232). He thus positions the U.S. culture war as the dependent variable that explains American entry into the war. As noted above, he provides much evidence for the importance of identity and security. However, his analysis does not adequately diminish

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8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).


other conventional causes for the American decision to go to war that were advanced by Americans at the time and scholars afterwards, such as debates about neutrality, British interests, economics, the German threat, and Wilson’s desire to shape the postwar international order. The book has shifted my view of the American entry into the war to better appreciate the role of identity politics, but more empirical evidence is needed to demonstrate that it was more than one of several independent variables that came together in 1917 to create a situation where Wilson could bring his country into war. Haglund argues that the 1916 election was fought on cultural and identity issues (226). This is true, but all elections are fought on these issues to a greater or lesser degree, so what was unique about 1916? Haglund argues persuasively that the “culture wars” were an important campaign issue, but so obviously was the war itself. After all, the United States came into the war in 1917 after Wilson won the 1916 presidential campaign on a pledge to keep the country out of the conflict. This suggests either he was disingenuous during the campaign, or, more likely, that changing political circumstances (the Zimmerman telegram in January 1917, Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February and March 1917, revolution in Russia, and increased pressure from private American lenders such as J.P. Morgan & Co. to secure their loans to the Allied powers) were more important factors than Haglund suggests.12 The book’s argument that the ontological security threat provoked by the war led Anglo-Americans to drop their political Anglophobia in favour of allying with Britain is persuasive. It should take the next step, asking why the U.S. entered the war when it did. After all, the United States could have favoured Britain (which it did already before 1917) without fighting. The explanatory power of social identity theory is thus limited— it needs to be combined with an analysis which explains why events happen as they did.

A related issue is the definition of majoritarian ethnicity in America. Haglund coins the phrase “Hawthornian majority” to describe an English American identity that was at once descended from and inimical to England. The invocation of Nathaniel Hawthorne is particularly apt, as Hawthorne’s writing and public career (he was American consul to Liverpool in the 1850s) evinced both an attraction to what he perceived as English modernity and a Romantic desire to articulate a distinct American identity. This duality is muted in Haglund’s analysis however, with the “Hawthornian majority” presented as a distinct ethnic bloc rather than a complex, diverse, and shifting identity group. It is thus difficult to know who exactly Haglund is referring to when he speaks of the “Hawthornian majority.” Sometimes it encompasses all English-descended Americans, other times the post-Civil War North, and other times the New England elites whence Hawthorne himself came and about which he wrote.

This conceptual opaqueness results from Haglund’s depiction of ethnic groups as Huntingtonian blocs. This reductionism is a central reason that Huntington’s work is used as a straw man by most IR theorists, rather than a serious interpretation of international relations.13 We get little sense of the composition of American ethnic groups. Haglund’s argument thus becomes circular, in that it assumes the existence of ethnic identity groups whose existence and conflicts explain the American entry into the war. Language, religion, culture, and shared history—all key elements of identity—are muted in Haglund’s argument, and his frequent use of the passive voice to refer to his majority and minority groups masks their diversity. Class, race, partisan politics, regional and economic interests, and many other factors differed within ethnic groups, a diversity which disappears when we position ethnic groups as unified actors whose only explanatory significance is their collective “interest.” In addition to other differences, English Americans were divided politically over the war itself. Wilson, the isolationist American Senator William Borah, and the interventionist American Senator Henry Cabot Lodge were all “Hawthornians.” Postwar divisions between isolationists, advocates of neutralism, and internationalists also emanated from the war experience, as historians such as Brooke Blower and Stephen Wertheim have shown.14 Haglund’s


default realist assumption is that a national interest is the norm, and that ethnic politics is a deviation. His evidence demonstrates that the two are not mutually exclusive. Haglund’s "Hawthornian majority" conflated its own ethnic interests with those of the state. This is how privilege perpetuates itself.

Privilege also presupposes the inferiority of other groups. In the Anglo-American case, this meant non-white Americans, who constitute the most striking absent party in the book. Haglund argues that Anglo-American identity crystallized during the First World War culture wars in opposition to German and Irish American identities. Yet it was not an Americanized "Englishness" but race, and specifically whiteness, that was the core American national identity in the early twentieth-century. Whiteness was the explicit basis of the census. It was the determinant of suffrage. The immigration Act of 1917 imposed a literacy test for immigrants two months before the U.S. entered the war. Immigration is briefly broached in the book (175-75). Huntington would argue that rising immigration from central and southern Europe produced a defensive response from Anglo-Americans. How do these immigration flows fit into Haglund’s thesis? Many Anglo-Americans, after all, were as or more vociferous in their opposition to the immigration of these groups as they were of German and Irish Americans.

The Other against which Anglo-Americans constructed their identity was not, or at least not primarily, other European ethnic groups, but African Americans. The postcolonial literature with which Haglund does not engage provides clues to how this Other was created and subordinated. Here an analysis of the United States as a continental empire is helpful, showing how Haglund’s "Hawthornian majority" formed its own identity, and inter alia the national identity, through the conquest and subjugation of internal Others— African Americans, indigenous peoples, Mexicans and subsequently other Latin Americans, and European immigrants from ‘less developed’ countries. Racial exclusion and a privileging of whiteness as normative were also foundational assumptions of the emerging discipline of IR, as Robert Vitalis has shown.15 If IR has struggled to account for its own racial origins, it is perhaps not surprising that race is largely absent from much IR scholarship.

The British are a related lacuna in the book. Haglund perceptively asks why there was no Special Relationship before 1914 (41), and he shows persuasively why the two states did not foster closer political ties. Yet this is also true of American foreign relations more broadly. President Thomas Jefferson warned against “entangling alliances” in his 1801 inaugural address, and the United States scrupulously followed a principle of non-intervention through the nineteenth century. Historians thus debate whether the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century imperial expansion into the Caribbean and the Pacific was an aberration, or a projection of the racial predicates of American foreign policy. The absence of a special political relationship with Britain is thus not surprising, as the United States did not foster a special relationship with any country. As Kathleen Burk and many other scholars have illustrated, however, there were many unofficial and long-standing Anglo-American ties that were based on a shared culture and world outlook that was punctuated periodically by political disputes. The idea of Special Relationship from the British side was tied up with the idea of an Anglosphere, a global network of Anglophone societies bound together by ties of culture and language, and the pursuit of common political and economic goals. This idea has inspired English nationalists from the nineteenth-century English historian J.R. Seeley to present British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.16


The study of Anglo-American identity is an important but fraught subject. One of the book’s strengths is to engage with this important but difficult subject and recover the role that English American identity played in early twentieth century American foreign policy. Yet the extremes of this identity group, from nineteenth century lynch mobs, through the Ku Klux Klan’s rebirth during and after the First World War, to the white supremacists who marched at Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, reveal the toxic violence that can emerge from majority identity groups when they perceive their cultural, political, and economic hegemony to be under threat. It is thus odd that a sustained examination of the role of race is missing from the book’s argument.

The strengths and limitations of *The US “Culture Wars” and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* both result from the book’s ambitious goals. If Haglund takes on more ideas and history than he can fully address, he nonetheless provides readers with a serious argument with which to engage and instructive questions to guide further scholarship on the American entry into the First World War.

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This is not a book about the Anglo-American relationship. It is a book about international relations scholarship about the Anglo-American relationship. Nowhere do we hear the voices of important figures in debates about the relationship; nowhere do we read exchanges among policy makers about the great issues of the day where the subject was considered relevant to their decisions. What David Haglund offers instead is an extended exploration of the secondary literature about inner-American ethnicity (he shies away from terming it racism), political influence, and state behavior. However, his exclusive focus on ethno-civilizational narrative to the exclusion of strategic explanations overlooks the simpler, more compelling storyline.

Haglund’s amusing hook for his argument is that the “concept of ethnically-fueled culture wars [is not] anything new in America...today’s culture wars pale in comparison with those of the century or so ago” (15). I applaud his deflation of the idea that there is a mythical past when American politics were not grubby and antagonistic.

Haglund explores how a country that defined itself in opposition to Britain came to revere “civilizational” connectedness, which is a really interesting question. Warren Olney, President Grover Cleveland’s Secretary of State who wrote the infamous 1895 “twelve inch gun” legal opinion asserting the Monroe Doctrine against Britain, traversed to believing that “through racial, social, and commercial ties ever knitting them closely together, war between them has become almost unthinkable.”

Haglund’s argument is that growing Anglo-American identity among the English diaspora impelled the U.S. into World War I on the Allied side because strident German- and Irish-American activism served to create an Anglo sensibility that acknowledged a common “civilization” between Britain and the United States.

Haglund introduces the idea of a “Hawthornian majority,” by which he means Americans of white British extraction who developed a “civilizational” narrative that jettisoned their long-held antagonism toward Britain in their self-definition (122). Haglund does not argue that this emerged in an effort to justify their views and stature as they lost their demographic majority in the United States. Nor does he argue that joining the British side in the war facilitated a common sensibility. Instead, he argues that the behavior of Irish- and German-Americans after August of 1914 to prevent America joining the war created that sensibility (127).

Haglund’s conveyor belt from domestic to international relations is the idea of an ‘ontological security dilemma,’ in which states’ need for identity drives their international behavior. Haglund grounds his explanation in Samuel Huntington’s ‘kin-country’ concept, to which he attributes the attenuation of Irish- and German-Americans’ political influence and President Woodrow Wilson’s shift from neutrality to “acquiescing in belligerency” (124). In Haglund’s telling, “the identity ‘needs’ of America’s three largest European-descended ethnic groups would come to characterize both the causes and the stakes of the culture warfare of the neutrality years” (114).

Haglund is certainly right that “for all Americans throughout nearly the entire nineteenth century, Anglophobia was the closest thing to a default setting that their country’s foreign policy possessed (149-150). He amusingly terms this the ‘two Henrys problem,” setting up historian Henry Adams and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as major forces in propelling anti-British sentiment (154). Haglund acknowledges how much British policies matter in creating the problem, writing beautifully that “Lodge had come by his Anglophobia easily and honestly enough, for it resulted less from ignorance of

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2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer 1993), 15.
history than from knowledge of it” (155). He also rightly acknowledges the role of racial solidarity in reaction to Irish and Italian immigration, and the growing sense of Germanness among German-Americans as Germany unified in the 1870s (173).

The concept of Anglo-America began to emerge with the Great Rapprochement in the 1870s. The American civil war ended slavery, which had been a major friction between the two countries. The two economies became aligned with overflow British investment soaked up by expansion of railroads to the American west and reconstruction in the South. The two countries came to look alike to each other (imperial and democratic) and different from all other states, which is why the transition from British to American dominance of the international order occurred peacefully. As Haglund rightly emphasizes, British support for the United States in the Spanish-American war positively changed American sensibilities about Britain (158).

The central question Haglund asks is why the rapprochement did not result in a security alliance between the U.S. and UK before World War I. His answer is somewhat diffuse. Haglund also asks why the U.S. and UK did converge in their security sensibilities after 1917, and it is here that his theory of ‘ontological self-definition’ tries to shoulder weight.

Security studies and history both already give us straightforward and satisfactory answers to those questions, and much more rigorous proofs than those provided by Haglund: the U.S. clung to neutrality because Britain was perceived in the context of World War I to be just another European power. The U.S. had no national security interest in a war among European powers until Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. Once in the war, public attitudes became hostile to Germany and affectionate toward Britain.

It is surprising that Haglund did so little to refute the standard explanations. He spends most of the first hundred pages evaluating IR theory of World War I, yet does not disprove the central issue which is necessary to make relevant his argument about domestic politics as the driver of Wilson’s decision to join the war, namely, Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare (93-94). Haglund cites one scholar writing that motive inadequate and allows that to stand as sufficiency.

He does not even mention either the Senate refusing consent to the 1897 Arbitration Treaty demonstrating the vociferousness of Irish-American Anglophobia before 1914, nor Germany’s aggressiveness in the Pacific during the Spanish-American war in distinguishing its international comportment toward the U.S. from Britain’s, nor the role in 1917 of the Zimmerman telegram in how Germany came to be seen as the villain of World War I. Military and diplomatic history are entirely absent from his discussion. While I admire attempts to reveal new information and develop new theories, one feels the paucity of Haglund’s theory by comparison to the weight of alternative explanations.

Moreover, Haglund does not explain why 1917 is the culmination of his story. The U.S. and Britain did not form an alliance in 1917. Haglund even acknowledges the shallowness of attachment, writing about “the drastic downturn in the quality of Anglo-American relations that set in following the First World War” (1, 122, 245).

That prickliness came from British financial indebtedness to the U.S., resentment at American orchestration of the 1923 Washington Naval Accords that imposed restrictions on the Royal Navy with threats of an arms race, and Wilson’s aspiration to foster a new kind of international relations. Wilson’s universalist claims about self-determination sowed the seeds of Britain’s imperial demise, and the British government understood the American challenge in precisely those terms. It was so plaguing British officials during the 1917-1919 zenith of Anglo-American cooperation that the government

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1 The Royal Navy amusingly term the ships whose hulls had already been laid but were required to be cut down to meet the restrictions of the Washington Naval Accords as the “Cherry Tree Class” because Washington chopped them down.
undertook an internal study to determine whether the U.S. could force British capitulation (and concluded that the U.S. in fact could).

Nor does Haglund justify why 1917 is the end of the story on the German-American and Irish-American side of the equation. For if the visibly influential opposition of those communities to Woodrow Wilson’s re-election in 1916 was a “pyrrhic victory,” (225) how is it that Wilson blamed those two communities for the failure of his League of Nations years later? Wilson’s speeches declaimed the patriotism of “hyphenated Americans” long after Haglund tells us that their political power waned.

Haglund does not weight seriously Wilson’s desire to create an international order that was different from the blood-soaked frenzy of World War I. He believes that what the U.S. wanted the international order to become required a new kind of relations with Great Britain, ones which were different from those with other nations. That was true from 1870-1914 but was overcome by Wilson’s confidence that the entire international order could be structured to universalist American aims, as evidenced by his Fourteen Points. In that constellation, Britain became less important, not more.

Haglund’s book has another timeline problem, too, which is that Hagland attributes the “most significant foreign policy consequences ever” to the emergence of Anglo-American identity (20). But the consequence he is discussing is the “special relationship,” which did not come about for at least another two decades after the ostensibly momentous events of 1917.

*Culture Wars* is an erudite book. Its annotation is a thorough education; its reviews of the literature on ethnic identity, alliance formation, and the causes of World War I are admirable. Haglund acknowledges the seminal political science work of Srdjan Vucetic on race-based commonality and sociologist Noel Ignatiev’s excellent book *How the Irish Became White.* What he does not do is refute Vucetic or move our understanding beyond that provided by Ignatiev. Arguments are rehearsed more than they are assessed.

*Culture Wars* lacks the pungency of direct proof, or even the vicarious pleasure of eavesdropping on statesmen’s conversations. It is a major shortcoming of the book that we do not hear enough from Wilson himself. Haglund excuses this absence early on saying that Wilson was a solitary actor, who did not rely on his cabinet. But he did certainly have confidants, Colonel House prominent among them, who gave voice to his views in discussions with British government officials, the records of which are available. As a result, the book reads like an international relations scholar citing the works of other international relations scholars.

For a book ostensibly interested in grand strategy, *Culture Wars* gives remarkably little attention to the grand strategic elements of wars and treaties. The culture wars did not provide a new set of ontological villains as Haglund asserts (240). The actual wars did that.

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On 2 April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson stood before a joint session of Congress to argue for war. Citing Germany’s violation of its promise to curb unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as Berlin’s efforts to bring Mexico into an alliance with the Central Powers, the President furnished what became one of the most famous phrases in US foreign policy discourse of all time: ‘The world must be made safe for democracy.’ Four days later, Washington formally entered the conflict, to the delight of the Allies and their associates, from the mighty British Empire to the tiny Emirate of Riyadh.

U.S. entry into World War I transformed the course of American political development. In addition to mobilizing over four U.S. million troops, and sending over two million to the Western front, Washington drastically expanded its role in the economy in order to support the war effort. Millions of mostly white women soon gained more power, via the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, while around six million African Americans migrated from the Jim Crow South to wartime jobs in New York, Chicago, and other Northern cities.

David Haglund’s new book sheds new light on how and why this foreign policy U-turn happened. For three years, the Wilson administration had sought to maintain neutrality in the Great War in deference to powerful anti-war opinion that cut across the political spectrum. Yes, Haglund acknowledges, anti-Allied lobbyists from the German-American and Irish-American communities had much to do with this. But all this diasporic activism had another, larger effect: the onset of “culture wars” through which the English-descended Americans, a.k.a. the “Brito-Americans,” reconstituted themselves as English in civilizational terms. 1 Haglund calls this constituency, which was then a demographic majority of more than 55 million, the “Hawthornian majority,” after a mid-nineteenth century epigram by the novelist Nathaniel Hawthorne: “I hate England, though I love some Englishmen, and like them generally” (125).

The Hawthornian identity shift did not just send the U.S. to war in 1917. In fact, the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship,’ a mainstay of the international order that was until recently described as “liberal” or “rules-based,” has roots in these “culture wars”: by killing American Anglophobia for good, they essentially paved the road toward “eventual lasting strategic union” (248) between Washington and London.

Haglund’s book is an achievement. Relatively few IR scholars go into such level of historical detail to make their case, and even fewer can do so with such aplomb. But as someone who has had the privilege of commenting on much of the book’s first draft (x), I will surprise nobody when I say that any remaining disagreements I have with the author are minor, that is, in the nature of “Yes, but-” interventions. First, is the ontological security of the American state the same as that of the Hawthornians? In the International Relations (IR) idiom, ontological security refers to the idea that states care as much about their ontological security, or the confidence in knowing who you are when going on in the world. Haglund’s dominant empirical focus is on a societal collective, the Hawthornians, and their relations with multiple Others within the U.S. But ontological security theory invites us to move across borders and focus on the interaction between the inside and the outside. In this case, this entails looking how Others outside the U.S. (including the liminal Others, such as the Canadians) reacted to how they were being represented in the American “cultural wars,” and with what effects on the Hawthornian, American, and their own identity formations. If we accept that ontological security is a dialogical process, then the agency of the English/British, Germans, and Irish Others matters as much as the agency of their descendants in the United States. Accordingly, it could be that growing English/British recognition of their transatlantic cousins as equal, as

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1 The expression culture wars is usually associated with a series of debates about what it means to be America or American that gained prominence in the 1980s, but which can be traced back to earlier times. Haglund uses this idea that culture-war politics are a dimension of much deeper history of polarization in the republic, one that long predates the traditionalist-religious push back against modernist-secular ideologies and practice. For an IR deployment of this latter understanding of culture wars, see Michael Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (London: Routledge, 2007), Chapter 5.
opposed to inferior, also helped construct the U.S. as a more exclusive civilizational community and therefore silence alternative visions of American identity, not least those favored by the German-American and Irish-American communities.

Second and related, could it be that the German-Americans lost their ‘culture wars’ even earlier? As Haglund notes, nineteenth-century U.S. leaders and public-policy intellectuals were often deeply impressed with Prussian and later German excellence in military affairs, industry, commerce, science, and education (100, 173). The problem, however, was Germany’s Weltpolitik, especially in the Pacific, large parts of which the US claimed for itself (174). But I think there was another key development here: the second Venezuela crisis (compare 33-5).

In December 1902 Britain and Germany, as tactical allies (later joined by Italy), deployed their gunboats in the Venezuelan waters—that is, the American waters—with the objective of forcibly collecting debts. After the heavy-handed bombardment of Venezuelan ports, the American press and public opinion exploded in rage. The Theodore Roosevelt administration responded by dispatching a battleship squadron under Admiral Dewey, compelling the European allies to agree to arbitration. But then, in January 1903, German warships shelled and destroyed yet another Venezuelan fort. This sent the American press into a frenzy, and so Washington confronted Berlin with an ‘ultimatum.’ This led to the signing of the new arbitration agreement and a de facto expulsion of European military power from the western hemisphere (until the 1960s, when the Soviet missiles appeared in Cuba).

What mattered here was the differential construction of the European great powers by the U.S. media and public. As so often before, ‘Britain’ was misguided: the English/British people were sensible, but their government was not. ‘Germany,’ in contrast, was irredeemable. Here, too, outsider agency helped in a sense that many Britons publicly agreed with this view. Rudyard Kipling’s new poem “Rowers,” published simultaneously in the Times of London and The New York Times on December 22, 1902, put it thus: “With a cheated crew, to league anew/With the Goth and the shameless Hun!”2 If we accept that this crisis nipped American Germanophilia in the bud, then it stands to reason that German-American lobbyists had an uphill battle to fight later on (but his footnote 29 on page 174 contains some hints on how we might go about testing this claim.)

My final ‘Yes, but-’ concerns the conceptual dance between ethnicity and ‘race.’ Early on in the book Haglund offers good reasons as to why he opts to use the former (9-10, 43-44, fn. 56). I think an equally solid case can be made for using the latter. To begin with, the concept of ethnicity began to replace ‘race’ in policy and political discourses only in the 1930s. While this move helped delegitimate the sordid hierarchies of humanity, it simultaneously helped hide and depoliticize those hierarchies, too. (The very term ‘culture wars’ can be seen in this context, too.).3 Also, rather than being ‘merely’ reducible to phenotype (or body more generally) or to identity, ‘race’ is a global structure with global effects. As such, it compels us more forcefully to look at how domestic dynamics of racialization interact with those in the international realm, what W.E.B. Du Bois famously identified as the “problem of the color line,” to configure a state’s selfhood and, in extension, its foreign policies.4

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2 The two newspapers agreed to publish each other’s material in 1901, and the full text is now available via their online archives: https://www.nytimes.com/1902/12/22/archives/kipling-denounces-the-anglo-german-alliance-in-the-rowers-britons.html This was also one of the first English language uses of the word Hun to describe the Germans—a discursive practice that would of course come to full fruition after 1914. For my take on this crisis, see Srdjan Vucetic, “A Racialized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Relationship Special,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7/4 (2011): 403-421, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00147.x


4 Alex Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam, Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line (London, Routledge, 2014).
When I first began to think about how I should respond to the set of reviewers’ reports I received, I had imagined the best way might be to identify some common strains in the critiques of the five colleagues who so kindly gave of their time to read, reflect upon, and critique what I was trying to do in *The US “Culture Wars”* project. I had even outlined four rubrics within which I believed the gist of their individual comments could be identified, packaged, and debated.

As I began to draft this response, though, I realized it would make more sense if I abandoned Procrustean categorization in favour of good old-fashioned alphabetical order, which I became convinced would be a much fairer way for me both to capture the richness of each reviewer’s arguments, as well as to frame my reactions thereto. So on balance what follows will reflect my attempt to steer as clearly as I can away from the temptation of what J. H. Hexter memorably referred to as “lumping,” in favour of a more textured “splitting” of the substantive matters before me.¹ There is one exception, however, in which lumping seems to be the only appropriate course: it is on the matter of expressing my sincere gratitude to Professors Kathleen Burk, David Clinton, Daniel Gorman, Kori Schake, and Srdjan Vucetic. Where they have been complimentary of my book, I have naturally felt pleased. But even more abundant has been the pleasure derived from my having been forced by each of them to defend key assumptions, and to try to strengthen the case I have sought to make. For both of these reasons, I am in their debt.

I start with the commentary provided by Kathleen Burk, who quite rightly notes that I am not an historian, but rather a political scientist who resorts to history to frame hypotheses and conduct examinations of the evidence that might (or might not) sustain the hypotheses. I have for some time sensed among my colleagues in the ‘senior’ discipline (i.e., history) a hesitancy to accept with complete equanimity the intrusion of political scientists into their *chasse gardée*. There are good reasons for this hesitancy. Partly, political scientists have been known to behave a bit too much like rampaging Vikings who, when they find themselves confronting the bountiful booty offered by historical sources, cannot resist the impulse to ransack the ‘evidence’ needed to ‘prove’ their points, rather than try calmly to apply as best they can the documentary (and other) materials at hand to the job of testing their assumptions. But mainly, I think, historians often regard political scientists to be a species of hyper-generalizing baffle-gabbers, overly reliant upon theorizing.

Fortunately for me, Burk is reasonably tolerant of interdisciplinary raiding parties, even those conducted by someone with a Scandinavian surname, such that once she managed to, as she put it, get “beyond some jargon-ridden prose,” she found, “as I had expected, a deeply researched and lucidly-written analysis” that offered an unorthodox, but “on the whole, convincing” assessment of the impact that ethnic-diasporic lobbying could be said to have had upon the decision of the U.S. to enter the First World War in April 1917.

She flags two particular items. One concerns the very important issue of the “decision making” that led to President Woodrow Wilson’s historic – and in geostrategic terms, revolutionary – request to congress for a declaration of war against Imperial Germany, on 2 April 1917. It was revolutionary not because going to war was such a departure from the normal course of American grand strategy – after all, there had been three previous occasions upon which presidents had asked for, and received, congressional benediction for a war (the War of 1812, Mexican War, and Spanish-American War). It was revolutionary because, for the first time, a president was seeking permission to inject America into the European balance of power directly, on the Old Continent itself.

About Wilson’s request, much ink has spilled for more than a century now, and Burk is quite correct in observing that for an analysis such as mine, unambiguously presented as a Kenneth Waltzian “second-image” contribution to the intervention debate, the default position I ultimately adopt is a curiously first-image one: Woodrow Wilson was responsible for the

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choice in favour of war (for reasons I reflect upon below, in discussing some of the other reviewers’ critiques). Burk realizes, as do I, that my invocation of the “culture wars” of 1914-17 to serve as what many political scientists would term a “variable,” cannot be understood as an “independent” one in the sense that it fulfils the necessary and sufficient conditions for causality. If I took seriously the mooted epistemological prowess of “intervening” variables, that is how I might have garbed my framework of analysis, which Burk accurately identifies as outlining a “permissive” condition for the war decision – nothing more, nothing less.

She finds the articulation of this permissive condition to be fairly persuasive, which gets us to the kernel of the second substantive response I make here. While judging my treatment of this condition to be “convincing,” she goes on to express greater skepticism regarding another major thrust of my argument, for not only do I invoke novel considerations of “ontological security” to help account for the April 1917 decision in a way that no one (to my knowledge) has tried to do before, but I take the argument a step further and claim that the culture wars so altered the nature of American “Anglophobia” as to constitute a “necessary” condition leading to the eventual construction of the Anglo-American alliance, which is widely held to be conterminous with the Anglo-American “special relationship” (AASR). In other words, I am making a stronger claim about the origins of the special relationship than I am about the origins of intervention in 1917.

Indeed, there does appear something odd about an argument purporting that events between 1914 and 1917 would, with some considerable time lag, eventually pave the way for the special relationship’s arrival on the world stage. Quite a few scholars would simply deny that there is really anything “special” about this bilateral relationship, hence there is simply no need for me or anyone else to try to establish a necessary condition for its having come into existence, since it is non-existent. Burk is too much of an expert on the Anglo-American question to join the ranks of the special-relationship deniers. But she does query how events transpiring a quarter-century prior to the onset of the Anglo-American alliance can credibly be charged with explanatory significance for the special relationship’s eventual appearance in the decade of the 1940s, especially in view of the undoubted and steep decline in Anglo-American bonhomie that so colored the interwar period. My response to this is simply to note that while it is true that bilateral ties suffered a severe reversal in the 1920s and 1930s, and that Anglophobia once more reared its ugly head within the American body politic, this era’s ‘distaste’ of England differed greatly from the earlier and long-lived period when Anglophobia ruled the roost of American national sentimentality; the Hawthornians had ceased spearheading the charge against British political values as a means both of knowing and of valorizing their collective identity. Other ethnic groupings—the ones literary critic Henry Seidel Canby lampooned as America’s “real Anglomaniacs”—continued to rail against English political ways, but they were no longer being accompanied in their rantings by the Hawthornians. Because of the disappearance of the Hawthornian critique of political England, interwar Anglophobia simply proved incapable, once the Second World War arrived, of constituting much of a case against bilateral alliance. Thus, in this manner, the Hawthornian ‘conversion’ was to matter a great deal, even if belatedly so.

It is this apparent puzzle – namely the lag between the culture wars of 1914-17 and the onset of the lasting Anglo-American special relationship– to which David Clinton turns his attention in his commentary on my book. Since he says it better than I possibly could, let me quote him about that lag: “Political differences between London and Washington might and did reoccur, but never again were criticisms of British policy arising from those differences considered by most Americans, including most Americans of English and Scottish descent, as constitutive of American identity. When the events of 1939-1941 led step by step to a revival of the special relationship, one which was more durable and has lasted to the present day, it was not necessary to cross the same ontological Rubicon.”

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2 See her magnum opus, Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning (New York: Grove Press, 2009), as well as her Britain, America, and the Sinews of War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985)

No less significant is Clinton’s highlighting of what really has to be regarded to be missing-in-action from my argument, which is a fleshing out of the searing debates that made the 1916 U.S. presidential election such a critical moment in the crossing of that “ontological Rubicon.” Charmingly, the review faintly damns with ample praise; nonetheless, Clinton’s diplomatic manner of expressing criticism really does point to a lacuna in my exposition.

He focuses where focus is most needed: on that November 1916 election. Generously complimenting my inclusion of theories and evidence, from a variety of disciplines, appertaining to the question of April 1917, he ever so gently, yet very skillfully, chides me for not providing more material on the election that took place less than half a year earlier, when Woodrow Wilson narrowly defeated his Republican challenger, Charles Evans Hughes. He suggests that what is needed to round out the story I tell in this book is another one: a stand-alone examination of how it was that the culture wars culminated in November 1916, and with what fairly immediate, as well as longer-term, effects. I believe he is spot on with this comment, though my current struggle with trying to explain another important bilateral relationship America has ‘enjoyed,’ that with France, will necessarily render me incapable of rising to his challenge to provide this follow-on work. I think someone should undertake such a project, not so much to ‘prove’ me right as to query whether I might be wrong.

If Woodrow Wilson was, in foreign policy terms, by far the most important president in his country’s history (notwithstanding the self-promotion to that ranking of the current incumbent), then it could also be said, again in foreign policy terms, that the 1916 election was the most “critical” one in the country’s history.4 A revisiting of the strategic consequences of that balloting would make a wonderful subject for a dissertationist in quest of a topic that has been relatively untouched by scholars. I can come up with its title, thanks to Clinton: Crossing the Ontological Rubicon: Did the November 1916 Election “Revolutionize” American Grand Strategy, and if So, How?

Daniel Gorman similarly observes that more information about that November 1916 election would not have gone amiss. But he also makes a different sort of criticism, one concerning not the dearth of material required to substantiate more fully the argument I have been making, but rather my failure to have made the argument he would have made, were he writing the book. For he takes me to task in not seeming to accept that the principal ontological divide in the America of the early twentieth century was not the one cleaving the “Euro-Americans” who, these days, seem to be the apple of many a white-nationalist’s eye, but rather the barrier between white and non-white Americans.

Of course, he is correct. Only a nitwit would assert that the identity quarrels roiling relations between various European-descended identity bearers of a century ago outrank, on any scale of morality or domestic political consequence, the hideous burden bequeathed American society by the legacy of slavery and racism. But I was not writing a story about morality, or domestic politics; I was arguing that in terms of the implications for American foreign policy, nothing comes remotely close to matching the impact of the culture wars of a century or so ago, precisely because these pitted white identity groups, each possessed of reasons for “kin-country rallying,”5 against each other. That impact, or so I was arguing, was revolutionary in destroying the first, and longstanding, ‘Washington consensus,’ to wit, the injunction to stay out of the European balance of power. It did so in a surprising manner, as I try to show in the book.

Gorman claims that my argument is that “American entry into the war can be explained by an emergent majoritarian Anglo-Saxon identity that reversed Americans’ longstanding political Anglophobia.” This is not exactly my claim, though it comes close enough to be considered in the analytical ballpark. I rather agree with Theodore Roosevelt’s dismissal of Anglo-Saxonism as so much gobbledygook, and I much prefer what Finley Peter Dunne’s character Mr. Dooley called those ersatz

4 Walter Dean Burnham popularized the concept of a “critical” election in his magisterial Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970). Unlike Burnham, whose use of the adjective, “critical,” was intended to highlight elections that fundamentally realigned domestic parties, my borrowing of his concept is intended to identify elections that greatly changed the contours of foreign policy.

identity bearers: “An Anglo-Saxon, Hinnissy, is a German that’s forgot who was his parents.”6 Its conceptual flaccidity aside, the Anglo-Saxon construct had the additional demerit of forcing anti-Germans into coming up with persuasive ways of kicking the Saxons (i.e., the Germans) out of the Anglo-Saxon tent, a task whose difficulty I sought to illustrate through the improbable injection of Basil Fawlty into my analysis. This is why I explicitly refrained from hanging my argument on any Anglo-Saxon thematic hook, either in its ‘racial’ or merely in its “ethnic” signification. It is why I concocted the ‘Hawthornian’ category, which itself, as Gorman astutely notes, is hardly a self-evident construct. But then, in the realm of historical and social-scientific inquiry, what concepts are sufficiently self-evident as to render them immune from being “essentially contested”?7 Not very many, if any, and certainly not any important concepts.

Gorman offers a fascinating hint as to how African-Americans might possibly be slotted into the Hawthornian construct. Without going, say, to the extent of the African-American critical theorist from the Vietnam era, Nathan Hare, who identified and inveighed against a group he called the “black Anglo-Saxons,”8 I would suggest that it is worth pondering why leading African-American intellectuals such as W.E.B. Du Bois should have arrived at the same position on the question of intervention by 1917 as the Hawthornian majority. One answer to this question, but I stress only one among several answers, might be found in African-American ontological distancing from Irish-American nationalists, on the sound basis of the well-known association between Irish-American nationalism and racism during the Civil War and after. As with Clinton’s comments, I am left responding to Gorman’s with the same thought: there is much more work to be done on this topic. Perhaps he might wish to take up the challenge of doing some of it?

One final item in Gorman’s substantial roster of critiques needs a response: it is his imputation that in employing, as I do, Waltz’s conventional three images and plumping, again as I do, for a “second-image” coign of vantage, I end up “minimizing President Woodrow Wilson as a factor” in the U.S. entry into the war. But of course, I do not do this, something noted earlier by Burk, when she highlights the paradox of an avowed “second-imager” such as myself looking for, and finding, the sufficient reason for intervention in Woodrow Wilson. If anything, I might be charged with maximizing the Wilson factor, because if I had to sift through all of the plausible sufficient ‘causes’ of the intervention decision, and choose one or two of them as being most persuasive, I would come down in favour of two emphatically first-image explanations: either the submarine thesis, which had Wilson opting for war because he was simply forced to, or the argument that the country had to enter the war if its president was going to be allowed to design a postwar world from which war itself would be banished.

It is on this business of how I treat the 28th president that Kori Schake’s remarks have their greatest piquancy. As with Gorman, but in a different way, she criticizes my argument, concerning which she finds that I make the president subservient to the wishes of the Hawthornians. She writes, “[i]t’s surprising that Haglund did so little to refute the standard explanations [of the intervention decision]. He spends most of the first hundred pages evaluating IR theory of World War I, yet does not disprove the central issue which is necessary to make relevant his argument about domestic politics as the driver of Wilson’s decision to join the war, namely, Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare” (emphasis added). But in fact, as mentioned directly above, I do not reject the “standard explanations” because I happen to take them seriously, and I certainly did not suggest that Wilson took guidance from Hawthornians or anyone else – just the opposite, he kept his own counsel, defiantly so. All the Hawthornians did with their ontological flip-flopping (from eschewing to embracing

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6 Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley in Peace and War (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1898), 54. As for Roosevelt, not only did he happily admit to not knowing who (or what) was an Anglo-Saxon, but he insisted that whatever the term meant, it did not apply to him. Rudyard Kipling related that when he first met Roosevelt, the “latter had thanked God that he himself had not one drop of English blood.” Quoted in Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904 (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), 78.


political England) was to make Wilson’s choice for war far easier than it might otherwise have been; but it was Wilson’s choice, not theirs. More importantly, as this really is the crux of my argument, the flip-flopping opened up possibilities for an Anglo-American alliance that had hitherto been dismal to nonexistent, the “great rapprochement” to the contrary notwithstanding.

Schake seems to argue that the U.S. and Britain (and also the U.S. and France) were not really “allies” in 1917 and 1918. And if you took Woodrow Wilson at his word, they could not have been; instead the U.S. was merely an ‘associate’ of the two Entente powers. If you insist that alliances can only come into existence through treaties (think: the 1949 Washington treaty establishing NATO) and not through reiterated practices of mutual security cooperation, then of course Schake is right. Why would anyone so insist? Obviously, Wilson, who sincerely believed that alliances had caused the war and that only the expunging of alliances through “collective security” (never to be confused with “collective defense”) could remove the scourge of war, was hardly going to boast that America’s aim in joining the war was to become an ally. But an ally it very much did become, however temporarily.

Schake asks an excellent question, one that appertains to the postwar failure of the U.S. to join the League of Nations, given my assertion that America’s entry into the war in April 1917 effectively deflated nearly all of the earlier political significance that the Irish- and German-American diasporas believed they had attained over U.S. foreign policy. If I am correct, she wonders, “how is it that Wilson blamed those two communities for the failure of his League of Nations years later?” My response here is that he would say that, for to pin the blame (wrongly) on either (or both) of these diasporas, served Wilson wonderfully in shifting the responsibility for America’s failure to join the League from his own colossal mishandling of the peace settlement and subsequent transit of the Versailles treaty through the senatorial ratification process. There is a reason why many analysts regard Wilson himself to have been the single biggest factor responsible for the Senate’s failure, on three separate occasions in late 1919 and early 1920, to ratify the treaty. 

I certainly would not disagree strenuously with two of Schake’s three parting comments. The first of these is that my book “reads like an international relations scholar citing the works of other international relations scholars”; this seems to me to be a fairly judicious observation. Nor would I demur from her criticism that my approach is too rooted in domestic (second-image) debates and not enough in systemic (third-image) ones, since my intention was precisely to establish such rootage. But I am puzzled as to why she scolds me for trying unsuccessfully to “refute” work done by Srdjan Vucetic, a scholar whose study of Anglo-American rapprochement accords much greater weight to racialized collective identity than I was prepared to concede – and more to the point, than Schake herself was prepared to concede in her own path-breaking book on the same topic.

Fortuitously, I can here address Srdjan Vucetic’s arguments, as he happens to be the fifth and final of my reviewers. In an otherwise praiseful assessment of my argument, he makes a trio of fascinating substantive criticisms, which I take in ascending order of their importance (at least as I assess that importance). First comes the issue of what Gorman in his critique referred to as “reductionism.” Am I, wonders Vucetic, guilty of a category error, in making the referent object of ontological security an entity that is other than the state itself? In short, am I misapplying ontological security theory? He


11 See, respectively, Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); and Kori Schake, Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 29, where she concedes that there was a racial basis to the emerging Anglo-American “sense of sameness,” but then goes on to argue that Vucetic overstates his case, because he leaves out too many other, non-racial, components of this sameness, such as shared liberal-democratic political practices, similar imperial roles, and growing economic interdependence.
poses a tough question, to which I wish I had a ready response: “is the ontological security of the American state the same as that of the Hawthornians?” Had I argued that public opinion drove Wilson’s intervention decision, and that back in 1917 the Hawthornians still represented the majority of America’s ethnic stock (today they are only about 20 percent), then I perhaps could have attempted to trace the ‘necessary’ explanatory significance of the group’s ontological insecurity, and meld it into the country’s (or state’s), all with an eye to determining the intervention decision. The best defense I can muster here, however, is to revert to Burk’s comments, to the effect that I was positioning Hawthornianism as more of a permissive condition for something happening, rather than as a cause of its happening. In any event, I fail to see why, in logic, subnational groups cannot themselves be allowed to have concerns about their ontological security, or that such concerns cannot have foreign-policy implications.

Vucetic’s second criticism, also a good one, suggests that I may be too late in establishing the onset of the decline of the German “image” in the United States. Rather than dating that decline from the culture wars of the 1914-17 period, he wonders whether it might have been wiser for me to see the demise of the “good German” perspective as occurring a decade earlier, with the U.S. reaction during the second Venezuelan crisis of 1902-3? He notes, as indeed do I in my book, that the German image in America had been on a slow downward trajectory ever since the heyday of German-American friendship during the Civil War and immediate post-Civil War period. So perhaps, the supposition could be phrased, my invocation of the culture wars as dispositive needs to be qualified, and to be adjudged as, at best, merely epiphenomenal? Here my response would simply be to say that while Americans had been growing ever more ill-disposed toward German foreign policy behavior for some time, this did not make them more well-disposed to intervening in the European balance of power, against Germany. Everyone knows that when the war broke out in August 1914, most Americans who indicated they had a preference as to who should win, chose the Entente powers, not the Central Powers. Even Theodore Roosevelt, in deploring Germany, argued strongly for American neutrality. And as late as the November 1916 election, most Americans continued to profess a desire to stay out of the fighting, which is one reason why both presidential candidates emphasized their ability to keep the country out of war.

Something had to have happened to transform the American preference structure, so that what had been a non-permissive environment could be replaced by a permissive one. Most analysts would say events on the Western front and the high seas accomplished that trick. My claim is that events on the home front were no less significant, and may well have been even more important, in moving the needle away from demanding neutrality and toward permitting intervention.

Finally, we get back to Vucetic’s third criticism, which echoes remarks of Gorman and Schake. In addressing what he calls the “conceptual dance between ethnicity and ‘race,’” Vucetic makes plain his preference for the latter contested concept over mine for the former, equally contested, concept. It is not a bad criticism, but again, I fail to understand what cause is furthered by this violation of Ockham’s razor (i.e., the injunction that we abstain from trying to clarify one confusing category by invoking a second, equally confusing, category).

Consider that one of the most famous European sociologists, André Siegfried, could have written a book in the early years of the twentieth century, the English translation of which bore the title, The Race Question in Canada. Anyone coming across a tome carrying that title today would naturally assume the author must be approaching the question of ‘indigeneity’ in Canada’s society, or perhaps the equally familiar contemporary trope, the country’s ‘multiculturalism.’ But Siegfried was actually writing about relations between two emphatically and identically “white” groups of Canadians, who in the bargain were equally Euro-descended: English Canadians and French Canadians.12

However, it was more than an attempt to avoid confusion that stimulated me to frame my analysis in terms of ethnicity rather than of race. I also wanted to highlight the contemporary absurdity of so many among today’s American ‘alt-right’ enthusiasts, who couch the object of their desire in something they like to call ‘white nationalism.’ Invariably, this identity (if that is what it is) they hold to be synonymous with the country’s “Euro-American” identity. But the reality is that, from the

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perspective of America’s foreign policy, there has never been anything that could coherently be labelled ‘Euro-America.’ Moreover, if such a reification ever made any sense, its natural function was to sow division among, rather than encourage harmony between, the country’s ‘whites.’