

Contents

Introduction by Greg Donaghy, Historical Section, Global Affairs Canada ........................................... 2
Review by Stéphane Roussel, École nationale d’Administration publique, Montréal .................... 5
Review by Eric Tabuteau, Université Jean Moulin, Lyon ................................................................. 10
Review by Sandrine Tolazzi, Université Stendhal Grenoble 3, France ........................................... 16
Author’s Response by David Haglund, Queen’s University .............................................................. 20
since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, ethnic diasporas and their security implications have loomed large in popular and scholarly discussions of contemporary international relations. Unfortunately, those fraught and overwrought discussions have not always been particularly edifying. The frightening march of homegrown Islamic radicals through the streets of Boston, Paris, and even placid Ottawa has sparked nativist reactions in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, as well as persistent suspicions of ethnic dangers lurking just beyond the border. Since 9/11, wild speculation that jihadi terrorists targeting the U.S. are holed up in Canadian safe houses has driven Canadians to distraction, and encouraged the securitization of the Canada-U.S. border. For many analysts, this state of affairs is a novel and unique development, one likely to strain North American security relations. Political science professor David Haglund of Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario) thoroughly debunks this view in his most recent book, *Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-United States Security Community*, which grounds consideration of North American ethnic diasporas in their full historical setting.

*Ethnic Diasporas* is a compact and nicely organized work. It opens with three chapters where Haglund clearly lays out his main theoretical concepts, reflecting on the nature of Canada-U.S. security relations, the definition and evolution of the North American security community, and the impact of diasporas on international relations and foreign policy. These ideas are applied in three chapters providing historical case studies on the Irish-American, the German-American, and the Muslim communities in North America. Witty, literate, and sophisticated, *Ethnic Diasporas* judiciously weighs the influence of diasporas on Canada-U.S. relations before ultimately dismissing the notion that diasporas offer much of a threat to the established order. Indeed, their influence generally reinforces the ties that bind, what Haglund calls “the principle of the opposite effect” (227). In the enthusiastic words of reviewer Eric Tabuteau, *Ethnic Diasporas* provides a welcome “antidote to mass hallucination and collective amnesia.”

Haglund, who is almost as comfortable working in French as he is in English, has attracted a trio of francophone reviewers from France and Québec, who bring a European sensibility to their work. They appreciate depth and sophistication, and are uniformly keen about both qualities in *Ethnic Diasporas*. All three share Haglund’s enthusiasm for marshalling detailed historical case studies in the service of political science, and each applauds loudly when Haglund notes that “there really is not much that is completely new under the sun” (9). Our reviewers like Haglund’s offbeat humour and his quirky literary bent (though perhaps things have gone a touch too far when the author needs to justify his language in a footnote [130, note 56]).

The summary judgements of the three reviewers are uniformly positive. Tabuteau celebrates *Ethnic Diasporas* as “a dense, documented, and erudite analysis.” Sandrine Tolazzi calls the book “provocative and stimulating.” Stéphane Roussel describes Haglund’s work as “highly nuanced and convincing.”

But don’t be fooled. Lurking beneath this warm reception, there are questions and doubts about aspects of Haglund’s work. Some, of course, are simply the usual quibbles about emphasis and scope of coverage. Tabuteau, for instance, regrets Haglund’s failure to reflect on the “bunkerization” of the Canada-U.S. border since 9/11, and thinks that a few more words on the role of German-American subversion during the Second World War might have strengthened Haglund’s case study on the German-American diaspora. Similarly, Tolazzi argues that Haglund ought to have reflected more on representations of Canada-U.S. relations, a key element in definitions of Canadian identity. More importantly, Tolazzi draws sharp distinctions between the
broad-based nationalist radicalism of the Irish diaspora, and the nature of contemporary Islamic radicalism, which seems sharply divided. Perhaps, she implies, Haglund’s historical lessons are less apt than he thinks.

Certainly, Tabuteau and Roussel lean in this direction, at least on theoretical or conceptual grounds. Both offer a serious challenge to the way that Haglund has constructed his North American security community, where resort to military force has become unthinkable. In conceptualizing the security community, Haglund traces its foundation to 1937, when the U.S. military finally abandoned its war planning against Canada. (Canada had stopped planning for war against the United States just a few years earlier.) That date conveniently allows Haglund to explore how both the German-American and the Irish-American community may have hindered and/or hastened the emergence of the security community. But 1937 is a controversial date. Could it not be earlier?, ask Tabuteau and Roussel. Perhaps, suggests Tabuteau, even as far back as 1814, when the last real war between the two countries ended. Or August 1914, proposes Roussel, when Canada sent all its military forces to Europe without fear of U.S. invasion. These are not mere quibbles, but strike at the very heart of Haglund’s purposes, as Roussel in particular notes. It is an argument best left to the principals.

Participants:

**David G. Haglund** is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario). His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on Canadian and American international security policy. His most recent book, entitled *Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-US Security Community: From the Civil War to Today*, was published in 2015.


**Stéphane Roussel** is Professor at *École nationale d’administration publique* (ENAP) in Montreal, Canada. He is the Director of the *Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec* (CIRRICQ). From 2002 to 2012, he was Professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) where he held the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy. He graduated from Université de Montréal (Ph.D., 1999). Professor Roussel was president of the ISA-Canada section in 2004-2005 and served as president of the *Société Québécoise de Science Politique* (SQSP) in 2010-2011. He works regularly with the Canadian Armed Forces, including at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), Toronto. His latest book is *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (McGill Queen’s University Press, 2015, 4th ed.). He is currently working on research projects such as “Neoconservatism in Canadian Foreign Policy and “Diasporas, Election and Foreign Policy.”

**Eric Tabuteau** received his Ph.D. in English studies from the University of Burgundy in Dijon (France). He is currently Associate Professor of Applied English Language Studies at Jean Moulin University in Lyon where he mainly teaches North American Civilization. He has co-edited *A Safe and Secure Canada: Politique et

Sandrine Tolazzi is Associate Professor at the University of Grenoble, France, where she teaches Canadian studies in the Department of Modern Languages, and is a member of the Institute of European, American, African, Asian, and Australian Languages and Cultures (ILCEA4). She is the head of Grenoble’s interdisciplinary Centre for Canadian Studies, and sits as an elected member of the administrative board of the French Association for Canadian Studies (AFEC).
David G. Haglund ranks among the most prolific authors on Canadian security issues. He established his name as a leading figure of the Canadian “atlantist” school, i.e. scholars who investigate the historical, strategic and economic links between Canada and Europe, and stressing their importance for the former. But Haglund is also well known for his works on U.S. foreign policy and Canada-United States security relations. Over the past ten years, his publications have focused largely on these last two areas. While Ethnic Diasporas cannot, properly speaking, be viewed as the wrap-up of a long research program (many other dimensions of the topic that the author addressed elsewhere are not present in this book, as we shall see later), it appears to be the product of a deep investigation on a very specific topic.

The central purpose of this book is to assess if ‘diasporas’ established in the United States or Canada had an impact on the two nations’ security relations. More precisely, Haglund’s main argument is that the activities of diasporas delayed the establishment of the ‘North American security community.’ The book is divided into six chapters, the first three dealing with concepts and theory, while the others are devoted to three case studies. The first chapter explores the historical background of North American security, recalling that far from being the reign of peace as we know it today, the continent had a particularly violent history until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Chapter Two addresses the transformation of North America from a Hobbesian to a Kantian regional system, where war gradually disappeared as a means to solve conflicts within the American-British-Canadian triangle. The disappearance of the idea that force could be used to solve bilateral dispute (in 1937, according to Haglund) marked the emergence of the ‘North American pluralistic security community.’ Chapter Three discusses the concept of diasporas and the various hypotheses proposed to measure and explain diasporas’ impact, through their electoral weight and their lobbying campaigns, on regional security and on U.S. foreign policy, among other factors. Chapter Four, Five, and Six are case studies, respectively devoted to the Irish-American community, the German-American community, and the North American Muslim one.

While the independent variable is the evolution of the North American security community, this book essentially focuses on American foreign policy, since two of the three diasporas (Irish and German) under study were primarily located in the U.S. Readers looking for a Canadian perspective may be disappointed. But it must be recalled that Haglund has published extensively on the North American security community or on the various dimensions of diasporas’ impact on Canadian foreign and security policy, particularly in regards to the U.S.

The focus on the American perspective is, partly, due to a problem that haunts not only this book, but all works on Canada-U.S. relations before the Second World War, including those by the present reviewer. This problem is the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of distinguishing Canada from the British Empire. Canada

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gradually acquired the status of a fully independent state during the interwar years (with the date of 6 December 1931 as a marker, when the Statute of Westminster was proclaimed), a process that was completed, at least in the eyes of the U.S. government, during the Second World War. This makes the dependent variable, the evolution of the North American security community, much more difficult to measure, because until Canada’s full independence, the security community uniting Canada and the United States could simply be viewed as extension of the peace between London and Washington.

For those familiar with the ‘Haglundian style,’ this book is certainly exemplary: rich vocabulary, long and nuanced sentences, ability to summon and quote forgotten authors, digging out obscure historical facts to illustrate different points (as the fascinating saga of German Luftwaffe pilot Franz Von Werra, who escaped from a Canadian prisoner camp to enter in the U.S. in 1941), and challenging common wisdoms. The result is neither a dry, purely logical and theory driven exposé, nor a purely factual demonstration, but (to use words that this reviewer already used to describe another of Haglund’s works\(^3\)) an impressionist painting, in which a global image emerges from a carefully dosed mix of conceptual discussions and historical narratives. The result is a highly nuanced and convincing argument, despite some questions that it may raise.

This book is also exemplary of ‘Haglund’s style’ in the way it puts history into the service of political science. One of the common features of many of Haglund’s works is the (implicit) principle stating that ‘there is nothing new under the sun.’ According to that principle, contemporary events are rarely without precedent, and studying the past can inform us about contemporary events. History is then a laboratory to test political science theories and hypotheses.

Haglund’s research about diasporas’ influence over North American security can be traced in the months following 9/11, when there was deep suspicion among the U.S élite (including then Senator Hillary Clinton) and American public opinion that the terrorists had come from Canada – a claim that was proven to be completely false. The attacks had so deep an effect on trans-border traffic (especially on the very dense bilateral trade) that many commenters described the situation in which the Canada-U.S. relations were plunged as ‘completely new’ and ‘totally unprecedented.’ Haglund’s research program tends to demonstrate the opposite, and proves that we can get a better understanding of the impact of event such as 9/11 by digging in the past.

What do we learn from this research? First, diasporas may have an influence on global and regional security, but not necessarily a direct one nor the one they intende. One of the central conclusions is that Irish- and German-American activism delayed the emergence of the ‘North American Security community’ until 1937, as well as the alliance that emerged during the Second World War. Another conclusion is that the activism of the North American Islamic diaspora is unlikely to have a comparable effect on the well-established security community. Far from dividing the two states, the mid- and long-term effects of 9/11 and other actions conducted by homegrown radical Islamists reinforced the links between Washington and Ottawa. Finally, Haglund concludes by underlining the usefulness of diasporas’ activism as a heuristic variable, not as a direct independent variable, but a very important part of the context in which foreign and security policy decision-

making takes place. Those who are expecting a straightforward conclusion about the role and impact of the diasporas may be disappointed, since the book ends with very nuanced lessons.

Being myself a fan of the Haglund’s use of history (as well as his writing form), I will not address the foundation of the methodology. Nevertheless, there are some questions that could be raised. One of them is the conclusion about the impact of the contemporary Islamic-North American diaspora, which seems to be very different than the impact of the two other diasporas. This is not really surprising, considering that almost a century separates the latest from the former. Actually, one of the main differences between the case studies is that the first two focus on an era that, according to Haglund’s chronology, pre-dates the emergence of the North American security community, while the third one takes place long after the emergence of that institution. This makes the comparison more difficult to conduct.

This difference between case studies can be bypassed by a different interpretation of history, but at the risk of opening another gap in the line of argument. In fact, one can question what could at the first glance appear to be a minor point in the book, which is the vexing question of chronology. Haglund certainly understands the importance of that point, which may appear to be a byzantine debate of fuzzy concepts between amateurs. The question is when, exactly, the North American security community emerged? It is a difficult question, since a security community is neither a natural, material object, nor a formal institution bearing a signature date. In its very essence, it is a subjective notion based on the actors’ perceptions. A security community exists when relevant actors cease to believe that force can be used among their state and another one.

Haglund is certainly aware of the importance of that deceiving “minor point”, since he devotes thirteen pages to the issue (49-62). He concludes that 1937 is “the latest moment by which we can date the establishment of the continental security community” (61-62), that is the moment when the U.S. military declared that its war plans against Canada were obsolete and would not be replaced by new ones. This position may look reasonable, since it is based on an obvious and relevant observation. Nevertheless, this is maybe a too prudent, if not conservative, position, and the careful phrasing indicates that Haglund is also aware of that. As he writes, “common sense might dictate that the beginning of this new security dispensation in North America must have been earlier” (62). Actually, one might argue that signs that the security community was well embedded in the mind of many key actors can be found long before 1937. For example, Sean Shore notes that the very fact that Canada sent the bulk of its troops overseas during the First World War indicates that Canadian leaders were confident enough that the United States would not seize the opportunity to invade the country.4 Another study, conducted by Manuel Dorion-Soulié and this reviewer,5 shows that in 1914, at the time of the celebrations of the hundredth anniversary of the end of the war of 1812 and a century of peaceful relations between the two countries, many among the Canadian élites believed that the peace was an expression of the triumph of reason and were expecting that would last forever.


5 Manuel Dorion-Soulié and Stéphane Roussel, “Réinterprétation de l’histoire militaire et redéfinition de l’identité nationale : les commémorations de la guerre de 1812 au Canada”, Études internationales 44:3 (September 2013): 387-408.
Changing the moment when the security community emerged from 1937 to an earlier date (somewhere between the ‘great rapprochement’ between the British Empire and the U.S. in the second half of the 1890s and 1914) could have a significant impact on this line of argument. On one hand, it means that the three case studies are easier to compare, since all take place in the context of an established, or partly established, security community. This would have led to a different argument, which is not about the impact of diasporas on regional security, but instead how a security community could be a constraint or a limitation on diasporas’ activism. Such an angle would probably lead to the same conclusion, which is that diasporas have a limited impact once a security community is established. As far as this reviewer knows, such effect of a security community has never been considered in the literature on this topic.

Moving the date of the establishment of the North American security community would have a second consequence on one of the central hypothesis of the book, which is that “diaspora-rooted political activism was an important factor, among other factors, delaying the establishment of the continental security community” (49). If one accepts the ‘assumption’ (because it cannot be considered a fact) that the security community already existed during the First World War (if not before), then the ‘delaying effect’ was less significant.

This would leave us with a subsidiary question, which is the relationship between ‘diasporas’ and ‘alliances,’ and the relation between the later and a ‘security community.’ If, contrary to what Haglund claims, diasporas did not seriously delay the emergence of the North American security community, did they delay the establishment of an alliance between the British Empire and the United States, or between the later and Canada? The answer is unclear, again deriving from another problem with the chronology: this alliance, at least in its temporary form in 1917-1919, was created at the moment when the Irish- and German-American diasporas were reputedly losing their influence. At first glance, it seems to reinforce the argument of the influence of these two diasporas, since one can say that the alliance became a reality only when they lost their grip on the issue. But it is not so simple. Since the main objective of the Irish and German diasporas was to prevent the U.S. from joining the British side during the Great War, this failure, in itself, is a marker of their decline as a relevant political force in the United States. In this context, the causal chain is unclear: is it the decline of the influence of the two diasporas that allowed the conclusion of the alliance, or did the alliance simply reveal that these diasporas already lost their influence, if they ever had one?

The question as to whether the Anglo-American (and Canado-American) alliance delayed by the diasporas’ activism is an issue only if we assume that a security community leads necessarily to an alliance between its members -- otherwise, there is no reason to expect the U.S. and the British Empire to have allied before the First World War, and therefore to conclude that this ‘delay’ was caused by diasporas’ activism. This is an old bone of contention between Haglund and this reviewer. Neither of us believe that it is the case. But according to the Haglund, this is what the constructivist theory of the “liberal security community” (as expressed by our colleague Thomas Risse6) predicts, while this reviewer disagrees with this interpretation. If, like this reviewer believes, theory does not predict that a security community leads inevitably to an alliance, then the fact that the U.S. and the British Empire did not enter an alliance before 1917 (or even a permanent alliance in 1949) is not an anomaly that deserves an explanation.

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That discussion does not put into question the quality and the importance of Haglund’s works on diasporas. Quite the opposite, in fact. This book remains one of the most original and valuable works of research on Canada-U.S. relations published over the last decade. Almost fifteen years after 9/11, and in the context of a perpetual concern about terrorism in North America, political leaders, practitioners of security, and social-science researchers are still trying to understand the recent evolution of the continental security issues. In this context, Haglund’s book is the best contribution on what we can learn from History to understand contemporary events.
“History will teach us nothing” claimed a celebrated 1980s pop singer who argued that he would not learn anything useful from this subject at school. While scholars undoubtedly and justifiably scorn snap judgements of that kind, they are also aware that such easy aphorisms have unfortunately become commonplace in many a contemporary writing, and that, in this respect, studies devoted to North America are not spared, not even those that concentrate on as specific a subject as the North American community. That type of approach is a far cry from David Haglund’s latest publication, *Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-United States Security Community*, which functions as an antidote to mass hallucination and collective amnesia. Professor Haglund is a political scientist by training, not a historian, but he makes it clear from the very first pages that his book takes history seriously (8), a claim that is corroborated by the subtitle he has chosen, *From the Civil War to Today*. And the least one can say is that his work illustrates French Historian Marc Bloch’s worry that “it is necessary to be fully aware of the past to understand the present, but knowing current events also permits us to better grasp the past.” That point is forcibly made in the introduction when the academic contends that “both the United States and Canada have been nothing if not the product of demographic fluxes that started four centuries ago” (3), and when he mentions James A. Macdonald’s early twentieth century “North American Idea” (4), an allusion which can perhaps be interpreted as a “re-contextualization” of Robert Pastor’s recent vision of a continental future, bearing in mind that contextualizing has its limitations, as Haglund rightly underscores (8).

Since the book focuses on both ethnic diasporas and the Canada-U.S. security community, one is not surprised to find that the first chapter is largely devoted to an assessment of the two countries’ common frontier, borderlands often being zones of friction, even when they are located within security communities, as the recent events taking place along the French-Italian border have shown. What is maybe more unexpected is to read Haglund’s timely reminder that the still-common vision of the international line that separates Canada and the United States, viz. “the longest undefended border in the world” – although considerably beefed up after 9/11, is not the inheritance of an idyllic North American peaceful and distant past (28), but a fairly recent creation which is not self-evident. Undeniably, in the course of the twentieth century and until the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, pictures of a closed, militarized border between the two

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2. *Too Close for Comfort: Canada’s Future Within Fortress North America*, published by Canadian activist Maud Barlow ten years ago (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005), would be a case in point, as the 300 page opus deals out what its author considers to be truths – notably on North American security. However, her assertions are hardly ever backed by bibliographical references.


countries would only belong to speculative fiction, and Canadians as well as Americans were accustomed to seeing border guards at some rural checkpoints on the 49th parallel simply placing orange cones in the roadway before going home for the evening. However, this popular imagery says nothing of the date when one could reliably consider that the Canada-U.S. borderline had ceased to be a buffer. One therefore understands the scholar’s concern to tell facts from myths and to challenge widespread received ideas – the long frontier, guarded only by neighbourly respect and honourable obligation, would be a manifestation of North American DNA – by relying on hard data such as times of tensions between the two nations to establish the precise birth date of the open border (29). Yet, one may regret that the author mostly focused on the history of the frontier prior to 9/11 and does not really say whether its recent smartifying, nay partial bunkerization, has meant – or not – a sea change in the way North Americans view the line that bisects their continent, maybe feeling that their *lebensraum* has transformed from a zone of peace to a zone of war.

It is true that part of the answer is given in the following chapter, which is devoted to defining what a security community is, and explaining how and when North America became one such entity – and still is. Here again, Haglund goes against the grain as he refutes the generally accepted idea that the inception of this community dates back to the end of the War of 1812 and the signature of the Treaty of Ghent two years later (49), justifying his stance by the series of incidents that had set Britain – and therefore its North American Dominion of Canada – against the United States and resulted in relative hostility. Several dates are given and justified, but the author’s preference goes for 1937 (61), which entails that the North American security community is a fairly younger creation than its long-standing reputation as a zone of peace would have the general public believe. As a consequence, and not without a tinge of suspense, this is also the occasion for Haglund to remind the reader that, contrary to what might be expected, the first pluralistic security community actually happened to come to life not in the New World, but in Scandinavia, a decade before the North American endeavour (62). Beyond the historical accuracy reaffirmed here, what requires attention is the motive given by the author for determining the date when those security communities emerged, viz. not the end of all kinds of conflicts proper, but at the the abandonment of war-planning activities. And the question that arises is whether it is not excessive to expect that nations have to cease to work on possible conflict scenarios – bearing in mind that *si vis pacem para bellum* – to be convinced of their wish to establish a lasting security cooperation. Advocating such a stringent criterion is reminiscent of Philip K. Dick’s short story “The Minority Report” where potential offenders – i.e. potential innocents – are arrested prior to any infliction of public harm – i.e. before anything happens, validating Heinrich Heine’s claim that “thought

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6 As, for example, in Margaret Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale* (London: Vintage, 1996 [1985]).


Reasoning by analogy, is it justified to take such war-planning activities at face value, or is it possible to consider that they are just innocuous speculations – unless they maybe go awry, as everyone knows that even the oldest allies do not trust each other – as Wikileaks has now long reported without triggering the collapse of established security communities? Of course, that would entail that the birth of the North American security community could then be deemed to have taken place in 1814, on the condition that one forgets some regrettable incidents (52), which, though indisputable, nonetheless did not manage to challenge the Canadian-American relationship, and only resulted in bouts of *mésentente cordiale*.

The final chapter in the first section of the book tackles the other component of the title, i.e. ethnic diasporas and notably the role they could play in the fluctuating relationships between Canada and the United-States, or, in less diplomatic parlance, in the weakening of the North American security community. The choice made by the author to concentrate on Irish, German, and Muslim diasporas as population elements that have, at some point or other, endangered the North American security community is apt and will be extensively supported by multiple examples in the second section of the book. Yet, Haglund explains why other diasporas have been excluded from his study, starting with the numerous Latino population that an inattentive reader might have expected to be taken into consideration. (80-81) Demonstrating his mastery over the subject matter, the author provides ample justification for this decision while one only element would have sufficed to exonerate his choice, viz. the Latino community is almost exclusively located in the United States, and thus has hardly any impact on the whole North American security community. The chapter is also an occasion for Haglund to indulge in one of his talents, i.e. revisiting established thought that hardly anyone would consider questioning. His target is now Harvard Scholar Samuel Huntington, whose views on the impact of ethnic interest groups on American foreign policy comes under scrutiny. The author does not reject his conclusions, but examines them in a historical perspective that leads him to assert that the weight given to Huntington’s forebodings was perhaps excessive, as the study of American history – and particularly the second half of the nineteenth century – showed that they did not bring anything new (87-89). Moreover, although Haglund acknowledges that ethnic groups did resort to lobbying to influence the foreign policy which could have an impact on their homeland, he underlines that its efficacy is still debated by many academics today, and he is right in questioning whether raising the spectre of the ethnic vote was more often perceived as a means to move domestic rather than foreign policy issues to the forefront. (98-99) He finally takes advantage of these clarifications to broach the subject of multiculturalism – a major concept linked to diasporas – noting that the term is assuredly a contemporary creation and object of study, yet adding that historians know that the multi-ethnic situation it refers to is as old as the colonization of the North American continent (89-90), which may make it lose its progressive connotation.

After theorizing about borders, community securities and diasporas, Haglund proceeds in the second part of his work to develop three case studies that propose a minute analysis of the security implications generated by the three ethnic groups he has selected, starting with the Irish, continuing with the Germans, and ending with the Muslims to turn to the thorny problem of jihadism. The fourth chapter is a fascinating dive into the history of the triangular relationship between Ireland, Britain and, because of the weight of the Irish diaspora, the United States. The author gives indeed a detailed account of the role played by Irish Americans in the progress towards the independence of the Emerald Isle. But beyond the erudite study, he interestingly shows

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to what extent the crises that shook the British Isles were continuously exported to the New World and restaged by Irish American nationalists. Yet, he insists that the latter were far from being mimic men trying to reproduce in North America, and to a lesser scale, a duplicate of the original conflict, for example by targeting British interests in the neighbouring dominion – which they actually did with relative success (119-120). The point is well made as inexperienced observers could be tempted to construe Irish diasporic activism as an umpteenth colonial offshoot of a European conflict, just as in the eighteenth-century the Seven Years’ War waged in Europe had its North American extension known as the French and Indian War.11 But given the size of the Irish American diaspora which at times weighed more in terms of individuals than the island from which it originated (126-127), Irish Americans could hope to play a different score, which they did by interfering somehow in the course of World War I and supporting American isolationism to the detriment of British interests (118-119). However, the aptness of Haglund’s analyses does not limit itself to deciphering the past but, as already noted, to connect it with the present. Undoubtedly topical is his remark that the United States in the immediate post-Civil War period looked to Canadian policy makers not so unlike the way that Waziristan has recently appeared to Americans and their NATO allies: a safe haven from which attacks could be mounted with relative impunity (131-132.) Although it is clear that establishing such a connection will not result in practical solutions aimed at eliminating terrorism, it is wise to remember that learning from past mistakes is standard strategy to avoid their repetition in the present.12 In this respect, the lesson conveyed by Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-United States Security Community could be that ‘history will teach (the) US something.’

The next chapter is dedicated to the destabilizing role of another European diaspora and its putative negative impact on North American security. It takes the reader to the beginning of the twentieth century and the eve of the First World War to study German American activism aimed at thwarting the United States’ participation in WWI, although Haglund’s meticulousness leads him to narrate events from the previous century –namely America’s satisfaction at Prussia’s victory in the 1870 war against France (167-168) – to shed light on the German community’s leverage power to bend the U.S. government’s decision in its favour. However, the author’s focus is not simply on the potential neutrality of a Behemoth where 90 percent of the German diaspora lives, but on the latter’s wish to intervene somehow in the conflict, maybe by exacerbating tensions between the allied Anglo-Saxon nations (162-163). Although the disclosing of plans to invade Canada by means of half a million German ‘reservists’ residing in the United States may, with hindsight, seem extravagant to the contemporary observer (158-159), one must nevertheless reckon that the First World War did not lack astonishing episodes that eventually altered the power relations between the belligerents, starting with the Zimmermann telegram affair that involved a German intrusion in Pan-American matters.13 Thus, Haglund’s constant concern to contextualize hits home again, just as when he tarries on both Irish and German Americans’ obsession with delaying U.S. entry into WWI, pinpointing that their common goal did not imply that they had mutual sympathy or that they admired each other, thereby underlying that their


13 See, for example, Thomas Boghardt, The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012).
The sixth chapter is probably the one that a majority of readers who have been attracted by the title of the book are impatient to discover, as it deals with the contemporary issue of homegrown terrorism and its repercussions on North American security. However, as they start to familiarize themselves with the four sections dedicated to the Muslim diaspora and jidahism, they have already garnered sufficient information on the role played by ethnic diasporas in the course of North American history to put into perspective many a banality conveyed by common media sources, and they must revel in Haglund’s thorough and critical analysis. While some of the information given is unlikely to encounter any opposition as it has already been widely acknowledged, as for instance the reminder that Canada’s tough response to terrorism after 9/11 was prompted more by anxiety about the U.S. than about the jihadists (205), the author’s remark that Muslim North Americans have something in common in common with both the Irish Americans and the German Americans, in the sense that they are not to be trusted as loyal Americans or Canadians, is of particular relevance (213). At a time when the world community seeks to eradicate the scourge of terrorism, it is indeed necessary to insist that no such policy will ever be successful unless it can count on the involvement of the Muslim community, whether it be in North America or anywhere else. In the same vein, the lines devoted to the expressions ‘islamofascism’ and ‘fifth columnists’ that have become common currency to describe Salafist jihadism are usefully contextualized and help to denounce dangerous distortions (212). Resorting to historical precision is an infallible method for Haglund to put into perspective popular misconceptions that die hard, like the supposed Canadian negligence in dealing with potential terrorists, as the Ahmed Ressam case has long exemplified (223). The chapter provides a complete overview of preconceived ideas that have characterized the contemporary debate on Islamism and the author excels in debunking them one of the best examples of such preconceptions being that of jihadism which is, security-wise, supposedly driving a wedge between the two North American neighbours (203), while it seems that Islamists have on the contrary succeeded in bringing them closer together (227).

While, in the above-mentioned example, Haglund’s reading of current events leads to a more optimistic vision than the one commonly held, it is not always so, notably in the conclusion of the book. It does indeed


15 “Soon after the [9/11] attacks, reports surfaced that as many as five of the terrorists entered the United States from Canada, as had Ahmed Ressam, an al-Qaeda terrorist caught at the border in 1999 with a Canadian passport and explosives to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport. These reports were quickly found to be erroneous, but the impression that Canada was a terrorist haven lingered.” Kent Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 5.
convey a note of pessimism that emerges from the comparison between traditional diasporic activism – Irish or German for that matter – and jihadism whose objectives differ totally. Just as Irish activism disappeared with the creation of the Irish Free State, German activism vanished almost instantaneously when the U.S. entered the war; but that is a far cry from jihadism, which is disconnected from traditional political or territorial claims, and it is therefore difficult to capitalize on its eradication in the near future (245). However, that note of pessimism is counterbalanced by the fact that the fight against terrorism has strengthened the security community in North America more than it has weakened it, what the author best sums up as “the principle of the opposite effect” (227).

Those are the few reflections that reading Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-United States Security Community: From the Civil War to Today inspired in me. I am aware that there are be many more aspects to cover as this book proposes nothing less than encyclopaedic knowledge on the subject. That is why, as V.S. Naipaul once wrote, it is useful to remember that “because we read, really, to find out what we already know, we can take a writer’s virtues for granted. And his originality, the news he is offering us, can go over our heads.” It nevertheless remains that David Haglund’s opus offers a dense, documented, and erudite analysis of the challenges that the North American security community has faced and will continue to face, and I am confident that it will be well received by historians, political scientists, and all scholars who take an interest in the study of ethnic diasporas and security communities.

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Although David Haglund has acquired a solid reputation among international relations experts for his work on American and Canadian foreign policy as well as transatlantic relations, French scholars in the interdisciplinary field of Canadian studies have mostly focused on his analysis of Canada-United States relations, inviting him more particularly to look into their evolution after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I have personally enjoyed his account of the long-term implications of border reinforcement for the North American security community, and this not least because the parallel he made between two affairs that occurred at a 50-year interval helped shed new light on the post-9/11 American narrative of Canada being unable to protect U.S. interests. The use of comparative historical analysis again in this book to discuss what may seem like a security threat inherently related to our contemporary geopolitical context is perhaps the most important – and certainly the most original – contribution Haglund makes to current discussions on the Canada-United States security community. Taking as a starting point the growing concerns of the U.S. Homeland Security Committee that the Muslim diaspora might undermine American interests, his reflection opens up into a larger questioning over the influence of ethnic diasporas on foreign policy. Hence, he first questions the significance of the Canada-United States border, the establishment of a security community, and the practice of “ethnic lobbying” before discussing in detail the impact of the Irish diaspora, the German diaspora, and the Muslim diaspora on the North American security community over a period ranging from the end of the Civil War to the present time.

Finding points of comparison between these three diasporas while focusing on different periods of time appears at first glance to be a perilous exercise. Seeing further analogies between the story of a German prisoner of war bound for Canada and the post-9/11 security dilemma (25), or between an Irish American sent to life imprisonment at the Kingston penitentiary in the 1900s and a Muslim Canadian held at the infamous offshore prison of Guantanamo a century later (241) also requires a good stretch of the mind. And comparing the United States to the tribal area of Waziristan, a region administered by Pakistan (130), might seem totally unwarranted. Yet, Haglund succeeds in giving meaning to these analogies where others may have failed thanks to a very careful, if not ‘scientific,’ use of methodology. His epistemological approach relies on the works of a variety of scholars for the definition of every concept that he uses, such as the notion of a “security community” (4) or the idea of “diaspora,” which is still the source of many disagreements (80). Similarly, he seems to be making a point in presenting the scholarly debates on every issue he brings to the fore while refraining, in most cases, from taking a position, and nevertheless making sure that these debates are framed in the context of identifiable schools of thought or theoretical developments. An example of this would be his discussion on the emergence of a new paradigm in international relations known as “social constructivism” and its consequences on debates about foreign policy (87-88).

This need to provide a firm background to further discussions about the impact of the three different ethnic diasporas on the North American security community explains why the first half of the book is concerned about theoretical debates on the study of demography in relation to international security, on border theory, on security communities, or on the impact of ethnicity on security. Theorizing here is done with the aim of deconstructing specific representations, such as the idea that the War of 1812 was the last conflict between

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Canada and the United States (35), or the belief that the connection between ethnic diasporic activism and international security is a recent phenomenon (78). This book is of particular interest to students of international relations theory precisely because it takes very concrete events—Republican Congressman King’s criticism of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (vii-viii) or the 2002 broadcast of the CBS 60 Minutes television show depicting Canada as a safe haven for terrorists (17) — as starting points for theorizing. But most of all, in a post-9/11 world where it may seem like new paradigms have emerged in the field of international relations, Haglund’s theoretical discussions and analogies serve to show that many of the current debates about the impact of ethnic diasporas on security are anything but new.

An issue that is raised on several occasions and may be of particular interest to cultural studies concerns the representations of the Canada-United States relationship, which Haglund puts again in perspective. Thus, he shows that the worries expressed by the United States about Canada’s ability to ensure border security after 9/11 did not differ so much from Ottawa’s criticism of Washington’s lack of responsiveness in the face of actions carried out by Irish extremists living in the United States against Canada or Britain during the late 1860s and after (139). He also unveils how depictions by Irish Americans of the Canadian government as being oppressive and obsessed with homeland security at the time of these attacks may echo the more recent criticism of the United States and its incarcerated practices (142). This topic may have deserved even more consideration – thought it could be the focus of another book altogether – as Canada’s representations of a national identity tend to have been constructed in opposition to the United States, and its narrative of nation-building centres around the need to escape from its neighbour’s domination.2 By showing how even values that are closely associated with one country – such as multiculturalism with Canada – can actually be of more relevance to the other, (90) Haglund in fact raises questions as to the ways issues of national identity and the Canada-United States relationship articulate.

The author does not lay himself open to much criticism, for he has ensured that the analogies he makes between the three diasporas under study do not obliterate significant distinctions, such as the lack of collective self-understanding, nationalism, and political activism among the German Americans that did exist among the Irish Americans before the independence of Ireland (166), or the good social standing these German Americans enjoyed towards the end of the nineteenth century, at a time when racial theories praised their qualities (175). Muslim North Americans, though they are described as “having something in common with both the Irish Americans (the shared experience of the homegrowns) and the German Americans (the suspicion that [...] they are not to be trusted as loyal Americans or Canadians)” (212), are also identified as different from the other two diasporas in many respects. Though they are influential in both Canada and the United States and not only the latter, their numbers are nothing compared to the other two diasporas (216), they are not attached to any “ancestral homeland” (213), and the actions undertaken by non-state actors are not supported by the majority within this diaspora, which seems to be much more divided that the other two.

It might be in this description of the Muslim diaspora and the interpretation of its actions that we could find, in the end, some controversial elements. Reflections on the importance of the size of the diaspora, for example, can be questioned, especially given the importance of ethnic identity in democratic liberal countries

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such as Canada or the United States. Similarly, the statement that “diasporas whose identity is mainly predicated upon religious sentiments will not be as effective in promoting a coherent agenda as are those that have the lure of an established or imagined homeland to give shape and energy to their strivings” (214) must be approached with caution. Indeed, despite its small size but thanks to the institutional means it has developed to pursue its group interests, the Muslim diaspora almost succeeded in incorporating aspects of the Sharia into the Canadian judicial system by claiming their right to use the Arbitration Act to settle family disputes through religious tribunals in 2003. Although this failed because of strong opposition from both non-Muslim and some Muslim Canadians – especially the Canadian Council of Muslim Women who thought this would put women at a disadvantage – this shows the potential influence of the diaspora on public policy. And thought it does attest to divisions within this diaspora, the latter do not seem to be related to the absence of a common “homeland” but to perceptions about religion. What might be agreed upon is that in the absence of a common “homeland,” it might be hard for this diaspora to rally around a specific agenda in the field of foreign policy.

A recent phenomenon also raises questions related to the activities of non-state actors among the North American Muslim diaspora, which Haglund relates to the filibustering expeditions of the Fenians (202). In the past few years, people who do not belong to this Muslim diaspora have converted to Islam and volunteered to join the jihad. This phenomenon, which is growing among young Western Europeans for whom conversion to Islam already signals a deep malaise and thus a passageway into radical Islam, is also present in the United States and Canada where vulnerable individuals heed the calls of Islamic extremism in order to get a sense of direction. It leads to the conclusion that the “new Fenianism” (202) Haglund sees in the activities conducted by radical Islamists starting from the 1990s has evolved into homegrown terrorism that does not exclusively stem from the Muslim diaspora. Considering that terrorist activities within Muslim countries themselves also constitute a threat to North American interests, the argument that non-state armed actors (as opposed to lobbies) of the Muslim diaspora may influence discussions related to the Canadian-American security community has to be refined. And given the diasporic leadership’s opposition to Salafist jihadism in Western countries, one might be tempted to think that the latter cannot be studied in relation to the Muslim diaspora the same way Fenianism was studied in relation to the Irish diaspora. In other words, the distinction between the Muslim diaspora and Salafist jihadism needs to be highlighted even more strongly, because while the former’s activism cannot be said to have much influence over the North American security community, as Haglund seems to imply in his conclusion (244), the latter does represent an important threat which has had a great impact on the evolution of Canada-United States relations over the past twenty years.

Apart from these few elements that form an interesting basis for discussion, Haglund has already envisaged every argument and counter-argument that may emerge along his demonstration and managed in general to give substance to different approaches by calling on many political theorists. This might be unsettling to readers who are used to scholars clearly adhering to one school of thought or theory or strongly defending their point, discarding any argument that may run counter to their thesis. However, it is also refreshing to see a well-established specialist in his field approach his topic with so much academic conscientiousness. Moreover, Haglund does not hesitate, at the same time, to refute many presumptions or open new perspectives, such as when he runs the risk of describing the English and French wars in North America between 1689 and 1763 as “ethnic conflicts” resulting in “ethnic cleansing” (29), or when he strives to

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pinpoint the exact date from which we can talk about a “security community” between Canada and the United States (60). He successfully manages to demonstrate that the fears of leading academics Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Samuel Huntington about the influence of ethnic groups on American policy have been exaggerated (91). Finally, the theory of the “opposite effect,” which he introduces to suggest that the opposition of the Irish-Americans and German-Americans to a strong North American security community may have actually hastened the formation thereof, or that home-grown terrorism may have brought Canada and the United States together rather than driving them apart, also opens up new perspectives on the influence of ethnic diasporas on the North American security community. This theory, as Haglund notes, could be further developed in another volume, which we will hopefully be reading in the future. In the meantime, I would like to thank the author personally for this provocative and stimulating book and for the impressive amount of research that lies behind it.
I must start by expressing my gratitude to the three reviewers for taking the time and trouble to read and then to assess so thoughtfully, from their various disciplinary perspectives, the argument of my book. I also appreciate their kind words. Most of all, I am happy that they accompanied their praise with a healthy serving of well-aimed criticism, for their sharp and insightful observations on matters where they and I disagree leads me to refine, and in some cases re-think, certain of my assumptions. In short, I have learned from this exchange, and for that I am in their debt.

In what follows, I will attempt to respond not to each reviewer individually and in sequence, but to address clusters of major points that have been addressed by all three of them in the respective critiques. I break down my response into four categories. First, I discuss the epistemological approach that I adopted when researching and writing the book, saying what I think is helpful about it but also acknowledging some of its demerits, including those revealed in the reviews. Second, I address both the symbolism of border-management regimes and the impact of changing circumstances upon one’s empirical and normative perspective on these structures, and in this regard I am especially well served by having as two of my reviewers French academics, for over the past two years the French (and broader European) debate on the meaning of borders has taken a turn that I certainly did not foresee at the time I was writing my book in 2014. Third, I address a puzzle that may only be baffling to a very small number of people, but fortunately some of this tiny group happen to be among my book’s reviewers, and my response gives me the chance to offer further perspectives on what I hope is not an exercise in scholasticism, namely the connection between security communities and alliances. Finally, I turn to the policy implications that might be derived from the book’s core thesis, for if there truly is nothing new under the sun, as I pretend in its pages, then presumably some knowledge might be gleaned about the future of the diaspora/security nexus from what we think we know about its past.

All three reviewers do well to remark upon my comparative-historical focus. Eric Tabuteau invokes the great French historian Marc Bloch to make the excellent point that historical analysis is always a two-way street; for what we assume to be true of the present depends in no small measure upon what we believe we know about the past, but by the same token, how we come to grips with present-day realities has a way of shaping our understanding of the past. I suppose that my book serves in both capacities – after all, maybe calling post-Civil War America Canada’s Waziristan, and zeroing in on Brooklyn, New York, as its Swat Valley, does summon forth the present to help us better comprehend the past, if for no other reason than through the shock value of the unusual (some say outrageous) implied geographical pairing. But mostly, my epistemological claims are suffused with “presentism,” in the sense that, because I am not a historian but a political scientist, I am primarily driven by a craving for the sort of “situational awareness” of current events that can be discovered through a systematic cultivation of the past. In short, I want to know whether the kinds of demography-dependent security challenges that we have been witnessing in connection with the Salafist jihadist problem of today resemble other instances in which the demographic variable I concentrate upon in this book, ethnic-diasporic political activism, also had a way of roiling security arrangements, both regionally (in North America) and more globally.

Of course, all ‘availability heuristics’ come up short, for any number of reasons. We use these cognitive crutches (among which ‘analogy’ is a consensus repeater, both for policymakers and policy analysts alike) because we have to; there seems to be little alternative to trying to contextualize the present by at least some importation of past events – events that we frequently endow with the capacity to impart ‘lessons.’ But if
analogy and case studies can be helpful (because necessary), they can also wildly mislead us. Thus Sandrine Tolazzi’s critique is apt, for three reasons. First, she queries my assertion that the North American Muslim diaspora, precisely because it lacks the kind of “national” (state, really) affective referent object that served to animate both Irish- and German-American diasporic activism, is likely to be less capable of pursuing a coherent political agenda than either of the earlier ethnic “lobbies.” Second, she questions the importance of a diaspora’s size to its “non-kinetic” (i.e., nonviolent and legal) political activism, with my perspective being that simply because of demographic heft, the Irish-American and German-American diasporas possessed much more political leverage (exercised via the ballot-box) than Muslim North Americans could ever hope to attain. Instead, Tolazzi argues that “the Muslim diaspora almost succeeded in incorporating aspects of the Sharia into the Canadian judicial system by claiming their right to use the Arbitration Act to settle family disputes through religious tribunals in 2003.” Whether or not this was as closely run an affair as she implies, it is hard for me to see how its effect upon the Canada-U.S. security community (which is, as Stéphane Roussel notes, my “dependent variable”) could have been anyway near as significant as some of the major Irish- and German-American agenda items during an earlier period. Nevertheless, she makes a good point.

Third, Professor Tolazzi raises an interesting conundrum, one that I confess causes me no little consternation. What if, she suggests, the changing face of Salafist jihadism is such that new technologies (especially those associated with social media) can break the earlier link between “kinetic” (i.e., violent) activism and the presence of a diaspora? After all, a point upon which I have insisted through the three case studies is that there must be some non-trivial demographic presence of a diaspora in one (or both) of the North American host countries, if there is to be activism with regional-security implications. Indeed, I even go so far (on page 92) to invoke the “agrarian socialism” theory of Communist China’s founder and longtime leader, Mao Zedong, to make a claim about diasporic activism of a kinetic nature, with the diaspora constituting the “lake” in which the revolutionary agents swim. But what if one can become, through the Internet, a convert to Salafist jihadism even in a country where there has been no local Muslim diaspora? It is conceivable that this might happen, though I for one suspect that the absence of any discernible Salafist jihadi presence in, say, Mexico, has a great deal to do with the absence of the diasporic “lake.” And, further to this issue, recent developments in Europe might suggest strongly that a demographic footprint remains a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for kinetic activism to take place. This, to me at least, is the meaning of Molenbeek.

This gets us to a different element of disputation, one raised by Eric Tabuteau, when he chides me for going a bit too lightly on recent trends in the North American border regime, regretting as he does that I “mostly focused on the history of the frontier prior to 9/11 and do[…] not really say whether its recent smartifying, nay partial bunkerization, has meant – or not – a sea change in the way North Americans view the line that bisects their continent, maybe feeling that their lebensraum has transformed from a zone of peace to a zone of war.” From having attended many conferences in Europe and having read many European experts on the topic, I know fully well that since 9/11 the North American border-management regime has taken on a new and very interesting symbolism for Europeans, who never seem to tire of decrying and decrying what they more often than not assume to be a budding militarization of the erstwhile “longest undefended border in the world.” However, recent events in France and elsewhere in Europe, which transpired subsequent to my writing this book, serve to remind all of us of the wisdom of Martin Luther’s remark about normative assessments: “It makes a difference whose ox is being gored.”

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1 Quoted in John Bartlett, Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 14th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 180.
There was a time when border-management in North America (north of the Rio Grande, at least) was relatively non-controversial, consisting basically in an exercise in commercial and fiscal policy, rather than in population control. This was particularly so during the first half of the twentieth century when borders in Europe were heavily fortified and militarized, such that it was possible – indeed, virtually obligatory – for so many Canadians and Americans to sing praises to their wonderful border and to their effulgent ‘North American Idea.’ Then came the turn of the Western Europeans, post-9/11, to wag fingers at North Americans, particularly Americans, for their excessive border-management zeal. Now, over the past year or so, we glimpse a new and foreboding era, thanks in part to the current refugee crisis, and in part to the activism of Europe’s own “homegrown” Salafist jihadis – an era in which it is not so apparent that North American and European border-management really is so dissimilar as to invite or even compel normative differentiations of the sort so often on display in recent years. Thus, in answer to the question Professor Tabuteau poses, I do not think that there really is a risk of North American “lebensraum” once more being characterized as a zone of war. I only wish I was confident enough to say the same about European space. I suspect many Europeans would share that wish.

Who says ‘zone of war’ has in mind, ‘zone of peace.’ This leads us to the heart of an interesting debate about security communities, in North America as elsewhere – a debate that I confess to having played my part in instigating, often over beer, with one of my reviewers, Professor Roussel. We agree on much, but disagree on a question that might seem trivial, at first blush: when did this wonderful entity known as the North American security community come into existence? Professor Roussel’s liberal-constructivist orientation inclines him to want to see its rise as being more or less contemporaneous with the solidification of liberal-democratic governance processes in both North American countries. As for myself, an abiding legacy of my misspent ‘realist’ youth leads me to express somewhat greater skepticism about the human condition. I do, as does he, accept the assumption (because as he wisely tells us, it is not a “natural, material object” but a subjective deduction) of the North American zone of peace, and I think liberal-democracy certainly has a lot to do with it. But since I date the security community’s onset from a later period than he does (I say the late 1930s, he says 1914) it is obvious that chronology in this instance is actually telling us something important about theory. In fact, in the book I turn around the familiar liberal-democratic peace theory (known as DPT) to suggest that liberal-democratic governance practices, when taken to heart by a large and vibrant diasporic community in America with an abiding grudge against Britain (and therefore Canada) could and did have a negative impact upon the quality of North American security relations – and this even at a time when Irish-America had mainly abandoned the kinetic version of activism known as ‘Fenianism’ in favour of a quite legal and constitutionally ‘proper’ variant of diasporic activism known as ‘ethnic lobbying.’ In short, liberal democracy giveth, but it also taketh, and in exercising their constitutional (First Amendment) right to petition the government on behalf of their ethnic agenda of Irish freedom, Irish-Americans really did have an impact upon regional security such as almost certainly to retard the security community’s onset – not so much despite DPT but because of it. This does not mean I think that both Irish- and German-American diasporic activism delayed its onset until 1937, as Professor Roussel avers that I do (on page 2 of his review). It just means that I believe a definitive date for the security community’s arrival on the scene can be given, and it is 1937, when the U.S. abandoned the last of its war plans drafted with the prospect of Britain (and the Dominions, including Canada) being a possible enemy. Less in dispute is that I believe the Irish-Americans had a big hand in delaying the onset of the first, and necessary stage of community building in North America, the rapprochement between the U.S. and UK at a time when Canada, as Roussel reminds us, was virtually indistinguishable from Britain.
To understand the impact of the Irish- and especially the German-American diasporas on regional security in North America, we need to turn to another issue raised in Professor Roussel’s review: the relationship between security community and alliance, in theory as well as in practice. Here we would be well-advised to have recourse to another body of theory in international relations, similar but hardly identical to DPT. That body of theory can be called “stable peace theory,” and according to its most prominent exponent, Charles Kupchan, there is a staged process by which states proceed from enmity through to alliance, with the stages numbering three: first, rapprochement; then, security community; and finally, union (or for our purposes, alliance).2

In trying to puzzle out the relationship between the latter two stages of stable peace, I found my argument taking an unexpected twist, as Professor Tolazzi so correctly notes (page 4 of her review), in highlighting what I call the “principle of the opposite effect” (157), argued by me to have come to bear, in a counterintuitive fashion, upon diasporic lobbying activities of the Irish- and German-Americans between August 1914 and April 1917 – activities intended, albeit for different reasons, to accomplish the same effect, of keeping America from entering the war on the side of the Entente powers. For what I adumbrate in the book under review here, and what has inspired the book I am currently writing on the April 1917 decision of Woodrow Wilson to ask Congress for a declaration of war on Imperial Germany, is that it might make more sense to discard earlier assumptions about the “influence” wielded by America’s two huge diasporas in delaying the country’s entry into the war – assumptions that continue to reflect the conventional wisdom – and ask instead whether the diasporas might have helped stimulate pro-British feeling among the majority of American citizens, themselves of English (or, more accurately, British) descent. Space here does not permit anything like a just airing of this perhaps bizarre thesis, nor did space in the book being reviewed now allow for the same; but since elsewhere in my book, as Professors Tabuteau and Tolazzi rightly point out, I have not hesitated to criticize Samuel Huntington on one of his claims (viz., that following the Cold War’s ending American foreign policy became the plaything of ‘special’ interests – basically ethnic lobbies and big business), let me simply say here that I am coming around to the position that ‘civilizational rallying’ – a Huntingtonian concept if ever there was one! – during the home-front “culture wars” between 1914 and 1917 may well have moved majority public opinion from its classic default position of political Anglophobia (else what was the point of the Revolution?) to one of support for American involvement in the war on Britain’s (and Canada’s) side.

Now, if this exotic hunch bears fruit once I have had a chance more fully to research it, we have an interesting puzzle appertaining to the stages of stable peace. Professor Roussel is correct to note that he does not see any reason why security community must lead to alliance; nor do I, actually, at least in general, though we differ as to why NATO came into existence (a debate for another time). I am not sure he is correct, however, in suggesting that the Irish- and German-American diasporic activism proved ultimately to be without “influence” in 1917, because the U.S. did, after all, become an ally, if only for the duration of the war. He puts the question thusly (page 4 of his review): “is it the decline of the influence of the two diasporas that allowed the conclusion of the alliance, or did the alliance simply reveal that these diasporas already lost their influence, if they ever had one?” Now, if influence means to have an impact upon outcomes, even if an unintended and undesired one, then it surely is worth exploring carefully whether the coordinated influence attempts of Irish- and German-America simply backfired, and this because the majority of the American

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public came to realize, and to resent, that *its* ‘civilization’ was being condemned in the two diasporas’ sustained onslaught against ‘English’ civilization. We are told these days, and not just by constructivists (for Huntington also agreed with them) that ‘identity’ prefigures ‘interest.’ If this is so, then it may well be that the next promising frontier for research into American involvement in the First World War is the ‘ontological’ one.

But whether or not this is such a looming frontier, the experience of that war speaks volumes about the sequencing of stable peace (on the assumption, of course, that the Canada-U.S. security community is a more recent phenomenon than many believe): for if in 1917 and 1918 America and Canada were ‘allies,’ while their security community had yet to be born, then it would appear that Professor Roussel is right to deny, as he does, that security community must lead to alliance – but not necessarily for the reasons he would prefer. If alliance can predate security community, then the two kinds of security dispensation might be said, *pace* stable peace theory, actually to exist independently of each other. I am not sure I am happy with this thought, as I like to believe that the solidarity of the Canada-U.S. alliance – which, be it recalled, is America’s most long-standing unbroken alliance (since the 1778 pact between the U.S. and France expired in 1800, and the two ‘oldest allies’ did not become allied again, for good, until 1949) – contributes in no small way to the strength of the Canada-U.S. security community. I suspect Professor Roussel agrees with me on this point. At the very least, it deserves a further discussion, ideally over beer.

Finally, can it be said that my book contains any implications for policy? Here Professor Tolazzi, pursuing the “principle of the opposite effect” to its most recent manifestation, correctly has me recorded as being rather optimistic about the home-grown challenge in North America, which basically boils down to the thought that domestic plots, foiled or otherwise, in either country have had the unintended effect of bringing about a convergence in threat assessment as between the U.S. and Canada that stands in contrast with the countries’ earlier disparate reactions to the Salafist jihadist problem. In that earlier period, which I label one of a “new (Islamic) Fenianism” (202), it seemed that Ottawa’s main concern was to go along with U.S. border-tightening measures not so much for reasons related to Canada’s worries about jihadist violence on its soil, but because of its worry about what a really angry America would do to it if events such as the Millennium plotting of Algerian jihadi, Ahmed Ressam, had not been nipped in the bud. The homegrowns have had a dual impact, and a curiously beneficial one, for bilateral relations: 1) they have convinced Canada that it, too, could be the target of Salafist-inspired mayhem, and 2) perhaps more to the point, homegrowns in the U.S. have brought home to American officials the reality that it was quite possible for Salafists to carry out attacks in the U.S. without needing or even wanting any “staging area” north of the border. In this sense, the geostrategic significance of the Canada-U.S. border has become downgraded.

But what of the problem outside of North America? Here Tabuteau is correct to note that my optimism has changed to uncertainty tinged with worry. This is because the two earlier diaspora-related challenges to the North American security community actually managed to be *solved* – and this by events outside the confines of North America. Ireland got its independence from Britain, and with this there was a radical reduction in diasporic activism, with most of the policy implications falling on the ‘demand’ side of the ledger. As for German-Americans, the events of 1917 were not repeated in 1941. They did not need to be: unlike in the 1914-1917 period, when German-America largely (not completely), 3 supported the Fatherland in its struggle

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against its great-power rivals in Europe, by the Second World War, most of German-America was as opposed to Nazism as the rest of the country. The current Salafist challenge is more difficult to defeat, because the objective of the wielders of violence really is not (the temporary existence of the Islamic State to the contrary, notwithstanding) to promote the interests of a state. It is to propagate something much more amorphous, an ideology.