Exploring a Postsecular Perspective of Multiple Modernities in Tatarstan:
The Use of Jadidism in Building Tatar Ethno-Religious Identity

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To my loving parents
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Abstract

Religious and cultural revivals in post-communist regions challenged Western concepts of secularism and modernity. To account for the prevalence of religion in the public sphere, social scientists have developed a number of theories, one of the most prominent and debated being Jürgen Habermas' postsecular theory. Habermas' postsecular theory proposes that in order to integrate religious participation in the public sphere, both religious and non-religious citizens should work together to promote a cooperative civic discourse. However, Habermas' critics assert that his thinking is laden with Eurocentric-Western biases that favor liberal mentalities, neglect the discursive history of religious participation in civic discourse, and predominantly view secularity as an attribute of Western society. Despite these criticisms, social scientists have emphasized a key feature in postsecular theory—reflexivity. Postsecular reflexivity connotes an awareness that religious traditions and secularism are valid sources in order to enrich society. Similarly, Shmuel Eisenstadt's Multiple Modernities Theory (MMT) theory affirms that there is no single standard model of a modern society, and in order to for society to develop its own variant of modernity based on its own history it must display self-reflexivity. Thus, this theory disputes the notion that non-Western societies replicate and accommodate Western hegemonic patterns of modernity. To explore the application of a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities in non-Western, non-Christian, and non-democratic contexts, the case of post-communist Tatarstan will be examined. Tatarstan is a multicultural society and is characterized by its Tatar Muslim and Russian heritage. Since the 1990s, the Tatar government used a contemporary adaptation of Jadidism—a nineteenth century modern reform movement—to promote Tatar Islam through educational reforms and language policy. The ultimate goal of these interventions has been to reclaim Tatar ethno-religious identity. This case study concludes that the tensions that arise at the public boundaries between religion-as-culture and religion-as-political ideology can be analyzed using a synthesis of postsecular theory and MMT.

Introduction

The sociologist Jürgen Habermas argues that the concept of modernity can no longer be equated to secularity. Habermas uses the term postsecular to describe the continuous reassertion and nuanced manifestations of religion in the public sphere. In a postsecular society, citizens, both religious and non-religious, engage in reciprocal deliberation in the public sphere as part of a "complementary learning process" and "translation proviso."[1] This learning enriches individuals' worldviews and, in turn, informs civic discourse. According to Habermas' critics, the term postsecular is problematic because it is rooted in the Western conceptualization of the secular. For example, Massimo Rosati argues Habermas' conceptualization of "the postsecular" is characterized by two biases. First, it is based on a "hermeneutic model of the Enlightenment."[2] Habermas' postsecular theory falls within the discursive history of secularization which emerged from the European Enlightenment. This discourse portrayed religious and secular worldviews as contending over the same space—the public sphere. Habermas' postsecular theory suggests that religious and secular worldviews are confrontational and incompatible in the public sphere. Thus, there is a need for compromise. Secondly, Habermas' view of religion is derived from the European Enlightenment which privileges Western Christian perceptions of religion.[3] To address this and to explain the local character of modernity and secularity, Rosati and other scholars such as Rosi Braidotti, Aleksandr Krylezhev and Mustapha Kamal Pasha, have explored the term "postsecular" in non-Western, non-democratic, and non-Christian contexts.

[1] Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 131.

[2] Massimo Rosati, *The Making of a Postsecular Society: A Durkheimian Approach to Memory, Pluralism and Religion in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 38.

[3] The concept "religion" is a recent term that emerged out of the discursive history of European Enlightenment and was developed further by early social theorists such as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber in order to elaborate theories on secularization and the place of religion in society.

This essay consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides a review of the postsecular literature beginning with Habermas. It argues that the postsecular is not a singular theoretical framework that is limited in assessing predominantly Western, democratic, and Christian societies. Instead, this framework can provide new ways to assess the various manifestations of religious and secular worldviews globally. The chapter concludes that an additional theory, however, is required to expand the postsecular framework for these applications.

In the second chapter, Shmuel Eisenstadt's Multiple Modernities Theory (MMT) is considered in relation to postsecular theory. Eisenstadt argues against a single standard model of a modern society. As such, he proposes that each society develops its own version of modernity in the context of its own history. Thus, MMT disputes the implicit notion that non-Western societies simply replicate and accommodate Western hegemonic patterns of modernity.[4] In the last half of chapter two I elaborate on Kristina Stoeckl's phrase "postsecular perspective of multiple modernities" particularly in conjunction with Willfried Spohn's assessment of MMT and his argument that MMT provides an avenue to analyze the role of ethnic and religious identities when constructing national identity. I will conclude that a feasible route to assess the concept of postsecular perspective of multiple modernities is to examine the tensions that arise at public boundaries when religion-as-culture is used to support political endeavors. In particular, this study considers the development of an ethno-religious national identity through public policies in order to manage collective identity as one of the types of political endeavors that religion-as-culture can be used to bolster.

In the third chapter, I explore the interaction of postsecular theory and Multiple Modernities Theory through an examination of the Tatars. The Tatars are a Turkic people located in the Volga

[4] Shmuel Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus*, 129 (2000): 2–3.

region which is east of Moscow. The Tatars converted to Islam during the 10th century, "influenced by the missionary work of Ahmad ibn Fadlan."[5] Very little is known of Tatar religious life before their conversion; what is known is that the Tatars were colonized by the Mongols, the Golden Horde, who occupied the region from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries.[6] Following the disintegration of the Mongol empire, the region was ruled by the Russians and Ottomans. Due to a mixture of religious and ethnic influences, the Tatars are a people who "bridge Christianity and Islam."[7]

Since the nineteenth century, most Tatars have followed the Hanafī school of Islam.[8] This school is considered to be a liberal form of Sunni Islam that tolerates liberal religious practices such as the recognition of female clerics.[9] During the nineteenth century, Tatar intellectual and religious elites developed a modern Islamic reform movement called Jadidism. This movement encouraged the adaptation of concepts of European intellectualism such as the incorporation of scientific knowledge into the Islamic education system. However, the Jadid movement was halted by the Russian Revolution in 1917.

After decades of forced secularization during the Soviet period (1920s–1980s), the Tatars are now experiencing a religious and cultural revival demonstrated by the contemporary adaptation of Jadidism. The Republic of Tatarstan is now a semi-autonomous state that is part of the Russian Federation. The contemporary adaptation of Jadidism is based on its nineteenth century premise, but nuanced to reflect contemporary Western conceptions of modern society such as encouraging

[5] Helen M. Faller, *Nation, Language, Islam: Tatarstan's Sovereignty* Movement (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011), 6.

[6] Faller, *Nation, Language, Islam: Tatarstan's Sovereignty* Movement, 6.

[7] Charlotte Mathilde Louise Hille, *State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1.

[8] Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 176, 217.

[9] Roana Keenan, "Tatarstan: The Battle over Islam in Russia's Heartland," in *World Polity* 20, no. 2 (2003): 76.

gender equality, supporting multiculturalism, and promoting educational reforms that allow forms of knowledge beyond the religious to inform Tatar-Islamic identity. It also recognizes that both religious and secular discourses contribute to ethno-religious identity and civic discourse. Jadidism in contemporary Tatarstan therefore lends itself to being analyzed through a combination of MMT and Habermas' postsecular theory because of the way it acknowledges the role of religion in the public sphere. Specifically, this chapter explores the influence of the Jadid movement on the Tatars' attempt to reclaim their ethno-religious identity through educational reforms and language policy. The Tatar case study provides an avenue to investigate the feasibility of a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities in a non-Western context

Ultimately, this study highlights the need for further research on religion and modernity in non-Western contexts. In particular, the investigation of post-communist nations like Tatarstan may lead to a better understanding of the transformative role of religious and secular worldviews under the conditions of late modernity.

Chapter 1: Postsecular Theory

The aim of this chapter is twofold: to explore the genesis of Habermas' postsecular theory and to review how this framework has been altered and applied by other scholars in order to explain local specificities beyond Western, democratic, and Christian contexts. This exploration of the postsecular framework will lay the foundation for the discussion of the Republic of Tatarstan in chapter three.

Postsecular theory acknowledges the role of religion in the public sphere and its contribution to civic discourse. Habermas views the postsecular as a cognitive recognition of religion's place in the public sphere and its impact on secular worldviews.[10] In Habermas' postsecular theory, secular and religious worldviews are seen as contributors to society. However, Habermas does not elaborate concerning the extent to which or in what ways secular and religious worldviews contribute to society. Nonetheless, Habermas' critics, such as Michele Dillon, contest the ways in which Habermas uses the terms "religion" and "secular" within postsecular theory. For Habermas, religion within a postsecular society is a "political cultural resource" that can support "'a contrite modernity'" in developing "religious-derived norms and ethical institution[s]," that can help "human society deal with 'a miscarried life, social pathologies, the failures of individual life projects, and the deformation of misarranged existential relationships."[11] According to Dillon, Habermas "tends to treat religion as a monotheistic" and "reified phenomenon" which "does not acknowledge the multiplicity of strands and discourses that are characteristic of both premodern and post-Enlightenment religions."[12] Dillon states that Habermas "posits a polarization

[10] Jürgen Habermas, "On the Relation Between the Secular Liberal State and Religion," in *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Postsecular World*, ed. H. de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 258.

[11] Michaele Dillion, "Jürgen Habermas and the Post-secular Appropriation of Religion: A Sociological Critique," in *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society*, ed. Philip S. Gorski et al. (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 254.

[12] Dillion, "Jürgen Habermas," 252.

between religion and reasons or rationality" which obscures the discursive development "involved in understanding revelation and how … diverse religious traditions are open to reasoned self-criticism."[13] Furthermore, Dillon states that this polarization implies that Habermas "has long constructed the West as essentially secular since the Enlightenment."[14] In that regard, religious worldviews for Habermas are unfixed compared to secular rationality. As such, for a society to use religious and secular worldviews as equal contributors, religious worldviews must undergo a process of rationalization or argumentative deliberation to integrate religion into civic discourses.

Thus, an assessment of the role of Jadidism in present day Tatarstan requires an examination of the application of postsecular theory to non-Western contexts. First, I outline the emergence of Habermas' postsecular theory from the social scientific debates surrounding secularization in the 2000s onward. Next, I examine the advancement of thinking about the postsecular by recent critics of Habermas, such as Rosi Braidotti, Gregor McLennan, Peter Nynäs, Bernice Martin, Massimo Rosati, Kristina Stoeckl, Aleksandr Krylezhev and Mustapha Kamal Pasha.

Secularization Theory

Secularization theory came into vogue between the 1950s and 1970s, influenced by a number of prominent nineteenth century social theorists including Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber.[15] Subsequently, well-known variants of the secularization thesis were developed by European sociologists Bryan Wilson, Thomas Luckmann, Karel Dobbelaere and American sociologist Peter Berger. These theories sought to explain social changes including urbanization,

[13] Dillion, "Jürgen Habermas," 252.
[14] Dillion, "Jürgen Habermas," 256.
[15] Judith Fox, "Secularization," in *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, ed. John Hinnells (New York: Routledge, 2010), 306–8.

industrialization and bureaucratization.[16] The observation of a decline in the relevance of religion due to the differentiation of social institutions, the ascendency of scientific rationality, and a decrease church attendance formed the core of these twentieth century theories of secularization. The American sociologist José Casanova has distilled three major definitions of secularization that have developed in these debates over the last number of years.

The first is "functional differentiation" which refers to "patterns of fusion and dissolution of religious, political and societal communities"[17] resulting in institutional spheres that are autonomous from one another. For example, the state, the economy, and religious organizations are considered to be institutionally autonomous, and theoretically cannot exert complete control over the other. While this understanding of secularization "remains relatively uncontested in the social sciences, particularly within European sociology," Casanova questions:

> whether it is appropriate to subsume the multiple and diverse historical patterns of differentiation and fusion of the various institutional spheres (that is, church and state, state and economy, economy and science) that one finds throughout the history of modern Western societies into a single teleological process of modern functional differentiation.[18]

Casanova's second definition of secularization is the decline of religious practices and beliefs.[19] This is the most widespread definition of secularization. However, it tends to be rejected in practice by American sociologists due to the marked absence of "any of the usual 'indicators' of secularization" like the long term declines in "church attendance, frequency of prayer, belief in God, etc." among the American public.[20]

The third definition of secularization is the "privatization of religion." According to

[16] William Swatos and Kevin Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept," *Sociology of Religion* 60, no. 3 (1999): 210.
[17] José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization," *Hedgehog Review* 8, no. 1–2 (2006): 7.
[18] Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization," 9–10.
[19] Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization," 8.
[20] Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization," 8.

Casanova, this process is understood to be, not only part of the "modern historical trend," but also a "normative condition" and "precondition for modern liberal democratic politics."[21] European social scientists "tend to switch back and forth between the traditional meaning of secularization and the more recent meaning that points to the progressive, and, since the 1960s, drastic and assumedly irreversible decline of religious beliefs and practices among the European population." These European scholars tend to view the second and third definitions of the term "as intrinsically related because they view the two realities—the decline in the societal power and significance of religious institutions, and the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals—as structurally related."[22]

Due to the ongoing debates between European and American sociologists, the analytical utility of the concept of secularization remains unsettled. In the last four decades, secularization theory has fallen largely out of favour. Many scholars argue that it does not provide a sufficient explanation of the persistent role of religion in the public sphere.

The Motives Behind Postsecular Theory

Habermas' speech for the 2001 Peace Prize of the German Publishers and Booksellers Association, entitled "Faith and Knowledge," argued "that the secularization hypothesis has now lost its explanatory power and that religion and the secular world always stand in a reciprocal relation" implying, according to commentators Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt, that "although faith and knowledge are clearly separate from each other, they inherently depend on a constructive coexistence."[23] Awareness of the inadequacy of secularization that Habermas touches upon has been developing since the 1980s. It was most famously articulated by the once fervent proponent

[21] Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization," 7.
[22] Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization," 8.
[23] Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt, S.J., "Habermas and Religion," in *An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 6.

of secularization Peter Berger, who stated that "the world today…is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever" and that the body "of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled 'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken."[24] Berger's recantation of the secularization paradigm is a response to the prevalence of religion in the public sphere and the pluralization of religion occurring in multicultural societies. As a result of these developments, he and other scholars have produced new explanations for the continuing presence of religion in the public sphere. Habermas' postsecular theory is a prominent example of this work. According to Habermas, three factors spurred the development of postsecular theory. First, he claims to have been responding to current global conflicts, notably those rooted in religious fundamentalism, and the effects these have had on the secularist mindset. A secularist mindset for Habermas refers to the term secularism; for example, fellow sociologist Casanova states, on the one hand, that secularism refers to a broad range "of secular worldviews…that may be consciously held and explicitly elaborated into…projects of modernity and cultural programs." [25] On the other hand, secularism can "be viewed as an epistemic knowledge regime that may be unreflexively held and…assumed as the taken-for-granted normal structure of modern reality."[26] In that regard, for Habermas, fundamentalist movements that use religious language have undermined the "secularistic belief"—the secularist mindset—that religion would eventually disappear and the certainty that living in a secular society would diminish the "personal relevance of religion."[27]

Second, religious organizations and institutions are assuming more prominent roles in the "public arena of secular societies," and, in turn, have influenced public opinion on key legislative

[24] Peter Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Perspective," in *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter Berger (Grand Rapids: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 2.
[25] José Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms," *New School for Social Research* 76, no. 4 (2009): 1051.
[26] Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms," 1051.
[27] Habermas, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," 20.

issues such as abortion, assisted suicide and reproductive rights.[28] Habermas contends that the rise of pluralistic societies has brought religious and secular worldviews into competition for influence in the public sphere.[29]

Third, with the rise of immigration and global mobility, societies face the challenge of maintaining a "tolerant coexistence" within a multicultural and multi-confessional social landscape.[30] Habermas postulates that, with the growth in social diversity through migration, societies have the potential of becoming more aware of the "public influence and relevance" of religion.[31] Habermas does not specify how society is becoming aware of the public relevance of religion, but rather observes that with the pluralization of society through immigration there are more cultural and religious interactions occurring.

The Mechanics of Habermas' Postsecular Theory

In the past decade, Habermas' postsecular theory has gained notoriety in academia. Habermas' work on this theory is exemplified in *Between Naturalism and Religion*, which was built on his earlier works (e.g., *The Theory of Communicative Action* [1985]; *Post-metaphysical Thinking* [1992]). With the aid of John Rawls' concept "public use of reason," Habermas lays the groundwork to expand on the social-political mechanics of the postsecular society.[32] Public reason, according to Rawls, is not a single political value competing among other values, but rather it encompasses the various constructs that build up the idea of a constitutional democracy.[33] Rawls explains that the basic feature of a democracy is "reasonable pluralism." This consists of a "plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines [those being]: religious,

[28] Habermas, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," 20.
[29] Habermas, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," 20.
[30] Habermas, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," 20–21.
[31] Habermas, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," 21.
[32] Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 119.
[33] John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," *The University of Chicago Law Review* 64, no. 3 (1997): 768.

philosophical, and moral."[34] Furthermore, in order to develop a discourse of "public reason," citizens of a liberal democracy must reach an agreement or "mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines."[35] This form of public deliberation and the processes involved are what Habermas rephrases as the "complementary learning process."

The rationale behind Habermas' adoption of Rawls' concept lies in his argument that "competition between worldviews and religious doctrines that claim to explain human beings' position in the world" is generally irreconcilable. [36] The unwillingness to compromise on a topic that concerns the general community, in the view of Habermas, can result in "cognitive dissonances"—inconsistencies of thought and belief.[37] These cognitive dissonances may disrupt the normative foundations found in a liberal democracy—equality and liberty—that Habermas believes to regulate the "social interactions of citizens."[38] The result of cognitive dissonances could be the fragmentation of the political community into "irreconcilable religious and ideological segments based on a precarious *modus vivendi*."[39] Furthermore, Habermas suggests that "reciprocity of expectations" is essential to prevent "cognitive dissonances" from occurring; all citizens are expected to demonstrate a level of respect towards opposing views.[40]

At this point, Habermas' postsecular framework is situated in a narrow liberal-democratic context. Although this context gives us a way to envision the mechanics of the postsecular framework, it relies upon the simplification of a political environment. In other words, Habermas does not factor in competing political powers that may impinge on a cooperative utilization of secular and religious world views. For example, Tatarstan has implemented educational reforms

[34] Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," 765–66.
[35] Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," 766.
[36] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 135.
[37] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 135.
[38] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 135.
[39] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 135.
[40] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 136.

inspired by Jadidism in an attempt to revive and reclaim the Tatars' ethno-religious identity. However, in 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin began to curtail the Russian republic's political and legal power, concentrating power in Moscow and reasserting "the primacy of ethnic Russian religious and cultural sensibilities in Russia."[41]

Similarly, scholars have also identified other limitations. Peter Nynäs et al. have argued that the characterization of religious participants in postsecular theory is limited. For example, religious individuals who come from religious "communities [that] have a long-standing tradition of participation in civil society and political life," may not "necessarily conceive themselves as either religious or secular citizens."[42] In that sense, Habermas excludes religious traditions like Islam that do not have a history of distilling politics from religion; in contrast to Euro-Christianity, Muslims since the time of the Prophet Muhammad have understood religion and politics to be naturally connected.[43]

The philosopher Rosi Braidotti writes that the notion of distilling religious traditions from politics emerged out of the discursive history of the Enlightenment. Part of the idea that dominated the Enlightenment period was the notion that the "secular distillation of Judeo-Christian perception" of the temporal world would conceive of "secularization defined as contractual agreements or respect for the law;" a sense of individual worth; "autonomy of the self, moral conscience, rationality and the ethics of love;" that did not need the validation of scripture.[44] According to Braidotti, a possible consequence of this characterization of religious and secular

[41] Kate Graney, "Tatarstan: Adjusting to Life in Putin's Russia," *Nationalities Paper* 44, no. 1 (2016): 1.

[42] Marcus Moberg, Kennet Granholm, and Peter Nynäs, "Trajectories of Post-Secular Complexity: An Introduction," in *Postsecular Society*, ed. Peter Nynäs, Mika Lassander, and Terhi Utriainen (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2012), 6.

[43] Leon Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to* Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 31–32.

[44] Rosai Braidotti, "In Spite of the Times: The Postsecular Turn in Feminism," *Theory, Culture and Society* 26, no. 6 (2008), 8–9.

worldviews is that "this specific brand of" secular worldview is presented "as the embodiment of universalism" and perceived as "achieving absolute moral authority and the social status of dominant norm."[45] In that view, Braidotti explains that secular discourses have implicitly presented religious and secular worldviews as mutually exclusive of one another, and "consequently leave Islam in the singular position" as the only "monotheistic religion" without "secularist distinctions."[46] Likewise Habermas appears to maintain an Enlightenment perception of the terms "religion" and "secular." Since in his work the concept of the "postsecular" is portrayed as an attempt to reconcile religious and secular worldviews, the implication is that they are incompatible with one another. For instance, according to Habermas, to curtail the "asymmetric burden" imposed on religious participants as a result of the "translation proviso," secular citizens must dispose of preconceived notions that religious knowledge is irrational, and they must overcome the "rigid and exclusive secularist self-understanding of modernity;"[47]by doing so religious knowledge and tradition can be a part of the process of public deliberation and to transform alongside secular society.[48] In that regard, Habermas' postsecular theory favors moderate-liberal religious citizens, excluding conservative religious citizens. Similarly, Gregor McLennan argues that there is an assumption in Habermas' work that either the "majority of citizens in a formally liberal state are consciously secularist" or that secularist citizens identify a clear boundary between the public and private spheres.[49] For McLennan, Habermas equates secularity to non-believing, and neglects the idea that citizens can be both religious and secular.[50] McLennan bases his critique on Habermas' "translation proviso" and "complementary learning

[45] Braidotti, "In Spite of the Times," 9.
[46] Braidotti, "In Spite of the Times," 9.
[47] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 138.
[48] Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 137–38.
[49] Gregor McLennan, "Towards a Postsecular Sociology?" *Sociology* 41 (2007): 867–68.
[50] McLennan, "Towards a Postsecular Sociology?", 868.

process," concepts that describe how religious citizens translate religious knowledge into a common secular language.

While Habermas treats both religious and secular participants in this normative claim, Bernice Martin contends that the "complementary learning process" and the "translation proviso" not only construe "religious" and "secular" as mutually exclusive, but still otherwise remain dependent on the rules of the Enlightenment.[51] According to Martin, the Eurocentric undertones in Habermas' postsecular theory are centered on the idea of "reflexive detachment." Martin argues that Habermas' postsecular theory "looks politically and sociologically naïve because it requires religious citizens, many of whom have precisely *not* been formed by the European Enlightenment, to behave as if they had."[52] Likewise, James Boettcher and Jonathan Harmon offer a similar argument, stating that there are no distinguishing markers that aid in "specify[ing] the 'secular,'" apart from "secular cultures" and religious "worldviews."[53]

Similarly, Massimo Rosati argues that the translation of religious knowledge for public deliberation renders it inaccessible. Religious citizens wishing to participate in public deliberation must give up their religious vocabulary.[54] The failure of arguments formulated in religious language compels religious citizens to frame their position in secular terms. While the translation is required by secular citizens, it consequently diminishes the *consumability* of the argument for all citizens.[55] Rosati explains that arguments are more accessible when they have a "broader cultural understanding" and are nuanced by "personal experience."[56] For example, according to

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[51] Bernice Martin, "Constructing Modernities: 'Postsecular' Europe and Enspirited Latin America," in *Exploring the Postsecular*, ed. Bernice Martin (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 73.

[52] Martin, "Constructing Modernities: 'Postsecular' Europe and Enspirited Latin America," 73.

[53] James Boettcher and Jonathan Harmon, "Introduction: Religion and the Public Sphere," *Philosophy and Social Criticisms* 35 (2009): 12

[54] Massimo Rosati, *The Making of a Postsecular Society: A Durkheimian Approach to Memory, Pluralism and Religion in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 38.

[55] Rosati, *The Making of a Postsecular Society*, 38.

[56] Rosati, *The Making of a Postsecular Society*, 38.

Yakh'ya Abdullin, the contemporary adaptation of Jadidism is a "religio-philosophical system" that provides "a basis for spiritual and moral life; providing the foundation of Tatar culture; and protecting the unity of the Tatar nation," allowing Islam "to adapt to current scientific, philosophical and political thinking."[57] However, not all Tatar Muslims accept the contemporary adaptation of Islam offered by Jadidism. For instance, it has been rejected by some Muslim clerics in Tatarstan. As Shireen Hunter explains, Jadidism is predominantly supported by Tatar political elites, while the majority of Muslim Tatars "view Jadidist ideas" as subverting traditional Islamic teachings and norms.[58] The issue of subverting Islam vis-à-vis Jadidism will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

To summarize, Habermas' postsecular theory recognizes the importance of religious and secular worldviews in society. While Habermas' postsecular theory is distinct from previous social theories, it still retains Western perceptions of religion and secularism. Conversely, although we can envision the postsecular in a stable liberal-democracy, Habermas' postsecular theory does not consider other political systems. In order to examine postsecular theory in the context of Tatarstan, the next section will look at other scholars' reinterpretation of the postsecular, thereby widening the analytical utility of postsecular theory.

Reinterpreting the Postsecular

Several scholars have expanded postsecular theory by applying it beyond Western, democratic, and Christian contexts. These expansions provide substantial analytical tools to examine Tatarstan and the contemporary adaptation of Jadidism in chapter three.

According to Massimo Rosati and Kristina Stoeckl: "a postsecular society requires an end

[57] Marlies Bilz-Leonhardt, "Islam as a Secular Discourse: The Case of Tatarstan, Religion, State and Society," *Religion, State and Society* 35, no. 3 (2007): 236.

[58] Shireen T. Hunter, *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and* Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 93.

not only of the modernist dream of the total eclipse of the sacred or of the *privatization* of religion, but also the end of conditions of strict religious monopoly."[59] Rosati and Stoeckl view a postsecular society as multi-religious, where traditional faiths exist alongside "diasporic religious communities."[60] They argue that the coexistence of multiple worldviews enriches the public sphere by including "individual and collective religious beliefs and practices."[61] Religious traditions provide a "source of meaning," "a tool of social criticism," and a means to challenge "the self-referentiality" of Western conceptions of secularization.[62] Religion in a postsecular society can take on "different forms, immanent and civic as well as transcendent."[63] In short, religious traditions and secular worldviews in a postsecular society are malleable and open to reciprocal interpretation.

Alternatively, though Aleksandr Kyrlezhev does not view "the postsecular" as a form of society, he does view it similarly to Rosati and Stoeckl. Rather than a form of society, Kyrlezhev views postsecular as an age where religion "resurfaces in a symbolic form," and becomes a "marker of tradition."[64] Moreover, Kyrlezhev's view does not "imply [one's] belonging to a religious tradition in the sense of faith and practice."[65] Like Habermas, Rosati, Stoeckl, and Kyrlezhev view postsecular society as a distinctly liberal enterprise, where citizens engage in reciprocal deliberation. Thus, the limits of postsecular analysis may be examined in societies where the government uses religion as a means of control.

Matthew S. Erie applies postsecular analysis to the Chinese government's use of religious

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[59] Massimo Rosati and Kristina Stoeckl, "Introduction," in *Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Societies*," ed. Massimo Rosati and Kristina Stoeckl (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 5.

[60] Rosati and Stoeckl, "Introduction," 5.

[61] Rosati and Stoeckl, "Introduction," 5.

[62] Rosati and Stoeckl, "Introduction," 5.

[63] Rosati and Stoeckl, "Introduction," 6.

[64] Aleksandr Kyrlezhev, "The Postsecular Age: Religion and Culture Today," *Religion, State and Society* 36, no. 1 (2008): 27.

[65] Kyrlezhev, "The Postsecular Age," 27.

tradition. In his view, postsecular theory can explain the Chinese regime's use of aspects of religious tradition to facilitate governance. In 2001, the Chinese government began using Shari'a law in Ningzia Hui—a region with a population of 6.3 million which is 35 percent Chinese Muslims.[66] Erie argues that the Chinese regime exerts control over the multi-confessional population of this region by using the religious traditions present in the area.[67] Aspects of Shari'a law are protected under Chinese law such as "dietary rules," and "ritual aspects" including "ablutions, prayer, and recitation."[68] However, other aspects of the religious law, such as family, property, divorce and marriage, are invalidated by the secular Chinese state.[69] Religious symbols and practices are thereby deprived of their sacred meanings. However, in China, they are transformed into tools of governance, not simply markers of tradition. Thus, according to Erie, the boundaries between secular and religious worldviews become "blurred" as a result of "the state depend[ing] on religious authorities to" exercise secular authority.[70] While less aggressive than Chinese policy, the Tatar government is reclaiming Tatar ethno-religious identity through educational reforms and language policy driven by Jadidism. This top-down approach—using religious tradition to facilitate governance—completely departs from notions of "reciprocal deliberation" central to Habermas' postsecular theory. Instead, this policy facilitates an elitist monopoly over the transformative role of religious and secular worldviews on society.

Postsecular theory can also be applied to the tensions around the Western conception of the secular public sphere. In Mustapha Kamal Pasha's article, "Islam and the Postsecular," he argues that "under conditions of late modernity" postsecular analysis can "open up the possibility

[66] Matthew S. Erie, "Defining Shari'a in China: State, Ahong, and the Postsecular Turn," *Cross-Currents: Eastern Asian History and Cultural* Review 12 (2014): 95.
[67] Erie, "Defining Shari'a in China," 102.
[68] Erie, "Defining Shari'a in China," 102.
[69] Erie, "Defining Shari'a in China," 102.
[70] Erie, "Defining Shari'a in China," 109.

to account for the assumed resistance of Islam to secular modernity" in Islamic Cultural Zones (ICZs).[71] The term ICZs does not refer to specific areas, but rather to Muslim majority areas connected through "symbolic commonality, memory, and historical experience. The term stresses the plurality of Islamic cultural experiences…without essentialising Islamic identity."[72]

According to Pasha, there are two dispositions present in contemporary Islam. These dispositions are based on two distinct political mentalities. First, "closed" Islam (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism) rejects Western concepts of modernity.[73] Second, "open" Islam is non-confrontational and adaptable to conceptions of secularization and modernization.[74] Pasha states that the political distinction between "closed" and "open" Islam "capture[s] struggles in the ICZs over the nature of the social and political order."[75] Out of the two Pasha stresses "closed" Islam in order to assess "postsecular theorising."[76]

Pasha argues that there are several underlying challenges when using postsecular analysis to examine "closed" Islam. First, postsecular analysis postulates a transformation of public, cognitive and private spheres which is incompatible with "closed" Islam.[77] As indicated above, in the Islamic tradition, religion and politics are inseparable. This aspect of Islam challenges, not only secularization, but also, according to Pasha, postsecular discourses that retain "conceptions of secularity, secularisation or secularism."[78] Pasha contends that postsecular discourses have largely reproduced the "social imaginary" of the distillation and reconciliation of religious and secular worldviews.[79] Thus, Pasha is similar to Habermas' critics—like Bernice Martin, Peter Nynäs et

[71] Mustapha Kamal Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012): 1043.
[72] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1041.
[73] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1055.
[74] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1053.
[75] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1053.
[76] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1041.
[77] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1048–49.
[78] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1049.
[79] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1049.

al., and Gregor McLennan—who argue that citizens are not exclusively either religious or secular. Instead, these scholars contend that postsecular citizens fall along a continuum from conformity with to complete rejection of secular worldviews.

The inseparability of religion and politics in Islam raises a second challenge: the struggle to interpret—in the context of postsecularity— "the assumed stubbornness of Islam to secular modernity."[80] Pasha suggests "an alternative idiom" is required. However, according to Pasha, this idiom would require a "recognition of the relative autonomy of political practices detached from religious attachment," and a "rejection of the totalising nature of Islam" in both historical and contemporary terms. Thus, such an idiom would not explain the rejection of Western secularized modernity by "closed" Islam, but reduce "the discursive space of religion."[81] Alternatively, Pasha considers "reflexive postsecularity," which acknowledges "both the historical transformation wrought by 'secularising' processes" and its limits. [82] Pasha argues that "postsecularity opens up new spaces" that recognize "suppressed religious vernaculars [e.g., Islamic fundamentalism] within Western modernity as a condition of possibility to be attentive to alternative cultural programmes."[83] However, "[r]eflexive postsecularity would show an awareness of cultural particularism" in a given societal context.[84]

In contrast, Kristina Stoeckl suggests that postsecular theorizing illuminates a condition "of religion and secular outlooks on society and politics" where one's "modes of understanding" of one's "life creates tensions."[85] According to Stoeckl, postsecular theorizing do not merely address the existence of religious and secular discourses present in the public sphere; instead,

[80] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1052.
[81] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1053.
[82] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1047.
[83] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1049.
[84] Pasha, "Islam and the Postsecular," 1049.
[85] Kristina Stoeckl, "Defining the Postsecular" (presentation, The Seminar of Professor Khoruzhij, *Academy of Sciences,* Moscow, February 2011).

recognize "a condition of permanent tension" present in the plurality of religious traditions and secular outlooks within society.[86] Societal awareness of the presence of multiple discourses and influences on society opens up discursive spaces. These spaces could allow a society to reflectively interpret its religious, cultural and secular histories. Stoeckl's view of the postsecular as "a condition of permanent tension" present in pluralistic societies is thus comparable to Shmuel Eisenstadt's Multiple Modernities Theory (MMT). MMT proposes that societies develop their own form of modernity in the context of their religious, cultural, and secular histories. In the next chapter, I assess how we might be able to take a postsecular perspective of MMT.

[86] Stoeckl, "Defining the Postsecular."

Chapter 2: Multiple Modernities Theory

The goal of chapter two is to determine whether there is a feasible synthesis of Multiple Modernities Theory and postsecular theory, in other words, a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, that can explain cases outside the purview of Habermassian discourses. The specific case under consideration (in chapter three) will be Tatarstan and the nation-building project that uses Jadidism to reclaim Tatar ethno-religious identity.

Shmuel Eisenstadt's Multiple Modernities Theory (MMT) rejects a normative-singular version of modernity.[87] Similar to Habermas' postsecular theory, the genesis of MMT is rooted in social theories on secularization. According Colin Jager, secularization theories viewed Western society as the template for "industrialized societies" that develop "according to a single, culture-neutral model in which complexity and reflexivity replace simplicity and tradition."[88] However, in the view of Eisenstadt, "modernity and Westernization are not identical" and Western modernity is not the sole authentic model for modern society despite being the dominant historical reference point.[89]

Unlike previous social theories having to do with secularization and modernization, MMT considers the "social, political, and intellectual activists, and…social movements" in a given society that are "pursuing different programs of modernity."[90] Eisenstadt argues that MMT aims to understand multicultural and multi-confessional societies that "reappropriate and redefine the discourse of modernity in their own new terms."[91] However, as with postsecular theory, critics of

[87] Shamuel Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus*, 129 (2000): 2–3.
[88] Colin Jager, *The Book of God: Secularization and Design in the Romantic Era* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 27.
[89] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 2.
[90] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 2.
[91] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 24.

MMT allege a Western bias and question whether MMT is distinct from previous theories on secularization and modernization.

Are There Multiple Modernities?

Volker H. Schmidt argues that MMT cannot simply theorize that non-Western societies develop distinct variants of modernity by merely incorporating different cultural and religious traditions.[92] Similarly, Alexander Agadjanian contests the feasibility of MMT and argues that MMT's rejection of the relevance of Western hegemonic patterns in concepts of modernity do not diminish Western-centricities: "multiplicity can mean *not* the growth of authentic different modernities but rather a variety of ways to accommodate western modernity and to be accommodated to the global climate of western cultural hegemony."[93] According to Agadjanian, the contestation of Western forms of modernization demonstrates a selection process where Western conceptions of modernization legitimize non-Western society's variant of modernity.[94] For Agadjanian, when societies select aspects of Western concepts of modernity, these societies are implicitly "accepting the very language of modernity" which is by "default coded in western modern terms."[95] Agadjanian thus argues that MMT fails to adequately address the cultural Western hegemony underlying it.[96]

According to Alberto Martinelli, from a multiple modernities perspective, in non-Western societies "leaders, elites and collective movements" not only innovative on non-Western concepts of modernity by "continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of" Western concepts

[92] Volker H. Schmidt, "Multiple Modernities or Varieties of Modernity?" *Current Sociology* 54, no. 1 (2006): 78.

[93] Alexander Agadjanian, "Russia's Cursed Issues: Post-Soviet Religion, and the Endurance of Secular Modernity," in *Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Societies*, ed. Massimo Rosati and Kristina Stoeckl (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 84–85.

[94] Agadjanian, "Russia's Cursed Issues," 84.

[95] Agadjanian, "Russia's Cursed Issues," 85.

[96] Agadjanian, "Russia's Cursed Issues," 85.

of modernity, but also express "an ambivalent attitude towards" these concepts.[97] As an example of innovation, consider the official support of Jadidism by Tatarstan's first president, Mintimer Shaimiev, who "advocated [for] education for women, a synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophies, and a merging of Western technology with the wisdom of the Koran."[98] A demonstration of the "ambivalent attitude" is the support by "Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders" who called Jadidism "Euro-Islam" and "stress[ed] the special, moderate nature of 'Russian Islam,'" which unnerved "some Muslims" who feared "that official endorsement alone [would] discredit the reform process."[99]

Martinelli argues that the various responses and strategies are ways to handle the introduction of Western concepts of modernity, "such as industrialization," a capitalist economy, "social differentiation, urbanisation and mass migration."[100] For Martinelli, these various responses and strategies represent the "different national routes to modernisation" that are shaped by a given country's "economic and political" relationship with internal and external economic and political institutions.[101] Furthermore, these various responses and strategies enable those with political clout—those with political influence or power—access to "cultural and organizational recourses."[102] Martinelli considers those who have access to cultural and organizational resources to be "key agents of modernisation."[103] An example of this is Tatar political elites' reinterpretations of Western concepts of modernity throughout the 1990s that led the Tatar government to eschew a single top-down approach reminiscent of Soviet policies. Instead, the government adopted the

[97] Alberto Martinelli, "Global Modernisation and Multiple Modernities," in *Modernity at the Beginning of the 21th Century*, ed. Volker Schmidt (New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 192.

[98] Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, "Introduction," in *Religion and Politics in Russia: A Reader*, ed. Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer (New York: Routledge, 2010), xxi.

[99] Balzer, "Introduction," xxi.

[100] Martinelli, Alberto, "Global Modernisation," 192.

[101] Martinelli, Alberto, "Global Modernisation," 192.

[102] Martinelli, Alberto, "Global Modernisation," 192.

[103] Martinelli, Alberto, "Global Modernisation," 192.

Western concept of multiculturalism to support Tatarstan's language policy to avoid alienating ethnic Russians. By doing so, the Tatar government reduced its explicit emphasis on Tatar ethno-religious identity and promoted a bilingual language policy.

From a postsecular perspective, the internal and external tensions produced by various responses and strategies among those with political clout demonstrates societal awareness that each opinion in society—whether from political leaders or minority groups—affects the reinterpretation of Western concepts of modernity such as bilingualism or multiculturalism; such awareness enables a given society to tailor Western concepts of modernity by considering local specificities such as its religious and ethnic makeup.

Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Theory

At this point, the Multiple Modernities Theory will be linked with postsecular theory. This provides the theoretical foundation for the case study in chapter three. To reiterate, a key issue this study investigates is the utilization of Jadidism by the government of Tatarstan. One of the defining features of Jadidism is its modern-reformist approach to ethnic-religious identity as a part of a nation-building project.

Similar to Habermas and Eisenstadt, Stoeckl considers religion as playing an important role in reinterpreting concepts of modernity.[104] For Stoeckl, in order to assess the role of religion in a given society is to synthesize postsecular theory and MMT. Though Stoeckl does not elaborate further on the phrase "postsecular perspective of multiple modernities," she does note that postsecular MMT enables one to assess "actors and cultural dominions" present in society, and explain the transformative role religion plays in a given society's cultural and political programmes.[105] That being said, a more substantial route to assess the feasibility of postsecular

[104] Stoeckl, "European Integration and Russian Orthodoxy," 102.
[105] Stoeckl, "European Integration and Russian Orthodoxy,"111.

perspective of multiple modernities would be to assess the conjuncture between religion and secular worldviews in the public sphere; specifically the tensions that arise at public boundaries when religion-as-culture is used to support political endeavors such as developing an ethno-religious national identity through public policies in order to manage collective identity.

According to Willfried Spohn, one of the benefits of using Multiple Modernities Theory is that it enables one to scrutinize the various constructions of national identity in contemporary society, especially with respect to the prevalence of religion. By looking beyond hegemonic patterns of Western modernity, one is enabled to analyze the influence of religion on contemporary politics.

After the collapse of Soviet Communism, a "parallel revival of ethnic nationalism and religion" occurred throughout Eastern Europe and Eurasian regions that were part of the Soviet bloc. In the view of Spohn, this challenged Western concepts of modernization.[106] This is because, according to him, Western concepts of modernization do not consider the influence of religion on national identity. Instead, he proposes that "with the dissolution of ethnic communities and religion" through "the modernization processes…national identities in modern societies" begin to "[shape] civic and secular" discourses. [107] Spohn states that there is a "dilemma of explaining …the rise of ethnic nationalism and religion," and argues for the use of MMT to do so. He lays out three of its advantages for analyzing the rise of ethnic nationalism and religion.[108]

First, Spohn addresses the assertion that "with the formation of modern nation-states" nationality constituted by ethnicity is "replaced by [secular] political and civic dimensions."[109] To

[106] Willfried Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," *Current Sociology* 51, no. 3–4 (2003), 265.
[107] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 267.
[108] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 268.
[109] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 268.

account for this displacement of ethnicity, in the modern state, ethnicity is viewed as a "crucial component of modern national identity and nationalism."[110] It presents an idealized "distinction between two" forms of nationalism: the "political-civic western type" and the "ethnic-cultural eastern type."[111] However, Spohn argues that neither considers the multiple influences on national identity. In order to rectify this problem, Spohn suggests that "national identities and nationalisms" can be constructed through various "combinations of" ethnic and "political-civic components."[112]

Second, Spohn views MMT as addressing criticisms similar to those that questioned the adequacy of the secularization thesis. He notes that in "recent studies" investigating "the relationship between religion, nation-building, [and] nationalism," doubts have arisen concerning the "modernist assumption that nation-state formation and modern nationalism dissolve religion and religious identities by secular forms of national identity."[113] Similar to Habermas' response to the debates on secularization and the continuous reassertion of religion in the public sphere, Spohn argues that MMT can address the transformative role of "religion and religious traditions" on "nation-building and collective identity" can address the "constitutive component of modern nations and national identity."[114] The notion that religious traditions contribute to the formation of national identity is similar to Rosati and Stoeckl's view on a postsecular society, particularly the contention that religion becomes a source of meaning. Similar to Kyrlezhev's view, religious symbols become a marker—but, in the case of nationalism, religion becomes a marker for national identity.

[110] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 268.
[111] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 269.
[112] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 269.
[113] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 269.
[114] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 269.

Third, Spohn argues that globalization is not the "dissemination and imposition of western market capitalism, democratic nation-state and secular culture."[115] Instead, globalization processes are a multiplicity of irregular "encounters of varying types of modernities in their economic, political, religious and secular cultures."[116] Spohn posits that "non-western varieties of modernity are not simply an adaptation of non-western civilizations to western modernity, but an incorporation of western impacts and influences" on "non-western civilizational dynamics, programmes of modernity and modernization processes."[117] As such, according to Spohn, to explain the "global rise of ethnic and religious nationalism," one must consider the "internal…[and] external forces of nation-building and national identity formation."[118] The internal and external forces driving the processes of nation-building and national identity is similar to postsecular reflectivity. According to Rosati and Stoeckl "postsecular reflectivity"[119] implies that both secular modern society and religious traditions are "capable of finding from within their own imaginaries good reasons to enter into a dialectical relationship of mutual tolerance and/or recognition" of each other.[120] However, although "postsecular reflectivity" is important in postsecular theorizing and there is a similarity with MMT, from a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, postsecular reflexivity is critical particularly when considering the influential role religion plays in a given society and the active process of selection and reinterpretation of Western concepts of modernity by a non-Western society.

[115] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 270.
[116] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 270.
[117] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 270.
[118] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity," 270.
[119] In postsecular literature, there is a switching back both between "reflectivity" and "reflexivity." The difference between the two is this, "reflectivity" implies that one is reflecting on past events or a large body of knowledge; whereas "reflexivity" implies a pro active response when one not only reflects, but also through reflection is able to gain insight before one acts on a social endeavor.
[120] Rosati and Stoeckl, "Introduction,"4.

That being said, in the final chapter, the postsecular perspective of multiple modernities will be elaborated on and applied to the case of Islam in the Republic of Tatarstan. Analysis will focus on the role of Jadidism and its influence on Tatarstan's educational and language policy as a means of reclaiming Tatar ethno-religious identity.

Chapter 3: Reclaiming Tatar Ethno-Religious Identity

A postsecular perspective of multiple modernities articulates tensions that arise as a result of the coexistence of religious and secular worldviews in contemporary non-Western societies. One of the key characteristics a postsecular framework brings to MMT is an awareness of the transformative role of religion in public civic narratives. Through these civic narratives, religion impacts both national identity and public policy. Their synthesis therefore yields a promising theoretical tool for analyzing non-Western, non-democratic, and non-Christian contexts. This chapter tests that utility by applying it to the case of Tatarstan, where the Tatar government has had to balance its emphasis in public discourse and policy between religious, ethnic, and linguistic identities using an imported concept of multiculturalism. This balancing act has happened in the context of the Islamic modern reform movement of Jadidism and its survival through the Soviet period of state-enforced secularism. First, I provide a short history of Jadidism followed by a survey of the impact of Soviet antireligious policies on Tatar Islam. Second, I analyze the use of Jadidism by the Tatar government to promote educational reforms and language policy.

Jadidism: Tatarstan's Islamic Modern Reform Movement

During the nineteenth century, a new movement emerged from the Hanafī branch of Islam known as Jadidism. This was an Islamic modern reform movement supported by Tatar intellectuals and religious elites.[121] The Jadid movement saw modernization as a way to improve Tatar religious life and education. These reforms included opening the interpretation of the Qur'an, *ijtihad*, in order to introduce Western scientific knowledge into Tatar education, and supporting political autonomy from Imperial Russia.[122]

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[121] Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia Islamic Threat* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 174.

[122] Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 4–10.

Like today, during the nineteenth century, Tatarstan was home to a multitude of ethnic and religious communities. However, there was still resistance to Jadid reforms, the main source of which came from the conservative Hanafī Islam adherents and the enclaves of the Sufi brotherhood.[123] According to Adeeb Khalid, the Jadid reformers struggled over the interpretation of Islam with older and more conservative elites.[124] Khalid argues that these conservatives wished to prevent the use of religious and cultural symbols by Jadid reformers to propagate a "coherent, systematic and self-contained set of beliefs and practices," and promote "worldly" knowledge, such as scientific knowledge, distinct from Islam.[125] From a conservative perspective, Jadidism departed from traditional understandings of Islam as inseparable from all aspects of daily life. Despite this resistance, reforms did occur; for example, changes were made to the educational system in Kazan, the current capital of Tatarstan. Religious schools in Kazan were encouraged to promote a Jadidist open interpretation of the Qur'an instead of viewing the sacred text as a source of immutable knowledge. The Jadid reformers believed the open interpretation of the Qur'an would encourage the growth of secular forms of knowledge. In the eyes of Gordon Hahn, who specializes in Russian and Eurasian political history, the nineteenth century Jadid educational reforms distinguished Jadid "Tatars [as] some of the most modern Muslims of their day."[126] In the view of Hahn, the Jadid educational reforms in nineteenth century Kazan were able to directly challenge the "conservative 'Qadimists', (*qadim* means 'old')," who "attribute[ed] all phenomena to Allah," and favored fixed interpretations of the Qur'an.[127]

The Jadid movement also cultivated a secular form of Islamic nationalism in order to

[123] Alexandre Bennigsen, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 5.
[124] Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 5–6.
[125] Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 113.
[126] Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat*, 176–77.
[127] Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat*, 177.

distance Tatars from their identity as imperial subjects of Russia. Influenced by "romantic discourses of nationhood" from Imperial Russia,[128] the reformers considered Jadidism as a "marker of political and cultural identity."[129] Furthermore, nineteenth century Jadidism was characterized as a "fluid rather than fixed" form of Islamic nationalism, thereby enabling Jadid reformers to remain adaptable to secular worldviews that may be introduced to Tatar Islam.[130] In that regard, the legacy of nineteenth century Jadidism still influences Tartar political and religious elites in today's post-communist Tatarstan. This enabled them to not only meet the challenge of reclaiming Tatar ethno-religious identity, but also handle the political and cultural tensions that resulted from the Soviet collapse in 1991.

The Soviet Era: The Effect of Anti-Religious Policies On Islam

With the establishment of the Soviet government after the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Soviets began to consolidate their rule by implementing anti-religious policies. These policies restricted religious activities, confiscated property such as mosques, and restricted the growth of religious education by censoring religious literature.[131] During the 1930s, the Soviets liquidated mosques and suppressed Islamic religious leaders, *mullas,* who were accused of having foreign contacts and conspiring against the Soviet government.[132] This was followed by the restriction of the Islamic educational system.[133] The Arabic alphabet, an important link to Islam, was replaced in schools with the "Latin-based Yangalif (lanalif)," and consequently an "Islamic education

[128] Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat*, 175.
[129] Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform,* 11.
[130] Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 12.
[131] Philip Walters, "A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy," in *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union,* ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.
[132] Dilyara Usmanova, Ilnur Minnullin, and Rafik Mukhametshin, "Islamic education in Soviet and post-Soviet Tatarstan," in *Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and its Successor* States, ed. Michael Kemper, et al. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 42.
[133] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 43.

[became] impossible."[134] The Soviet government developed a secular curriculum based on dialectical-materialism to replace religious schooling. According to Dimitry Pospielovsky, dialectical-materialism served as an ideological "theory about the true nature of reality." [135] It replaced the metaphysical explanations of religion and emphasized scientific discourse and Marxist views on human beings as natural products of "material forces."[136]

The Soviet suppression of religion reached its peak in the 1950s. Religious activities were only permitted at home. Religious practices, beliefs, and rules were done in a "rudimentary fashion."[137] From the 1960s to the 1980s, Islamic "services and rituals [were] conducted by unqualified men" and there was a steady decline of the Arabic language among ethnic Tatars.[138] Though urban areas such as those in Kazan and Bukhara (a city in Uzbekistan) had Islamic religious schools, none were afforded new religious materials.[139] It was not until the late 1970s that a select number of students from Bukhara were allowed to train as Islamic officials outside the Soviet Union.[140]

A cultural and religious revival began in the 1980s during perestroika, a Russian word meaning "restructuring." Supported by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, perestroika sought to open up the Soviet Union to stimulate economic and social growth. Perestroika was a time of reform and political decentralization. In 1985, the Soviet government implemented new religious policies. The "new union law *On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations* and the law *On the Freedom of Worship* (1990)" gave religious organizations legal rights.[141] The new laws

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[134] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 43.
[135] Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, *A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism a Soviet Antireligious Polices: Volume 1 of a History of Soviet Atheism in Theory and Practice, and the* Believer (London: MacMillan Press, 1987), 21.
[136] Pospielovsky, *A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism a Soviet Antireligious Polices*, 21.
[137] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 45.
[138] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 48.
[139] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 49.
[140] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 49.
[141] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 50.

prompted the registration of new mosques and by 1994 about 3000 were opened.[142] Alongside these developments, the restoration of "older prayer houses," the growth of religious literature, and the re-establishment of religious education, including Islamic schools, also occurred.[143]

Jadidism in Present Day Tatarstan

As stated in the introduction, Habermas argues that the concept of modernity can no longer be equated to secularity. The visibility of religion in the public sphere since the fall of Soviet Communism in the early 1990s and rise of ethnic and religious nationalism in the former Soviet bloc challenged Western concepts of modernity and secularity. To account for the presence of religion in the public sphere, social theories such as postsecular theory and MMT draw attention to the way that religious and secular worldviews within a given society construct and shape civic and political narratives. In turn, they also challenge perceptions that societies, particularly non-Western and non-Christian societies, simply replicate a culture-neutral Western model of modernity. These theories acknowledge that non-Western and non-Christian societies are actively formulating their own variants of modernity. In doing so, they not only depart from previous Eurocentric assumptions that assume a top-down structural agency, but rather illuminates the influential role of human agency that ranges from political elites to oppositional minority groups. Taking that into consideration, during the transition period, i.e., 1990s onward, in Tatarstan. Tatar political elites sought to consolidate regional autonomy without provoking a backlash from Moscow. In support of the effort to gain regional autonomy, Tatars embarked on reclaiming their ethno-religious identity. However, as Shireen Hunter states, "religion did not play a dominant role" in the national movement among Tatar political elites. Tatar political elites envisioned a modern-secular state where Islam would serve "as a unifying cultural symbol even for secular

[142] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 50.
[143] Usmanova, Minnullin, and Mukhametshin, "Islamic Education," 50.

nationalists."[144] To accomplish this, the government of Tatarstan created *The All-Tatar Public Center* (ATPC), whose goal was to synthesize Islam with contemporary public policy. Its guiding principle was that "the history of Tatar culture and enlightenment, the entire way of life, is closely connected to Islam. Therefore, Islam cannot be separate from national policy or from the national movement."[145]

According to Guzel Yusupova, Jadidism legitimized Tatar nationalism throughout the 1990s.[146] It supported the Tatar government's goals of reclaiming Tatar ethno-religious identity and presenting Tatarstan as a modernizing state. In effect, the use of Jadidism blurred the boundaries between religious and secular worldviews.

According to Greg Ashworth, the use of religious heritage to formulate public policy is a way to manage "collective identity" without having to believe in and practice a particular faith. In this context, "religion has become a political matter" which is emphasized through "linguistic, ethnic" as well as "political programmes and aspirations."[147] From a postsecular perspective, the role of religion in policy-making illustrates postsecular reflexivity. James Bohman notes that the concept of reflexivity found in Habermassian postsecular discourse refers to more than just a "change of mentality" among "religious believers and nonbelievers."[148] It also refers to them seeing "the limits of their own perspective" and cultivating an "open[ness] to the 'true contents' of other views."[149] In that regard, Jadidism's influence on Tatarstan's educational reforms and

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[144] Shireen T. Hunter, *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and* Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 218.

[145] Hunter, *Islam in Russia*, 218.

[146] Guzel Yusupova, "The Islamic representation of Tatarstan as an Answer to the Equalization of the Russian Regions," *Nationalities Papers* 44, no. 1 (2016): 44.

[147] Greg Ashworth, "Public Pasts in Plural Societies: Model for Management in the Postsecular City," in *Postsecular Cities: Space, Theory and Practice*, ed. Justin Beaumont and Christopher Baker (New York: Continuum, 2011), 169.

[148] James Bohman, "A Postsecular Global Order?" in *Habermas and Religion*, ed. Craig Calhoun et al. (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 180.

[149] Bohman, "A Postsecular Global Order?" 180.

language policy illustrates postsecular reflexivity, not only because there is an emphasis on Tatarstan's Islamic heritage, but also because there is a consideration of its impact on the present and future of Tatarstan's multicultural society.

The Tatar government explicitly sought to depict Tatar Islam as the standard form of Islam within the Russian Federation. To avoid conflict, Tatar politicians and intellectuals, such as Mintimer Shaimiev, Tatarstan's first president (1991–2010), and his advisor Rafael Khakimov, were adamant on presenting Jadidism as a "modern" branch of Islam. The reason for such an ardent desire to present Jadidism as a modern branch of Islam was to avoid sparking hostility from Moscow. This disposition was influenced by the war in Chechnya (1994–1996). According to Vahit Akaev, the Russo-Chechen war was characterized by the emergence of *Wahhabism*, a radical form of Islam, which was a central component that encouraged Chechen rebels to seek political sovereignty and establish an Islamic state similar Saudi Arabia.[150] According to John Russell, the Islamic component present in the Chechen war was played out by the Russian press and was successful in "prey[ing] on the fear in the Russian psyche of Islamic fundamentalism," wherein "the words 'terrorist,' 'Caucasian' and 'Muslim' had merged into one demonic figure."[151]

Shireen Hunter notes that Khakimov viewed Jadidism as an "'Oriental' interpretation of European culture."[152] He believed that it could foster individualism and liberal democracy.[153] Further, Khakimov saw Jadidism as a foundation for modern Islam and Tatar-Islamic values. Similarly, Azat Khurmatullin indicates that Khakimov's interpretation of Jadidism was based on the idea that "in order to develop" an Islam compatible "with present-day social and political

[150] Vahit Akaev, "Chechniia and Ingushetiia: Islam and Politics," in *Radical Islam in the Former Soviet* Union, ed. Galina Yemelianova (New York: Routledge, 2010), 69–70.

[151] John Russell, "Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russia Perceptions of Chechens During the Wars in Chechnya, 1994–96 and 1999–2001," in *Russia After Communism*, ed. Rick Fawn and Stephen White (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 79.

[152] Hunter, *Islam in Russia*, 92.

[153] Hunter, *Islam in Russia*, 92.

values" it would be necessary to offer a "contemporary interpretation of Islamic norms in terms of the spirit of the Qur'an."[154] Consequently, Khakimov's view on Jadidism ignited debates among Tatar intellectuals and religious elites. Of central importance was the balance between establishing a society guided by the Qur'an while still "accepting modern benefits, including the scientific accomplishments of the West."[155] In debating this issue, Valiulla Yakupov, a former member of Tatarstan's religious board publicly voiced opposition towards contemporary Jadidism. Yakupov argued that this "Eurocentric" interpretation of Islam was "artificially created in order to please the West and certain circles," including the central Russian government.[156] Yakupov suggested that to "overcome Euro-centrism" prompted by contemporary developments in Jadidism, Tatar society should instead invest its efforts in reviving Hanafī Islam.[157] Yakupov argued that Hanafī Islam could equally sustain "Tatar ethnic peculiarities" and "local traditions," as well as consider secular concepts.[158] Conversely, Khakimov argued that Tatar Muslims "should not reject" the possibility of reinterpreting Islam simply because "modern concepts" have "Western origin[s]," and "the East will not take liberalism in its pure form."[159] Rather, Khakimov suggested that an alternative would be to "reject" Western-modern concepts by using Islamic traditions such as *ijtihad* (the act of personal interpretation), which he argues is an Islamic form of "liberal thinking."[160] Khurmatullin states that Khakimov's view on Islam is rooted in his own interpretation of the Qur'an, exemplified by his statement that: "the faithful cannot be slaves to Allah because they have chosen of their own free will to practice Islam," and faith is the embodiment of the

[154] Azat Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with nationalism," in *Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism*, ed. Roland Dannreuther et al. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 114.
[155] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 113.
[156] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 114–15.
[157] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 116
[158] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 116.
[159] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 114.
[160] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 114.

freedom to believe in a "transcendent God" and "the human mind."[161] Despite criticisms, the Tatar government was determined to use Jadidism throughout the 1990s. From a postsecular perspective, the debates surrounding Tatar political and religious elites showcase postsecular reflexivity. As Rosati and Stoeckl indicate, postsecular reflexivity is illustrated when religious traditions are able to adjust "to a secular environment," not by "*giving up* their vocabulary and embracing an allegedly natural public reason, but on the contrary by *mobilizing* their religious language and their own religious imaginary in order to respond to the modern condition."[162]

Similarly, the Tatar government promoted "Islam in Tatarstan" in three distinct but interrelated ways that positioned Jadidism as an authentic form of Islam and "legitimize[d]" the Tatar identity as a "traditional culture" that was compatible with Russian society.[163] The first was to present Jadidism as a central "feature of 'traditional Tatar Islam'" that could establish good diplomatic relations "between the Muslim world and Russia." The second was the proposal that Tatar Islam could ease the conflict between "the Muslim and the European civilisations" on religious grounds and encourage religious tolerance. Third, Tatar Islam was presented as the "face of Russian Islam."[164] The adaptive use of Jadidism by the Tatar government, from a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, does illuminate postsecular reflexivity—a key feature in both postsecular theory and MMT—occurring in a non-Western and non-Christian context. Nonetheless, the synthesis of postsecular theory and MMT fails to provide an avenue to assess a non-democratic context. The reason lies with the presence of postsecular reflexivity—understood as a cognitive awareness—among collective social actors within Tatarstan of the influence of Tatar Islam within that semi-autonomous territory, in the Russian Federation, and internationally. That

[161] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 114.
[162] Rosati and Stoeckl, "Introduction," 4.
[163] Yusupova, "Islamic Representation of Tatarstan,"46.
[164] Yusupova, "Islamic Representation of Tatarstan," 46.

is to say, Tatar political elites displayed a degree of political responsibility by considering the possible impact that Jadidism may pose towards the general populace. Furthermore, the basic premise of contemporary Jadidism favors a liberal-democratic context which contrasts with the anti-religious policies of the Soviet period that neglected both the negative or positive ramifications of policies on the populace under Soviet control. Within this case study, at least, the postsecular perspective of multiple modernities falls short in assessing a non-democratic context.

Despite Tatarstan's promotion of Tatar Islam, in the early 2000s during Vladimir Putin's rise to power, an alterative to Jadidism, called "Russian Islam," emerged. Russian Islam was a project developed "by the Nizhnii Novgorod Center for Strategic Research" and "supported by the then head of the Volga Federal District and former Prime minister Sergei Kirienko."[165] Khurmatullin states that the aim of the program was to change the mentalities of non-Muslim Russians by incorporating "Islam into Russian reality."[166] Doing so required displacing the "Tatar led definition and promotion of Islam" through, for example, the use of Russian "in mosques in urban centers" as a way to oust the role of Tatar as the "language of identity."[167]

According to Khurmatullin, among Tatar political elites, language is considered a part of "religious identity." Similarly, Aurora Veinguer and Howard H. Davis affirm that "language is the main symbol of [Tatar] tradition."[168] Its continuous presence in "different spheres of everyday life"—ranging from the domestic sphere to the public spheres of mass communication and the workplace—is required to ensure the public presence of Tatar identity.[169] Therefore, if the Tatar language were to lose its "influence as the language of religious identity among Tatars," then Tatar

[165] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 116.
[166] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 116.
[167] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 116.
[168] Aurora Alvarez Veinguer and Howard H. Davis, "Building a Tatar Elite," *Ethnicities* 7, no. 2 (2007): 197.
[169] Veinguer, and Davis, "Building a Tatar Elite," 197.

ethno-religious identity would be at risk of disappearing.[170]

From a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, the contentious atmosphere surrounding contemporary Jadidism is twofold. First, the internal disagreements or rather states of tension illuminated an awareness among Tatar religious elites that Islam could decline in social importance among ethnic Tatars due to its perceived westernization through Jadidism. Equally, Tatar political elites recognize that to reclaim and sustain ethno-religious autonomy, Tatar Islam had to remain open, flexible, and responsive to criticisms expressed from within Tatarstan. Second, the tension among Tatarstan's political and religious elites illustrates what Gerald Delanty describes as an "encounter between the cultural model of society—the way in which society reflects and cognitively interprets itself—and the institutional order of social, economic and political structures."[171] According to Delanty, culture can be seen "as a form of mediation between agency and structure,"[172] where those who have access to cultural resources, have a sense of interpretative autonomy or "creative action."[173] In that regard, both Tatar political elites and religious elites not only can be seen as having access to cultural resources like Jadidism and Hanafī Islam, but also that access enables them to influence public policy and the ways in which Tatar Islam is portrayed publicly. Likewise, from a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, the perception that Islam is predominantly closed off to secular worldviews diminishes. Though Jadidism requires a democratic context to balance religious tradition and secular worldviews, it does not seek to relegate Islam, but rather seeks to re-negotiate the place of Islam alongside secularism. In that regard, from a postsecular and multiple modernities point of view, it could be

[170] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan," 116.
[171] Gerald Delanty, *Social Theory in a Changing World: Conceptions of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), 11.
[172] Delanty, *Social Theory*,11
[173] Delanty, *Social Theory*, 10.

argued that the use of Jadidism encourages a departure from the notion that the incorporation of secular discourse delimits aspects of Islam. Instead, what possibly occurred is a transformation of Islam through Jadidism. In that regard, Tatar political elites not only retained the relevance of Islam, but also promoted a distinct form of Tatar Islam that reflected the adaptive and secular disposition present in Tatarstan's educational reforms and language policy.

Tatarstan: Educational Reforms and Language Policy

Eisenstadt theorizes that "the growing diversification of the understanding of modernity" and "basic cultural agendas of different modern societies" is produced by "the ongoing dialogue" between global "modern reconstruction[s]" and local "cultural resources" expressed by "respective civilizational traditions."[174] The "ongoing dialogue" among transnational civilizations is occurring within local societies where "new questionings and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity are emerging."[175] This "ongoing dialogue" can be seen in Tatarstan's educational reforms and language policy.

According to Katherine E. Graney, Tatar political elites sought to gain control over "institutions of public knowledge production and dissemination," including education and language policy, which formed part of Tatarstan's nation-building project.[176] The Tatar language became synonymous with the Tatar identity and became "a central symbol and instrument in" Tatarstan's nation-building project.[177] Dmitry Gorenburg indicates that the Tatar national movements highlighted the negative effects that Soviet policies had on Tatar culture and language.[178] These negative effects were exemplified by the declining use of the Tatar language in

[174] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 24.
[175] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 24.
[176] Katherine E. Graney, *Of Khans and Kremlin: Tatarstan and the Future of Ethno-Federalism in Russia*, (New York: Lexington Books, 2009), 67–69.
[177] L. R. Nizamova, "Ethnic Tatars in Contention in Recognition and Autonomy: Bilingualism and Pluri-cultural Education Policies in Tatarstan," *Nationalities Papers* 44, no. 1 (2016): 75.
[178] Dmitry Gorenburg, "Tatar Language Policies in Comparative Perspective," *Ab Imperio* 1 (2005): 259.

the public sphere.[179] To reverse this decline and reclaim Tatarstan's public persona, in 1992 the Tatar government implemented a language policy that declared the official languages of Tatarstan to be Russian and Tatar. This language policy was followed by the 1997 educational law that "made Tatar language learning compulsory in all secondary schools for all nationalities."[180] As part of the educational reforms, new science academies were established alongside Islamic "religious schools (*medrese*)" meant to educate "a new generation of Tatar Muslim clergy."[181] The Tatar government also created a "new national educational center, the Tatar *gymnásia*."[182]

According to Veinguer, and Davis, "these new schools were" considered a "potential vehicle for Tatar culture and language development."[183] In addition, they were also a place where students could "learn Arabic and become familiar with Islam," thereby creating relevant "new narratives of the Tatar people" to reflect Tatarstan's contemporary society.[184] In the view of Sergei Kondrashov, the purpose of Tatarstan's educational reforms was to transmit the "Muslim faith and culture" in general and, specifically, to transmit Tatar ethno-religious identity to the next generation.[185] From a multiple modernities perspective, Tatarstan's educational reforms and language policy facilitated a new type of collective identity. Jadidism was adaptive in that it enabled Tatar political elites to overcome "homogenizing program[s]" such as the Soviet model. In doing so, they were able to claim cultural autonomy through public institutions.[186] However, according to Gorenburg, though "both Tatar and Russian" citizens accepted the Tatar language policy, "Russian activists expressed

[179] Gorenburg, "Tatar Language Policies," 259.
[180] Teresa Wiggleworth-Baker, "Language, School and Nation-Building in Tatarstan," in *Nation-Building and Identity in the Post-Soviet Space*, ed. Rico Isaacs and Abel Polese (New York: Routledge, 2016), 85
[181] Sergei Kondrashov, *Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988–1992* (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), 85.
[182] Veinguer, and Davis, "Building a Tatar Elite," 190.
[183] Veinguer, and Davis, "Building a Tatar Elite," 190.
[184] Veinguer, and Davis, "Building a Tatar Elite," 202.
[185] Kondrashov, *Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty*, 85.
[186] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 18.

concern" that the prioritization of the Tatar language in the public sphere might lead to "discrimination based on language knowledge."[187] Aware of these criticisms, the Tatar government curtailed its asymmetric emphasis on the Tatar language to sustain a co-operative relationship with ethnic Russians living in Tatarstan. In turn, the Tatar language policy was promoted as a bilingual language policy to showcase the equal importance of Russian and Tatar.[188]

As Gorenburg states, the promotion of bilingualism saw a concomitant rise in Russians endorsing both languages. For example, in 1997 a survey "showed that 70 percent of urban Russians and 92 percent of rural Russians wanted their children to learn Tatar."[189] By 2001, surveys indicated that "over 70 percent of Russians [supported] the idea that state workers must speak both Russian and Tatar."[190] However, despite the relative success of the Tatar language policy and educational reforms, according to Matthew Derrick, the ascendency of Vladimir Putin in 2001 had a negative impact on the government of Tatarstan's ability to emphasize Tatar ethno-religious identity.

In 2002, under the Putin government, Tatarstan lost its "status as a sovereign republic" and became "a 'subject' of the Russian Federation."[191] Following Tatarstan's change in status, an amendment was implemented to curtail the use of titular languages—ethnic languages not recognized by the central Russian government as official languages—across Russia.[192] The

[187] Gorenburg, "Tatar Language Policies," 264.
[188] Nizamova, "Ethnic Tatars," 75.
[189] Gorenburg, "Tatar Language Policies," 272.
[190] Gorenburg, "Tatar Language Policies," 272.
[191] Teresa Wiggleworth-Baker, "Language Policy and Post-Soviet Identities in Tatarstan," *Nationalities Papers* 44, no.1 (2016): 22.
[192] In 1997 the Tatarstan government switched to Latin from Cyrillic on the basis that it emphasized Tatar's linguistic distinctiveness. The Tatar people share cultural ties with other Latin-script-using Turkic states; and it made translation easier compared to Cyrillic. See Kyle L. Marguardt, "Language and Sovereignty: Comparative Analysis of Language Policy in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, 1991–2010," in *Identity and Politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. Mohammed Ayoob and Murad Ismayilov (New York: Routledge, 2015), 49.

amendment mandated the use of the Cyrillic alphabet throughout the Russian Federation.[193] The Tatar government filed an appeal to continue using its variant of the Latin alphabet, but the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the requirement to use Cyrillic.[194] As Teresa Wiggleworth-Baker explains, the amendment was "regarded as Putin's way of curtailing what he considered as 'separatist tendencies.'"[195] Despite the Russian government's ban, "Tatar language and educational developments have continued."[196] In the view of Tatarstan's political elites, the language policy is a form of "cultural autonomy," providing a "supplementary form of self-determination."[197] Therefore, to sustain Tatarstan's sense of autonomy, the government had to find an alternate way of supporting Tatar ethno-religious identity.

During the 2010s, Tatarstan reduced its efforts to "reconcile Tatar national claims and ethno-cultural diversity," because of the rise of Russian nationalism and Putin's reassertion of political power.[198] In lieu of explicit support for Tatar ethno-religious identity through educational reforms and Tatarstan's language policy, the Tatar government promotes Tatarstan as a multicultural society. According to Nizamova, the Tatar government views this change as "a necessary condition for the recognition of Tatar identity."[199] Thus, the Tatar government can balance its interests "among ethno-cultural groups," implicitly legitimizing "the development of Tatar language, education, mass media and religion in the republic."[200]

From Eisenstadt's perspective, the reconfiguration of Tatarstan's approach to Tatar ethno-religious identity illustrates the development of "local concerns and interests," and depicts the

[193] Wiggleworth-Baker, "Language Policy," 22.
[194] Wiggleworth-Baker, "Language Policy," 22.
[195] Wiggleworth-Baker, "Language Policy," 22.
[196] Wiggleworth-Baker, "Language Policy," 22.
[197] Nizamova, "Ethnic Tatars," 84.
[198] Nizamova, "Ethnic Tatars," 87.
[199] Nizamova, "Ethnic Tatars," 87.
[200] Nizamova, "Ethnic Tatars," 87.

continuous tension among reformists, traditional religious actors, and "new modern programs" that play out publicly.[201] The adaptive and reflexive approach illustrated by Tatarstan's civic discourses has redefined Tatar identity. This identity is not strictly religious, secular, or ethnically singular. Instead, Tatarstan's claim to Islam and Tatar identity morphed from a Tatar-Islamic identity into a multicultural one. From a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, the society is experiencing a shift from an idealized view of identity to a more open and pragmatic disposition. This has allowed the Tatar government to "reframe the relationship between Western and non-Western" conceptions of "civilization, religions and societies."[202] From a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, Tatarstan provides an avenue to assess the contentious, but transformative, role of religion in a non-Western and non-Christian context. Though the synthesis of postsecular theory and MMT does not provide an adequate framework for studying a non-democratic context, nevertheless, the synthesis of these two theories could pursue an analysis of the ongoing struggle for authority between local Tatar elites and the central Russian government. Of particular interest is the authoritative approach that the Russian government takes when handling ethno-religious endeavors. If a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities can shed light on the discursive role of religious and secular worldviews, this analysis could be proven even more beneficial. In particular, it would be a viable framework when considering instances where ethno-religious endeavors are under political tension that either obstruct or prevent a given society's desire to articulate its own variant of modern society. In that regard, the future impact of Jadidism on public policy and Tatar ethno-religious identity is yet to be determined. Thus, further research is needed to analyze societal changes in Tatarstan, particularly the use of religious, secular, and ethnic identities to inform civic discourses.

[201] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 18–20.
[202] Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 20.

Conclusion

Given the relevance of religion in the public sphere, there is little doubt among contemporary social scientists that no society is either monolithically secular nor religious. Though Habermas' postsecular theory recognizes religion as a political and cultural resource that can help secular society construct a reflexive public discourse, the deliberative procedures required for religion to be part of the public sphere delimit religious citizens and communities. That is, it proposes that within a postsecular society citizens, both religious and non-religious, engage in procedural deliberations in order to incorporate religious traditions into the public sphere. As Habermas' critics, such as Michele Dillon, Gregor McLennan, Massimo Rosati, and Kristina Stoeckl, have indicated, Habermas' postsecular theory portrays the default mentality of citizens within a postsecular society as predominantly secular, thereby neglecting the discursive history of religious participation in civic discourse. It ignores the possibility that citizens within a postsecular society can harbor both religious and secular mentalities. Habermas' critics view postsecular societies not as processes of deliberative procedures, but as discursive spaces characterized by an awareness that religious and secular discourses are in a condition of transformative tension.

From a multiple modernities perspective, the transformative tension that arises from the interaction of religious and secular discourses is a part of various processes involved in modern society. Postsecular MMT thereby departs from earlier social theories about secularization and modernization that consider Western society as a culture-neutral model. As Eisenstadt argues, societies are not all replications of Western society, because, although non-Western societies undergo social and intuitional differentiation, there is no certainty that ethnic and religious identities are displaced for a secular one. Instead, the interaction between religious traditions and secular worldviews enables a society to decide its own variant of modernity.

The synthesis of postsecular theory and MMT, or, as I have called it after Rosati and Stoeckl, a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, considers the multiplicity of social actors and cultural programs, thus allowing one to assess the use of religious and secular discourses present in cultural and political programs such as the use of Jadidism by the Tatar government in order to synthesize Islam with public policies as well as the debates it. By distinguishing between the use of religious and secular discourses present in society, one not only diminishes the possibility of abstracting social actors and human agency, but rather focuses on how internal tensions among social actors influence public debate and public policy.

In that regard, cases studies, such as this one on Tatarstan, enable one to investigate how aspects of religious traditions, such as the education and language elements of Jadidism, become political and cultural resources among collective social actors and government institutions wanting to use religious traditions not only as a means of transforming society, but also as a way of managing collective identity. The use of Jadidism by the Tatar government has enabled it to promote Tatar Islam as a tolerant form of Islam and to support educational reforms and language policies that have buttressed Tatarstan's ethno-religious history. Though one can argue that the use of Jadidism by the Tatar government was relatively successful for most the 1990s, it did not quell public debates and internal tensions that arose among political and religious elites concerned about the impact of Jadidism, not only in shaping Tatar ethno-religious identity, but also in shaping Tatarstan's multicultural society and its political relationship with the Russian Federation. From a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, such considerations illustrate what social theorists have articulated as "reflexivity" – a cognitive awareness that different dispositions along a spectrum of open-mindedness, ambivalence, or rejection of the combination of religious traditions with Western concepts of modernity and secularity can influence how a given society articulates

itself.

Although a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities can be useful analyzing the transformative role of religious and secular discourses within aspects of Tatarstan's nation-building project, yet another avenue that may be useful in substantiating a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities would be to use a comparative analysis approach. A comparative analysis enables social scientists to cross-examine different societies, ranging from how religious traditions are used in conjunction with public policy, to how a given society reinterprets religious tradition through economic consumerism. That being said, by using a comparative analysis approach, one may be able to analyze how non-Western societies are using religious traditions in conjunction with secular worldviews and concepts of modernity. Moreover, a comparative analysis using a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities would also enable one to not only assess how non-Western societies create new variants of modernity, but also to illuminate the peculiar religious landscape present in a given society such as the ways in which religious traditions are expressed at the individual or institutional level, and how these expressions promote levels of religious mobility such as believing without necessarily practicing. However, until a more in-depth and comparative analysis is conducted, the role of Jadidism and Tatar ethno-religious identity in Tatarstan's future remains uncertain.

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