Towards a Paradigm Shift in International Development?
Discourses, Norms, Practices

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Abstract
Since the late 1990s, a new paradigm in international development has challenged the so-called Washington Consensus (WC). While the latter is based on neoliberal economic growth, the new model of development, which we will refer to as ‘Inclusive Development’ (ID), is based on the concepts of ownership and human development. Using Inclusive Development as a case study, this paper posits a new approach for studying the process of dominant paradigm shifts. This research demonstrates that although the new model may have challenged the WC in the discourses, it hasn’t challenged it in the practices. Our overall argument is that a paradigm shift will take place only if an alternative model replaces the dominant one in the discourses, in the normative space and in the practices. Inclusive Development has already influenced the discourse of international organizations, NGOs and governments. Moreover, as a normative paradigm, it has passed through the three phases that Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) have conceptualized for the norm cycle, i.e. emergence, cascade and internalization. However, the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) proves that the WC still dominates the global policies of international development. As such, the paradigm shift remains incomplete.
Introduction

Since the late 1990s, a new paradigm in international development has challenged the so-called Washington Consensus (WC). While the latter is based on neoliberal economic growth, the new model of development, which we will refer to as ‘Inclusive Development’ (ID), is based on the concepts of ownership and human development. Using Inclusive Development as a case study, this paper posits a new approach for studying the process of dominant paradigm shifts. This research demonstrates that although the new model may have challenged the WC in the discourses, it hasn’t challenged it in the practices.

Our overall argument is that a paradigm shift will take place only if an alternative model replaces the dominant one in the discourses, in the normative space and in the practices. Inclusive Development has already influenced the discourse of international organizations, NGOs and governments. Moreover, as a normative paradigm, it has passed through the three phases that Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) have conceptualized for the norm cycle, i.e. emergence, cascade and internalization. However, the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) proves that the WC still dominates the global policies of international development. As such, the paradigm shift remains incomplete.

In this article, we will first define what we call Inclusive Development (ID). We will then demonstrate that it has been very influential in the discourses and as a normative paradigm, but not as much in the practices. In the first section of the argument, we will analyze the acceptance process of ID in the discourses. Precisely, from 1990 to 2000, the
United Nation Development Program (UNDP) has supported the institutionalization of this new paradigm with the emergence of new tools used to measure levels of development. Furthermore, the PRSPs and the MDGs, from 2000 to 2010, has consecrated what analysts call a new discursive consensus. After having exposed this change in discourse, we will analyze the emergence of ID as a normative paradigm, using the norm cycle theory borrowed from Finnemore and Sikkink. They argue that an idea will become a norm when it will have passed through three phases: emergence, cascade and internalization. We will apply this approach to the internalization of a normative paradigm, which we define as a coherent set of norms and standards.

In the second section of the argument, we will demonstrate that, although it is very present in the discourse and in the normative space, ID has not successfully influenced global public policies. In fact, the use of concepts such as human development and ownership in the PRSPs and the MDGs remains rhetorical. In contrast, we argue that a paradigm shift happens when an alternative paradigm has not only been institutionalized in discourse and passed through the three stages of the norm cycle, but has also been implemented in practices. Inclusive Development, as a normative paradigm, is at the third stage of the norm cycle, that is, internalization. Thus, following our approach, ID is not yet dominant because it has not completed the last stage of the process of a paradigm shift, which is implementation in practices. This logic supports that the Washington Consensus remains the dominant paradigm, for it still determines the practice of development. In other words, the supremacy of the WC, along with the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), has prevented Inclusive Development from inducing a paradigm shift.

**Limits**

Our research focuses on this novel approach on paradigm shifts. Our conclusion is that the Washington Consensus remains hegemonic. However, as a matter of fact, we do not argue for the profound reasons of this dominant paradigm stagnation. In other words, we do not explain *why* the WC is still prevailing. Numerous answers could explain this dominance: the national and international institutions’ rigidity, the difficulty to implement practices related to Inclusive development (human development and ownership), the slowness of social constructions’ changes, the presence of power relations between actors in the international system, etc. In the end, we aimed to posit an approach on the process of paradigm shift, not an explanation of the reasons for such a change.

Definition of Inclusive development

Criticisms of the Washington Consensus have contributed to the formation of different post-WC models. In this research, we focus on a post-consensus model called Inclusive Development. This challenging paradigm is defined by the concepts of human development (HD) and ownership, which will be explained in the following pages. Our definition of the ID paradigm goes beyond that of inclusive development that can be found nowadays in the literature, and which is often perceived as another attempt to impose neoliberal policies (Chibba 2011; Ruckert 2007). It also goes beyond the definition of inclusive growth (World Bank 2009), or pro-poor growth (Saad-Filho 2010). ID is also more encompassing than the
paradigm based solely on human development, as has been proposed by Richard Jolly (2007). In sum, the new consensus based on ID is broadly viewed as a conciliation of the UN paradigm (economically comprehensive and focalized on the individual) and the BWIs’ paradigm (national and neoliberal), thus a compromise between the Left and the Right (Therien 1999; 2007; 2010).

*Human development*

In the 1990s, Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq contested the well-accepted idea of development, seen as purely economic, suggesting it be based rather on an increase in human capacities, thus of their “freedom” (Sen 1999: 15). The UNDP's first Human Development Report (HDR) defines HD as an approach focused on the people and their accountability, that is, on the acceptance that « people are the real wealth of nations » (UNDP 1990: 1). The novelty of the idea of human development comes directly from its capacity to change our conception of development from a definition based on economic growth to one focused on the individual’s emancipation (Mahbub ul Haq 1995). An increase of the GDP/capita is no longer a goal in itself, but a means towards development. We will see later how the Human Development Index has contributed to this redefinition. HD has been substantiated with UNICEF’s publication of « Adjustment with a human face » in 1987, and with the launch of the Human Development Reports by the UNDP in 1990.

*Ownership*

We define ownership as both as development programs’ ownership by the governments of the South, and as the participation and inclusion of their civil society. These two kinds of
ownership imply a process of political transfer: a shift from a top-down approach led by the BWIs to a bottom-up approach starting from the South. Ultimately, taking into account the other, the dominated, such theoretical bases of ownership have a postmodern frame (Shuurman 1997; Leal 2007). The dominated here are the poor, in this case represented by the southern states and their population. Thus, in opposition to one-size fits all policies, dictated from the international organizations, the general idea underlying ownership in the ID is to draw from knowledge at the local level and to build-up development policies that are unique to each country.

Inclusive Development in discourse

The first section of our argument posits the implementation process of Inclusive Development in the global discourse in international government. We argue here that ID has been very influential in the global discourse in the field of international development. We divide this section chronologically, first going through the decade 1990-2000, and then through the decade 2000-2010.

First Decade (1990-2000)

First and foremost, since its conceptualization in 1990, HD has been supported by two principal tools: Human Development Reports (HDRs) and the Human Development Index (HDI). Such tools have greatly promoted HD implementation in the discourse of international organizations, NGOs, medias and governments. Firstly, printed every year since 1990, the HDR contributed to the acceptance of HD. “The impact of the Human Development Report on global dialogue on policies has exceeded expectations. More than
100 000 copies of the report are produced in 13 languages... It is quite an unusual answer for a report published by the United Nations” (Haq 1995: 43). Despite the annual HDR, more than 500 national human development reports have been produced since 1990.

The HDI, moreover, is an aggregation of three dimensions (health, education and income) and four indicators (life expectancy, education years average, expected years of education and GDP/capita). The HDI has quickly become a credible alternative for the GDP/capita. Before the launch of the HDI, development was seen exclusively as economic growth, for the GDP/capita was the only measurable tool of development. Since then, the HDI has contributed to the influence of ID in the discourse of governments, organizations and media. The Economist wrote, in 1991, that at the center of the report is a simple but clever index: it has been conceived to measure the results of development in a more subtle way than the World Bank’s classifications based on GDP (UNDP 2010).

Throughout this first decade (1990-2000), the definition of development, thus the global discourses on it, has been increasingly influenced by HD. Academics, practitioners, media and the public have started to change their vision of ‘what development meant’. The HDI, despite few criticisms on its simplicity, has greatly stimulated public debate. Today, while GDP/capita is still broadly used, new classifications have surfaced to counter-balance those based only on economic growth. It is possible to make relatively fast improvements in terms of HD despite slow progress in terms of economic growth – even though it is hard to sustain HD improvements on the long term without economic expansion (Jolly 2007: 638). This changes how states and international organizations see and talk about development.
During the first decade (1990-2000), some authors have criticized the lack of theoretical coherence of the Inclusive Development paradigm based on human development (Pieterse 1998: 348; Saad-Filho 2010: 16). However, during the second decade (2000-2010), acceptance of Inclusive Development in discourse as a coherent model has accelerated (Gore 2000). During its second decade, ID has really become paradigmatic, i.e. it has acquired coherence as a conceptual framework.

Particularly Human development, during this period, has become more than a slogan or a buzzword. It acquired both analytical rigor and institutionalization (McNeill 2007: 9). Firstly, academic authorities supported HD, as have shown the economists Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq. The terminological rigor of the concept of Human Development has prevented it from being misinterpreted and its conceptual stability has been emphasized by many authors (McNeill 2007: 13; Jolly 2007: 646). Secondly, the UNDP has been a great bureaucratic support for the institutionalization of HD, and thus of ID, especially with the publication of the HDR and the HDI. In sum, the paradigm of ID based in great part on HD, has become the most structured and the most credible alternative to the Washington Consensus (Therien 2012).

Therefore, in the 2000s, the importance of ID in the discourse of development has increased enough to challenge the WC. This acception of the new paradigm by the BWIs has been crucial to its institutionalization, especially when the PRSPs replaced the Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in 1999 and when the Millennium Declaration was signed in 2000. In the next section, we will demonstrate that the formulation of the PRSPs and the MDGs is evidence of the presence of ID in discourse, for the concepts of human development and ownership support these public policies.

**Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers**

The BWI issued the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 1999 to replace the much-criticized Structural SAPs of the 1980s and 1990s. The PRSPs are part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPCs) initiative. In the 1980s, the BWIs were focusing on the debts of middle-income countries (e.g. Mexico, Argentina, Brazil). Since 1996, they have turned to the HIPC (initially 41 countries, mostly Africans), which totalized a debt close to 200 billions (Serieux 2001: 536-537, quoted in Campbell et Losch 2002: 181). The PRSPs have become the *sine qua non* condition for obtaining a debt relief (Peet et Hartwick 2009).

According to the IMF website, there is presently 68 countries with a PRSP in progress, and many are at their second or third generation.

Concretely, a PRSP is a macroeconomic, social and structural program extended on three years, promoting growth and poverty reduction (Craig et Porter 2001: 1, emphasis in original). In other words, it is a development program based on economic growth at the macro level (liberalization, taxation, payment balance, and budget management) and on poverty reduction at the local level. David Craig and Doug Porter explain that the PRSPs are born to build inclusive policies around a neoliberal framework, while preserving the interests of the civil society.
Indeed, the PRSPs must be written by the receiving countries through a process of participation of their civil society. The poverty reduction strategy is bottom-up, in contrast to the structural adjustments lead from the BWIs in a top-down fashion. With the PRSPs, the Bank and the IMF let local stakeholders formulate their strategy, allowing a broader participation. As was explained earlier, such ownership has become a central element of the new Inclusive Development paradigm. Therefore, the shift from the SAPs to the PRSPs represents an important change in the field of international development, at least in the way international organizations see and prescribe development policies.

In sum, the PRSPs have become an important vehicle for the ID model, for they support the two basic norms of the new paradigm. As shown in Table 1, two of the five fundamental principles of the poverty reduction strategy are based on ownership, while the three others are related to human development (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Inclusive Development Aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country-driven</td>
<td>Include the civil society and private sector in every stage, from formulation to evaluation.</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results oriented</td>
<td>Focus on results profitable to the poor.</td>
<td>HD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
<td>Admit a multidimensional nature of poverty.</td>
<td>HD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership based</td>
<td>Include the participation and the coordination of multiple actors (bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental).</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>Based on a long-term perspective of poverty.</td>
<td>HD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Millennium Development Goals

In September 2000, 193 UN member states and over 20 regional and international organizations have agreed on the Millennium Development Goals, which will become a major symbol of Inclusive Development in the discourses. More accurately, MDGs are eight objectives, 34 targets and 60 indicators. In overview, the eight objectives are to halve the extreme poverty (1), to universalize primary education (2), to promote gender equality (3), to reduce child mortality (4), to improve maternal health (5), to reduce HIV infections and other diseases (6), to ensure environmental sustainability (7) and develop global partnerships in international development (8). Every country is invited to align its own policies to the MDGs, and is encouraged to adopt additional objectives. Mongolia, for example, has adopted an objective concerning democracy and governance (UNHCHR 2010).

Thomas G. Weiss (2010) argues that the MDGs are one of the UN’s ideas that have had the most considerable impact on the discourses of international development. However, even if the consensus around MDGs is rooted in the UN system, many authors have understood it as a compromise between the UN and the BWIs (Jolly 2007; Therien 2007). In sum, the PRSPs and the MDGs, emanating from the UN ideas, have greatly modified the discourse of international organizations, for they have improved the influence of HD and of ownership. These concepts, through the PRSPs and the MDGs, have been an important showcase in discourse.
Inclusive Development in the normative space

As we have already shown, Inclusive Development is one of the most important discursive changes of the last 30 years in international development. Having exposed the chronological implementation of ID in discourse, we will now explain its institutionalization in the normative space, i.e. as a normative paradigm. We will refer to the norm cycle approach of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). The concept of ‘normative paradigm’ is here privileged to the detriment of the concepts of super-norm (Hulme et Fukuda-Parr 2009) and informal institution (March et Olsen 1998). In sum, a paradigm such as Inclusive Development represents a normative and empirical structure that articulates many norms in order to form a coherent model. As mentioned earlier, ID also goes beyond the paradigm based on human development as defined by Richard Jolly (2007), for it also includes the concept of ownership. As such, we follow Finnemore and Sikkink’s approach, even though it is primarily concerned with the internalization of individual norms. We will then argue that ID, as a complex normative paradigm, has followed the same stages as an individual norm. In the last section, we will posit that to become a dominant paradigm, ID will have to go through a fourth and last stage, i.e. implementation in practices.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms go through three stages (1998: 895): emergence, cascade and internalization. Emergence is the promotion of an idea by norm entrepreneurs who attempt to convince policymakers, stakeholders and the public. Cascade is when a great number of states and organizations start adopting the norm. Finally, internalization occurs when the norm has been broadly accepted. Internalization takes
place if no country discursively contradicts the targeted norm. For example, norms such as women's right to vote or the abolition of slavery are broadly accepted (despite the existence of movements against such norms). Other norms, for example gay rights, are not considered internalized for they are still debated.

Stage 1

The emergence of norms, and then of a normative paradigm, is due to two principal elements: norm entrepreneurs and organizational platform. At first, an idea is not considered a legitimate idea per se; its success depends in great part on its transmission to the public (Schmidt 2010). Therefore, to be accepted, an idea must be the object of intensive promotion from what Finnemore and Sikkink call norm entrepreneurs. Such individuals, states or organizations are central in the emergence of the norm for they reframe old issues or create new problems that were absent from the agenda. The presence of norm entrepreneurs is also crucial for they promote new ideas that must compete with norms existing in the same normative space. For example, an important part of Barnett and Finnemore’s theory (2004) suggests the autonomy of international organizations comes from their role as norm promoters. These actors, with their expertise and knowledge, are able to promote new ideas such as peace imposition or refugee rights.

For Inclusive Development, norm entrepreneurs are also individuals such as Amartya Sen, Mahbub ul Haq, Joseph Stiglitz or Dani Rodrik, which have used their intellectual prestige to promote ideas of human development and ownership. The UNDP may have been the most important promoter of ID, especially with the HDI and the HDR. Moreover, NGO networks,
by participating to Summits and through advocacy, have also supported many norms that are today part of the human development concept. A few examples of important NGO networks would be Greenpeace (sustainable development), the Red Cross and Doctors without borders (norms related to health), and Oxfam (women's rights). Many local NGOs from the South and from the North have also advanced the ideas of local ownership and participation of the civil society.

More than the norm entrepreneurs, the organizational platform offered by the UN and the UNDP have greatly promoted the emergence of a new normative paradigm, again with the HDR, but also with many Summits and Conferences. Many smaller norms underlying ID have been promoted through, for example, the Summits held in New-York in 1990 for children's right, in 1992 Rio in 1992 for the environment and development, in Beijing in 1995 for gender equality, in Istanbul in 1996 for habitat, in Copenhagen in 1995 for social development, and in New York in 2000 for the Millennium Summit (Hulme and Fukuda-Parr 2009: 8). After convincing many important actors and stakeholders, ID has reached what Finnemore and Sikkink call a threshold: after this point lies the second stage: the norm cascade.

*Stage 2*

The norm cascade does not mean a universal adoption of the norm, but a strong contagion. This norm contagion takes place through a socialization process pushing countries to become norm followers. At this stage, most countries adopt the norm without any kind of internal or external pressure to do so. The sociologist John Finley Scott argues that the
socialization is done through a process of positive or negative reinforcement induced on some agents (here the states) by other agents (here the IO or NGO) (Scott 1971: 45). This process of positive or negative valorization is called ‘conditioning’. Scott’s sociological theory has been adapted to international relations. In its classic « Theory of International Politics », Kenneth Waltz defines socialization as valorizing the states that founded the norm and praising those who follow the norm, while ridiculing those who do not. While Waltz addresses the internalization through attitudes, Alexander Wendt talks of the internalization at the level of identity (1999: 324-327). Doing so, the latter posits the existence of a process of imitation and of social learning. Imitation, he suggests, is the process through which states mimic the ones that they consider successful. Social learning is when a state realizes that there are advantages to adopt a certain norm. While it is hard to say without any doubts which kind of socialization has happened in a precise case, many such forms apply during the norm cascade.

As for inclusive development, the UN, the BWIs, NGOs and states are considered to have contributed to the socialization process. On one hand, the UN, through new rankings based on the HDI, have kept track of ‘good states’, which implement a form of Inclusive Development at the national level, and ‘bad states’, which do not follow ID. On the other hand, the BWIs, through the PRSPs, dictate the new way countries should develop and reward those who adopt the model with loans and debt reduction. NGOs and advocacy networks also hold a role in this socialization process by pressuring governments to adopt a form of Inclusive Development. From these processes follow the internalization of the norm, and then of the normative paradigm.
Stage 3

Internalization happens when the norm meets global acceptance. Conformity to the norm then becomes automatic. Scott has developed this phenomenon, also from a sociological point of view, in his well-known book: “Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment” (1971). According to him, the term internalization is a metaphor: “it implies that something moves from outside the spirit to inside it” (Scott 1971: 3). In other words, it means that someone will conform to a norm without a resort to sanctions. This sociological concept has also been transposed to the structural level of the international relations.

Internalization is thus the most advanced stage of institutionalization of a normative paradigm. In our case study, the MDGs and the PRSPs have contributed to this internalization. All countries now, at least discursively, conform to the new rules of the game in terms of development. The language and the discourse of the UN, the BWIs, and of States and NGOs, have definitely changed. Rare are the actors in international development that still conceive development as economic growth exclusively, conforming to a top-down approach. Even the BWIs, even if less openly than the UN, has changed its conception of development. Some may object by stating that the BWIs needing to approve the PRSPs in order to obtain a debt relief is a sanction in itself, thus that the norm has not been internalized. However, we argue that states, even in their national policies and discourses, have internalized the relevance of an Inclusive Development.
In conclusion, the normative paradigm of ID has passed through the three stages defined by the norm cycle of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Each of these stages has implied specific actors, motivations and mechanisms. This process has been summarized in Table 2, theoretically (from the theory of Finnemore and Sikkink), and empirically (from our case study).

**Table 2. Norm cycle: Inclusive Development.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>STAGE 1 Emergence</th>
<th>STAGE 2 Cascade</th>
<th>STAGE 3 Internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norm entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Inclusive Development</td>
<td>Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Amartya Sen, Mahbub-ul-Haq, UN, NGOs</td>
<td>States, International Organizations, networks.</td>
<td>UN, BWI, NGOs, States (North and South)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motivations</td>
<td>Altruism, empathy, engagement to an idea</td>
<td>Engagement to the ideas of HD and ownership</td>
<td>Legitimization, reputation, prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant mechanisms</td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>HDR, HDI, International Summits and Conferences</td>
<td>Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We have demonstrated that ID, as a normative paradigm, has successfully completed the three stages of the norm cycle; it has been broadly accepted. However, although it has become a coherent normative framework, it has still not launched an empirical change in practices. If we apply Finnemore and Sikkink's logic to the process of dominant paradigm shift, a fourth stage must be added: implementation in practices. Inclusive Development
would thus remain at the third stage (internalization), having not completed the fourth stage (implementation in practices). The fourth part of this article will demonstrate that a change in practices has begun, but that the Washington Consensus still dominates the global public policies.

Inclusive Development in the practices

The Inclusive Development paradigm has come a long way in the discourse, yet it has not obtained as much importance through the implementation of global public policies (PRSPs and MDGs). It has been introduced in practices, of course, but the domination of the WC remains undeniable. While the new paradigm has been very important in discourse and as a normative paradigm, our argument is that it has not replaced the WC as the dominant paradigm, for it has not been completely implemented in practices. ID has marked the MDGs and the PRSPs ideologically, but many problems empirically prove the persistence of the WC.

**Millennium Development Goals**

The Millennium Development Summit, although it has initiated an important step in discourse shift, has not contributed as much for the implementation of the ID in practices. As explained by David Hulme (2010), the MDGs are based on two intellectual traditions: result-based management and human development. Result-based management, or management strategy (Chibba 2011: 83), is defined as changes in the governmental apparatus aiming to improve performance and obtain better results. National governmental
agencies are thus encouraged to focus on the pursuit of concrete developmental results. Their objectives should be specific, measurable, consensual, realistic and short-termed.

The ideology under the Millennium Summit is clearly supported by result-based management and by human development, the latter having been already defined in this article. However, the ‘importance of the results’ and the HD have influenced the MDGs in two very different manners. On one side, result-based management has directly impacted on the writing of the MDGs as a ‘grocery list’, while on the other side, the HD has had a much more diluted impact, as a moral ideology underlying the Summit.

Specifically, according to Hulme, result-based management has influenced the MDGs in three manners. Firstly, it has determined the structure of the objectives, written in a short-term and hierarchical way. Secondly, it has influenced the specificity of the objectives, e.g. halving the number of people living with less than 1$ per day, reducing children mortality, reducing ¾ of maternal mortality, etc. Thirdly, except for the 8th objective, no hardly measureable concept has been included in the MDGs, may it be ownership, human rights, democracy or individual liberty. These ideas, more akin to ID, are diffused in the MDGs yet are not directly part of their implementation guide. It would indeed be paradoxical to ally concepts such as human rights or ownership with the idea of having measurable and short-term objectives.

Finally, MDGs directly contradict the ownership aspect of ID. As a universal list of objectives and indicators, MDGs are a one-size-fits-all method. As such, they may go against local
priorities and participation processes that are essential to the application of Inclusive Development (Fukuda-Parr 2010: 28). In sum, to follow the MDGs could contradict national priorities of certain countries, e.g. if they face diseases not included in the list, if they have major ethnic tensions, or different environmental issues.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

Macro Framework

The first indicator of the absence of Inclusive Development in the PRSPs is the marked continuity of the macroeconomic framework. Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud suggest that the PRSPs are only a “recycling of earlier policies, with an adjustment at the margin to make a link with poverty” (2002: 13). Presented as an inclusive neoliberalism, Inclusive Development is considered by many authors to be very similar to the economic framework defended by the SAPs: privatization, liberalization and macroeconomic stability (Ruckert 2007). Ultimately, the idea remains that the pie must grow before it is cut into pieces, and development remains economic and national.

As for local ownership, if local programs of poverty reduction are sometimes taken up by organizations from the civil society, then the macroeconomic framework is not under any kind of participatory process and remains the exclusive task of the central government and donors. Since the first PRSP in 1999, many civil society organizations have felt that although national stakeholders have left a certain space for participation at the micro level, it has not been the case at the macro level (Wood 2004). "NGOs constantly report that there are two parallel processes, with ‘social’ problems meeting little participation, and ‘macro’ problems
meeting no participation at all" (Enquête d’Europad, cité dans Campbell et Losch 2002: 180).

*Participation of civil society*

Our fourth indicator is that the participation of the civil society in the writing process of the programs is globally lacking, for ownership has only just become a new conditionality for southern countries. In addition to be accountable in terms of objectives, they also have to conform to a process of participation from the civil society, dictated by the BWIs (Dijkstra 2011: 113). In other words, BWIs do not only regulate the results of the developmental policies, but also the process of elaboration of these policies.

This principle of ‘imposed ownership’ in the PRSPs has been widely criticized. Many countries have put in place a hasty and weak participation process, and the participation of civil society is only seen as a mean to obtain debt relief. At first, countries had to implement a PRSP one year before obtaining a debt relief, which forced southern countries to fasten local participation in order to accelerate the process and get the money. To overcome this problem, the BWIs have created the I-PRSP (intermediate-PRSP), which could be elaborated faster and yield a faster debt relief. Doing so, they hoped for a more elaborate participation process in the aftermath. However, the effect was quite the contrary: local ownership has deteriorated, for policymakers at the national level were simply copying what has been rapidly written in the I-PRSP in their real PRSP. In Malawi, for example, the I-PRSP has been written in only four months, leaving only a few weeks of participation for this country of more than 15 millions persons (Cambell and Losch 2002).
The need to satisfy the BWIs could explain partly the lack of engagement of the government in encouraging the participation of civil society. In other words, to receive a debt relief, the programs must be approved by the BWIs, which greatly affects local ownership (Wood 2004: 95). Jan Willem Gunning argues that while many glorify this ‘new order’, the real ownership is only a flash in the pan. “Aid will be allowed only to countries which adopt a series of policies favorable to donors” (Gunning 2000: 4). Having no other financial sources, the HIPCks have no other choice but to borrow from the BWIs. Wood even argues that some countries in disagreement with the BWIs will write programs they know the BWIs will like, only for the money (Wood 2004: 33).

The definition of the term participation is also an important issue in the evaluation of the so-called participation of civil society. The Sourcebook defines it as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control on development initiatives and on decisions and resources that will affect them” (Klugman 2002: 280). It is then not a matter of giving full control to receiving countries, but to share the control. The modalities of this sharing are themselves not defined in practical terms, while it is nonetheless widely accepted that an effective participation must be based on a clear conception of who will participate, in what sphere, at what level, and how (Piron and Evans 2004).

Moreover, the Bank uses in a commutable way the terms participation and consultation, although they are highly different concepts (Molenaers and Renard 2003). The Sourcebook lists the consultation mechanisms as: participatory studies (on the perceptions of the poor),
the dissemination of information, the consultation of organizations from civil society, and the creation of working group on different issues (Klugman 2002: 238). Participation is thus, for the World Bank, a partnership between national stakeholders, services providers, international organizations and the population. Many groups of civil society had quite a different understanding of participation. They saw participation as an opportunity to lend power to the poor by giving them the opportunity to directly participate to the making of development programs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the Inclusive Development paradigm has challenged the WC in discourse and as a normative paradigm, but not in public policies. Some authors argue that this disjunction between rhetoric and practices affects even more the legitimacy of BWIs. However, our approach is more optimistic. The emergence, the cascade and the internalization of an alternative normative model are an important step towards a paradigm shift. Numerous ideas have never completed the internalization stage, as is the case, for example, of the concept of human security. Moreover, many alternative models have never acquired enough theoretical coherence to be called a coherent paradigm, such as sustainable development. Therefore, we argue that Inclusive Development is the most credible alternative to the Washington Consensus, and remains the only one able to replace it as the dominant paradigm.
References


