

The Enemy Within:

The rise of Populist-Authoritarianism in Western Democracies

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart

University of Michigan/ Harvard University

What explains rising support for populism?

- I. The populist challenge to liberal democracy
- II. Concepts and theories of populism
- III. Classifying populist parties
- IV. The impact of economic insecurity and cultural backlash on populist voting in Europe & US
- V. Key findings and implications

Cultural Backlash: The Rise of Populism

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018

Preface and acknowledgments

List of tables and figures

I: Introduction

1. The cultural backlash theory
2. Conceptualizing and classifying populist parties

II: Comparative evidence

3. Generation gaps in support for populist parties in Europe
4. The rise of progressive values, cultural losers, and generational turnout
5. Global migration, ethnic diversity, and terrorist threats
6. Financial shocks, global trade, and socioeconomic inequality

III: Single-country case studies

7. U.S. elections, the Tea Party, and Donald Trump
8. Nigel Farage, the UK Independence Party, and Brexit
9. The fortunes of the Marine Le Pen's Front National in France
10. Post-Communist authoritarianism: Viktor Orbán's Fidesz
11. Latin America and Hugo Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela

IV: Consequences

12. Populist contagion: The impact on mainstream parties and the policy agenda
13. For elections and liberal democracy, social stability and tolerance, and global governance

V: Conclusions


14. The challenges of populism




I: The populist challenge

I: The populist-authoritarian challenge

- Donald Trump in the US
- UKIP and Brexit
- Part of a broader phenomenon disrupting party competition
 - French National Front,
 - Swiss People's Party,
 - Austrian Freedom Party,
 - Swedish Democrats,
 - Greece's Golden Dawn,
 - Italy's Lega Nord,
 - Dutch Party for Freedom



Rising support for populist-authoritarian parties in Europe



Source: Calculated from ParlGov1

What is populist rhetoric?

- **Critique of established structures of power in liberal democracies**

- *Populism challenges the checks and balances of liberal democracies.*
- Faith in the wisdom and virtue of ordinary people over corrupt establishment: big banks, multinationals, legacy media, elected politicians, government officials, intellectuals and experts, privileged rich and powerful

- **Vox populi - Popular sovereignty**

- *Populists emphasize that legitimate political authority is based in popular sovereignty and majority rule.*
- Favors direct voice of the people through majoritarian elections, polls, referenda, rallies

- **Consequences**

- In practice, *populism opens the door for leaders to claim sweeping powers unhampered by the conventional institutional safeguards and counter-veiling actors in liberal democracy.*

What are Authoritarian values?


- CONFORMISM
 - Strict adherence to conventional social behaviors, faith, family, marriage and sexuality, and rejection of multi-cultural relativism
 - Prejudicial feelings towards 'outsiders' such as racial/ethnic minorities, Islamophobia, misogyny, homophobia and anti-Semitism and loss of national identities
 - Against cosmopolitanism, globalization, and open national borders facilitating the mobility of people, ideas, jobs, and goods,
- SECURITY
 - Belief in tough security against the perceived threats from outsiders, xenophobic nationalism and fear of foreigners.
 - Reject the legitimacy of the institutions of global governance, such as the European Union, the United Nations, NATO, and NAFTA.
- DEFERENCE
 - Obedience towards authority figures, security agencies, and strongman leaders
- Not all populists are authoritarians – not all authoritarians are populists



II: Theories of populism

Economic insecurity or cultural backlash -- or both?

Comprehensive explanations





II: Explaining populism: Economic insecurity


- 1950s and 1960s Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell
- Fascism in Weimar Germany, Poujadism in France, McCarthyism in the US
- Authoritarian reaction against modernity by petite bourgeoisie fearing downward mobility squeezed between big business and organized labor
- Today emergence of new under-class in global markets, low-skilled, low-wages, benefit-dependent, poor job security, vulnerable to social risks
- If so, **populist support should be concentrated among economically marginalized - unskilled workers, those lacking college degrees, unemployed, living in inner cities, welfare dependent, and subjective feelings of economic insecurity and lack of social mobility**

Explaining populism: Cultural backlash

- Rise of progressive values during the 1970s, especially among younger cohorts and college educated in Western societies
- Value diverse forms of sexuality and gender identities, LGBT rights, same sex marriage, secular, cosmopolitan, open-mindedness towards diversity of lifestyles and support for international cooperation
- Catalyzed a cultural backlash among traditionalists – a tipping point threatens the once predominant values and status of several sectors – older generations, men, white population - on issues such as faith, family, patriotism, and nationalism.
- If so, **populism should be predicted by generation/birth cohort, religiosity, education and sex – as well as by authoritarian values**









III: Classifying populist parties

Traditional model of party competition

ECONOMIC LEFT


State management
Economic redistribution
Welfare state
Collectivism

ECONOMIC RIGHT


Free Market/Small state
Deregulation
Low taxation
Individualism




Contemporary model of party competition



Contemporary model of party competition



Rising salience non-economic issues



Notes: Scores on the vertical axis are calculated by counting the number of economic issues, and non-economic issues mentioned in each party's electoral manifesto for the most recent election, weighted by each party's share of the vote in that election, giving equal weight to each country. **Source:** Party Manifestos data from Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States, in Zakharov (2013).

Factor analysis CHES-2014

Description	Cultural cleavage	Economic cleavage
Favor traditional values	.943	
Opposes liberal social lifestyles	.923	
Promote nationalism	.918	
Favors tough law and order	.916	
Against multiculturalism on immigrants	.904	
Against immigration	.880	
Opposes rights for ethnic minorities	.864	
Supports religious principles in politics	.787	
Supports rural interests	.737	
Favors market deregulation		.956
Opposed to state economic intervention		.925
Opposed to wealth redistribution		.894
Favor cuts in taxes and services		.890

Notes: CHES 2014 expert survey of political party positions in 31 countries, including all EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, Dec 2014-Feb 2015. Factor analysis with rotated varimax with Kaiser Normalization.



IV: Explaining support for PA parties in Europe and the US

European Social Survey

Pooled data classifies populist parties and voters

Mean Voted for populist party


.06
.04
.02
.00

Salariat Routine nonmanual Petty bourgeoisie Foremen and technicians Working class

Goldthorpe-Heath class schema

Cases weighted by Post-stratification weight including design weight

Source: Pooled European Social Survey 1-6



Mean Voted for populist party

.060
.055
.050
.045
.040
.035
.030

1900-1939

1940-1949

1950-1959

1960-1969


1970-1979

1980-1989

Cohort of birth

Cases weighted by Post-stratification weight including design weight

Source: Pooled European Social Survey 1-6



A: Controls

	Beta	SE	Sig						
CONTROLS									
Age (years)	.007	.001	***						
Sex (male)	.380	.021	***						
Education	-.086	.008	***						
Religiosity	.123	.004	***						
Ethnic minority	-.952	.043	***						
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY									
Routine non-manual									
Petite bourgeoisie									
Skilled manual worker									
Unskilled manual worker									
Unemployed (3 months+)									
Live on social benefits									
Subjective economic insecurity									
Urbanization									
CULTURAL VALUES									
Anti-immigration									
Mistrust global governance									
Mistrust national governance									
Authoritarian values									
Rightwing on left-right ideological scale									


		A: Controls			B: Economic security					
		Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig			
CONTROLS	Age (years)	.007	.001	***	.006	.001	***			
	Sex (male)	.380	.021	***	.341	.022	***			
	Education	-.086	.008	***	-.062	.009	***			
	Religiosity	.123	.004	***	.122	.004	***			
	Ethnic minority	-.952	.043	***	-.915	.069	***			
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY	Routine non-manual				.180	.027	***			
	Petite bourgeoisie				.372	.032	***			
	Skilled manual worker				.243	.038	***			
	Unskilled manual worker				.217	.035	***			
	Unemployed (3 months+)				.082	.025	***			
	Live on social benefits				-.409	.067	***			
	Subjective economic insecurity				.025	.013	*			
	Urbanization				-.068	.031	***			
CULTURAL VALUES	Anti-immigration									
	Mistrust global governance									
	Mistrust national governance									
	Authoritarian values									
	Rightwing on left-right ideological scale									
Nagelkerke R ²	Source			Pooled European Social Survey 1-6						

		A: Controls			B: Economic security			C: Cultural Values		
		Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig
CONTROLS	Age (years)	.007	.001	***	.006	.001	***	.005	.001	***
	Sex (male)	.380	.021	***	.341	.022	***	.319	.022	***
	Education	-.086	.008	***	-.062	.009	***	-.026	.008	***
	Religiosity	.123	.004	***	.122	.004	***	.084	.004	***
	Ethnic minority	-.952	.043	***	-.915	.069	***	-.760	.069	***
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY	Routine non-manual				.180	.027	***			
	Petite bourgeoisie				.372	.032	***			
	Skilled manual worker				.243	.038	***			
	Unskilled manual worker				.217	.035	***			
	Unemployed (3 months+)				.082	.025	***			
	Live on social benefits				-.409	.067	***			
	Subjective economic insecurity				.025	.013	*			
	Urbanization				-.068	.031	***			
CULTURAL VALUES	Anti-immigration							.016	.001	***
	Mistrust global governance							.005	.001	***
	Mistrust national governance							.003	.001	***
	Authoritarian values							.008	.001	***
	Rightwing on left-right ideological scale							.314	.005	***
Nagelkerke R ²	Source			Pooled European Social Survey 1-6				.128		

US – Trump voters


2016 American National Election Study (ANES) and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)

Trump vote by HH income, US 2016



Cases weighted by Common content weights post-election

Trump voters by birth cohort, US 2016



Source: CCES 2016; N. 38,305 Cases weighted by post-election weights

Democratic Primary Vote Clinton v. Sanders (ANES)		Socio-economic			+ Culture		
		B	S.E.		B	S.E.	
Socio-demo	Age (years)	0.052	0.006	***	0.049	0.006	***
	Gender (male)	-0.404	0.173	*	-0.567	0.186	***
	Highest educational qualification (4-cat).	-0.058	0.090		-0.061	0.101	
	White	-0.130	0.314		-0.056	0.342	
	Black/African-American	1.436	0.361	***	1.536	0.395	***
	Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	-0.615	0.315	*	-0.483	0.335	
Economic	Income summary scale	0.014	0.012		0.004	0.014	
	Unemployed, laid off or disabled	-0.167	0.287		-0.137	0.311	
	Economic Security	-0.126	0.091		-0.103	0.097	
	Econ mobility easier/harder comp to 20 yrs ago	-0.206	0.057	***	-0.123	0.061	*
Attitudes	Party ID (7-pt scale)				0.032	0.039	
	Nativist values				-0.077	0.097	
	Populist values				0.233	0.090	***
	Cultural values				0.273	0.109	**
	Racial Equality values				0.032	0.105	
	Trust in Government scale				0.581	0.104	***
	Evaluation of Obama's Performance				-0.441	0.140	***
	Democratic values				-0.299	0.102	***
	Retrospective Evaluations of Economy				0.457	0.104	***
	Constant	0.049	0.685	1.050	-0.874	0.775	
	Number of respondents	735			735		
	Nagelkerke R2	27.2			37.9		
	% Correctly predicted	69.6			74.6		

Source: 2016 American National Election Study Time-Series



V: Conclusions

Key findings

- Debate between economic insecurity and cultural backlash theories
- Overall several demographic and social factors (age, sex, education, ethnicity, religiosity) and cultural attitudes are the strongest and most consistent predictors of populist support in Europe & US
- By contrast, economic inequality is less consistently linked with populist votes in Europe and the US
- Phenomenon reflects a retro backlash among once-predominant generations against progressive value change; heightening generation gaps in the electorate.

Qualifications and next steps

- Book in progress
- Cohort analysis using longitudinal panel survey data since 1970s suggests period effects
- Diverse illustrative national cases (US, France, Brexit, Venezuela, Hungary)
- Fuller multilevel models need to analyze supply-side, demand-side and institutional contexts
- Robustness tests for alternative dependent variables



More details

www.pippanorris.com