The Canadian Free Trade Agreement and Interprovincial Trade

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Queen's Institute for Trade Policy, November 2020

How Important is Internal Trade in Canada?

Figure 1: Internal and International Trade as a Share of GDP (1981-2019)



Source: Own calculations from Statistics Canada data table 36-10-0222.

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Figure 2: Interprovincial Imports as a Share of GDP (2019)



Source: Own calculations from Statistics Canada data table 36-10-0222.

Senate of Canada Report, 2016

Supreme Court of Canada Rulings (R v Comeau 2018 SCC 15)

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AGLC Alberta Gaming & Liquor Commission

LCBO

Measuring Internal Trade Costs

The Head-Ries Index of Trade Costs

Pair observed trade data with empirical estimates of trade elasticities to infer the magnitude of unobservable trade costs.

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- Trade cost: $\left(\frac{0.15 \times 0.06}{0.75 \times 0.83} \right)^{-1/3.8} = 1.75 \rightarrow$ a 75% tariff-equivalent cost

The Head-Ries Index of Trade Costs

Figure 3: Tariff-Equivalent Internal Trade Costs in Canada (2016)



Source: Own calculations from various Statistics Canada tables.

Geographic Determinants of Trade Costs

Figure 4: Head-Ries Trade Costs vs Physical Distance (2016)



Note: Displays the average trade-weighted trade costs versus distance between pairs, controlling for product-specific factors. Specifically, this plots the residuals from a regression of log trade costs on product-specific dummy variables against the distance between Origin-Destination trading pairs in Canada.

Estimates of Policy-Relevant Trade Costs

The best estimates of non-geographic internal trade costs:
Bemrose, Brown, and Tweedle (2020), "Going the distance: Estimating the effect of provincial borders on trade when geography (and everything else) matters," *Canadian Journal of Economics*

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Other estimates:

- Albrecht and Tombe (2016, CJE): 7.8 – 14.5% overall, average for agriculture and manufacturing is less than 5%

Policy Options to Lower Internal Trade Costs

Key Dates: Selected Internal Trade Agreements in Canada



A long and difficult road for policy makers.

The Canadian Free Trade Agreement is the most ambitious and far reaching internal trade agreement ever.

Canadian Free Trade Agreement

Agreement in force on July 1, 2017 (Happy 150!)

Establishes rules and procedures to encourage easier goods and services flows across subnational borders.

- Broad coverage: 80% of GDP
- Stricter procurement rules
- “Stronger” dispute settlement (sort of… but… not really)
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A (Potentially) Very Big Deal: A new transparent ongoing process to smooth-out regulatory differences (!)

Regulatory Reconciliation and Cooperation Table (RCT)

The RCT Process: Structured Intergovernmental Bargaining

1. Identify a potential barrier. F/P/T governments only.
2. Governments negotiate. A “reconciliation agreement” is (hopefully) reached. Can take many forms.
3. Implement the agreement (following whatever method was negotiated: mutual recognition, harmonization, etc.)

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The 2020/21 Work Plan: 33 items

The Gains from Internal Trade Liberalization and a New Method to Prioritize Policy Effort

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- **Aggregate Gains:** Estimates abstract from distribution of costs and benefits across individuals.
- **Legitimate Policy Objectives:** Regulatory variation may serve valid purposes – and may yield efficiency benefits despite inhibiting trade.
- **Federalism:** Potentially unavoidable consequence of a decentralized federation

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Policy makers could benefit from a simple rule-of-thumb to allocate effort across products, sectors, etc.

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The "Marginal Cost of Internal Trade Frictions" (MCTF)

$$\text{MCTF} = \text{"Network Centrality"} \times \text{Internal Trade Share}$$

A sector's "centrality" is how "important" a sector is as a supplier of intermediate inputs and final goods. It is measured using input-output data. If you like math: $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = (\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\beta}$

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Intuition: The MCTF is *almost* equal to a sector or product's **interprovincial trade** relative to Canada's **aggregate GDP**.

Example of MCPF In Action!

Bemrose et al. (2020) estimate **internal trade costs of 4% for food and non-alcoholic beverages**

The **network centrality** of this sector (calculated "easily" from Statistics Canada's input-output tables) is 0.0643

Total **Interprovincial imports** is 26.5% of total expenditures on goods produced by this sector

The aggregate real GDP cost of internal trade frictions in food/beverages is therefore roughly $1.6 billion

Comparing the MCTF Estimates with a Full CGE Model

Figure 5: Real GDP Gains from Lowering Sectoral Internal Trade Costs by 1%



Source: own calculations from Tombe (2021?), not yet publicly available. Soon! … hopefully

Potential Gains from Internal Trade Liberalization

Figure 6: Gains from Eliminating Non-Geographic Trade Costs on Goods



Source: Alvarez, Krznar, and Tombe (2019), Table 7. IMF Working Paper No. 19/158.

Gains from Unilateral Internal Trade Liberalization

Figure 7: Real GDP Gain to Alberta, Unilateral vs Multilateral Liberalization



Displays the gains in real GDP from Alberta unilaterally lowering the cost of imports from other provinces by 1 per cent. Source: own calculations from the Tombe and Winter (2020, CJE Forthcoming) model.

Gains from Unilateral Liberalization

Figure 8: Real GDP Gains from a 1% Reduction of Alberta Import Costs



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A Related Issue: Interprovincial Labour Mobility

Figure 9: Real GDP Gains from Easier Labour Mobility



Source: Tombe and Schwanen (2020), "Alberta's Opportunity: The Ins, Outs and Benefits of Greater Job Mobility," *C.D. Howe Institute Commentary No. 580*, Figure 3.

Conclusion

Concluding Thoughts

Significant progress on internal trade policy in Canada

Accelerating progress through the CFTA to enhance Canada's post-COVID recovery requires a careful allocation of effort

- The RCT capacity is limited
- Direct effort towards highest-return products/sectors

Provincial governments can achieve a majority of available economic gains from internal liberalization by moving unilaterally

- Has both political advantages and disadvantages
- Alberta started, but appears to have completely stalled
- Post-COVID, watch Alberta for more