



Policy Studies

DONALD MATTHEWS LECTURE  
IN GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY  
8 NOVEMBER 2013

## **Wanted: A New Breed of Civil Servant**

**Don Drummond**

## **Introduction**

I wish to open by acknowledging the contribution of Richard Chaykowski to this address. I was explaining to Rick what I thought was required to produce the new breed of civil servant and he commented that it seemed complicated. He suggested it might be easier to engage in genetic code modification instead. I will admit that everything I know about genetic code manipulation and cloning comes from the Woody Allen movie "Sleeper." I suspect Woody didn't know a lot about the subject because all he did was fuss that the clone would be appropriately dressed upon arrival. I am not so concerned with what the new breed of civil servant wears. I suspect Rick doesn't know a lot more about the subject than Woody. But just in case he is onto something, I would like to put in my order. The new breed of civil servant should have a big heart. I take that pretty much for granted and advise the geneticists not to spend a lot of time on this characteristic. I find most civil servants are in the business to make this a better world and I think and hope that will always be the case. Second, they will need really strong spines. But not stiff spines, because they will need to be flexible. It is easy to say this from a distance, but with some notable exceptions like our colleague Munir Sheikh, civil servants today seem to be presiding over a systematic decimation of information and analysis without putting up much of a fight. Third, they will need really big brains. There have been a lot of smart civil servants over the years but the future breed will have to have big brains that can excel in more dimensions.

Now just in case Richard's simple solution doesn't work out or takes too long, I will present an alternative route to produce the needed new breed of civil servant.

## **The Vision Thing**

The starting point is my vision of what Government in Canada—and I mean that in the broadest sense to sweep in all jurisdictions—will look like in future. I made 362 recommendations in the Ontario Commission, but they all share the same core. That is, Government should be effective and efficient. Effectiveness meaning achieving program objectives. Efficiency meaning doing so at an overall cost that is respectful of the taxpayer. And to support these two Es, they need a third, evaluation. Constant and rigorous evaluation must inform effectiveness and efficiency and be the root of corrective actions.

This might not sound too heroic but I would argue this is not the core of present Government functions and has not been the practice of the past either. Governments pay some attention to effectiveness, but usually only on an a priori basis on program design without verifying this through evaluation. And they pay very little attention to efficiency. If I have one lament about the reaction to my Ontario Commission is that the key message has become lost. The focus has become all about spending numbers whereas it was supposed to be about improving efficiency. That would take care of the numbers and minimize the hit to public services. Indeed, if done properly it should simultaneously improve quality while allowing expenditure growth to slow.

In the future, the public sector will look a lot more like the private sector. More services will be delivered through the private sector. The first phase of this will simply be catch-up. Canadian Governments outsource at half the rate of the OECD average. But we will go further than simply match outsourcing practices elsewhere. Management techniques such as careful measurement of outputs and productivity

will be borrowed by the private sector. Incentives will be aligned to reward efficient operations rather than being skewed to those who introduce new programs or expand existing ones.

As the operation of Governments changes, so must the behaviour of civil servants. To a degree existing civil servants will change. But more fundamentally, the change in Government operations will require a new breed of civil servant. This will be a combination of people coming into the public sector from different backgrounds and those continuing to come through the historical channels being trained differently and behaving differently in line with the modified incentives. Some civil servants already on the job have many of the characteristics of the new breed and simply need the improved environment in which to blossom.

One might have the urge to stop me at this point and say this is all madness. That in the current climate of government secrecy, de-emphasis on analysis, and civil servant “bashing,” the future is dismal for bureaucrats. In that future, brain dead would be more appropriate than really big brains. That would be dangerous thinking and leave us unprepared for the future. The current state is going to lead to major program errors. Public fatigue will set in with the lack of transparency. The opportunity for change will present itself, sometime, somewhere. The smart civil servants will need to recognize their moment to lock in changes for the better. And they had better be prepared for the moment .

## **Back to the Future?**

In a moment of naïveté, I once thought that I was recreating “Back to the Future”—that the future I saw was really a nostalgic plea to return to the civil service of yesterday. At least superficially there is something to this. When I joined the federal government in 1977 after graduating from Queen’s with a Masters in Economics, one could not help be impressed with the number of really smart civil servants who had very strong backbones. And they had the opportunity to put their analyses before the public. Think of the Conservative Government’s Agenda for Economic Renewal in 1984 which set out the thinking for some fairly radical changes in policy direction. Lots of analysis was released analyzing the estimated economic impacts of the Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA as well as the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax. When the Liberals came to power in 1993 they released their so-called Grey and Purple Books setting out their visions for economic and fiscal policy. Considerable information was put out on how the spending cuts under Program Review of 1996 were going to impact the economy and services.

Few broad policy analysis pieces have been published by the federal or provincial governments in recent years. In the federal case, very little information has been produced on the impacts of the spending cuts introduced starting 2 years ago. The former Parliamentary Budget Officer—another MA in Economics from Queen’s, I should note—felt forced to go to court to get the information and failed. The new PBO promised that he would try a more conciliatory approach, but after his first months he has nothing in hand. No comprehensive analysis comparable to that for the Free Trade Agreement has been made public for the trade liberation negotiations with the European Union.

So is the glorious future just a return to the past?

My first hesitation came when former Clerk of the Privy Council Office, Mel Cappe, argued that those who talk about the good old days just have bad memories. Upon reflection, Mel may be onto something. Perhaps the old days weren’t quite as good as I thought at the time. And I now think they

wouldn't fit well into the context of tomorrow. Those brainy civil servants paid some attention to effectiveness but rarely to efficiency and were very spotty on efficiency. In most times they most excelled in spending a lot of money. They were also proficient in cutting spending when required but turned it more into a numbers game than an efficiency exercise. Attention quickly shifted to controlling inputs such as spending and bureaucratic head counts rather than watching the impact on program outcomes and the efficiency with which they were being delivered. Much of the thrust to efficiency was left to Auditor General reports. But they place undue emphasis on shutting down the tiniest risks with almost no consideration to the benefit-cost ratio of doing so. In the end, they often promote inefficiency. No, the past isn't the future we need.

## **Why Don't Governments Focus on the 3 Es: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Evaluation?**

One needs to then understand what is wrong with Government services to contemplate what needs to change for the future. In particular, why is so little effort made at being effective and efficient and why aren't these objectives continuously supported through evaluation.

I can think of a number of reasons. Some of them are real head scratchers as to how they should be addressed. Some of them are merely reflections of poor structures and processes that could readily be changed. I will start with the tougher ones.

- Through much of the post-war period governments have not faced much of a budget constraint. So they have not needed to be efficient. For most of the period revenues flowed in amply and Governments blew the money back out the door. Even when revenue growth slowed Governments initially just built up deficits and debt rather than constraining spending growth and focusing on efficiency. Then when the occasional bout of austerity seems unavoidable, Governments inordinately focused on restraining inputs such as dollars spent and headcounts of civil servants with little regard for the impact on outcomes. In other words, with little regard, again, for efficiency. That happened in almost every jurisdiction in the mid-1990s and it is happening again. In really good economic times, Governments show an allergy to budget surpluses, so spending just ramps up further. That's been the historical pattern. And that is where I think the future will break with the past. We won't have this rapid growth in spending any more. There will be at least a modest budget constraint in operation for a long time. This is key to a lot of reasons why a new breed of civil servant is called for and I will have more to say on it in a moment.
- Governments don't have a simple framework such as profitability around which to judge efficiency.
- Government programs have multiple objectives.
- There can be complex interactions across programs that are not easy to disentangle.
- There can be complex and long lags between policy change and outcomes.
- In some areas, such as policy development, it can be difficult to measure outcomes. But this isn't nearly as difficult an issue as it is usually made out to be, especially for provincial and local governments where a lot of services are provided.

Other reasons flow more directly from flawed governance structures.

- Many governments do not want to be transparent and accountable; and the public, either directly or through various mediums such as Parliament and the media, fails for long periods to put much pressure on them to change.
- Administrative structures are not conducive to measuring and rewarding efficiency. In the private sector CFOs and heads of human resources or talent acquisition and heads of audit tend to be at very senior levels. In Government they are more middle-level managers. As usual, structure reflects a mindset.
- Bureaucratic incentive systems are not conducive to supporting efficiency. The bureaucrats who get promoted and paid bonuses tend to be those who introduced new programs or services or expanded something. Or chopped spending and head count. As a civil servant, I reaped the rewards on both sides of this equation. It is rarer for a bureaucrat to be rewarded for making an ongoing program more efficient.
- Governments tend to focus a lot on inputs or resources and much less on outcomes.
- Governments tend to only have fuzzy objectives for programs. And they rarely set out on an a priori basis the metrics that should be followed to see if the objectives are being met.
- Civil servants have weak backgrounds and receive precious little training in key skills such as human resource management, contract law, regulation, etc.

These flaws lead to a predictable sequence with the old and current breed of civil servants:

- A program is created to address a problem that is ill-defined.
- The objectives are unclear.
- A priori metrics to evaluate success are not established.
- Evaluation is rare.
- Even when evaluations are done failures are often not corrected.
- Instead a new program is often created on top of the failing one.
- The Auditor General might eventually do a damning evaluation but the thrust is to devote additional resources to close off what might be minor program risks.
- The success or failure of programs is not integrated into the overall budget process.

By contrast, the sequence for the new breed of civil servant will be:

- Clearly define the problem at hand through analysis.
- Set clear objectives.
- Establish a prior metrics to monitor and ensure the required data will be available.
- Measure performance efficiency and benchmark it against other public sectors and the private sector.
- Integrate the results into budget making.
- The effect of living forever under a budget constraint
- A key hypothesis behind calling for a new breed of civil servant is the notion Canada, along with other developed countries, will see more limited economic and hence revenue growth in future. In turn, that means limits on how fast government spending can increase.

Over the next decade or so, Canada's labour force participation rate is unlikely to rise more than 1 per cent per year. And even that requires continuing increases in the rate for older workers and women and large numbers of immigrants. Over the past ten years Canada's labour force productivity growth rate has not even hit the 1 per cent annual pace. To keep the math simple, let's suppose we do a bit better and average 1 per cent in future. That means real economic growth, or potential output, averaging 2 per

cent per annum. Let's assume the government and the Bank of Canada continue rolling over their agreements to keep inflation around 2 per cent per annum. So 2 per cent real growth and 2 per cent inflation gives 4 per cent growth in nominal output or income. With unchanged tax rates, that means revenue growth for Canadian governments will average around 4 per cent per year (the revenue elasticity being around 1 as a combination of a progressive personal income tax system but the inelasticity of other revenue sources such as specific taxes – in the case of Ontario a detailed analysis by the Ontario Commission calculated the elasticity to be slightly less than 1).

Health care, the largest public spending item for the combined Government sector, is very unlikely to increase by less than 5 per cent per annum and it could well be higher. We have 1 percentage point growth from population and an additional one percentage point from population ageing. Just the normal rate of inflation takes growth to 4 per cent. And then there's the upside pressure from the normal relationship of above average inflation in the sector combined with persistent increases in the intensity of health care use. The latter has typically cycled between 1 and 3 percentage points per year over the past 20 years in most Canadian jurisdictions. So even relatively optimistically that means it is unrealistic to think any jurisdiction will keep its health care spending below 5 per cent growth per annum on a sustained basis.

Except, that is, the federal government, where there is a commitment to increase transfers to the provinces at the rate of nominal income growth. Under the assumptions here that would be 4 per cent per annum. That means the federal contribution to health will be ever dwindling and the provinces will be left holding the growing residual. We'll see whether that is sustainable.

With health care approaching half of all provincial spending 5 per cent health care spending would only allow 3 per cent annual spending growth on everything else combined. That's a decline of 1 per cent per annum in real, per capita terms. That is not particularly tight, but nor is it a generous amount.

The context described here suggests there will be an ongoing budget constraint facing the governments over the next 10-20 years, particularly at the provincial level. It is unlikely that on a sustained basis they will be able to have the spending growth spurts witnessed several decades ago and re-visited from the late 1990s until austerity was against introduced in 2011.

Yet the wants and needs of the electorate will continue. A focus for politicians and bureaucrats will be on how these wants and needs can be met within the budget constraint. Of course taxes can be raised. At the moment, that seems to be forbidden territory politically. However, that could change. But it needs to be noted that there is a growth rate constraint. That means one-time tax increases can only provide temporary relief. Persistent increases in tax rates would be required to relieve the constraint on spending. I think it is unrealistic to assume that will be tolerated by the electorate.

So, to return to the refrain, governments will need to be effective and efficient. And to support effectiveness and efficiency they will need to be in constant evaluation mode so they get feedback between outcomes and inputs and adjust appropriately.

## **What the Future Holds for Civil Servants**

Senior civil servants involved in policy have largely, but certainly not exclusively, come to Government from university programs in economics and policy studies. Few have come from business schools. Even

fewer have made the transition later in their careers from business to Government. This poses a problem in the paradigm I have described on how Governments will need to operate in future. And in many respects, the situation is getting worse. As Gregor Smith, a professor of economics at Queen's, put it, over recent decades "economics has moved away from policy and policy has moved away from economics." I hate to tamper with what is a very astute and pithy assessment of the situation, but I don't think Gregor just meant that policy schools (and he was referring to the domain in general as opposed to just at Queen's) has separated from economics. I think he meant that more generally, policy schools have not fully embraced an analytical framework, whether that be borrowed from the economics discipline or elsewhere.

In future, I believe Governments will draw more civil servants directly from business schools because they will have the mindset and skills required for the new paradigm of Government operations. In that case, economics and policy studies will have to modify their recruitment and curriculum to fit the times. I will return to this after addressing what life might be like for a civil servant in the new paradigm.

### **How Will the New Breed Apply their Big, Multi-dimensional Brains?**

The future civil servant will be much more like the businessperson of today. They will be skilled managers of people, able to lead their teams and manage labour contracts. They will address outcomes and inputs, and hence efficiency, and support all of this through rigorous evaluation. They will be much less likely to preside directly over Government delivery of services, or even of policy development. More likely they will create, and then manage, contracts with the private sector for these services. As such they will be masters of contract law and operation. They will have advanced analytical skills to conduct proper evaluations and will be masters of finance in order to oversee operations such as public private partnerships. They will be experts in regulation because they will be much more likely to work in that domain than on a pure spending or tax program.

The brainy civil servant of the future will look at program evaluation from a completely different perspective. I will address this in turn for programs dealing with business and then individuals.

The future civil servant will be able to prove that almost all business subsidies, whether they be through spending or a tax preference, have a negative benefit-cost ratio. Eventually politicians will get it and kill subsidies. The only programs that will survive will be those that address a clear market failure. And this will more likely be done through the provision of information or regulation than through spending or tax. First, it will be recognized that in full employment, the first order impact of a subsidy is simply to transfer money from one person's pocket, the taxpayer, to another's, the recipient of the subsidy. No output or income is generated in the process. But, much has been destroyed. First, there is the deadweight loss from the program's administrative cost. Second, there is the economic distortion caused by the taxation to pay for the subsidy. In a recent article in *Canadian Public Policy*, John Lester, a friend and former colleague from the Department of Finance, did a survey of the literature on this impact and found the deadweight economic loss through this distortion to be 26 cents for every tax dollar raised. Few programs would generate a positive benefit-cost ratio dealing with that cost alone. But third, there is the economic distortion caused by artificially shifting the economy's resources to the area being subsidized. From this holistic approach to evaluation, the future civil servant will have an appropriate answer to the lame political defence that a subsidy created some jobs. They will simply say, "yes, some jobs were created in the sector being subsidized but many more were destroyed elsewhere. If there is a market failure we'll tackle that directly—and if not, we'll scrap the whole thing."

Programs affecting individuals are evaluated through the perspective of the program rather than the individual. And the impacts of the program are measured in the here and now whereas there are often long lags between a program change and the full impact on the individual. For example, a homeless person with a mental health issue will show up in evaluations of shelters, food banks, affordable housing, welfare, policing, criminal justice, emergency departments and maybe, just maybe, but not likely, a mental health facility. Seven or eight observations will be generated on this individual with nobody recognizing it is one person. And nobody taking any action that will address the person's problem. Instead, they get picked up by the police, put in a corrections facility without treatment and then get taken right back to the corner they came from. Jeffrey Turnbull, Chief of Staff of the Ottawa General Hospital, is involved in a health clinic in lowertown Ottawa. One day he set out to calculate the public cost of the 15-20 "regulars" at the clinic. He only counted housing, social welfare, police and criminal justice costs. No recognition was given to any possible external costs on society such as if the person committed a crime. He came up with a cost of \$170,000 to \$220,000 per year. He observed that he could put each person up in the Westin Hotel's penthouse suite for that kind of money. Of course that wouldn't in itself address their mental health issue. But then that isn't likely being addressed under current policy approaches either.

In Ontario 1 per cent of the population—just 130,000 people—account for 49 per cent of all hospital spending, and 34 per cent of the total provincial health care bill. They are categorized by their principal morbidity, which isn't very useful because they typically have multiple morbidities. Nothing is known about their socio-economic characteristics. They interact with the health care "system," not as an individual, but as their various morbidities flare up. Nobody is co-ordinating their overall care—at least not until very recently. This was a major recommendation made in the Ontario Commission. I am convinced the bill for looking after these people could be slashed 10-20 per cent while simultaneously improving their quality of life. But that would require managing to the individual, not the program.

The really smart future civil servant will also look at time differently. They will figure out a way to measure the longer-run impact of Government actions on individuals and hence be able to establish more appropriate benefit-cost ratios. Of course the toughest brain teaser in this will be to convince politicians to look beyond their normal 3-5 year horizon, conveniently tied to the election cycle. The strength of their analysis will be a part of this sales pitch. I wish I could set out all the other elements they will employ but my brain isn't big enough.

This longer-run time perspective will, of course, require data—such as longitudinal surveys—and civil servants who are highly skilled in analysis. We have some longitudinal survey and they have been put to use on some policy issues such as the economic and social fates of immigrants. But these very surveys are now at threat through budget cutbacks at Statistics Canada. And of course it is more than just a budget-cutting issue. The very fact they are at threat says a lot about the current lack of interest in analysis. But watch: that will change some day. Hopefully the tools and the ability to use them won't all be lost by then.

Changing the time dimension will change almost everything in the approach to policy. The quick wins that are so often the focus of policy now won't look so attractive. The really big economic and social gains that might take years to produce will look like the winners. For example, the greatest benefit-cost ratio might be supports to ensure healthy birth weights for babies. To tackle the associated problems of alcohol fetal syndrome et cetera. Early childhood interventions would become more predominant.



Under a more sensible perspective on time, policies would be more clearly demarcated between temporary support for larger numbers of people and deeper, more durable support for the few. I will use affordable housing as an example. About 13 per cent of Canadian households are in “core housing need,” typically meaning they must spend more than 30 per cent of their income on housing. But only 4 per cent stay in core housing need over a three-year period. For most the need is a result of a temporary setback. This is typically associated with the loss of a job. Or a divorce where there is either a lag in receiving child support payments or those payments are not enforced. The people with the temporary problem need temporary solutions. That would be a satisfactory employment insurance system complemented, for those who need it, by access to welfare. We don’t have either at this time. It would require stricter enforcement of alimony and child support payments. Then the focus would turn to those in longer-run need. And it would be quickly discovered that housing wasn’t their only issue. All of the issues would be addressed, around the individual or family, rather than waiting for them to show up through the program lens. The core problem might be a mental health issue or illiteracy. And the really smart civil servant of tomorrow would trace the root causes of the person’s or families’ problem back through time and note and act upon the factors that led to it so the history isn’t repeated through other people.

### **What Can Queen’s University Do to Produce the New Breed of Civil Servant?**

Queen’s University has played a very important role in producing the top civil servants in Canada. A number of facets went into this. The excellent reputation of the university drew the top students. Many of the departments, certainly including the Department of Economics and the Department of Political Studies, were actively engaged in public policy research and had close and deep contacts with Governments. And they offered advanced courses in the area. I reaped the benefits as a student in the late 1970s. It was an exciting time for a policy wonk to be at this campus.

All this has waned in recent decades. As noted above, Economics at Queen’s has moved away from a policy to a degree. Political Studies has certainly moved away from Canadian policy. To a degree the School of Policy Studies has filled the gap. But typically without the emphasis on analytical rigour. And the School has confined its relationships mostly to Social Sciences rather than to Law and Business. So holes have been left and there is a consensus that the University no longer holds the dominating position it once had in the public policy space.

The first piece of good news is that no other university has taken Queen’s former position of dominance in public policy. While there are more than a dozen policy schools across Canada, most offer the same sort of approach and curriculum. And most of the economics departments across the land have similarly moved away from policy, at least Canadian policy. It will be interesting to see if the newest school, at Calgary, breaks new ground.

The second piece of good news is that Queen’s still has the required ingredients. It has retained its overall reputation of excellence as a drawing card for the best and brightest to work and study here. The ingredients missing from the programs producing potential civil servants are available across the campus. All that is required is to connect the dots.

Interestingly, some of the missing ingredients for the Master of Public Administration program are available from the Masters of Industrial Relations side of the same School. The Economics Department has recently received some good news that should help it better reconnect with policy. It has received

funding for the Stephen Smith Chair in Policy. The Jarislowsky Chair in Policy is reverting back to the Department and can be filled. And it has received multi-year funding to offer a new Diploma in Financial Risk. This is all very exciting.

The Faculty of Law at Queen's and the Queen's Business School are excellent and offer many of the approaches and courses that will be needed for future civil servants. No doubt Governments will do more hiring in future directly from these Faculties. As well, the School of Policy Studies can "rent" professors and courses from them, and in return teach policy to students in those faculties.

A broadened curriculum in the School of Policy Studies would see the students getting more exposure to management, accounting, contracts, regulation, evaluation and other tools needed to run the public sector in a more effective and efficient way. And in particular, it will need to up its game in analytical methods. This is without a doubt the most difficult thing to teach in the School at present. I cannot think of any other course or class in a university that faces a more heterogeneous group of students. Some might have taken many undergraduate courses in statistics and research methodologies. Others might have taken nothing. Worse, they've self-selected to take nothing, indicating some sort of aversion to the field. The School narrows the dispersion slightly by exempting some of the students with better backgrounds. But this is not usually appropriate because they too will need to up their game to be prepared for the civil service of tomorrow. The dispersion will need to be further narrowed by either upping the entrance requirements for backgrounds in quantitative methods or requiring the students with weaker backgrounds to do some remedial action before the first semester starts. Then the program will need to offer more courses throughout the duration of the students' program. Some theory will be required but mostly the courses would deal relentlessly with policy applications.

Of course requiring students to study more things has a time and money dimension. It seems inconceivable the civil servant of tomorrow can be adequately prepared with a one-year program. It will likely have to go to two. And the courses cannot be satisfactorily offered at current tuition rates. One possibility, which hits at several dimensions of this, is for the School of Policy Studies to join Business and Law in a Professional School. Whatever format is chosen, one would want to take care that the links to the Departments of Economics and Political Studies are not lost but rather strengthened.

Action needs to start now if Queen's is to be at the forefront of building the new breed of civil servant.

And what if I am wrong about the future paradigm? What if there isn't this pull to Governments that focus relentlessly on effectiveness, efficiency and evaluation?

Well, then Queen's will be supplying the graduates that will provide the push. They'll have the hearts, the strong yet flexible spines and the big, multi-dimensional brains that can return us to at least one aspect of the past—that being Queen's dominant position in Canada's public policy sphere.

It all comes down to a race against time.

Can Queen's do the hard work and put in place a country-leading, if not world-leading, public policy competency before Richard Chaykowski figures out how to produce the new breed of civil servant through genetic re-coding? My bet is on Queen's. Sorry Rick. But don't feel bad. Your contribution is badly needed on the former quest.

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## **Don Drummond**

Don Drummond is the Matthews Fellow in Global Public Policy and Adjunct Professor at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. In 2011-12, he served as Chair for the Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services. Its final report, released in February 2012, contained nearly four hundred recommendations to provide Ontarians with excellent and affordable public services.

Mr. Drummond previously held a series of progressively more senior positions in the areas of economic analysis and forecasting, fiscal policy and tax policy during almost 23 years with Finance Canada. His last three positions were respectively Assistant Deputy Minister of Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis, Assistant Deputy Minister of Tax Policy & Legislation and most recently, Associate Deputy Minister. In the latter position he was responsible for economic analysis, fiscal policy, tax policy, social policy and federal-provincial relations and coordinated the planning of the annual federal budgets.

He subsequently was Senior Vice President and Chief Economist for the TD Bank (2000-2010), where he took the lead with TD Economics' work in analyzing and forecasting economic performance in Canada and abroad. For Canada, this work was conducted at the city, provincial, industrial and national levels. TD Economics also analyzes the key policies which influence economic performance, including monetary and fiscal policies. He is a graduate of the University of Victoria and holds an M.A. (Economics) from Queen's University.

## **Donald Matthews Lecture in Global Public Policy**

The Donald Matthews Lecture Series is supported by the Matthews Faculty Fellowships in Global Public Policy. Established by Donald Matthews (B.Sc. 1950) in 2006, this endowment supports the appointment of world-class, leading-edge scholars and practitioners to teach, lead research and share their experience with students and faculty at Queen's University. It continues and honours the life-time commitment of Donald Matthews, a Canadian business leader, to public service.

Donald Matthews served with distinction in the Canadian Air Force during the Second World War, subsequently returning to Queen's University to study engineering. Following graduation, Matthews founded his own construction firm which was remarkably successful. Named in 1989 as Canada's seventh largest construction company, it was active in planning, aggregate quarrying and sales, house-building and heavy construction. He also headed a consortium in the 1990s involved in the design, development and construction of airports around the world.

Throughout his life, Matthews combined private pursuits with public purpose. As a university student, he was elected by student veterans across Canada to help design special programmes to assist Canadian veterans to finish post-secondary studies. As a young professional, he was involved in local politics in the City of London. As a successful business leader, he was a close advisor to Ontario premiers, John Robarts and William Davis, and several national leaders. In 1974, he was President of the Council for Canadian Unity. In the 1990s, he served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Canada.