The Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series presents

Lorne Maclachlan
Queen's University

Is There a Place for Consciousness?

Thursday, November 28, 2019

4:00 pm

Watson Hall, Room 517

The integration of consciousness in the natural world is the last frontier facing the attempt to provide a unified account of what is real.  The simplest solution would be to identify consciousness with something that already has a place in the natural world, but this has not proved possible.  Nor can consciousness be safely eliminated, since there is an important and extensive segment of the natural language devoted to its description. Daniel Dennett argues against the influential theory that although experiential concepts cannot be replaced with concepts from physical discourse, the reality denoted is identical.  I agree with this, but not his idea that discourse about consciousness does not state facts.   Instead, I offer a hybrid of empiricism and transcendental idealism, holding that immediate experience offers a thing in itself, whereas the world not directly perceived is an object of representation, explaining why consciousness can have no place in the world as we know it.

EVERYONE WELCOME 

Accessibility requirements? sheena.wilkinson@queensu.ca