At first glance, as adversaries like Russia continue developing emerging technologies like hypersonic weapons, it appears necessary for Canada to obtain missile defences to bolster North American security. Such action would guarantee Ottawa’s agency in ensuring its own defence, rather than relying on the United States’ ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, and contribute to a more credible “deterrence by denial” posture that prevents an adversary from achieving their objective, while maintaining traditional “deterrence by punishment” approaches by promising retaliation. Thus, in the face of great power competition, many arguments have been made in favour of Canada playing an active role in North American defence by making substantial contributions to President Donald Trump’s Golden Dome initiative.
This shift towards deterrence by denial is supported by Canadian academics, think tanks, and policy circles, but it neglects three simple realities. First, nuclear deterrence should not be conflated with conventional deterrence, since the latter faces the challenge of uncertain military outcomes, rather than mutual destruction. Second, hypersonic weapons do not pose a new threat to North America because there remain persistent technological challenges. Third, this perspective does not account for how Russia’s war in Ukraine negatively impacts Moscow’s conventionally-armed hypersonic missile stockpile, which raises serious doubts regarding the Kremlin’s ability to pose a revolutionary threat to Canada or the United States.