Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP)

time to read: 19 min

^{Covering forty percent of Canada’s landmass, the Arctic represents both the heart of Canada’s sovereignty and the frontier of its greatest vulnerability. Once shielded by geography, the region is now exposed by climate change, emerging shipping routes, and intensified geopolitical competition. Yet, despite growing threats, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) remain ill-equipped, underfunded, and strategically fragmented across the North. This policy brief argues that Canada must urgently re-establish a credible Arctic deterrent through a twelve-year, multi-phase reinvestment in military infrastructure, technology, and personnel. Funded through reallocation of existing federal expenditures and modest NORDREG user fees, this policy would rebuild Arctic readiness, enhance surveillance and response capabilities, and affirm Canadian Arctic sovereignty. While recognizing fiscal, political, and technological risks, the paper contends that proactive reinvestment is essential to ensure Canada’s ability to assert influence, defend national priorities, deter conflict, and maintain stability in a rapidly transforming Arctic.}

Covering nearly 4 million square kilometers, Canada’s Arctic makes up about 40% of the country’s land and 24% of the Arctic Circle, making it the second-largest Arctic nation after Russia. Although, the Arctic’s extreme environment has been an effective deterrent against threats to Canada’s sovereignty and security, the region is now being reshaped by climate change. Previously inaccessible resources and shipping routes, like the Northwest Passage (NWP) which cuts through the heart of Canada, are opening up. Furthermore, given that close to 13 percent of worldwide untapped oil reserves and 30 percent of unexplored worldwide natural gas are found in the Arctic, Arctic and non-Arctic nations alike have begun to build up their military and civilian capabilities to ensure that they can maximize their gains once the Arctic becomes fully accessible.[i]

Russia is rapidly rebuilding its Arctic defense and security capabilities while seeking to expand its claims over underwater territory, some of which overlaps with Canada’s own claims. At the same time, China has been working hard to lay the foundation for its “Polar Silk Road” and ensure that it can maximize the Arctic’s economic opportunities, going so far as conducting hydrographic charting of the Northwest Passage before Canada. Even the U.S., Canada’s closest ally and trading partner, disputes Canada’s jurisdiction over the NWP, and has proposed annexing Canada. Thus, critical concerns are being raised about Canada’s ability to safeguard its national interests and maintain territorial and maritime security.[ii] However, not only has Canada been hampered by low Arctic population density, vast uninhabited areas, small remote settlements, and significant logistical hurdles for both civilian and military operations, but to complicate matters (among other factors), Canada lacks a unified Arctic security strategy across all branches of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which itself has been characterized by inadequate staffing as well as very limited Arctic military infrastructure and equipment (much of which is also deteriorating).[iii]

As such, I would argue that based on a thorough analysis of the Canadian Armed Forces vis-à-vis the Arctic both historically and at present, Canada must urgently take steps to strengthen its territorial and maritime sovereignty and security in the Arctic. I would further posit that Canada can achieve this goal by immediately funding and re-building the CAF in the Arctic to a combat-ready state over the next 12 years so that Canada can demonstrate strategic capability, safeguard national priorities, deter hostilities, and maintain stability in the Arctic.

Without doubt, if Canada intends to decisively assert its Arctic sovereignty and security, it must step outside of its comfort zone and adopt proactive and substantive measures that have not previously been necessary in its history. Canada’s success or failure in resolving this complex and emerging policy challenge will either solidify Canada’s stature as a preeminent Arctic power or serve as an open invitation for foreign powers to dictate the entire nation’s future.

The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic

Although Canada has always considered the Canadian Arctic to be an integral part of its sovereign territory, it has also been understood to be at the periphery of Canada, with “governmental presence and effective control being minimal…attract[ing] national coverage on a punctual basis, mainly when sovereignty was challenged or perceived as such.”[iv] Given the effectiveness of the Canadian Arctic’s harsh conditions as a deterrent against security threats, for most of its history, Canada’s securitization of the Arctic has been sporadic at best.[v]

Beginning with “military forces [that] have been involved periodically in the North since the days of the Klondike Gold Rush in 1898,” the Canadian Army (CA) began formally operating in the north (although still below the Arctic Circle itself) at around the same time. The Yukon Field Force was sent to Fort Selkirk and Dawson City as a quasi-police auxiliary, but it was not until after World War II that the CA began deploying more soldiers to northern Canada. Notably operating in the Canadian Arctic (along with other parts of Canada) are the Canadian Rangers.[vi] Formed in 1947 as part of the CA, the Canadian Rangers consists of approximately 24 percent Indigenous members, which allows it to leverage the Indigenous knowledge and experience of its members, especially in Canada’s Arctic.[vii] Their responsibilities include patrolling, data collection for the CAF, assisting with search and rescue, as well as aiding with emergency response.[viii]

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) began operating in northern Canada in 1927 when the Canadian government assigned six aircraft to carry out reconnaissance in the Hudson Bay Strait. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was the last branch to begin serving in the Arctic, and not until 1948. As RCN vessels of that time were not designed for ice conditions, they merely conducted summer patrols, primarily as a symbolic gesture of sovereignty.[ix] The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), which was formed in 1962 and not a branch of the CAF, also operates in the Arctic and holds responsibility for maritime search and rescue, marine pollution response, icebreaking, as well as maritime communications and traffic.[x]

The Cold War was an important milestone for the development of Canada’s Arctic security, during which Canada and the U.S.’s Arctic security become interlinked due to the on-going threat of the USSR.[xi] Indeed, the Arctic served as a strategic refuge for Soviet nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, as the Arctic’s ice and cold water made them difficult to detect.[xii] Launching missiles from the Arctic towards North America was a strategic advantage for the USSR as it enabled shortened flight times, thereby effectively reducing a given target’s early warning time.[xiii] As such, with the USSR immediately adjacent to the U.S. via Alaska, this (new) threat demanded a united front between Canada and the U.S. to secure North America from any potential bomber attacks and ensure nuclear deterrence. In response, the U.S. sought access to Canada’s Arctic for the construction of airfields and weather stations (the latter through the Joint Arctic Weather Stations program) during the mid-20th century.[xiv] This led to the installation of a series of radars throughout Canada’s Arctic that became the Distant Early Warning System (superseded later on by the North Warning System in the 1980s), as well as the formation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).[xv]

Following the Cold War, Canada’s stance on Arctic affairs began to move away from North American security towards Arctic collaboration as well as a broader understanding of security that included human and environmental factors.[xvi] As a result, in the years since, although Canada has published several Arctic policies committing itself to investing in and strengthening its Arctic sovereignty and security; has led annual joint military exercises (such as Operation NANOOK) in the Canadian Arctic with NATO allies; and has increased Canadian Arctic air patrols, in many respects, Canada’s Arctic security projection has regressed, as detailed below.

At present, a key component of Canada’s Arctic defense posture has been its Joint Task Force North (JTFN), which is tasked with northern operations. It operates above the 60th parallel and is headquartered in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, with an assigned contingent of roughly 349 personnel while also maintaining detachments in Iqaluit, Nunavut, and Whitehorse, Yukon. The following units are also based in Yellowknife alongside JTFN but are under the command of different branches of the CAF: 440 Transport Squadron (consisting of four CC-138 Twin Otters); the C Company (The Yellowknife Company) of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (with an undisclosed force strength, but likely not more than 100 based on other reserve unit sizes); and the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (consisting of approximately 1,750 members).[xvii]

However, there are no permanent CAF bases in the Canadian Arctic. As such, JTFN uses forward operating locations (FOLs) in Inuvik, Iqaluit, and Yellowknife to enable fighter jets from bases in other parts of Canada such as Bagotville, Quebec, and Cold Lake, Alberta, to land, refuel, and take off in support of Canadian Arctic missions. JTFN also maintains facilities throughout Nunavut in Alert, Resolute Bay, Fort Eureka, and Nanisivik. Northern operations are further supported by RCAF units across the country, which assist with resupplying CAF installations in the Arctic and providing crucial support for search and rescue operations in the region.[xviii]

For maritime security, the RCN operates four diesel-electric Victoria-class submarines, which are only capable of operating in limited Arctic conditions (unlike nuclear-powered submarines). As these are the only four submarines in Canada’s naval fleet, these submarines are not exclusively deployed to the Arctic but are set to be retired around 2035. As such, Canada has initiated the procurement process for up to 12 replacement submarines, the first of which will be put into service in the mid-2030s to replace the Victoria-class vessels.[xix]

Canada’s most notable asset for Arctic operations has been the RCN’s purchase of eight Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS); the first AOPS was put into service in 2020. Built to sustain operations in the Arctic by enhancing the operations of the RCN and the CCG, the AOPS are unlike anything previously designed for the RCN and are perhaps synonymous with Canada’s evolving Arctic policies and associated role of its military in the Arctic. Nicknamed “Frankenboats,” the AOPS “fit awkwardly into traditional warfighting, provision, patrol, or icebreaking roles, with the result being criticism of their speed, range, and armament – culminating in widespread disagreement over their purpose and utility.” [xx] Although they “began as a concept in search of a mission,” the AOPS were eventually designed to address projected rather than well-defined threats, the latter of which have continued to evolve since the AOPS were ordered in 2007.[xxi] Canada also operates the second largest icebreaking fleet in the world (after Russia), with a total of 18 icebreakers of different sizes and capabilities and is in the process of building 6 more.[xxii]

Aside from deficiencies in the aforementioned areas, the CAF also struggles with sensing and surveillance technology and equipment in the Canadian Arctic. Given the remote nature of the Arctic, domain awareness along with the ability to identify and respond to threats are vital mechanisms to ensure Canada’s sovereignty and security.  At present, there are only “46 active North Warning System radar sites across all of Canada’s North” whose abilities are further impacted as a result of the earth’s curvature when measured across the entire Arctic. As such, to remedy this limited domain awareness, the CAF regularly collaborates with allies and partners at both strategic and tactic levels.[xxiii] That being said, in 2022, Canada committed C$38.6 billion over two decades to help modernize NORAD, aiming to enhance North America’s aerospace defense capabilities. A key part of this effort involves deploying advanced surveillance technologies, such as over-the-horizon radars, designed to improve early detection of potential threats, such as (but not limited to) hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles from Russia. However, this modernization does not include the ability to defend against ballistic or hypersonic missiles; NORAD will only be able to defend against cruise missiles.[xxiv]

The CAF’s current broader recruitment and retention challenges are further exacerbated by the increased cost of living, lengthy wait times for benefits, and regional isolation of the Canadian Arctic. These are made all the more challenging by the fact that JTFN does not have an associated force generator responsible for building and maintaining its capabilities by training personnel, developing doctrine, and ensuring equipment readiness. Instead, JTFN must rely on CAF staff allocated provisionally from other units to assist its Arctic operations.[xxv]

The CAF’s challenges also extend to its annual Arctic security exercises. As part of the CAF’s attempts to project security into the Canadian Arctic, it engages in annual exercises such as Operation NANOOK in partnership with allies but these exercises “do not accurately reflect the [CAF]’s unplanned operational manoeuvrability requirements in the Arctic.” In fact, the largest part of Operation NANOOK takes place in late summer, during which the actual difficulties of operating in the Canadian Arctic’s winter, such as the ability for equipment to endure severe cold, are avoided. Moreover, due to a lack of resources, Operation NANOOK must rely on the use of leased air transport and equipment, with over 50 percent of the operations’ budget being spent this. As well, as a further embarrassment, “despite several years of conducting northern activities such as Op NANOOK and Arctic experimentation, every deployment to the next Op NANOOK seems to start from a zero-base knowledge of the Arctic.”[xxvi]

In addition, the CAF suffers from inadequate and diminishing physical infrastructure, the "exact status [of which] is unknown," as well as the inability to build and protect its own infrastructure to shelter personnel in the Arctic, all of which has further hindered the CAF’s ability to operate in the Canadian Arctic. Out of 102 Arctic airfields, fewer than approximately half can be used by the CC-130 Hercules and only about 13 percent can be used by the CC-177 Globemaster due to short runways, along with gravel runways that only accommodate specific aircraft. Moreover, not only are they located far apart from each other, but CAF infrastructure is only able to “provide limited support for large or sustained deployments.” In fact, the CAF’s Facility Condition Index has indicated that without intervention, the state of its Arctic assets will soon reach the “rust out” stage. For example, 81 percent of assets are at least 30 years old, while 38 percent of buildings are at least 50 years old.[xxvii]

Finally, the CAF’s function in the Arctic remains ambiguous, which has fundamentally limited Canada’s ability to project sovereignty and security into its Arctic. A 2024 evaluation of Canadian Arctic operations demonstrated that there are no clear guidelines as to how the CAF may best respond to emerging threats in the Arctic, such as (but not limited to) ecological consequences resulting from stranded ships, intercontinental missiles passing through Canada’s Arctic, or the failure of critical military infrastructure due to climate change. Furthermore, not only is there “no federal organization…solely responsible for the surveillance of Canada’s Arctic waters,” but the lack of a clear and shared vision for the future of Canada’s Arctic by the federal government has negatively impacted the “identification and mitigation of current and future threats.” [xxviii] Indeed, the RCN and the CA have established mutually exclusive Arctic strategies, while the RCAF does not even have one as of yet. This misalignment of strategic planning has meant that the CAF as a whole has not been able to effectively prioritize the necessary investments to safeguard Canada’s Arctic security and sovereignty, as demonstrated by the significant (and persistent) gaps in its security architecture detailed above.[xxix] As such, it is clear that the CAF continues to face significant challenges in projecting sovereignty and security in the Arctic. In response, Canada must take urgent steps to ensure a more coordinated and robust approach if it wishes to safeguard its north.

Renewing Canada’s Northern Deterrent Capacity

Although Canada has its own military, the mere presence of the neighbouring U.S. military has served as an effective deterrent to potential security threats such that Canada has not had to maintain the CAF to the same degree of readiness as the U.S. Indeed, as demonstrated by the gaps in infrastructure, equipment, funding, and recruitment, there is much room for improvement by the CAF, especially in the Arctic. Moreover, given the desire of the U.S. for Canada and European countries to defend themselves rather than rely on the U.S., as well as the lengthy lead times for the delivery of major military assets such as submarines and icebreakers, Canada must begin preparing immediately for a potential future when it can no longer rely on its southern neighbour for security, especially in the Arctic.[xxx] As such, Canada must immediately invest in re-building the CAF’s assets to a combat-ready state so that Canada can “project power, protect national interests, prevent conflict, and preserve order” in the Arctic.[xxxi] Canada will fund this option through the reappropriation of funds from other federal government departments as well as by implementing a graduated submission fee for mandatory NORDREG filings. Indeed, preparing for war is the best way to prevent it.

As this will be an undertaking of historic proportions that will require significant funds, it will be funded through several primary funding streams. During the 2024-2025 fiscal year, Canada allocated approximately C$30.58 billion to its military (compared with approximately C$1.2 trillion for the U.S. over a similar period of time, given that both states have different fiscal years.)[xxxii] As such, it is proposed that an overall approximate additional C$6 billion or 20 percent be added annually to the military’s federal budget allocation, with this increase to be specifically designated for Arctic military spending. This increase would be funded through budget cuts to other parts of the federal budget, such as (but not limited to) the federal public service (which has grown by approximately 40 percent since 2015) and foreign aid.[xxxiii] Specifically, Canada spent approximately C$11 billion in foreign aid in 2023-2024 (2024-2025 figures are not yet available), so it is proposed that this budget item be reduced through a re-assessment of foreign aid priorities and recipients.[xxxiv]

As ships transiting through the NWP are required by Canadian law to submit NORDREG documentation, additional funding would also be generated through the implementation of a mandatory fee for the submission of NORDREG documentation and reports. This fee would not only cover the cost of mandatory icebreaker escorts and navigational support but also allow for a modest 5 percent margin to support the execution of this policy proposal. These fees would also be variable depending on the size and class of the transiting vessel, as multiple icebreakers or additional environmental mitigation measures may also be necessary. Furthermore, fee parity with Russia’s fees for transiting the NSR would be established to help create cost certainty for Arctic shipping routes, while discounted rates will be offered to ships from states that recognize Canadian sovereignty over the NWP. Indeed, as the Arctic ice begins to melt and NWP traffic increases, these fees would provide a steady (and increasing) revenue stream to further fund the renewal of the CAF in the Canadian Arctic.

This policy proposal would be initially implemented in four consecutive, three-year phases as per the table below, during which Arctic security infrastructure would be acquired and/or renewed. Each year of each phase is budgeted with the additional C$6 billion identified above, bearing in mind that specific asset requirements and configurations will impact the final cost of each asset. After these four phases (covering a span of 12 years), the annual allocation of C$6 billion will be used for ongoing renewal and modernization of Arctic security assets and infrastructure, based on evolving operational requirements and strategic assessments.

Analytical Assessment of Policy Effectiveness

As Canada lacks credible and substantial security assets and infrastructure in the Arctic, this policy proposal will help Canada rapidly close this security gap before the Arctic is fully melted, by acquiring the necessary equipment to effectively “project power, protect national interests, prevent conflict, and preserve order in the Arctic.”[xxxvii] Furthermore, given current economic uncertainty and rising inflation in Canada, this will be achieved without increasing the federal budget, such that there will not be an increased tax burden on Canadians. Rather, by re-appropriating funds from other government departments, not only will Canada be able to secure its Arctic but also force these other departments to operate more efficiently by embracing innovative (and previously theoretical) service delivery models.

This policy proposal also leverages increased public support for a more assertive approach, especially given the current ambivalence towards Canada by the U.S. For example, a majority of respondents in a poll conducted in 2024 advocated for a more assertive stance on border conflicts, with 49 percent favouring an aggressive approach. Interestingly, only 32 percent thought a strategy centered on negotiation and compromise with other nations regarding Arctic boundaries was appropriate.[xxxviii] Moreover, likely due to Russia and China’s current overall geopolitical aggression towards the West, 55 percent of Canadians in 2024 believed that conflict is expected to shape the future of the Arctic, with 73 percent of respondents expressing concern that Canada may lose sovereignty over portions of its Arctic territory unless it establishes a more assertive presence in the region.[xxxix] This is contrasted with previous polls whereby Canadians favoured “reliance on international organizations, construction of international laws and norms, and the search for compromise and negotiations” as the optimal means to secure Canada’s Arctic.[xl] Indeed, this policy solution will enable Canada to ease its reliance on the U.S. for security and demonstrate that Canada is willing and able to defend itself, thus paving the way for a potential reset in Canada-U.S. relations.

In terms of specific security advantages, the proposed security assets will drastically increase the CAF’s ability to locally counter sovereignty and security challenges in the Arctic on short notice or for longer periods of time, without having to return to southern Canada for maintenance, refuelling, or staffing changes. Specifically, the additional AOPS and icebreakers will provide Canada with an effective all-encompassing means of deterrence. Furthermore, the development and deployment of drones will not only demonstrate Canada’s readiness to control vital Arctic territories as well as respond to incursions quickly and effectively, but it will establish red lines for foreign powers, such as Russia and China, seeking to test the extent of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. It will also foster the development of a new industry in Canada, serving as an economic engine that generates employment and promotes financial prosperity, which is particularly important given the potential diminished reliance on the U.S. as a trading partner. Indeed, Canada must be able to demonstrate its ability to respond, “at the speed of relevance.”[xli]

Finally, the collection of NORDREG submission fees provides Canada with a non-threatening means to actively demonstrate its sovereignty claims over the NWP, while generating funding for CAF operations in the Arctic. At the same time, this policy would ensure that Canada is not in contravention of UNCLOS, which prohibits charging any kind of payment as a condition for allowing passage through a strait. [xlii] Indeed, by framing these fees as being for the purposes of covering the costs of icebreaker escorts, navigational support, and any necessary environmental mitigation measures associated with transit, Canada can further assert control over critical Arctic waterways in a non-confrontational manner, thereby reinforcing its Arctic sovereignty and enhancing its regional influence.

While the proposed reinvestment offers clear strategic benefits, past studies have also shown that government messaging and media coverage appear to influence public opinion and policy preferences. External pressures such as Russia’s flag planting on the ocean floor at the North Pole, Canada’s UNCLOS territorial claims, and overall increased military focus on the Arctic by other Arctic states (including Canada), helped build broader support for a more assertive approach to resolving disputes at the time. However, as most of these contentious issues were resolved by 2010, support for a stronger military presence in the region subsequently diminished.[xliii] As such, while there is current public support for a more aggressive approach to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security, this support is expected to diminish over time.

To complicate matters, given the rapid rate of technological advancement and change, especially in a security sector that is always trying to outpace very real adversaries, as the nature of threats change, there is no guarantee that security assets acquired by Canada will remain effective. Asset obsolescence is a significant challenge that will continually be faced by Canada in its attempts to strengthen its Arctic sovereignty and security. Moreover, there is no guarantee that these assets will ever be deployed in a confrontational context, thereby raising questions about the value of such a substantial investment. Indeed, if Canada were involved in a kinetic conflict that also posed a threat to the U.S., it is likely that the U.S. would intervene in Canada’s defence thereby further calling into question the strategic rationale behind this investment.

That being said, when the broader geopolitical context is taken into consideration, “the re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence.”[xliv] It should also be noted though that the Arctic sovereignty and security challenges faced by Canada do not need to be solved immediately within the next 24 (or 48) hours. However, Canada’s federal budgets have not traditionally prioritized funding for the CAF. As a result, political bargaining may be required to pass a budget that does prioritize the CAF, especially if the government of the day does not hold a majority of seats in Parliament. Additionally, as Canadian procurement processes have historically been slow, even with the creation of the new Defence Investment Agency, it will take decades before all Arctic military and security assets and infrastructure are fully operational. However, by implementing this policy proposal now, it can be fully realized by the time the Arctic ice has fully melted and/or when security threats become imminent. If Canada were to wait until that time before taking any action, it will already be too late.

In conclusion, in order to strengthen its Arctic sovereignty and security, Canada must possess a “credible military deterrent [that] serves as a diplomatic tool which, in concert with dialogue, can help to prevent conflict.”[xlv] It can no longer assume that the harsh Arctic conditions will serve as an effective deterrent against foreign interests. Clearly, if it has not yet already, Canada will soon be entering the next phase of its history whereby it must secure and protect its territorial and maritime claims in the Arctic and make plain that it will not be denied agency within its own territory.

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