Abstract: This paper examines whether a liberal right to rebellion—understood as a legitimate resistance to unjust rule—can be found within Islamic political thought. It begins by outlining the importance of the right to rebellion in Liberalism, specifically John Locke’s social contract theory. Against this background, the paper investigates how rebellion against political and religious authority can be understood in Islamic political philosophy. Through an analysis of early Islamic rebellions, the paper argues that these events constitute acts of rebellion rather than the exercise of a right to rebellion grounded in a prior social contract. It then turns to Islamic political philosophy, focusing on al-Fa ra bī ’s hierarchical and paternalistic conception of rule, which leaves no room for popular sovereignty or legitimate revolt. The study further explores Shiʿi and Ismaili notions of Imamate, guilt, and moral authority, showing how transhistorical guilt and paternal obedience replace rights-based political agency. Finally, through a discussion of al-Ghaza lī ’s Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk, the paper demonstrates that even Sunni critiques of Shiʿi Imamate do not yield a theory of rebellion. Overall, the paper concludes that Islamic political thought accommodates rebellion but not a right to rebellion.