Abstract: This paper argues that liberal democracies remain normatively incomplete when equality is understood primarily in terms of legal status and group recognition. While rights-based and multicultural frameworks aim to secure inclusion in pluralistic societies, persistent inequalities in political participation reveal that formal recognition does not necessarily translate into equal standing within democratic life. Drawing on relational egalitarianism (Anderson 1999) and the ethics of vulnerability (Porro 2021), the paper develops a normative account of democratic justice focused on the quality of social relations rather than solely on legal entitlements or distributive outcomes. To explain how inequalities of standing persist despite formal inclusion, the paper introduces two analytically distinct but mutually reinforcing forms of vulnerability: institutional vulnerability and epistemic vulnerability. Institutional vulnerability refers to asymmetries embedded in bureaucratic procedures, educational systems, and political forums that systematically disadvantage certain participants. Epistemic vulnerability concerns patterns of credibility deficit and marginalization in communicative practices that undermine individuals’ authority as speakers and participants in public deliberation. Language policy serves as an illustrative case showing how formally inclusive regimes can nevertheless reproduce hierarchies of standing. By shifting the evaluative focus from status to relations, the paper proposes a vulnerability-sensitive framework for assessing democratic legitimacy in pluralistic societies and highlights the need for institutional reforms that address not only rights but also the relational conditions of political participation.