Josh Livingstone, one of our current PhDs, has recently published a new article in the journal Symposium titled "Defending Philosophy: Plato, Heidegger, and Meno's Paradox."
Abstract: Asserting that all inquiry is either superfluous or futile, Meno’s paradox threatens the very heart of philosophy. In response, philosophers have tended to refute the account of inquiry that the paradox presupposes, i.e., inquiry as a means of acquiring knowledge, and to promote an alternative view. While this strategy can be effective in refuting Meno, it can also take philosophy in some uncomfortable directions. This, I argue, is the case for both Plato and Heidegger, whose accounts of the nature of inquiry lead either into conditions of excessive constraint or excessive openness.
Josh Livingstone's "Defending Philosophy: Plato, Heidegger, and Meno's Paradox."