Christine Sypnowich has published an article in The New Statesman on the importance of local input on siting decisions. Issues at the local level – such as where to locate a wind turbine or solar panels – are often controversial. People who are generally in favour of certain progressive policies may not want them implemented in their own neighbourhood. Such people are pejoratively called “NIMBYs” (taken from “Not In My Backyard”).
Date
Thursday March 25, 2021Location
Queen's University, ZoomTitle: The Permissibility of Lesser Evil
Abstract:
Flood: Flood water is headed toward a cave where five innocent people are trapped and will be killed if the water reaches them. The water can be diverted into a mineshaft, but innocent Betty is trapped in the mineshaft and will be killed if the water is redirected. Albert is a bystander who has seen and understood the whole situation, and he stands next to a switch that can divert the flood. He can easily flip the switch.
When considering cases like this, some people believe that Albert is morally required to save the five at the cost of Betty’s life (the requirement thesis). Others believe that Albert is permitted but not required to save the five (the permissive thesis). I argue in favor of the permissive thesis and against the requirement thesis. I conclude by considering some further implications for the ethics of self-defense and war.
Date
Thursday February 25, 2021Location
Queen's University, ZoomTitle: Are Citizens Culpable for State Action?
Abstract: International law holds that states are holistically responsible for their acts. Yet what does the ascription of responsibility to the state imply about the responsibility of its citizens? This paper argues that most citizens in a representative democracy bear culpability in association with their state’s wrongful acts. Most democratic citizens can be blamed for empowering representatives to act on their behalf, and then failing to adequately oversee and dissent from the specific wrongful decisions their representatives made. Drawing on theories of representation, I argue that in certain cases, though A does not directly participate in B’s action, still the action is undertaken on A’s behalf and in A’s name, such that we can appropriately regard A as bearing some responsibility for it.
For further information, contact Meesha Paul (Meesha.Paul@queensu.ca).
Date
Thursday February 11, 2021Location
Queen's University, ZoomDepartment of Philosophy Presents: Mary Kriza, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse
Date: Thursday, February 11th, 2021
Time: 4:00 pm
Location: Zoom (link distributed via email)
Title: Aristotle’s elements and a problem for change.
Abstract: Aristotle’s theory of material elements, as described in On Generation and Corruption II.1-4, points toward a serious issue for his theory of matter and change: in support of his ontology of things, they must be able to change into one another, but such changes are not readily explicable by the mechanisms of substantial change set out in Physics I.7-9. In this talk, I set out the origins of the apparent inconsistency and show that three common attempts to avoid it are not successful. In turn, I introduce an alternative solution, arguing that in the case of simple bodies, the notions of subject and constituent come apart.
For further information, contact Meesha Paul (Meesha.Paul@queensu.ca).
Date
Thursday January 28, 2021Location
Queen's University, ZoomDepartment of Philosophy Presents: Sukaina Hirji, University of Pennsylvania
Date: Thursday, January 28th, 2021
Time: 4:00 pm
Location: Zoom
Title: Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy
Abstract: Recent defenses of the political value of anger have focused on what I call “reform anger”, anger that serves to hold an abuser to account and to demand repair or reform. Defenders of the political value of anger have either ignored or unfairly dismissed a second kind anger that I call “outrage anger”. I argue that the very features that seem to be bad about outrage anger — that it is not aimed at repair or reform, and that it is insensitive to nuance or discrimination — are also the features that make it politically and morally important in some cases. Outrage anger, I will suggest, is valuable in certain cases precisely because of how it blocks one’s ability to feel empathy with an abuser.
Sukaina Hirji, "Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy", Poster (PNG 295 KB)
Rahul Kumar has been awarded a SSHRC Insight Grant for his project, "What We Owe to Future Generations".
Research Associate
Philosophy
Arts and Science
Animals Politics, Animal Ethics, Political Theory, Feminist Philosophy
Sue Donaldson followed an unconventional path as teacher, writer and advocate before finding a home in political philosophy. Her research, situated in the ‘political turn’ in animal rights theory, explores the implications of recognizing animals as members of social, cultural, and political communities. What would it mean to live with other animals in relationships of mutual respect and flourishing instead of tyranny and exploitation? Sue’s work centres animals’ rights to collective self-determination, and to co-authorship of their relationships with humans through practices of citizenship, denizenship and treaty diplomacy. This work draws insights from citizenship theory, feminist and decolonial political theory, disability theory, children's rights theory, democratic theory, ethology, and ecological ethics; as well as practical "experiments in living" such as animal sanctuaries and intentional communities. Sue is the co-author (with Will Kymlicka) of Animals and the Right to Politics (Oxford UP 2025) and Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford UP 2011). She has published more than 40 academic articles, as well as contributing dozens of essays, columns and interviews on animal-related topics for popular media. Sue is co-convenor of the Animals in Philosophy, Politics, Law and Ethics research group at Queen’s. APPLE sponsors animal studies talks, workshops, reading groups, public outreach, and the ‘Animal Turn’ podcast.
Books
Selected Journal Articles
Selected Chapters in Books
Encyclopedia & Handbook Entries
Associate Professor
Philosophy
Arts and Science
Early Modern Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Creativity
About
My research spans three areas: (1) the history of early modern philosophy, (2) contemporary epistemology, and (3) the philosophy and cognitive science of creativity. Much of my work in the first two areas focuses on the phenomenon of clarity, or clear perception. This project develops along two parallel tracks.
(1) The first track is historical, as I analyze the role that clarity plays for Descartes and other figures stretching back to the Stoics. This project culminates in a book, Clarity First: Re-envisioning Descartes’s Epistemology (forthcoming 2026, Oxford). I argue that clarity is the central notion in Descartes’s epistemology—and indeed in his philosophy as a whole. On my reading, every epistemic notion Descartes posits is either defined or explained in terms of clarity. Thus I attempt to systematically reinterpret his epistemology by unpacking his views on clarity: what it is, what it does, and how we get it.
(2) The notion of "clear (and distinct) perception" has fallen out of favour in modern philosophy, but in new work I argue that we need to bring it back. I think the right conception of clarity illuminates a wide range of philosophical concerns, including cognitive phenomenology, perception and perceptual bias, reasons for belief (and reasons for doubt), introspection (and its limits), self-knowledge, intuition, inference, and even freedom.
(3) In my third area of research—creativity—I explore questions such as: What is creativity? Can it be explained? Does being creative involve a distinctive kind of agency, or even freedom? My current projects include a monograph called Creative Agency, to be co-authored with Dustin Stokes, under contract with Oxford.
Before joining the faculty at Queen's in 2018, I was a Bersoff Fellow at New York University and then an Assistant Professor at Barnard College of Columbia University.
Book
Edited Book
Selected Journal Articles
Selected Book Chapters
Reviews
Public Philosophy
Book in progress
Professor
Philosophy
Arts and Science
Early Modern Philosophy (esp. rationalism), Ancient Philosophy (esp. Stoicism)
Jon Miller is a specialist in early modern and ancient philosophy. His particular interest lies in the reception of ancient philosophy by early modern philosophers. He is best known for his work on Spinoza and the Stoics, though he has also published on other early modern thinkers such as Grotius and Descartes, and other ancients, including Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus and the Skeptics. Miller’s many publications include six books, numerous journal articles and book chapters, an array of encyclopedia entries, and more. Miller has been fortunate to have his research supported by various grants, including several from SSHRC, a Chancellor’s Research Award (Queen’s), and others.
Though Miller’s published works fall mostly in the history of philosophy, he maintains a wide range of philosophical interests. These are reflected in the courses that Miller regularly teaches or co-teaches, including first-year introduction to philosophy, second-year metaphysics and epistemology, third-year history of philosophy, African philosophy, and more. Miller enjoys teaching and he is often named for teaching awards.
Miller has held faculty positions at Queen’s, the University of Minnesota, and Uppsala University. He has taught numerous different courses through the years, though these days he tends to teach PHIL 111 plus an upper-level course in the history of philosophy and a seminar.
Date
Thursday January 14, 2021Location
Queen's University, ZoomTitle: Are Animals Moral?
Abstract: It might seem like the simplest sort of question; you define your terms, do some science, and there you have it. However, as we begin to reflect on the question, it becomes clear that the nature of morality is quite muddied. Morality is the subject of this investigation. I will rely on a familiar distinction between ethics and morality, such that ethics is the academic study of morality. When I ask whether animals are moral, I am using this distinction and asking whether some animal behavior should be included as the proper subject of ethics. We cannot answer that question by appealing to ethical theory. I aim to show that we can answer the question of animal morality affirmatively, in the following way: if we can agree that morality is found across human cultures, then we must conclude that some animals are moral. Appealing to work in anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, I will consider accounts that conceive of morality in terms of cooperative practices and in terms of responsibility practices. I will defend responsibility practices as a conception of morality, and briefly describe some responsibility practices that are seen in many nonhuman species. The conclusion challenges the dichotomous thinking that tries to neatly separate humans from other animals.
Zoom details will be distributed closer to the date. For more information, contact Meesha.Paul@queensu.ca
